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Abstract 
This study is an in-depth investigation into the Christian Democratic parties of Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands, focusing particularly on these parties during the 1990s. The 
primary intention is to give greater coverage to these oft-neglected parties through an account 
of political, electoral, programmatic and organisational developments. The research probes 
the position of the parties in the 1990s and analyses the extent to which the electoral decline 
of these parties after 1990 was the result of common factors as well as the role of nationally 
specific contextual variables. This is carried out through a consideration of the contraction of 
the social bases of Christian Democratic partisanship and detailed case-studies of the parties 
in the 1990s. The reactions of the parties to this decline are also analysed, looking specifically 
at strategic, programmatic and organisational changes. Historical background will also be 
provided by the opening chapters. Chapter two looks at Christian Democrats in the early post-
war period, highlighting the rapid rise of such parties and contrasting the lack of a unified 
Christian Democratic party in the Netherlands while chapter three investigates the reaction of 
the parties to the loss of national office and/or the emergence of electoral problems. In each 
case, programmatic and organisational adaptation occurred although as the chapter argues, by 
the end of the 1980s such efforts were very much marginal after the parties had re-established 
their position in government. Chapter four then examines the key social bases of Christian 
Democratic support and illustrates their long-term decline. It concludes that while such 
change need not necessarily result in electoral problems, there has been a decline of Christian 
Democratic partisanship in the electorate in the three countries. Chapters five, six and seven 
analyse the CDU, QVP and CDA in the 1990s. In each case, Christian Democrats found their 
position under greater threat than previously although the scale of their problems varied. 
Chapter eight scrutinises the development of Christian Democratic electoral programmes 
using the Comparative Manifestos Project dataset. Although it finds some evidence of 
divergence in the electoral platforms of the parties, there was also a clear increase in the 
prominence of traditionalist themes in recent years. The thesis argues that Christian 
Democrats were undermined in the 1990-9 period by unpopular leadership, an unfavourable 
issue context, intra-party problems and greater levels of party competition in addition to the 
erosion of socially rooted partisanship. Furthermore, although programmatic change was 
limited and the essential components of Christian Democratic identity remained in place, 
there were clear signs of ideological strain in each party with accompanying organisational 
problems. 
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Chapter 1. Christian Democratic Parties: origins, essence and party change 
I. Introduction 
Throughout the post-war period in Western Europe, Christian Democratic parties have 
played a role of unquestionable importance. In many countries, Christian Democrats 
quickly established a wide electoral base and became the leading party in government. 
The achievements of these new parties were not inconsiderable: nations devastated by 
war were rebuilt with American aid, pressing socio-economic problems were tackled 
(Schulz 1996) and the foundations for long-term peace in Europe were laid through 
economic co-operation in the ECSC and its successor organisations (Becker 1997: 118). 
Moreover, the ideology of Christian Democracy provided a means through which the 
right in Europe could overcome its traditional antipathy to democracy (Girvin 1994). By 
the late 1950s, Christian Democrats throughout mainland Europe had reached 
"remarkable heights of power" (Fogarty 1959:340) and seemed to have firmly 
consolidated their position as the pre-eminent West European political force. In West 
Germany, Italy, Austria and Belgium, Christian Democrats became the largest party and 
routinely claimed the chief executive pose. Though not strictly a Christian Democratic 
party on account of its closed Catholicism, the Catholic People's Party (KVP) in the 
Netherlands occupied a similarly pivotal position within the Dutch political system. 
Yet this golden age of Christian Democracy had already begun to unravel by the 
onset of the 1960s. The challenges faced were the result of both structural and contextual 
factors. Across all of Western Europe, long term social developments threatened the 
electoral foundation of Christian Democratic parties with the decline of key social 
groups. As a consequence, the electoral environment became less hospitable, a change 
also resulting from the increasingly centrist position of Socialist/Social Democratic 
parties. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), hamstrung by a troublesome leadership 
succession, faced greater competition from the post-Godesberg SPD in the FRG. In the 
Netherlands, the electoral challenge came not so much from the Labour Party (PvdA) 
but from the splintering of the party system whereas the dominance of the Belgian 
Christian People's Party (CVP) was seriously threatened by the linguistic division 
destabilising the entire political system. The brief period when the Austrian People's 
Party (OVP) held an absolute majority (1966-70) only temporarily masked the mounting 
I For the first twenty years of the FRG, the chancellorship was exclusively in the hands of the 
CDU. Similarly, after the provisional post-war government headed by the socialist Renner, the 
Austrian Chancellor was a Christian Democrat until 1970. In Belgium, the CVPIPSC supplied the 
prime minister from 1949 to 1954 and then 1958 until 1973. The stranglehold of the DC on the 
premiership was even more extreme with no non-Christian Democratic prime minister until 1981. 
problems of the party and proved to be an aberration before the start of the SPO-
dominated Kreisky years. Only the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) could be said to 
have emerged from the decade relatively unscathed and even there discontent with the 
performance of the party was pervasive (Donovan 1994:74). Furthermore, the economic 
context was slightly less favourable to government parties than previously as growth 
rates slowed, prefiguring the crisis years of the 1970s2• The political supremacy of 
Christian Democratic parties began to ebb away. For the CDU and the OVP, this 
brought them into the unfamiliar surroundings of opposition. Even where Christian 
Democrats were not cast out of office, their capacity to adapt was seriously strained with 
the most dramatic example being the eventual fusion of the Dutch confessional parties 
into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). 
Table 1.1 Average results for Christian Democratic parties by decade 
1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Germany 31.0 47.7 46.3 46.8 45.9 40.1 
Austria 46.9 43.8 46.9 43.2 42.3 28.8 
Italy 41.9 41.3 38.7 38.6 33.6 17.8 
Belgium 43.0 45.1 36.0 33.9 27.7 24.7 
Netherlands 52.5 49.3 46.9 33.3 32.6 20.3 
Note: Dutch results pre-1980 based on cumulative KVP, CHU and ARP results. Italian 
results post-1990 include DC, PPI and CCD/CDU. Belgian results post-1960s based on 
cumulative CVP and PSC scores. 
Gradually, Christian Democrats recovered much of their former strength, 
benefiting from the general swing to the right across the West. It would be mistaken, 
however, to equate the past two decades with the earlier period of Christian Democratic 
hegemony. The new environment these parties found themselves in was more 
competitive and far less certain as voter loyalty could no longer be taken for granted. 
Table 1.1 demonstrates that despite the CDU and OVP returning to office and the 
continued Christian Democratic presence in the Belgian and Italian governments, the 
average result for such parties dropped in the 1980s. This slight decay preceded the more 
substantial losses sustained in the following decade. It is striking that in each of the five 
countries the average Christian Democratic electoral result dropped. Christian 
Democratic parties, therefore, have not been insulated against the gusts of political 
change sweeping through Western Europe. While the sudden demise of the DC in 1993 
and the crumbling of the CDA vote in 1994 were the most extreme examples of change, 
2 This fall was marked in West Gennany, less so in Austria and the Netherlands. See OEeD 
2 
they were by no means unrepresentative of a general trend in support for the centre-right 
in the 1990s. Indeed, by the late 1990s, the centre-right appeared in retreat across much 
of Western Europe. The rejuvenation of the centre-left and a succession of novel 
coalition constellations3 forced many established centre-right parties of government into 
opposition. The correspondence between these national developments inevitably 
prompted debate about the future of the centre-right4• The oft-asked question "What's 
left of the left?" seemed to have found a matching conundrum in "What's right about the 
right?". 
II. Aims and Methodology 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate this decline of Christian Democratic parties, 
focusing solely on the CDUs, the OVP and the CDA. The three parties cover a wide 
range on a spectrum of Christian Democracy: the Dutch party has typically been viewed 
as more ideologically 'pure' than the pragmatic CDU with the Austrian party generally 
closer to its German counterpart although a wide breadth of opinion is a characteristic of 
all three (Hanley 1994:5). While support for each party dipped in the 1990s6, the scale 
and nature of the decline varied quite markedly. Both the CDA and the OVP endured a 
sudden and drastic drop in one election followed by further, less severe losses while the 
pattern of CDU/CSU support shows more gradual deterioration. As well as probing 
whether the tribulations of Christian Democratic parties in this period are bound to the 
specificities of national political contexts or whether there are indeed common factors, 
the thesis will also explore the reaction ofthe parties to it. Have, for example, the loss of 
votes and/or office provoked a shift in Christian Democratic ideology and policy? Both 
of these aims will pursued through a consideration of the erosion of core bases of 
Christian Democratic support, detailed case studies of party-related developments in the 
1990s and quantitative analysis of Christian Democrat electoral platforms using the 
Comparative Manifestos Project data. 
figures cited in Peters (1991:5) 
3 The first ever purple coalition (Social Democratic/ Conservative Liberal! Progressive Liberal) in 
the Netherlands in 1994 was almost exactly mirrored five years later in Belgium. In the 
meantime, the gauche plurie/le alliance had come to power in France in 1997 as had the first ever 
federal level Red-Green coalition in the FRG in 1998. In some cases, however, these 
experimental partnerships did not exclude Christian Democratic or centre-right parties e.g. the 
Irish Rainbow and Italian Olive Tree coalitions. 
4 See Freeland "The right is left bereft" The Guardian (22/08/2001); Nolte "Die Krise des 
Konseratismus" Die Zeit nr.31 (26/07/200 I); Katz (2002); Chandler (2002). 
5 Although it cannot be left out of the study entirely, the Christian Social Union (CSU) will not be 
examined here. However, when referring to electoral statistics, the Union parties will frequently 
be paired together as most quantitative research effectively treats the two parties as one. 
6 See Table 1.1 and appendix for complete election results. 
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Within the case studies of the parties in the 1990s, no uniform model has been 
applied to guide the research. Rather than impose a rigid system to these chapters, a 
more flexible approach focusing on political and electoral, programmatic and 
organisational developments has been employed with the end point being the last 
election of the 1990s in each country (1998 in Germany and the Netherlands, 1999 in 
Austria). Therefore, in view of the CDU's strong position in government and lack of 
leadership change, the focus is on government policy in the German chapter, while for 
the OVP (as junior coalition partner) and the CDA (in opposition post-1994) more 
attention has been given to events in internal party life. A number of elite interviews 
have been conducted primarily for background material. In addition, the opening 
chapters will give a brief historical overview of the parties from 1945-1969 and 1970-
89. This will provide valuable historical context which allows for the adoption of longer 
term perspective on the development of Christian Democratic electoral strength and 
party ideology. It is vital to acknowledge the exceptionalism of the Dutch parties: prior 
to 1980, no major Christian Democratic party existed. However, the inclusion of the 
confessionals is necessary to understand the development of the CDA and also sheds 
some light on the differences between the confessional parties and their Christian 
Democratic successors. Before this, however, this chapter will concentrate on the origins 
and essence of Christian Democracy and a consideration of parties and change. 
III. Structure of Chapter 1 
Section IV of this chapter will trace the roots of Christian Democracy from the middle of 
the 19th century. Since this point, Christian Democracy has been, in Lucardie's 
imaginative metaphor, the "lost daughter" who set out from the conservative home 
(1993:51) who "has developed differently" but whose "family resemblance" is stilI 
apparent. Like conservatism, the precursors of post-war Christian Democracy originated 
in reaction to the French revolution. However, the influence of social Catholicism 
divided the movement from its conservative contemporaries. Social Catholicism 
represents the fruit ofthe interaction between lay Catholic mobilisation and the efforts of 
the Papacy to direct this. However, it is also vital to acknowledge the importance of the 
"little" or unofficial tradition of Catholic thought (van Kersbergen 1995) which sought 
to embrace democracy. Following this, Section V will review the existing literature on 
Christian Democracy, in the process defining the essence of Christian Democratic 
identity as well as drawing out the typical policy preferences resulting from this. 
Although Christian Democracy has been a long-ignored topic, a number of studies have 
appeared in recent years which have greatly improved our understanding of the 
phenomenon. Such works have helped to combat the tendency to classify Christian 
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Democracy simply as a variant or sub-type of conservatism. It will be suggested here 
that Christian Democracy must be considered as a separate, if related phenomena and 
the core of this distinctiveness will be examined. 
A consequence of the academic concentration on the nature, progress and 
problems of the European left is that very few researchers have tried to incorporate 
Christian Democratic parties into theories about political parties. Given this paucity and 
the lack of English-language work on Christian Democracy, this thesis is not intended as 
an explicitly theoretical test of an existing model of party change nor an attempt to 
formulate a new one. Rather, the primary purpose is to make a detailed contribution to 
our understanding of Christian Democratic parties. Nonetheless, the penultimate part of 
this chapter will examine the existing literature on political parties, focusing in particular 
on the question of parties and change. Since the earliest work on parties, the topics of 
organisation and ideology have been identified as essential to an understanding of how 
parties work. Political parties are, after all, "organisations 'with attitude'" which 
"embody ideological values" (Luther and Milller-Rommel 2002:5). While the focus in 
this work will be on ideological change, this section will also highlight that it is difficult 
to separate the two, particularly in analysing party behaviour in response to shifting 
external environments. The final section will sketch out the chapter-by-chapter 
development of the thesis. 
IV. Origins of Christian Democracy 
Before progressing to the main themes of the thesis, it is worthwhile to consider the 
roots of Christian Democracy for this lies at the heart of its distinctiveness. Of all 
Christian Democracy-related topics, this theme has been the most well-explored (e.g. 
Kalyvas 1996; van Kersbergen 1995; Irving 1978; Pombeni 2000; Burgess 1990). As 
such authors have demonstrated, the central tenets of Christian Democracy were not 
created in a vacuum in the aftermath of WWII. The widespread economic and social 
devastation and political disrepute of the authoritarian right had opened up a gap for new 
political movements but ideas such as subsidiarity, personalism and solidarity were not 
wholly novel. The newly founded Christian Democratic parties have been described as a 
culmination of a slow process of maturation (Sigmund 1987) and drew heavily from the 
doctrine of social Catholicism which had developed since the end of the 19th century. At 
the same time, however, the emergent parties also represented a rupture in Catholic 
politics (Hanley 1994:3). In contrast to their pre-war confessional party predecessors, the 
Christian Democrats fully espoused democracy and stood for a programme beyond mere 
defence of Catholic sub-cultural autonomy. In seeking the origins of Christian 
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Democracy and its ideas, it is necessary to look to the development of both official 
Vatican doctrine and the unofficial "little tradition" of Catholicism (van Kersbergen 
1995: 187). While the ideas developed by the theorists within the latter group are the 
nearest equivalent to the philosophy of the nascent post-war parties, it is only by 
considering them against wider trends in Catholicism and especially the role of the 
Papacy that the evolutionary leap from the numerically insignificant group of pro-
democratic social reformist Catholic thinkers to Christian Democracy, the dominant 
political force on mainland Europe post-1945, can be understood. 
Until the later stages of the 19th century, the Papacy did not have a viable 
alternative to modernity. Popes such as Leo XII (1823-9) and Gregory XVI (1831-46) 
strenuously opposed all liberal reforms within the papal states, suppressing press 
freedom, and denouncing unequivocally the separation of Church and state (Sigmund 
1987:536). Not only did the Vatican abhor the noxious individualism and personal 
freedoms promoted by liberalism, it was also fearful of the threat posed by socialism. 
Socialism was fiercely decried for its atheistic and materialist conception of the world, 
its condemnation of private property and its relegation of the status of the family. It was 
in the words of the later Quadragesimo Anno (1931), "irreconcilable with true 
Christianity" (quoted in Walsh 1998:38). Despite the fear that the working class could 
be lost to socialism, the Vatican could offer no alternative other than a nostalgic 
romanticism of a pre-modern past. The Syllabus of Errors of 1864, condemning the evils 
of liberalism, seemed to cement the association between the church and the forces of 
reaction, so that by the time of Pius IX's death, "the church and its leadership in Rome 
seemed to be at war against almost every feature of the modern era" (Camp 1969:9). 
The rejection of modernity by the Vatican was not shared by all Catholics. In 
France, a number of writers such as Abbe Felicite de Lamennais were contributing to a 
burgeoning intellectual trend, the principle aim of which was to find a distinctively 
Catholic solution to the main problems in society, i.e. the working and living conditions 
endured by the industrial working class under capitalism. Elsewhere, von Kettler was 
instrumental in pushing German Catholicism towards a more socially-minded 
reformism. Moreover, other theorists began to press for more than social reform. 
Lacordaire was one of the earliest Catholic intellectuals to seek an accommodation 
between Catholicism and democracy. He argued for the separation of Church and state, 
press freedom and the full extension of the vote (Irving 1973:28). Despite the modest 
impact of their views and the unambiguous condemnation of the Papacy, the efforts of 
6 
such thinkers marked the beginning of the separation of lay Catholic social and political 
thinking from the reactionary conservatism of the time. 
The death of Pius IX signalled the commencement of a new phase in the 
Church's relations with society. Leo XIII (1878-1903) adopted a far more conciliatory 
position than his predecessors. The encyclicals produced during his reign, most notably 
Rerum Novarum (1891), represented the Church's first serious attempt to present 
solutions to the difficulties caused by capitalism. Clearly, socialism was still 
unacceptable and private property was inviolable. Nevertheless, for the first time the 
predicament of the industrial working class was addressed. The difficulties faced by this 
group were the result, it was argued, of their exploitation by employers and "the erosion 
of the traditional bonds of religion and the guild society" (van Kersbergen 1995:222). 
Rather than advocating a restoration of feudal conditions though, Rerum Novarum 
tentatively developed a theory of how these conditions could be ameliorated. The "hard-
heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition" (Article 3 Rerum 
Novarumf should be replaced by a more benevolent attitude derived from the 
employer's duty to look after his employees. 
The Church began to develop '''a social doctrine' of its own which in certain 
respects was radically critical of liberal society" (Pombeni 2000:291) and which 
attempted to mark out an alternative to socialism and liberalism, a crucial part of 
Christian Democratic self-identity as will be shown later. The Vatican's answer to the 
social problems of the industrial age was still quite imprecise, especially on how the 
improvements in social life were to be effected. Leo's preference was for social reform 
to be carried out primarily through voluntary Catholic organisations rather than by the 
state and the concept of charity was still central (Camp 1969: 138-43) but even before the 
creation of the encyclical, the German Catholic party (Zentrum) had moved towards a 
more active form of social policy and other reformers also used the document to justify 
state intervention. Further refinement of the Church's approach towards state 
intervention came with Quadragesimo anno (1931) in which the principle of subsidiarity 
was set out clearly. Tasks should be carried out at the lowest level possible, whether that 
be the individual, family, community, intermediary organisation or state. The concept of 
subsidiarity and the accompanying belief in social pluralism were to be of great 
significance within later Christian Democratic thought. 
7 hnp;//www.vatjcan.ya/holy father/leo xiijlencycJjcals!documentslhf 1-
xii; enc 15051891 rerum-noyarum en,html Accessed 13/02/03 
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Shifts in papal attitudes also brought unintended consequences in the political 
realm. Overt Catholic political action was still frowned upon but French Catholics were 
urged to rally behind the Republic in Au Milieu des Sollicitudes (1891)8 albeit without 
any concessions to militant anti-clericals. This cautious and hesitant accommodation 
with parliamentary democracy could in no way be described as an endorsement9 and the 
beliefs and actions of later popes up until the Second World War stunted the growth of 
pro-democratic feeling within the Church lO• Yet the effect of this incremental attitudinal 
change was to encourage those lay Catholic thinkers already engaged in theorising about 
Catholicism's relation to the social and political order. The momentum that had created 
Catholic political parties was largely beyond the control of the Church (Kalyvas 
1996:64) but Leo XIII's less dogmatic stance also gave further impetus to the Zentrum's 
social reform efforts (Walton 1994:108). Other Catholic parties were not as progressive 
(e.g. the Austrian Christlich-Soziale) and it took longer for parties to develop in Italy 
and France. The first mass Italian Catholic political party Partito Populare Italiano 
(PPI) formed in 1919, shortly after the final overturning of the prohibition of Catholic 
involvement in politics and with the blessing of Benedict XV. In France, two proto-
Christian Democratic parties, the Action Liberale (based around Albert de Mun) and the 
more marginal PDP, arose in 1901 and 1924 respectively. The social reformism of the 
former was fairly weak and arose more from pragmatism (i.e. the need to defeat the 
socialist danger) rather than from a more genuine belief in the need to remedy the worst 
aspects of capitalism but the PDP's political philosophy bore a closer resemblance to 
post-war Christian Democracy. It strongly affirmed the legitimacy of the Republic, 
personal and press freedoms and argued for social reforms and a harmonisation of the 
interests of workers and employers. 
Although the papacy of Leo XIII encouraged greater Catholic activity in social 
and political groupings, it had not signified a permanent repudiation of past attitudes. 
Later popes (such as Pius X 1903-14) seemed inclined to reject modem society 
completely. Nonetheless, the rapid growth of extensive lay Catholic organisations in the 
Interbellum was tolerated by Benedict XV (1914-22) and positively encouraged by Pius 
XI (1922-39). Catholic trade unions had existed in Germany for a number of years 11 and 
8 htw:ljwww.vatican.ya!boly father/leo xiiilencyclicals!documentslhf I-xiii enc 16021892 au-
mjljeu-des-sol\jcitudes en,html. Accessed 13/02/03. 
9 The Vatican would only go so far as to state that none of the different forms of government 
France had experienced was "in itself, opposed to the principles of sound reason nor to the 
maxims of Christian doctrine" (Article 14, Au Milieu des Sollicitudes). 
10 For example, the bar on Catholic political participation in Italy remained in place from 1867 
until 1919. 
II The Gesamtverband der christlichen Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, GcG, was founded in 
1899. 
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this example was increasingly copied in other countries12• These Catholic unions were 
only one part of a wider network of organisations, an emerging Catholic sub-culture 
which could, in the most extreme cases, shelter and enclose the Catholic population 
'from cradle to the grave,\3. The wave of enthusiasm for such organisations was the first 
real indication of Catholic acceptance of mass participation yet the increased self-
confidence and assertiveness of Catholics was a mixed blessing for democracy. From the 
mid-1920s onwards, a new mood of intransigence and radicalism, antithetical to the 
Christian Democratic 'spirit', was increasingly prevalent. 
This new disposition was in part due to changes within the Vatican. Pius XI 
(1922-39), believing that the Church had to give stronger leadership to an increasingly 
polarised Western world, promoted the new Catholic Action groups. The rise of Catholic 
Action was linked to the growth of a young, highly educated Catholic intelligentsia who 
advocated the 'rechristianisation of society' (Conway 1997:43). One effect of this 
intellectual direction was that the value of politics, and specifically Catholic parties, in 
promoting Catholic interests was questioned by militants. Involvement in politics 
inevitably involved compromise with other political parties who lacked any sort of 
religious inspiration and who stood in the way of the envisioned religious revival. Pro-
democratic feeling among Catholics began to ebb away as Catholic Action gathered 
momentum. Pius XI had little sympathy for confessional parties, believing them to be an 
ineffective means of preserving Catholic interests. For Pius XI, the choice for the 
Church was effectively between fascism and communism and like many contemporary 
conservatives, he preferred the former, convinced that the autonomy of the Church could 
be maintained within such regimes. Accordingly, he repeatedly undermined the position 
of the already fragile PPI which splintered into pro- and anti-Mussolini groups (Irving 
1978:6). In Germany too, the Zentrum suffered through the increasing radicalism of lay 
Catholics. Faced with declining levels of participation within its organs and the loss of 
electoral support to the far right, confessional leaders could not look to the Vatican for 
assistance. Deprived of this support, the subsequent fate of the Zentrum and the PPI was 
not surprising. 
The socio-political environment of the 1920s and 1930s, then, was extremely 
unfavourable to embryonic Christian Democratic ideals. In a situation of increasing 
political polarisation, the volatile centrist coalitions that made up confessional parties 
12 For example the Confederation Franfaise du Travail Catholique in France and the 
ConJederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori in Italy. 
13 This was particularly the case in the Netherlands (see Lijphart 1975; Bakvis 1981) and Austria 
(see Steiner 1972). 
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were torn asunder. Papal backing for the Catholic-inspired, corporatist authoritarian 
regimes of Austria and Portugal also undennined attempts to find some accommodation 
between Catholicism and liberal democracy. While practical political Catholicism 
shifted away from the nascent Christian Democratic ideas, isolated "groups of 
progressive Catholic intellectuals, middle classes and trade unionists clung tenaciously 
to their democratic and refonnist beliefs and rallied to the support of regimes threatened 
directly from both extremes of right and left" (Burgess 1990:147). The two most 
prominent figures were Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier. Maritain argued that 
democracy was the fonn of government most compatible with Christian beliefs. His 
conception of a 'personalist' and 'communitatrian' democracy "provided a theoretical 
justification that drew on Catholic and Thomist conceptions of human nature to argue 
for free institutions, the welfare state, and political democracy" (Sigmund 1987:541). 
Mounier argued for a 'personalist' philosophy which placed the individual in a social, 
religious and familial context. Only within these natural structures could the individual 
approach personal contentment. Before the war, Maritain and Mounier remained 
marginal voices within mainstream Catholicism but the pro-democratic outlook of 
Maritain and the personalism espoused by Mounier were very influential in the 
fonnative stages of post-war Christian Democracy. 
It must be reiterated that those Catholics promoting democracy, social 
refonnism and the separation of Church and state were still a peripheral presence within 
Catholic communities across Europe. Only in the transfonned social, political and 
economic circumstances of the post-war period could this minority strand of thought 
grow into the dominant political ideology of Continental Europe in the post-war period. 
In this respect, the impact of WWII cannot be underestimated. Mass lay Catholic 
acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic government was undeniably brought about 
by the sheer scale of human suffering. Authoritarian regimes were now thoroughly 
discredited. The Church's complicity (in the fonn of the Concordats with Gennany and 
Italy) before the commencement of the war prompted a thorough re-evaluation of 
traditional Catholic thinking. Additionally, the participation in the Resistance by people 
from different religious backgrounds helped to break down many of the barriers 
surrounding the 'closed' Catholic world. In a period of great upheaval and renewal, the 
conditions were favourable for a new evolution of Catholic thinking even if the 
institution itself remained largely reactionary and authoritarian (Girvin 1994: 101-3). 
The emergent Christian Democratic ideology was not without echoes of past 
ideas. The influence of the social Catholic tradition shaped these parties decisively. 
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Christian Democrats denounced the collectivism of socialism and the unchecked 
individualism within liberalism and instead lauded a model of society based on 
solidarity, subsidiarity and pluralism. However, in their normative commitment to 
democracy and the separation of church and state, the new parties were also inspired by 
the more radical 'small tradition' which had attempted to reconcile Catholicism and 
democracy. In the transformed circumstances of the post-war period these theories found 
a receptive audience. The political elites of many countries were searching for a basis on 
which to rebuild their devastated nations and in the small tradition of political 
Catholicism, they found a suitably pro-democratic yet malleable source. With any form 
of Catholic-corporate authoritarianism rejected, the choice that now confronted the 
Church was between Soviet-style communism and some form of accommodation with 
liberal democracy (Almond 1948:743-4). There was, then, little alternative for the 
Catholic hierarchy but to embrace the rapidly developing ideology of Christian 
Democracy. 
v. The essence of Christian Democracy 
A recurrent complaint in the literature on Christian Democracy is the extreme scarcity of 
English language work within this area of study. Although academic interest has picked 
up in the last decade (see the edited volumes of Hanley 1994 and Lamberts 1997; 
Kalyvas 1998; van Kersbergen 1995)'4, this enthusiasm is long overdue. Symptomatic of 
the earlier academic disinterest in the Christian Democratic movement is the ambiguity 
that surrounds the ideology. Unable to trace the inherently flexible ideology of Christian 
Democracy back to a single doctrinal source, West European specialists have frequently 
subsumed these parties under the umbrella label of conservatism. Duverger famously 
asserted in 1966 that the Catholic parties of the Low Countries and Austria were "purely 
and simply conservative parties that changed their name" (quoted in Kalyvas 1998:4) 
and even recently, Lane and Errson (1991: 108) noted that in many cases Christian 
Democratic parties were functional equivalents of Conservative parties. This analytic 
amalgamation of Christian Democracy and conservatism ignores the quite separate 
gestation of many Christian Democratic ideas as described in Section IV. The religious 
heritage of Christian Democratic parties continues to shape their identity in decisive 
ways. As will be shown in this section, the parties retain a traditionalist perspective on 
14 This increased interest can be seen not just in works specifically on Christian Democracy. For 
example, a number of people have made comparisons between the Blairite project in Britain and 
the philosophy of Christian Democracy. Roy Hattersley used the term to describe the Blairite 
project in Britain (The Guardian 27/9/99), Huntington and Bale (2002) have also noticed the 
overlap between New Labour's Third Way and Christian Democracy as have party-affiliated 
researchers at the Scientific Institute (Wetenschappelijk Instituut) in the Netherlands (author's 
interviews ). 
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cultural and moral affairs and the legacy of social Catholicism has left an ambiguous 
attitude towards state interventionism. Certainly, Christian Democratic parties are parties 
of the centre-right which attract the support of social groups who in other nations would 
have been naturally accommodated within a Conservative party but this does not 
invalidate their examination as a separate party family. 
Recent work has firmly emphasised that while a degree of overlap may exist 
between the two doctrines, Christian Democratic theory and the parties which espouse it 
must be treated as distinctive entities (van Kersbergen 1995; Hanley 1994; Kalyvas 1996 
1998). Passing over the now rather dated contribution of Fogarty (1957), one of the first 
studies to consider Christian Democracy in this way was Irving's The Christian 
Democratic Parties of Western Europe (1978)15. He argues that Christian Democracy 
cannot be understood simply as a "synonym for Conservatism" (p.xxi), that it represents 
a central path between liberalism, socialism and conservatism and that the essence of 
Christian Democratic ideas can be found in the concepts of personalism, pluralism and 
natural law and in its distinctive social policy and support for European integration. 
Irving's book is mainly a collection of case studies (on Italy, West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France) with a small amount of comparative analysis. While 
these case studies are rich in historical detail, impressive in geographical and linguistic 
coverage and contain many valuable insights into these parties, there is perhaps an over-
concentration on electoral history without a more rigorous analysis of how the parties 
have expressed Christian Democratic ideology in practice. For example, a stronger link 
could be drawn between the sketch of Christian Democratic ideology and the individual 
case studies. Such criticism, though, cannot obscure Irving's pioneering role in the 
English language study of Christian Democratic parties. 
Sadly, no other political scientists followed up Irving's ground-breaking work in 
the next decade with a study of similar depth. The reluctance to study Christian 
Democracy as an independent phenomenon was exemplified by Layton-Henry's edited 
volume on West European conservative parties which included only a cursory 
examination of these parties before concluding that Christian Democrats could be 
identified as "conservatives of the pragmatic and reformist tradition" (Layton-Henry 
1982:17). A more perceptive approach could be found in von Beyme's (1985) 
classification of Familles Spirituelles. Christian Democracy was identified as one of the 
nine party families in Western Europe and hence as a separate political phenomenon. It 
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may be an overstatement to claim, as von Beyme does, that the Catholic political 
tradition contains "a body of thought in the papal encyclicals which is common to all 
Catholic Christian Democrats and accepted by them" (p.89) as clearly not everything in 
the encyclicals would still be considered valid but the link made between this 
background and the discrete identity of Christian Democratic parties is vital. Von Beyme 
sees the critical features of Christian Democracy in its open form of Christianity, that is 
a general belief in religious values without close ties to the church, its self-description as 
a middle way between unrestricted capitalism and socialism and its stress on the 
principle of subsidiairity. Though this outline was fairly brief given the scope of the 
book, von Beyme does correctly highlight important elements of Christian Democratic 
identity. 
Further consideration of Christian Democracy as a separate political 
phenomenon came with the publication of Hanley's comparative volume in 1994. This 
brought together a series of contributions about Christian Democratic parties across 
Europe, including even the lesser known Scandinavian parties and investigating the non-
existence of French and British parties. This range comes at the cost of the detail 
provided by Irving but one of the advantages of the collection is that a common 
methodological approach is applied in each case, focusing on the origins, organisation, 
electorate, ideology and government record. Additionally, the introductory chapters by 
Dierickx and van Kersbergen explore the ideas of Christian Democracy in more depth 
than had previously been achieved. The former examines the ideology of Christian 
Democracy and compares it to other ideal-type ideologies in terms of the balance 
between Gemeinschafi (community) and Gesellschaft (society) elements. He classifies 
Christian Democratic philosophy as being a doctrine caught between community and 
society, marrying a nostalgic longing for the solidarity of traditional life with currents of 
progressive social thinking (1994: 18). Christian Democrats, he suggests, seek not the 
disintegration of society into smaller communal units but instead try to counter the 
negative aspects of mass society through social and cultural policy (p.22). This results in 
a number of distinctive policies being pursued: strong support for the family, for 
educational pluralism, for co-management in economic decision-making and for a 
solidaristic social policy which is "sensitive to economic disparities" but does not aim 
for economic equality (p.28). In sum, Christian Democratic thinking constitutes a 
separate ideology. 
IS The title is something of a misnomer as the book focuses on only those Christian democratic 
parties within the European Community, thereby ignoring, for example, the Osterreichische 
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Dierickx's argument is fairly convincing and his recognition of the social-
personalist and solidaristic component of Christian Democratic thought is significant but 
the application of his theory is geographically limited. He focuses solely on the Low 
Countries and omits conservatism from the comparison. Given this national focus, the 
latter's exclusion is not surprising: in the Netherlands, the tenn conservative is 
considered "a priori dishonourable or objectionable" (von der Dunk 1982:182). 
Nonetheless, the position of Christian Democracy vis-a-vis conservatism must be 
addressed. This deficiency is rectified by van Kersbergen in the same volume. Van 
Kersbergen systematically refutes the commonly held notions that Christian Democracy 
can be understood as a sub-type of conservatism, that as a centrist ideology it inherently 
lacks distinctive features and that Christian Democracy cannot be distinctive because it 
is a catch-all party. Van Kersbergen rejects the catch-all description on account of the 
polarising appeal of religion and suggests, instead, that a position in the centre of the 
political spectrum is not necessarily incompatible with holding principles. In common 
with von Beyme, he believes that the social component of Christian Democratic thought 
is critical in differentiating these parties from other party families (van Kersbergen 
1994:36).The influence of Catholic social doctrine continues to shape Christian 
Democracy and results in certain key principles for these parties. These are "integration, 
(class) compromise, accommodation and pluralism" (p.36). In this way, Christian 
Democrats elevate the search for a negotiated compromise into a principle with their 
religious inspiration playing a vital role in social integration. 
From the sources examined above, it is possible to sketch the fundamentals of 
Christian Democratic political philosophy. In contrast to their pre-war confessional 
precursors, Christian Democrats are committed to democracy and strongly affinn 
individual freedoms. Freedom, however, is balanced by responsibility and Christian 
Democrats see their ideas as offering a middle way between the mistakes of liberalism 
and socialism although by the time of the Cold War anti-Communism was the dominant 
leitmotif. Although private property is considered inviolable and there is broad 
acceptance of the market, an atomised, individualist view of society is also rejected. In 
some countries, Christian Democratic parties explicitly adhere to a personalist 
philosophy but even in those nations where the term is not used, it is recognised that the 
fulfilment of the individual can only be brought about through the community and 
especially the family. In addition to families and communities, the Christian Democratic 
pluralist model of society foresees a major role for intennediary organisations organised 
Volkspartei. 
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according to the precept of subsidiarity. State intervention is only justified where a lower 
organisation is unable to provide a social good. 
All Christian Democratic parties believe in a Christian image of man yet theirs is 
an open Christianity, not bound to one confession nor even to devout believers. 
Religious values do not provide political solutions but instead produce general political 
principles l6• Probing beyond the parties' self-description of their principles, it is 
possible to discern deeper values which guide the thinking and behaviour of Christian 
Democrats everywhere: accommodation, integration, pluralism and class compromise 
(van Kersbergen 1994). These principles do not have the rigidity of firm dogmas; 
indeed, by their very nature, they raise compromise to an ideal. Like conservative 
thinkers, Christian Democrats are dubious about the utility of abstract theories about 
society (Veen & Gruber 2000:23) and sceptical about the state's ability to solve social 
ills. Nonetheless, their social Catholic inheritance does instil a strong element of social 
concern .. In line with the guideline of subsidiarity, government action, in theory at least, 
should only seek to complement the activities of non-state organisations but this is 
always balanced by the demands of solidarity and social justice. Another important 
component of Christian Democratic thinking is its internationalist dimension. From the 
beginning, Christian Democrats looked beyond national boundaries. In part, this was a 
consequence of their connection to religious institutions claiming universal importance 
but it also represented a rejection, in the aftermath of WWII, of narrow nationalist 
ambitions and a commitment to international co-operation although first and foremost 
within the Western alliance (Hanley 1994:8). 
Regardless of the ideological distinctiveness of Christian Democracy, it must 
also be shown that such parties pursue separate policy agendas. After all, if the 
distinctiveness of Christian Democratic parties was limited to programmatic rhetoric, 
then Duverger's description quoted earlier might not be so inaccurate. This can be 
refuted in a number of ways. Firstly, Laver and Hunt's study (1992) of party leadership 
positions illustrated that Christian Democratic parties, though right of centre on 
questions of public ownership, were still far less rightist than Liberal and Conservative 
parties. Moreover, in contrast to prior expectations, they showed significantly less 
variation than their Socialist/Social Democratic and Conservative counterparts. 
Moreover, Christian Democratic parties were even more distinctive in their moral-
16 In the CDA's case, these are stewardship, justice, spread responsibility and solidarity while the 
CDU are freedom, solidarity and justice. The CVP has tinkered with its principles regularly but at 
the time of the last Basic Programme, its principles were freedom, responsibility, sustainability, 
justice, achievement, security, partnership, subsidiarity, participation and tolerance. 
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cultural policyl7, being located to the right of all other party families with the exception 
of the far-right. Therefore, in terms of party leadership positions at least, Laver and 
Hunt's data substantiates Christian Democracy's discrete identity. 
A second means of establishing the independent identity of Christian 
Democracy is to ascertain certain characteristic policies which derive from the political 
philosophy of the movement. In economic policy, Christian Democrats have since the 
end of the 1940s advocated and implemented the social market. This model was 
synonymous with Ludwig Erhard, the first finance minister of the FRG but serves as the 
basis for Christian Democrat economic thinking whether it is explicitly mentioned by a 
party (e.g. the 6VP) or not (e.g. the CDAI8). Although the model was fundamentally 
based on a capitalist market economy with the commitment to tackling market 
malformations initially the main social element, the concept subsequently proved 
flexible enough to include more active state interventionism. As such, it became an 
alternative between laissez-faire economic liberalism and socialism, albeit more inclined 
towards the former. Van Kersbergen (1995) argues that Christian Democrat-dominated 
political regimes produce a characteristic 'social capitalist' form of welfare state. In 
common with those countries where a strong Social Democratic party had existed, 
traditionally Christian Democrat-dominated nations are characterised by a high levels of 
welfare spending. Yet drawing on recent comparative welfare state research, van 
Kersbergen shows that these welfare regimes diverge from the Social Democratic model 
in a number of important ways in their noticeable lack of interest in increasing social 
services or policies aiming for full employment. Moreover, Christian Democratic-shaped 
welfare states privilege families, are based on cash-benefits with minimal state 
involvement and rely upon employees insurance for most of the financing. Van 
Kersbergen convincingly demonstrates how the strain of social Catholic thinking present 
in Christian Democracy discernibly influences policy outcomes. Combining the analysis 
of van Kersbergen and that of Laver and Hunt, it can be concluded that while Christian 
Democratic economic priorities are market-centred, the concept of the social market 
economy has been sufficiently malleable to accommodate high levels of social 
expenditure, thus locating this party family to the left of liberals and conservatives on 
socio-economic affairs. 
A second key feature of Christian Democratic parties also identified by Laver 
and Hunt was been their cultural-moral traditionalism. Typical policies resulting from 
17 Laver and Hunt call this social policy but it is really a measure of permisiveness. 
18 Although by 1996, CDA programmatic documents did mention the Rhineland economic 
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this stance include strong support for the family, restrictions on the availability of 
abortion and divorce, rejection of euthanasia, opposition to cultural permissiveness and 
defence of a (essentially religious) pluralist educational system. Thus, Christian 
Democrats have fought a continual battle against the general West European trend 
towards greater individualism and secularisation. Success in this regard has not been 
especially extensive l9 with the exception of education (e.g. the preservation of religious 
schools). It is noticeable, though, that despite the inability of Christian Democrats to 
reverse or even halt social trends, they have not given up such efforts. Christian 
Democrats continue to cling to their religiously inspired beliefs about human dignity and 
the fundamental value of the family and this shapes their policy preferences accordingly. 
Finally, within the field of foreign policy, Christian Democratic policy is also 
marked by its consistent promotion of European integration and a strong commitment to 
the Atlantic Alliance. From the earliest efforts of di Gasperi, Schuman and Adenauer, 
Christian Democrats have led and moulded the process. As the introduction of the 
concept of subsidiarity into European level debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
illustrated, the process of European integration has continued to bear a heavy Christian 
Democratic influence. This integrationist stance was, of course, not unrelated to the 
fervent anti-communism within Christian Democratic parties but it also grew from a 
genuine attempt to end nationalist conflict through new solutions. The intrinsic value 
attached to European unity has not diminished over time and remains a remarkably 
constant aspect of Christian Democratic policy. 
The aim of the preceding two sections has been to show that the religious roots 
of Christian Democracy cannot be dismissed as the superficial decoration implied by 
Duverger. Nor can these roots be said to have entirely withered. The social Catholic 
heritage of Christian Democracy continues to be relevant to the philosophic identity of 
the party family and to the policy choices of the individual parties. This argument, 
however, prompts further questions: if the social Catholic roots of Christian Democracy 
are a crucial part of its identity, how is this identity affected by secularisation? Indeed, if 
religious values are held by an ever-decreasing minority and society is increasingly 
individualised, can a cultural-moral policy based, broadly speaking, on Christian values 
command support? The dilemma now facing Christian Democrats may now be a choice 
model. 
19 For example, the CDU failed to get the Federal Constitutional Court to overturn the abortion 
law reforms of the Brandt government in the 1970s while the CDA has at best been able to shape 
and delay legislation on abortion and euthanasia. 
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between adherence to their historic traditions and adaptation in the direction of a more 
secular conservatism (Lucardie 1993; Lucardie and ten Nape11993) 
Aside from cultural-moral issues, Christian Democrats also face a socio-
economic quandary. Changes in the global economy, the drive towards deregulated 
markets within Europe and a shifting demographic balance throws the future of current 
welfare systems into doubt. This has caused a number of Christian Democratic parties to 
advocate welfare state retrenchment and market deregulation. Even though such policy 
shifts have been fairly tepid, the turn toward more neo-liberal solutions has not been 
electorally popular and as a result, raises questions about the future integrative capacities 
of Christian Democratic parties (van Kersbergen 1999). The essential flexibility of 
Christian Democrats has been noted by many writers (e.g. Rutan 1997: 1110; Lamberts 
1997b:475); as political and economic circumstances have changed, Christian 
Democratic parties have been able to adjust accordingly, emphasising either social 
justice and solidarity or a more market-led vision depending on the circumstances. What 
was always present, however, was a balance between the social and the market, a 
balance which was also present in the organisational make-up of the parties themselves. 
If this balance and the flexibility which accompanies it is lost, the nature of Christian 
Democracy would be fundamentally transformed. Therefore, a further aim of this study 
is to investigate to what extent these tensions have been visible in the various parties in 
the 1990s. 
VI. Parties and change 
Since the 1970s, the topic of political change in West European politics has received a 
great deal of attention. The realisation that the frozen party systems famously identified 
by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) were at least partially thawing prompted a number of 
studies charting rising electoral volatility (e.g. Pederson 1979; 1983), growing party 
system fractionalisation (e.g. Laakso and Taagepera 1979) and a general loosening of 
the bond between voter and party (e.g. Dalton, Beck and Flanagen 1984). Irrespective of 
whether these changes have heralded an era of dealignment or realignment, the 
challenge to the individual established parties was still considerable. At worst, parties 
were confronted by the possibility of "failure" (Lawson and Merkl 1988). Yet party 
system analysis (e.g. Daalder and Mair 1983; Mair and Bartolini 1990; Franklin et al 
1992) attracted the most interest with fewer researchers concentrating on change at the 
level of party families or individual parties. Nonetheless, a number of studies do take 
single parties as their subject. For example, political parties are often grouped together in 
national contexts and then studied for signs of continuity or change (see, for example, 
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the chapters in Katz and Mair 1994 and some of those in Lawson 1994). When the 
theme is a single party family, social democratic parties remain the principal topic of 
investigation (see Koelbe 1992; Patterson and Thomas 1986; Gillespie and Patterson 
1993; Kitschelt 1994) although green and far-right parties are also not ignored (recent 
examples include Richardson and Rootes' (1995) collection of pieces on green parties; 
Mudde 2000 on far-right). Consequently, centre-right parties have been largely 
neglected by scholars either as solitary case studies or in a comparative contexfo, a 
curious phenomenon in view of their pivotal position in most of Western Europe. As a 
result, there is no model of existing model of party change which has been specifically 
developed for Christian Democratic parties. Therefore, general models of party change 
that focus on function, goal priorities, organisation and ideology will be reviewed in this 
section as regards their applicability to the present study. 
Starting from the earliest, predominantly functionalist accounts, the subfield of 
political parties has been replete with attempts to capture their essence. A key dispute is 
between the proponents of a primarily vote maximisation definition of parties and those 
authors who ascribe rather more functions to parties. Typically, parties are seen as 
vehicles of representation and expression, participation and mobilisation, interest 
aggregation and elite recruitment which formulate policy and attempt to win office in 
order to exercise control of government (Macridis 1967: 17). For Schumpeter amongst 
others21 , however, this last function is by far the most significant. Hence, "a party is a 
group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political 
power" (Schumpeter 1950:283). The overriding importance of governmental ambition 
would thus lead us to expect that parties would adapt as necessary in order to achieve 
office. Ostensibly, Christian Democrats would seem to be perfect examples of the 
Schumpterian understanding of political parties. Such parties have clung onto office for 
impressively long periods of time while at the same time showing a certain degree of 
ideological flexibility. For example, Broughton (1994:102) describes the CDU as "a 
party for winning power and maintaining themselves in office rather than implementing 
a clearly set out ideological stance". This would seem to confirm that such parties are 
pure vote-maximisers. 
However, the vote maximisation model is unsatisfactorily minimalist, even for 
Christian Democratic parties. As von Beyme (1985: 13) recognises, parties are imbued 
with an ideological identity through their expressive and representative functions in 
20 Exceptions to this are the studies in Girvin (1988) and Wilson (1998). 
21 Other notable advocates of this approach are Duverger and Epstein. 
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addition to their other roles. This identity might not be drawn from a coherent doctrine 
but the "common values and norms" (p.29) of parties are deeper than mere short-term 
policy choices and cannot be discarded at will (Wilson 1994:271). Applying the 
threefold model of goals developed by Muller and Stram (1999), there is little doubt that 
Christian Democrats prioritise office above votes and policy2. Christian Democratic 
parties are unlikely to abandon this order of goal preference. Participation in government 
has been a vital factor in binding together the diverse constituent parts of these parties 
and periods in opposition have been fairly traumatic, often unleashing a cacophony of 
different voices and interests. Despite this consistent stress on seeking office, however, 
Christian Democratic principles have not been jettisoned. The roots and nature of 
Christian Democratic ideology have already been discussed in Sections IV and V of this 
chapter and it will be argued throughout this thesis that, in programmatic terms at least, 
continuity has been the prevalent theme. Although change is anticipated for the reasons 
set out below, the difficulty of achieving ideological adaptation, even in parties 
seemingly as flexible as the Christian Democrats, will be explored in chapter 3 and the 
case studies. 
A leading strand of party analysis has been based on attempts to formulate 
cross-national system-level theories of parties and change. These have highlighted 
transformations in the relative importance of party functions and in organisational styles. 
Duverger (1964) believed the centralised mass party typical of European socialist parties 
was ideally suited to the dynamics of competitive electoral politics. The success of these 
parties would act as a stimulus to the remaining cadre parties based on small groups of 
elites to adopt the mass model. Yet for Kirchheimer (1966), the mass party was already 
undergoing a mutation into what he termed the "catch-all party". This party type was 
characterised by the shedding of much ideological baggage, further centralisation at the 
cost of the influence of the individual member, a greater instrumentalism on the part of 
the leadership, a more inclusive social appeal and close links with interest groups 
(p.190). The validity of Kirchheimer's thesis appeared to be confirmed by a number of 
trends within West European nations, most notably the apparent depolarisation of party 
politics and the growing distance between party elites and mass membership. This latter 
tendency was also noticed by Panibianco (1988) who put forward the concept of 
electoral-professional party type. In this model, the institutionalisation of political 
parties had led to electoral goals taking precedence over all other aims and as a result, 
22 In both Gennany and Austria (although perhaps less so in the case of the latter), office seeking 
has been indistinguishable from vote-seeking but in the Netherlands, striving for office has on 
balance been more important than pure vote maximisation as seen in the flexibility of the CDA, 
and indeed the KVP, in their choice of coalition partners 
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parties had become professionalised machines in which the grassroots had become 
increasingly marginal. The decline of mass membership was also a key background 
feature of Katz and Mair's "cartel-party" (1995). Political parties, no longer able to 
survive on members' contributions, increasingly found financial security in the resources 
of the state via party funding. This "interpenetration of party and state" (p.17) was then 
defended by the established parties colluding together against the threat from political 
newcomers. 
The development of these system level ideal-types illustrates an important fact 
in understanding parties and change. While the central functions of political parties do 
not necessarily remain the same, parties have, with a few notable exceptions, 
demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive (Mair 1994). In explaining the survival of 
parties, the issue of organisation, namely the changing nature of linkage between voter, 
member and party elite, seems crucial. However, party ideology is bound up in this 
transformation. The party's historical political identity is, after all, a critical part of the 
link between voter/adherent/member and party and in each of the system-level models 
highlighted above, traditional party goals are de-emphasised. If the party leadership 
attempt to project as broad an appeal as possible (catch-all) or prioritise electoral goals 
over all others (electoral-professional), the ideological component of the party is diluted 
or diminished in importance. Even in the cartel party model, the party's historic beliefs 
are less significant as the representative functions of the party wither. 
Consequently, the question of change and adaptation also has an ideological 
dimension: to what extent do parties retain their expressive and representative functions? 
This question has been analysed both at the level of party system and individual parties. 
For example, Thomas (1980) and Volkens and Klingemann (2002) analyse whether 
European political parties have converged. Similarly, single parties or party families can 
be evaluated for signs of ideological drifting (Volkens 2001; Jahn 2001). As yet, no 
research has used similar techniques to study parties of the centre-right. This is not 
especially unexpected. In comparison to parties of the left, it is harder to identify a 
consistent dogma guiding the actions of centre-right parties. As numerous writers have 
observed, pragmatism rather than idealism appears as a fundamental characteristic of 
right wing politics (e.g. Leyton-Henry 1982: 17). Christian Democracy as a phenomenon 
which is from its inception "elusive and shifting" (Hanley 1994:2) is harder to trace than 
one where, in theory at least, a clear model of party ideology existed. Nonetheless as the 
preceding account of the development of Christian Democratic thought demonstrated, it 
is possible to identify the core identity of these parties in programmatic and policy 
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terms. Therefore, one of the aims of this study is to chart the political and programmatic 
development of the CDU, OVP and CDA, examining whether the expressive and 
representative function of these parties has changed and if so, in what direction. 
The question remains: why should we expect political parties to change? 
Organisational theory suggests that parties as organisations will have an in-built 
preference for stasis, yet this to some extent runs counter to our expectations. Parties are 
organs of representation whose responsiveness is democratically tested at regular 
intervals and as such they are presumed to be sensitive to changes in the external 
environment. Scholars of parties have tended to focus on socio-economic developments 
as a leading explanatory factor in accounting for party change23• Alterations in class 
structures (e.g. relative decline of the working class and the growth of the tertiary sector) 
shape voting alignments (e.g. the falling value of class as a predictor of voting 
behaviour) resulting in a less partisan, more volatile electorate. This trend has been 
reinforced by the higher levels of education, greater affluence and individualism in 
modern electorates. A number of recent studies point to a widespread decline of parties 
in the electorate in advanced industrial democracies (Webb 2002; Dalton 2000; Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2000). It has frequently been argued that faced by this more uncertain 
electoral environment parties are compelled to moderate their political appeal and seek 
out voters from beyond their traditional clientele. Although this approach is more 
commonly associated with studies of Social Democracy, it is one which can be equally 
applied to their Christian Democratic counterparts for the traditional social milieux of 
these parties are also contracting. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the decline of core 
Christian Democrat-supporting social groups has been mirrored in falling rates of 
Christian Democratic partisanship and party membership in the electorate. Therefore, 
from this perspective, Christian Democratic parties must also broaden their electoral 
appeal to attract new groups. 
The concentration on abstract socio-economic forces of change has been 
criticised as too reductionist by Wilson (1988, 1994; see also Harmel 2002). In his study 
of French parties under pressure and repeated in his cross-national comparison of 
French, British, Spanish and German Social Democratic parties, Wilson sketches a 
model of party change containing four inter-connected variables influencing the 
behaviour of parties: socio-economic setting, political culture, political institutions and 
competitive situation. Within this model, the role of the socio-economic variable is 
lessened. It is not that economic and social developments are unimportant; rather that 
23 A classic example of this approach is przeworski and Sprague (1986). 
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they are filtered through a variety of intermediary influences. Instead of simply 
describing the processes that alter voter alignments, it is necessary to analyse how such 
changes find expression in the competitive structures and institutions of the nation being 
studied. Moreover, even where such changes do produce a pressure for adaptation, a 
party may sometimes resist this. For Wilson, this variation is crucial and can only be 
explained by the role of individual leaders. Hence, 
The notion that parties are transformed by unseen socioeconomic, cultural or political 
forces while their leaders remain unaware is misleading. Parties change primarily 
because their leaders and members see the need to change and work within parties to 
change them (Wilson 1994:280). 
Wilson's argument provides a cautionary reminder not to neglect internal organisation 
when considering party adaptations. Parties are not just passive institutions which 
inevitably respond to environmental pressure. This is a particularly pertinent 
consideration as the organisational capacity of parties is not in decline: contemporary 
parties have greater financial and personnel resources than ever before (Webb 2002:442-
4; see also Mair 1994). Furthermore, broadly similar socio-economic trends affect most 
of Western Europe but their translation into the political arena is far from uniform. 
Therefore, it is essential to be aware of the critical role of internal organisation and 
leadership and developments in these areas will be covered in Chapters 2-3 and 5-7. 
Another theoretical justification for our expectation of change is based on 
Harmel and Janda's theory of party change (1994) which introduces both a conceptual 
vocabulary and a series of testable propositions. The conceptual framework 
distinguishes change as resulting from a number of possible external and internal factors 
(e.g. change in factional power or leadership renewal) but the most far-reaching and 
striking transformations are prompted by external shocks. Similar to the Muller and 
Stram typology, the authors argue that different parties hold different ultimate aims. The 
nature and extent of the external shock depends on the goal priority of the affected party. 
For parties that are primarily vote seekers, the collapse of electoral support would be a 
serious shock while the loss of participation in government would have a similar effect 
on office-seekers. Parties whose principle aim is ideological would receive an external 
shock through changes which undermine this credo. An external shock is, therefore, "an 
external stimulus so directly related to performance consideration on a party's 'primary 
goal' that it causes the party's decision-makers (perhaps through the pressure of others 
within the party) to undertake a fundamental reevaluation of the party's effectiveness on 
that goal dimension" (pp.267-9). 
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The framework adopted has been influenced by the literature on party change 
discussed above in a number of ways. First, although Chapter 4 will link the contraction 
of Christian Democratic milieux to party decline, the case studies will avoid the 
reductionism of concentrating exclusively on social and economic change by looking at 
the other important contextual factors which will be carried out in the detailed case 
studies of the parties in the 1990s. Second, Harmel and Janda's theory provides a 
theoretical justification for the focus on the three parties in the 1990s. As office-seekers, 
Christian Democratic parties would be profoundly affected by the move into opposition 
although a significant loss of votes might also be sufficient to bring about party change. 
The case studies (Chapters 5-7) wi11look at whether the external shocks endured by the 
6vp (electoral collapse) and the CDA (electoral collapse and loss of office) caused a 
significant change within each party and how this compared to the reaction of the CDU 
to its more gradual decline. Third, following Wilson's approach, particular attention will 
be given to leadership changes. The stimuli for adaptation will often come from outside 
the party but adaptation itself can only come about through party actors. Therefore, the 
case studies will also look at leadership changes to investigate whether personnel 
renewal brought about party change. Finally, no study of parties can ignore the role of 
organisation even though the focus here is predominantly on ideology and party identity. 
As the earlier discussion of system-level ideal types showed, changes in party 
organisation have ideological implications. This is especially pertinent to Christian 
Democratic parties. In accordance with their people's party (Volkspartei) image, 
Christian Democratic parties frequently have very diffuse, federal structures 
encompassing a broad range of social interests. These pluralistic party structures were 
not just instrumental in the development of a catch-all appeal but also reflected core 
Christian Democratic principles of integration and accommodation. If changes in the 
structure of the party threaten its diversity, the integrative capacity of Christian 
Democracy might be badly undermined. Therefore, within Chapters 2, 3 and 5-7, 
organisational developments will also be taken into account. 
VI. Structure 
The structure of the thesis will be as follows: Chapter 2 will cover the formative period 
of the Christian democratic parties in West Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. The 
political and electoral development of the CDU, OVP and the Dutch confessionals will 
be examined as will the programmatic profile of these parties. This will reveal the 
growing coherence of Christian Democratic thought as central themes found expression 
in the initial platforms of the parties although it is vital to acknowledge the 
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exceptionalism of the Dutch parties. As was shown earlier, questions of party 
organisation are also important and the structure of the various parties will also be 
examined, showing similarities and divergences in their organisational format. These 
themes will be carried on into the third chapter which will analyse the parties after the 
halcyon days had come to an end. This section, then, will investigate the reaction of the 
parties to their first 'external shock' (loss of office in the case of the CDU and 6vp; the 
dramatic collapse of the KVP's vote). In the Dutch case, this primarily brought 
monumental organisational change whereas for the 6vp, programmatic reform was 
paramount as attempts to alter fundamentally the party's structure ran into great 
resistance. The CDU was able to achieve both organisational and ideological reforms 
although the former was more significant 
As the global economic climate deteriorated and "old certainties such as belief 
in the efficacy of Keynesianism, economic planning and social engineering through 
welfare programs were all undermined" (Wilson 1999:259), Christian Democratic 
parties were well-positioned to take advantage. Yet while Christian Democratic parties 
strengthened their electoral and governmental power, their condition was not as secure 
as in the earlier golden age. In part, this was a consequence of the difficulty in adapting 
the programmatic profile of the various parties to the new economic circumstances. The 
social Catholic heritage of the parties prevented a full scale conversion to neoliberalism, 
evident in the dissent which market-centred programmatic reforms provoked within each 
party. Therefore, as Chapter 3 will show, Christian Democrats sought their own 
accommodation with the neoliberaI agenda. The consolidation of the parties in the 1980s 
varied in success. The CDA established a seemingly invulnerable position in the centre 
of the party system and the CDU also became the dominant party of government once 
more although not without difficulties. The 6vP's position was least secure, trapped in 
an unfavourable strategic alliance with the Socialists. Regardless of this variation, 
Chapter 4 will highlight the essential similarity in the Christian Democratic electorate 
and membership in the three countries. In each country, though, the core electorate of 
the Christian Democrats is in decline, posing a major threat to the future of each party. 
The greater insecurity of Christian Democratic parties even when in government 
was fully exposed in the 1990s. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will present case studies of the three 
parties in this decade. In this period the CDA and the 6vp endured further external 
shocks, causing internal reassessments of party priorities and strategies. In comparison, 
the CDU's predicament was less acute but by 1998, it found itself out of office and 
recovering from its second worst result in the history of the FRG. These chapters will 
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examine the causes for the decline of the parties, analysing the extent to which the loss 
of votes can be traced to contextual factors and deeper structural problems. In addition, 
the case studies will investigate whether this has brought about a response from the 
parties. In contrast to the qualitative analysis of party documents undertaken in Chapters 
2 and 3 and 5 to 7, Chapter 8 will instead utilise a more quantitative form of 
investigation into electoral programmes based on the Comparative Manifestos Project 
data. The approach adopted here will be broadly similar to studies of Social Democratic 
parties; however, it will be argued that the left-right scale used by Budge and Laver 
(1990) and Budge and Klingemann (2001) does not fully capture the change in Christian 
Democratic manifestos and in its place, a model based on the relative balance of market 
liberal, social interventionist and cultural traditionalism will be proposed. Finally, 
Chapter 9 will endeavour to draw together the evidence presented and in reference to 
recent events, venture some conclusions on the prospects for and nature of Christian 
Democracy at the start of a new century. 
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Chapter 2. The Golden Age of Christian Democracy 1945-70 
I. Introduction 
As was shown in Chapter 1, the Christian Democratic parties that emerged in the years 
following the end of the war were a new phenomenon, bringing together the ideas of 
social Catholicism, a deeply felt commitment to democracy and a belief in the social 
market. Once founded, these parties rose astoundingly quickly to political pre-eminence, 
shaping the post-war political order in highly significant ways. The Dutch case 
constitutes an anomaly here as the end of the war did not bring about a transformation of 
the political system and the three main religious parties retained their separate 
confessional identities. Nonetheless, gradually, the parties drew closer to each other and 
to the Christian Democracy found elsewhere. This chapter will examine the origins and 
development of the CDU, 6vp and Dutch confessionals in their golden age from 1945-
70. By the end of this period, this stage had unmistakeably come to an end: the German 
and Austrian parties were in opposition and the Dutch Catholic party had suffered a 
dramatic loss of support. Section I will consider the major political and electoral 
developments for the parties in this period. 
Having quickly assumed governmental responsibility, Christian Democrats 
showed little interest in programmatic discussion which could potentially open 
dangerous divisions between the different factions included in these umbrella parties. 
Nonetheless, slowly the CDU and OVP began to refine their programmatic identity and 
Section II will analyse these early documents, tracing how the ideas sketched in Chapter 
1 were expressed and developed by the individual parties. Again, the Dutch parties 
highlight the divergence between the beliefs of the confessionals and Christian 
Democrats and will be examined separately. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, organisation is 
a crucial aspect of the study of parties and for Christian Democratic parties, the question 
of suitable organisation is particularly relevant. As Volksparteien, they encompassed a 
potentially unstable plurality of diverse ideas and interests. The task for Christian 
Democratic parties was to create a party structure which balanced breadth of opinion and 
interest representation with party cohesion. This undertaking was further complicated by 
the strong emphasis on federalism present in Christian Democratic thought which bred a 
strong resistance to efforts to create powerful, centralised party organs. Section III will 
examine how Christian Democratic parties initially organised and the subsequent 
demands for reform. 
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II. Political and electoral developments 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 
Less than two months after the end of WWII, two branches of what was to become the 
CDU had already been formed in Berlin and Cologne. Yet despite this early start, the 
party structure remained extremely loose and the Federal Party was not founded until 
1950. From the outset, the Union was a party of regional associations, each arising 
autonomously and with its own identity and interests. Geographical diversity was 
accompanied by political variation and different regions were associated with certain 
political tendencies. For example, whereas in the Rhineland the overwhelmingly 
Catholic CDU was interested in cultural policy, the Berlin group was more inclined 
toward social concern. To a large extent, the success of the various Lander parties 
reflected their ability to tap into local political traditions (Bosch 2002:14). Thus even in 
the Protestant North, the position of the new party was far from hopeless as long as it 
was able to project a more middle class, business-orientated image although in most 
regions the membership was predominantly Catholic (Haungs 1992: 173). In Bavaria, 
however, the CSU was formed which remained separate from the CDU even though the 
two parties eventually formed one group in parliament. 
The CDU therefore brought together a collection of different regional, social 
and economic interests under one political roof. It was "a completely new type of 
party ... bringing together Catholics and Protestants, former members of the Zentrum and 
of the Liberal and Conservative parties, trade unionists and businessmen" (Irving 
1979: 16). That its unity withstood the tests of its formative years was in no small 
measure due to the leadership of Konrad Adenauer (Padgett 1994b:51). Adenauer 
enjoyed a fortuitous advantage over other political rivals in the formative stage due to 
the early licensing of parties in the British-occupied zone. This presented him with the 
opportunity to establish a power base within the new party while rivals elsewhere were 
hamstrung by the restrictions of the occupying forces, most obviously Jakob Kaiser and 
the other Christian Socialists in Berlin 1, and in February 1946, Adenauer was elected the 
chairman of the CDU zonal committee. The Ahlen programme the following year was 
an important step in the consolidation of Adenauer's power, securing the support of 
many Catholic workers in North Rhine Westphalia while paying lip service to the 
demands of employees, the British and the Social Democrats (Bosch 2002: 18; Haungs 
1992:183). Eventually, Adenauer's preference for more economically conservative 
1 Eventually Kaiser fled to the West but by this point, Adenauer's position was too firmly 
entrenched for Kaiser to challenge him. 
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policies became clear but this was always balanced with symbolic concessions to the left 
of the parryl (Oppelland 1996:79). 
Of more long-term significance was the Dusseldorf Programme of 1949 which 
served as a manifesto for the first federal election. Contained within this programme was 
the first mention of the key Christian Democratic concept of the social market 
economr. From this point on, the party would lean towards a more business-centred 
policy although without losing its social Catholicism (Smith 1979:89). Throughout the 
various Land elections before 1949, the Union established itself as a major political 
force and in the first Bundestag election of 1949, the CDU became the largest party and 
formed a coalition government with its Bavarian sister party, the CSU and the liberal 
FDP. However, its permanence was by no means guaranteed. The party faced numerous 
challengers on the right and the unity of the party was fragile. However, Adenauer 
managed to bind the party together, steering it away from dangerous programmatic 
debate which could expose internal divisions. Instead, the CDU built its political identity 
around Adenauer's leadership, foreign policy, in particular anti-communism, and the 
'economic miracle'. 
Throughout the following decade, the CDU, in conjunction with the CSU and a 
variety of coalition partners\ established and consolidated its political power. This 
strength was primarily founded upon the Chancellor's widespread popularity as 
"elections in the 1950s were Adenauer-elections" (Kleinmann 1993: 132). The 
Bundestag election of 1953 was particularly significant. Despite the challenge of a 
relatively large number of right-wing competitors, the Christian Democrats dramatically 
improved upon their 1949 result. This was mainly achieved through attracting votes 
from supporters of other right wing rivals such as the Refugee party (GB-BHE), the 
German Party (DP) and the reformed Zentrum. The CDU responded to the problems of 
the refugees through the Lastenausgleich laws and played upon the divisions within the 
GB-BHE and DP by inviting them into government (Lee 1999). The reformed Zentrum 
faded away quickly as the COU tightened its grip on Catholic voters while the OP was 
effectively swallowed by the Union over the course of the decade and the GB-BHE split. 
2 The fact that during his final years as Chancellor, Adenauer continued to receive the support of 
the social wing of the party against the more liberal Erhard demonstrated his skill in binding the 
rarty together (Kleinmann 1993: 186) 
See section III. 
4 See appendix for details. 
5 Again, Adenauer's sense for social spending when required was evident as he pressed for this 
law, allocating funding to the refugees, against his more cautious Minister of Finance, Schliffer 
(Oppelland 1996:85). 
29 
Contributing to Adenauer's hold on the party during the period of CDU/CSU 
ascendancy was the decidedly undeveloped party organisation6: membership figures 
were very low and the decision-making infrastructure was weak, providing little means 
of restricting Adenauer's power. Even the parliamentary party (Fraktion) was not a 
serious constraint on the Chancellor's power (Pridham 1977:69-75) and the party as a 
whole appeared little more than an organisation for the re-election of Adenauer, a 
Kanzlerwahlverein (Irving 1978: 127). Stirrings of rebellion within the party against their 
ageing leader, however, were visible towards the end of the 1950s. The public quarrel 
over the selection of the CDU candidate for the Federal Presidency in 1959 highlighted 
the party's succession quandary. Adenauer resisted going peacefully into retirement and 
wanted to handpick his heir7• While the Fraktion backed down, relations between the 
parliamentary party and the chancellor remained cool. Nevertheless, Adenauer stood one 
more time as Chancellor candidate in 1961, as the party lacked both the organisational 
structures and the political will to force their distinguished leader out. However in this 
election, the CDU/CSU lost 5%8. The Union parties also lost their absolute majority 
resulting in a new coalition with the FDP despite the Liberals' earlier explicit rejection 
of another Adenauer-Ied cabinet. The growing desire of the CDU for leadership renewal 
was finally satisfied when, after great indecision, Adenauer was finally persuaded in the 
aftermath of the Spiegel affair9 to set a date for his retirement and relinquish the 
chancellery in 1963. Informal consultations between central office and Land party 
executives suggested that Erhard was the consensus choice and despite Adenauer's 
dissatisfaction, Erhard became Chancellor in 1963. 
Erhard's initial popularity with the electorate as the father of the economic 
miracle could not hide the extent of Christian Democratic problems in the 1960s. Shorn 
of its father-figure, divided on foreign policy matters between Gaullists and Atlanticists 
and lacking a proper organisational base in the electorate, the party also faced a stronger 
challenge from the SPD. The decade marked a period of transition for the Union 
(Haungs 1992:175). Erhard remained distant and detached from party affairs and had no 
real power base within the party (Padgett 1994:52-54). Indeed, until 1966, Adenauer 
remained party chairman, undermining his successor on a number of occasions. Erhard's 
later ascent to party chairman after the resignation of Adenauer was a futile, overdue 
6 This will be covered in more detail in section III. 
7 This meant obstructing the obvious choice Ludwig Erhard who enjoyed a great deal of public 
popularity due to his economic refonns. See Kleinmann (1993: 174-6). 
According to Kleinmann (1993:185) nearly a quarter of the CDU's previous 1957 voters 
deserted the party. 
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attempt to counteract his weakness within the Union. After the successful 1965 election 
(47.6%, +2.3%), he formed a new coalition with the FDP but faced mounting internal 
dissent. The party had successfully emancipated itself from Adenauer's authoritarian 
style but this had released more internal conflict. After a poor showing in the 1966 North 
Rhine Westphalia Land election and coalition budgetary disagreements exacerbated by 
an economic downturn, Erhard's cabinet collapsed. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger was the 
favoured choice of the Fraktion for the new leader and following negotiations with the 
SPD, a CDU/CSU-SPD Coalition was formed with Kiesinger as Chancellor. 
Initially, the Christian Democrats benefited from the creation of the Grand 
Coalition. The SPD had difficulties justifying the alliance to its voters while the Union 
performed much better in the Land elections of 1967. This upswing, however, proved to 
be only of short term significance. Sharing power with the Social Democrats required 
adaptations to the CDU's governing style. The government authority which it had long 
used as part of its appeal was now also claimed by the SPD, which had the key 
economics and foreign affairs ministries. The divisions within the CDU and CSU 
towards the alliance were aggravated by the personal tensions between Kiesinger, CSU 
chairman Strauss and Schroder (Pridham 1977: 180-1). Moreover, the emergence of the 
extra-parliamentary opposition and the 1968 movement added to the general impression 
that the CDU had not kept pace with social developments. The swing between the 
coalition partners was modest but the slight drop in support for CDU/CSU (-1.5%) and 
rise for the SPD (+3.4%) in 1969 appeared to confirm the growing momentum behind 
the SPD and critically, opened up the possibility of a SPD-FDP alliance. Repeating the 
success of SPD-FDP co-operation in electing Heinemann (ironically an ex-Christian 
Democrat) as Federal President earlier in the year, a Social-Liberal coalition was formed 
pushing the Christian Democrats into opposition for the first time. Kiesinger remained 
party chairman but in the year following the election, the party remained in a state of 
shock as it struggled to adapt to its new situation. 
Austrian People's Party «)VP) 
The history of the Austrian People's Party stretches back to before the end of WWII. 
The idea of a new party of social integration was born in the Dachau camps where 
numerous major political figures, many from the old Christian Social party, were 
imprisoned. Prisoners of all political hues agreed on the underlying causes for the failure 
of Austrian democracy: an unwillingness amongst the political elite to co-operate and 
9 A number of members of der Spiegel's editorial team were arrested after the magazine had 
published an article on the government's defence policy. 
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compromise, the lack of an Austrian nation consciousness and a failure throughout the 
nation to identify with the state as whole (Kriechbaumer 1995: 13). In contrast to the 
Christian Socials, the new party was to be democratic, loyal to the Austrian nation and 
more distant to the Catholic Church (Reichhold 1975:62-3). It is important, however, to 
stress the strong elements of continuity with the pre-war party, particularly in terms of 
personnel and the social basis of support (Muller 1997:265). Upon release, figures like 
Felix Hurdes made contact with business and farmers' leaders and trade unionists with a 
view to winning their support for a new political grouping. In view of the advance of 
Soviet troops towards Vienna in April 1945, the foundation of the 6vp proceeded 
swiftly in order to establish some political stability and prevent the possible dissolution 
of the network of ties that had been built up. 
The Soviet-zone provisional government headed by the socialist Renner 
included the newly founded 6vp along with the Socialist sp6 and the Communist 
KPO. The party's representative in the cabinet was Leopold Figl and he became party 
chairman in September of that year as other potential candidates declined on health 
grounds. A crucial decision with far-reaching consequences was made when it was 
agreed that the internal interest groups, the Business, Farmers' and Workers and 
Employees' Leagues, should be the constituent elements of the partylO. Largely due to 
the enforced absence of competitors on the rightll, the OVP managed to win an absolute 
majority of seats in the first election to parliament (Nationalrat) in November 1945 and 
formed a national government with the SPO and initially the KP012 with Figl assuming 
the chancellorship. Even while Figl was still chairman of the party, a change in the 
balance of power could already be detected. The leaders of the Land parties were 
becoming increasingly influential, particularly Julius Raab, the chairman of the Lower 
Austrian Party. Additionally, the Business and Farmers' Leagues were growing in power 
with the Workers and Employees' League hampered by its lack of standing in the 
Chamber of Labour and the Trade Union Federation (OGB) (Kriechbaumer 1995:29). 
The model for the party was no longer the left-of-centre French MRP and increasingly, 
the Austrian Christian Democrats looked across at their West German neighbour for 
inspiration. 
Through co-operation in government and the structures of the social partnership, 
old enmities were if not completely forgotten, then at least put to one side in order to 
10 See Section IV. 
11 The Allies were unwilling to license any party to the right of the People's Party. 
12 The KPO left in 1947 in protest against the currency reform and the proposed Marshall plan. 
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tackle the nation's problems under the shackles of occupation (Rauchensteiner 1997). 
Some difficulties arose over the nationalisation of industries in the 1945-6 period but 
due to the threat of Soviet intervention in their occupation zone, a compromise was 
swiftly worked out. Despite this co-operation, the SpO argued for the admittance of 
another party onto the political stage, hoping this would split the right wing vote. 
Granted the approval of the Allied Council, the League of Independents (VdU)13, did 
indeed take votes from the OVP in the 1949 election but another coalition with the SPO 
was formed. The renewal of the Grand Coalition was not without controversyl4 and a 
growing feeling of discontent about the extent of compromises being made to the Social 
Democrats was brought to a crisis by the loss of the first ever presidential election in 
1951 (Sully 1981:71) and consequently, Figl was replaced as party chairman by Raab in 
1952. 
Initially, Figl remained Chancellor but in 1953, Raab replaced him in this post 
as well. The leadership changeover signalled a new era in the OVP. Heralded as the 
'Raab-Kamitz course', the party embarked upon a more market-centred approach. 
Kamitz, the new Finance Minister, was the most prominent advocate of the social 
market concept within the OVP while Raab was perceived as a defender of the 'small 
man' (Reichhold 1975:229). Together they crafted an economic policy based on stable 
financial policy, increasing incentives for individual private enterprise and a trade-
oriented growth strategy (Lauber 1996:129). The new business-centred approach of the 
OVP complicated its relationship with the Sp01S but did not endanger the Grand 
Coalition. The continuation of the system of governmental co-operation between the 
parties was now understood as self-evident (Kriechbaumer 1995:41) and was 
institutionalised on a number of levels, from the party-saturated environs of the social 
partnership l6 to the proportional division of posts throughout the public service and 
nationalised industries and the constitutionally required proportionality in many Land 
governments. 
Raab's leadership was based on a personal, paternal style of governing and after 
his successful negotiations with the occupying powers led to the signing of the State 
Treaty in 1955, he cemented his sizeable reputation throughout Austria. The 1956 
13 The VdU only contested one election and as the representative of the German nationalist-
liberal bloc was succeeded by the Freedom Party (FP(j). 
14 To the consternation of many in the People's Party, the SP(j received the Justice Ministry and a 
state secretary for infrastructure and the nationalised industries. 
IS For example, differing budgetary priorities led to early elections in 1956. 
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election brought an electoral reward (48.3%, +2.9%) while the challenge of the VdU's 
successor, the Freedom Party, seemed to be declining. This, though, proved to be the 
highpoint of the Raab era. After suffering ill-health in 1957, he then lost his accustomed 
counterpart in the SPO when Scharf was elected as President. The new leader of the 
SPO, Pittermann, was a more adversarial figure and made frequent use of Junktim 
dealsl7 (Kriechbaumer 1995:43). The endless delays this caused to the implementation 
of the government's programme resulted in new elections in 1959. The drop of 1.8% 
suffered by the OVP in this election brought about a crisis in the party. The leadership 
style and policies of Raab were subject to criticism from a new generation of OVP 
politicians (e.g. Klaus, Gorbach) as demand for a fundamental reform of the party 
fermented (Sully 1981:71). This disquiet was intensified by Raab's negotiations for the 
resumption of the coalitionl8• Soon after, Raab made way as party chairman for Gorbach 
and eventually, Gorbach took over the chancellorship after Raab resigned for health 
reasons. 
Gorbach's accession to Chancellor brought a comprehensive reshuffle of the 
cabinet introducing a number of young modernisers more inclined to value economic 
growth as their top priority. Growth rates were dipping and many critics bemoaned the 
tendency towards paralysis in Grand Coalition government. As a result, the OVP fought 
a more aggressive campaign in 1962 and reclaimed some of its lost votes (+ 1.2%). This 
success was short-lived as Klaus left the cabinet in protest at the outcome of the 
coalition negotiations while another reformer Withalm was also scathing about the 
party's failure. A split between the generation ensconced in Grand Coalition politics and 
the reformers developed (Hanisch 1994:449). The Habsburg scandal19 was another blow 
to Gorbach's leadership and when Klaus and Withalm became party chairman and 
general secretary respectively, a confrontation could not be avoided. After failing to win 
the unconditional backing of the parliamentary Klub for the rest of the legislative period, 
Gorbach resigned in April 1964 and was replaced as Chancellor by Klaus. 
16 For more on the Social Partnership, see Pelinka and Rosenberger (2002:167-182) and Lauber 
(1992).; Proporz system Luther (1992). 
17 This is the process of log-rolling two unrelated policy ideas as a means of achieving 
compromise. 
18 Klaus, for instance, was in favour of an alliance with the FPC) while Raab's initial offer of the 
Finance Ministry to the SPc) had been withdrawn after sizeable resistance from within the 
People's Party. 
19 Habsburg wanted to return to Austria, a move opposed by the sp6 and the FPC) regardless of 
Habsburg's willingness to sign the legally-required declaration of loyalty to the Republic. The 
6vp was more divided on the issue. 
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The changes in the OVP leadership foreshadowed the end of the coalition in 
1966. Mounting popular dissatisfaction with the incessant postponement of difficult 
decisions had already been evident for some time and this together with the SPO's 
internal problems2o gave the OVP its second absolute majority. SPO leader Kreisky 
managed to convince his party's executive board of the benefits of opposition (Muller 
1999b) and the first single party government in the history of the Second Republic was 
fonned. In many ways, this did not amount to as consequential a change as had been 
envisaged as Austrian politics remained highly consensual with both parties unwilling to 
disturb the post-war political fonnula too greatly. The sp6, for instance, still remained 
highly involved in decision making indirectly through the social partnership and through 
Land governments. Even in parliament, only 62 of the 515 laws passed in the 1966-70 
period were enacted with only 6vp support (Sully 1981 :72). 
The four year period of 6vp single party government did not herald a decisive 
realignment within Austrian politics. Instead, it was to be the electoral high-water mark 
for the People's Party. In government alone, it had sole responsibility for tackling 
sensitive issues deferred in the years of coalition. This was further complicated by an 
economic slowdown which necessitated tax rises and state cutbacks. At the same time, 
the composition of the party increasingly appeared out of step with Austrian society as a 
whole. Two vital segments of the party's electorate and membership, fanners and the 
self-employed, were in decline and the fa~ade of a modem, refonnist party projected in 
the 1966 election was quickly shattered (Muller 1988:97). The government was also 
hampered by a lack of discipline: battles between members of the cabinet over the 
allocation of the budget were waged via the press and an air of indecision hung over the 
cabinet as Klaus failed to impose his authority. Following a string of defeats in Land 
elections, the party lost its absolute majority in the 1970 Nationalrat election, falling 
behind the SPO. Kreisky's strategy following the election clearly aimed at the creation 
of a sp6 minority government (Muller 2000b:97) and this was successfully achieved 
when the People's Party unsurprisingly rejected his derisory offer of cabinet seats, 
choosing, instead, to go into opposition for the first time. 
The Dutch Confessional Parties 
No cross-denominational party emerged in the Netherlands in the immediate post-war 
period as the Dutch religious parties were able to refonn virtually unaltered. This lack of 
20 The party was caught up in a web of scandals and its stance on several issues appeared 
dogmatic. The departure of Olah and his subsequent formation of a new left wing party was a 
further blow to the SPO. 
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change was due to a number of factors: the Dutch system of subcultural pillarisation had 
resisted the challenge of anti-system parties before the Nazi invasion. Dutch pillarisation 
was still entrenched and there seemed little need for fundamental reform of it. 
Furthermore, many of the pre-war politicians re-emerged as leading political figures and 
most preferred the preservation of separate party identities. Our survey of Christian 
Democracy in the Netherlands must, therefore, begin in the late 19th century with the 
formation of the Anti-Revolutionaries. 
The Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) was not just the first religious party to 
organise in the Netherlands, it was the earliest of all parties21 • After 1848, Dutch politics 
was dominated by the liberals who were as yet without a party organisation. Formed in 
1879, the ARP was the first challenger to this supremacy. The party primarily 
represented members of the dissident orthodox Calvinist groups (after 1892, the 
different secessionists came together to form the Gereformeerde Kerken) who had split 
from the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerki2 in 1843 and 1886. 
The main political controversy mobilising the founders of the ARP was the issue of 
public education. The secular liberals were adamant that public schools should be devoid 
of sectarian content and that religious schools should not be state financed. This was 
strongly opposed by the gereformeerde. As their name suggests, the Anti-Revolutionary 
Party also rejected the values of the French revolution, as Groen van Prinsterer put it 
"Against the Revolution, the Gospels" (Irwin 1998:143). Particularly offensive to the 
Anti-Revolutionaries was the idea that sovereignty was vested in the people. Yet despite 
this disdain for democracy, there was a general acceptance within the ARP of the 
political arrangements which granted a voice to the 'smaller people' of clerks, farmers 
and shopkeepers23. The party was bolstered through the dynamic and charismatic 
leadership of Abraham Kuyper who was instrumental in both the construction of the 
party and the creation of a tight, unified gereformeede subculture. "Kuyper organised a 
daily newspaper, an Anti-School Law League, a mass political movement against the 
Liberal school law, the first national political party- the Anti-Revolutionary Party 
(ARP), the Free University in Amsterdam and a separate church organisation" (Irwin 
1980: 168). This organisational network mushroomed in subsequent years to include 
trade unions, health care organisations and a variety of different leisure groups. 
21 This early fonnation of cross-class mass based party helps, together with late industrialisation, 
to explain the relative weakness of socialist parties in the Netherlands. 
22 As both gerefonneerde and hervonnde translate as 'reformed', gerefonneerde will be used 
throughout the thesis to avoid confusion. 
23 For an interesting exploration of Kuyper's ambivalence towards democracy and his other 
beliefs, see Heslam (2002). 
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The Anti-Revolutionaries' network was part of a broader system of subcultural 
pillarisation (verzuilling) which came to international prominence in the 1960s primarily 
due to Lijphart (1968) and Daalder (1955; 1966). Dutch consociationalism, according to 
Lijphart, undermined the argument that deeply divided societies could not support stable 
functioning democracies. Lijphart demonstrated that such deep-rooted cleavages24 could 
be bridged by elite co-operation. The divisions between the different religious traditions 
in the Netherlands were historically rooted: Catholics had for a long time effectively 
been second class citizens and the southern predominantly Catholic provinces treated 
almost as colonies. Even after the centralisation of government under French occupation 
and later Willem I, the different religious communities remained self-contained leading 
to an exceptionally segmented nation in which individuals could live almost entirely 
within their own homogenous subculture. The diffuse subcultural network of Dutch 
Catholics mirrored the associations of the orthodox Calvinist world. Whereas the 
gereformeerde pillar was actively created by political leaders, Catholic subculture 
evolved more slowly, orchestrated by the bishops. No Catholic political party existed 
until the 1920s with the diverse group of Catholic deputies in parliament frequently 
divided. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, the Catholic members of 
parliament were beginning to unite with their Calvinist counterparts over the religious 
schools issue. This cross-denomination co-ordination marked the transcendence of a 
long history of intolerance but elite accommodation did not herald a dissolution of 
subcultural boundaries. Indeed, the divisions between the gereformeerde and the Dutch 
Reformed members in the ARP could not be overcome and as a result of the formers 
dominance within the ARP, several prominent figures left the party. This dissident group 
created a separate party which became the Christian Historical Union (CHU) in 1908. 
Unlike the ARP, the party was opposed to further extensions of the franchise and 
attracted a more upper-middle and upper class electorate (Irving 1979: 198). Dutch 
Reformed subculture lagged far behind its Catholic and gereformeerde equivalents in 
terms of its reach and density and similarly, the CHU lacked the organisational 
infrastructure of the ARP and remained more of a cadre party (Andeweg and Irwin 
1993:51). The loyalty of members of the Dutch Reformed Church to the CHU was never 
as overwhelming as the support of Catholics and orthodox Calvinists for their respective 
parties. Sizeable numbers were always willing to vote for the ARP, liberals or socialists 
(Koole 1996:116). 
24 The depth of these cleavages bas been questioned. Kieve (1981) believed that Lijpbart over-
emphasised the degree of societal division and that the pillars were instead constructed by elites 
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The most divisive issues of the period (education, franchise extension, social 
welfare) remained unresolved until 1917 when the 'pacification' settlement reached 
agreements acceptable to all the major political groupings (Gladdish 1991:25-26). The 
resolution of these controversies through a new constitution, though, did not herald the 
end for the confessionals. These parties no longer understood themselves as 
emancipation movements seeking to free their communities from the interference of the 
state but as defenders of the system (Lepszy and Koecke 2000: 128) and they played the 
pre-eminent role in government formation throughout the inter-war period. The Roman 
Catholic State Party (RKSP) was finally established in 1926, greatly enhancing the 
political influence of Dutch Catholics by minimising factionalism. Bakvis (1981) has 
convincingly demonstrated that the incredible loyalty of the Catholic electorate, first to 
the RKSP and then post-1946 to the Catholic People's Party (KVP), was not due to 
strong identification with the party itself but was founded upon the discipline exercised 
by the Catholic church hierarchy. Despite their original misgivings, the bishops routinely 
insisted on the need for Catholic political unity following the RKSP's establishment, a 
coded way of imploring Catholics to vote for it. These pronouncements, together with 
the punishments for those Catholics joining the Socialist party, trade union etc, were 
sufficient to fortify the party's electoral position. Furthermore, the Catholic party was 
crucial to the formation of any new cabinet due to its position in the middle of the 
political spectrum (Zwart 1993:28). 
After WWII, the parties had little difficulty in re-establishing themselves. The 
efforts of activists, predominantly leftists, to explode the pillarised system with the aim 
of creating two large parties failed as did the attempt to form a new Christian People's 
Party from a merger of the ARP and CHU. Subcultural networks remained tight and 
there was no great enthusiasm for change within the various party hierarchies nor 
amongst the grassroots. The pre-Occupation party system was not restored unmodified: 
the newly named KVP attempted to project a broader, more inclusive appeal 
emphasising its commitment to socially progressive ideals in order to attract non-
Catholics (Bakvis 1981:67-8). Yet the party remained rooted in the Catholic community 
as the hierarchy of the Church explicitly favoured the creation of separate confessional 
organisations including an exclusively Catholic political party, thwarting any attempt to 
establish a cross-denominational party (Koole 1996. p.165). Although unable to escape 
the Catholic ghetto, the KVP's new programmatic priorities did pave the way for a phase 
of close collaboration with the Labour party (PvdA) in a series of 'Roman-red' 
acting in their own interests i.e. to divide the working class. See Andeweg and Irwin (2002: 17-
34) and Daalder (1989) for a comprehensive overview of the pillarisation debate. 
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coalitions from 1946 until 195825• During this period, both the KVP and CHU votes 
remained very stable although the ARP suffered some losses26• For many foreign 
observers, the extraordinary stability of this period came to be synonymous with the 
Dutch consociational system27• Ironically, just as international academic awareness of 
Dutch accommodationist politics began to increase, the political system increasingly 
revealed signs of strain. 
Towards the end of the Roman-Red period, sections of the PvdA became 
increasingly frustrated with the limitations of co-operation with the Catholics. 
Discontent was also rife in the KVP and the party edged towards the right. The 
confessional parties continued to work together but after 1958, increasingly in 
conjunction with the liberal VVD. This was broken by the short-lived Cals cabinet 
between April 1965 and November 1966 which brought the PvdA together with the 
KVP and ARP. The optimism felt within the PvdA upon its return to government was 
quickly extinguished by KVP parliamentary leader Schmelzer who brought the 
government down. The acrimonious break-up of the government influenced Dutch 
politics decisively, nurturing a strong anti-confessional sentiment in the PvdA. The 
incident also demonstrated the disarray of the KVP (Koole 1996: 172) and support 
dropped 5.4% in the 1967 election. Faced with an increasingly independent electorate 
and a Church now unwilling to enforce political discipline, KVP leaders increasingly 
began to push for more cross-confessional co-operation. 
While the process of depillarisation was most clear in the Catholic subculture, 
its effects were felt throughout Dutch society. Other parties were also struggling to 
maintain their grip on their electorate as the lines between communities became more 
permeable. Support for the CHU remained relatively stable but the party's position was 
threatened by falling religious orthodoxy and the erosion of the link between active 
membership of the Dutch Reformed Church and CHU support (Andeweg 1982). In 
contrast, the ARP's hold on orthodox Calvinists endured and orthodox Calvinist 
religious participation remained relatively high (Gladdish 1991:47). While the ARP had 
re-styled itself as a "progressive party, deeply suspicious of capitalism" (Kennedy 
2002:51), its relative success in the later half of the 1960s seemed less due to this 
25 For more detail on post-war cabinets, see Appendix. 
26 The ARP was at this time caught between its (post-1952) participation in a social welfare-
expanding government and it own Kuyper-inspired aversion to state intervention (Kennedy 
2002:50) 
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programmatic shift as to the popularity of its leader Zijlstra28 (Koole 1996: 11 0). In any 
case, the ARP could not ignore the predicament of the KVP and CHU as their 
difficulties destabilised the political system and jeopardised the confessionals' strong 
position within it. By the end of the decade, the confessionals all accepted the need for 
closer co-operation29 but divisions between them still prevented a merger despite the 
increasing precariousness of their position. 
III. Christian Democratic ideology 
CDU and OVP 
The earliest programmes of the two parties reflect clearly the strong influence of the 
respective social wings at that time. The CDU's Ahlen programme (1947), an outline of 
the economic and political ideas of British zone CDU, is quite striking for the aversion 
to the unrestricted free market. Its opening paragraphs made clear that the economic and 
social order to be established must avoid the "accumulation of economic power in the 
hands of individuals, companies, private and public organisations" (section 'Ziel aller 
Wirtschaft ist die Bedarfsdeckung des Volkes,3~ which was a threat to the freedom of 
the individual. Although property rights, competition and private enterprise were 
accepted, those features of capitalism thought unsuitable for the German people were to 
be reformed, especially the concentration of power in individual enterprises. Moreover, 
the programme sought the socialisation of the mining and iron industries. However, state 
socialism was explicitly rejected, underlining that the CDU was attempting to establish a 
new form of economic system. This new system was to based on inclusion: in large 
firms, participation boards for workers and employees were to be created. 
The social Christian vision was also instrumental in shaping the OVP's earliest 
statement of principles (Muller 1997:278). The Programmatische Leitsiitze 
(Programmatic Principles) (1945) reflected the early dominance of the Workers and 
Employees League in the OVP. Amongst the guiding principles was social justice 
(Article 1) and as in the Ahlen document, a limited measure of nationalisation was also 
proposed. Moreover, the party desired a "genuine social state .... a state with exemplary 
27 While it has been pointed out that this era was exceptional (Kieve 1981), it can certainly be 
argued that a number of trends (elite co-operation, building of subcultural pillars) that had been 
evident since the later stages of the 19th century reached their zenith during this time. 
28 Zijlsrta had led the rump cabinet after the fall of the Cals government and was widely admired 
for his pragmatism. 
29 Nonetheless, differences existed between the three parties. Following ARP chairman Berhuis' 
call in 1967 for closer collaboration, a working group comprised of representatives from the three 
Earties was established to examine questions of ideology, strategy and organisation. 
o References to party programmes will generally refer to articles. When the section cited has no 
article reference, the section name will be given. 
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social legislation and model social institutions" (Article 15). The content of the 
document, though, was also influenced by the haste with which the programme was 
drawn up. Some of the classic hallmarks of Christian Democracy are missing. There was 
no direct mention of a Christian image of man nor is there a great deal of emphasis on 
the key elements of personalism and solidarity (Kriechbaumer 1995b:l09). Despite this, 
it contained a far fuller agenda than the Ahlen programme. The overcoming of past 
mistakes was clear in the acceptance of co-operation between all democratic parties and 
the OVP's ardent support for the Austrian nation. This new national consciousness 
infused every part of the programme, signalling the definitive break from the formerly 
dominant concept of the second German state. Additionally, the commitment to 
democracy and personal and cultural freedoms was strongly emphasised throughout 
(Articles 1,6). The economic ideas of the party remained imprecise but the achievement 
principle was central as were the rights to private property and a working wage. State 
intervention was acceptable only where it was more suitable for a particular good or 
service than private enterprise (Article 11). 
In the following years, both West German and Austrian parties moved 
rightwards. Despite its subsequent symbolic value as a rallying point for the social wing 
and an irritant for the business wing, the Ahlen programme's contemporary significance 
was limited as the ideas expressed in it were quickly toned down as Adenauer 
established his grip on the party. This is not to suggest that the ideas of the document 
were discarded entirely: the search for a new way between unregulated capitalism and 
collectivism remained a trademark of Christian Democratic thought as did the goal of 
social integration. Nonetheless, the Diisseldorfer Leitsiitze programme (1949), a year 
after the currency reform, contained greater acceptance of market forces, a stronger 
stress on private property and introduced the social market economy model. Throughout 
the brief document, the emphasis was on the conditions necessary for the social market: 
private property, lowering of prices rather than wage increases, freedom of profession, 
central supervision of monetary system, protection of currency, freedom of entrance into 
the market, tax reform and independent control of monopolies. The planned economy 
was rejected but economic policy making was to playa key role in serving the welfare 
of the nation. The contrast with the Ahlen programme was unmistakable. At this 
juncture, control of monopolies was the main social component of the social market 
economy (Leaman 1988:52) and the fading influence of the social reformist wing of the 
party was clear. Yet the identity of the CDU in this phase, nor indeed in subsequent 
periods, could be reduced to its policy documents. The concept of the social market 
economy developed beyond the specifications of the Diisseldorfer Leitsiitze under the 
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demands of CDU voters. For example in 1951, Adenauer pushed ahead with co-
determination in the coal and steel industries, securing support among the unions and the 
Social Committees (Bosch 2002:21). Despite this, the balance between the social 
elements and the market components of CDU's programme by this stage was heavily 
tipped towards the latter. 
A similar transition took place in Austia where the movement of the 6vp from 
a centre-left position to a centre-right one under the chairmanship ofRaab was echoed in 
party programmes (Kriechbaumer 1995:112). The structure of the "Alles fUr 6sterreich" 
programme of 1952 was identical to that of the 1945 document but a new tone was 
discernible. The most significant divergence with the earlier programme was in socio-
economic principles. Emphasis was more firmly placed on the limitation of the state's 
involvement in the economy. Whereas the Programmatische Leitsiitze foresaw some 
nationalisation, the 1952 document was more reserved. The transfer of industries or 
services to the public sector was to be rejected unless there was an economic advantage. 
The "Alles fUr 6sterreich" document also mentioned the damage done by 
bureaucratisation and stated that budgetary policy should be guided by frugality. The 
social component of the programme replicates much of the earlier 1946 plan yet 
crucially, small adjustments have been made. Unemployment was to be countered 
through increases in production, wage increases could only be afforded if they were 
economically justified (Article 25) and the right to strike must never be used for political 
purposes. 
Aside from the socio-economic aspects of the programme, the document was 
again notable for its more fully-fledged expression of Christian Democratic ideas in 
comparison to the CDU. Solidarity and federalism had become key principles of the 
party in addition to freedom (Article 3) and democracy (Article 2)31. Solidarity was 
based on the understanding that mankind forms a family and that everyone is dependent 
on others. From this, it followed that the interests of the individual can only be protected 
if he or she acts in the interests of the whole which in tum takes their interests into 
account. This philosophical backing for the 6vP's ideas, however brief, underpinned 
the rest of the party's principles. The section on cultural policy restated much of the 
earlier "Programmatische Leitsiitze": Austrian national consciousness was to be 
protected and bolstered, the educational rights of the parent were to be guaranteed and 
31 Interestingly, the programme also gives some support for the instruments of direct democracy, 
a theme that only recurred in public discourse much later and one that is not typically Christian 
Democratic. 
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furthered through funding for private religious schools and education should contain a 
Christian element. However, there were also some new developments. While the 6vp 
endorsed the influence of Christianity on society and its historical traditions, the party 
was not bound to anyone denomination, exemplifying one of the crucial differences 
between Christian Democracy and the pre-war confessional parties. 
The next significant statement of the CDU's aims was the Hamburg Programme 
(1953). It was a measure of the party's lack of programmatic interest that this was 
actually the first binding programme for the whole federal party. Even then, though, its 
primary function was as a quasi-manifesto with a clear focus on contemporary issues 
and a summation of the party's achievements in government. Despite this, the Hamburg 
programme remained the only statement of programmatic aims for the CDU for fifteen 
years and was closer to a fully developed basic programme than previous efforts. It gave 
the first indirect mention of subsidiarity in its opening section recognising the rights of 
the individual, the family and free social organisations. The authority of the state was 
only to be involved when self-administration was inadequate for the task in hand 
(Section I). Additionally, more detail on the social side of the social market economy 
concept was presented. "We approve of the systematic influencing of the economy by 
market-orientated means, the legal protection of competition and the fulfilment of the 
social responsibilities given to us" (Section III). Furthermore, social policy was "not an 
appendage of the social market economy, rather it is its goal". The earlier desire to 
prevent cartels and monopolies was again an important focal point but unemployment 
was also to be fought with all available means, including, if necessary, active 
employment policy. Financial assistance for the family through tax relief, subsidies and 
insurance and help for war victims and their families and the introduction of a clear 
pension law were further elements ofthe programme's social agenda. 
The Hamburg programme also voiced the Union's foreign policy priorities for 
the first time. The CDU's strong anti-Communist stance was expressed in the final part 
of the document. Although the party aimed for reunification, a united Germany must be 
free and respect human rights. At the same time, the CDU also expressed its 
endorsement for European co-operation through the Coal and Steel Community and 
NATO. This marked the first occasion where these foreign policy goals were explicitly 
connected in a party programme. Contrary to the arguments of the socialists, the way 
towards German unification could only be achieved through Western alliances·which 
would guarantee that unified Germany would be democratic and free from Soviet 
influence. 
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In many respects the Hamburg programme dealt with practical questions32 but 
certain key Christian Democratic principles could be discerned: market ideals balanced 
by social concern, an emphasis on the family as the foundation of the social order, anti-
Communism and a strong commitment to West European alliances and an inclination 
towards self-administration where possible. The longevity of the programme, however, 
was less to do with its value as a summary of Christian Democratic ideas than to the 
general lack of ideological discussion during the Adenauer era and the undeveloped 
structures of the party itself. 
In contrast to the lack of programmatic activity within the CDU, the avp 
continued to refine its ideological platform with "Was wir wollen" (1958). That this was 
necessary was not due solely to internal party pressure. Coalition disagreements over 
economic policy were becoming increasingly common and the Spa had itself brought 
out a new policy platform33• Much of the document repeated earlier themes: freedom, 
democracy, education, support for private property, the importance of the family. The 
theme of subsidiarity was more explicitly defined than in previous statements. 
"Fundamentally, the larger community should always only assume responsibility from 
smaller ones when the smaller communities are unable to bear this responsibility" 
(section 'Echte Demokratie duldet keine Machtzusammenballung'). In accordance with 
this principle, extensive autonomy was to be guaranteed for both the Lander and 
professional bodies. Despite the reiteration of established themes, there was also clearly 
an attempt to update the image of the party for the 'nuclear age', that the party's 
"eternally valid values" continued to be essential "at this turning point in history" 
(section 'Der Mensch in unserer Zeit'). The chief threat to modern man came from the 
growing power of the state. Against this, the party declared itself willing to fight 
collectivism and to preserve the personal sphere of individual influence. Additionally, in 
order to prevent people from becoming slaves of technology, it was necessary to give 
people freedom and the chance to shape their own life. Another fresh development was 
the support given to the unification of Europe and to peaceful European co-operation, a 
typical Christian Democratic theme as shown in Chapter 1. Yet with the signing of the 
State Treaty three years previously, the party also introduced the principle of Austrian 
32 For example, in the sections on the programme's support for the expellees, refugees and 
victims of the war, the concern for the support of important professions and the building of 
housing. 
33 Confirmation that "Was wir wollen" was partly a response to the sp6's actions comes from the 
explicit references to the Social Democrats' new programmatic statement in the Christian 
Democrats platform. 
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neutrality and as a result of the perceived incompatibility of this and EEC membership, 
the OVP refrained from seeking Austrian membership. 
The two programmes of the 1950s caused some irritation within the party. The 
focus on bureaucratisation and the socialist threat to freedom reduced the significance of 
the social Catholic influence on the party. Many of the programmatic formulations of 
1945 remained in place but more space was devoted to recognising the limits of state 
intervention. The growing focus on the principles of the market economy, indicative ofa 
general trend within the party, triggered discontent within the OAAB (Osterreichischer 
Arbeiter- und Angestelltenbund) as it saw its influence dwindle (Kriechbaumer 
1995b:116). Despite the two programmatic revisions of the fifties, clamour for more 
change was still evident. After the loss of votes in 1959, a growing band of reformers 
represented by Klaus and Withalm called for a new objective style of politics where 
rational calculation and technical expertise would playa leading role (Sully 1981 :90). In 
addition to this technocratic vision, a more value-based form of reform was sought by 
education minister Dimmel (Kriechbaumer 1995b: 119). The two strands of reform 
brought about a new programme introduced at the party conference in Klagenfurt in 
1963. While the Klagenfurt manifesto does reaffirm the party's religious inspiration (i.e. 
its basis on a Christian image of man and society) in line with Drimmel's wishes, it is 
principally a restatement and refinement of previously expressed ideas (i.e. subsidiarity, 
solidarity, social market economy, family as the nucleus of society). Compared to "Was 
wir wollen", there is a greater stress on the social Catholic-inspired elements of 
Christian Democratic thought such as personalism and solidarity but the programme was 
more noteworthy for its clear assertion of fundamental Christian Democratic ideas than 
for its innovation and did not constitute a massive transformation of the party's 
programmatic profile. 
Dutch confessional parties 
The programmatic ideas expressed by the Dutch confessional parties contrasts quite 
sharply with the documents of the CDU and OVP, highlighting again that the West 
German and Austrian Christian Democratic parties were indeed a new phenomenon. For 
the reasons suggested earlier, no Christian Democratic party emerged in the Netherlands 
at this point and the essential continuity of the Dutch parties is illustrated by the fact that 
the ARP's programme, first created in 1878, was only revised, not rewritten, in 1916, 
1934 and 1961 while the CHU's initial programme was formulated in 1908 with 
revisions in 1917, 1928, 1938 and 1951. Even the change from the RKSP to the KVP 
was small compared to the ideological rupture experienced elsewhere. The section will 
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examine the last programmes of the confessionals, in the process contrasting the 
different role of religion, the lack of democratic conviction and the strong concern for 
public morality with those of the CDU and QVP examined earlier. 
Although the ARP in practice was the more dogmatic party, programmatically 
the ARP and CHU share a number of common ideas34. In the programmes of both, 
religion was still absolutely central to the parties' identity. The ARP's "point of 
departure is the confession that God is the absolute Sovereign" (Preamble). The first five 
articles then outlined general principles concerning the application of the 
commandments of God on the state. The CHU also contended that certain lines of 
conduct drawn from the Holy Scripture, the Church and God's Authority must be 
observed. The KVP, by contrast, was far less emphatic in detailing the importance of 
religion to the state and in theory at least less closed. Certainly, the state was called on to 
recognise and serve God (Article 2) but less space was accorded to the nature of the 
state's relationship with God. The most obvious difference was the KVP's attempt to 
escape from the confessional ghetto and this was evident in party's self-description "The 
Catholic People's Party is an organisation which is open to all Dutch people and whose 
task is to support general welfare in the Dutch kingdom through participation in 
government life" (Section 'Wezen en doel van de KVP'). Although the opening to 
society effectively failed, it did mark an important step towards genuine Christian 
Democracy. 
A certain ambivalence towards democracy was obvious in all three parties. 
Neither the ARP nor the CHU believed that the people are sovereign; rather they 
believed that, as Article 2 of the CHU programme states, the "government is in such a 
manner God's servant and is in principle solely responsible to him" and that therefore 
government is "neither an organ of the people nor a representative of the people,,35 while 
the ARP refused to specify "any single form of government as the only acceptable one" 
(Article 5). The KVP also stopped short of endorsing one form of government, arguing 
instead that the structure of government ought to be in accordance with the nature, 
history and development of the nation (Article 4). Nonetheless compared to the ARP and 
the CHU, there was a greater emphasis on individual rights, especially the right to 
property, a critical feature of Christian Democratic programmes, in the KVP programme 
(Article 5). 
34 This echoes Daalder's weB-known remark about the problems of explaining the distinction 
between the Protestant parties to a foreigner (Daalder 1955:3) although there is a certain amount 
of divergence in economic policy. 
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In addition to the endorsement given to the traditional Dutch institutions 
(monarchy, constitution, Church, colonial system) the critical role of education36 in the 
formation of the parties was still apparent. Although only calling for uniform handling 
of both types of education, the ARP believed religious schools should be the dominant 
form of schooling (Article 11). This is also repeated in the KVP programme (Articles 
17,18) and the CHU's programme (Articles 14, 15). The latter further stated that any 
school failing to uphold traditional morality should have its government assistance 
withdrawn. This concern in the defence of moral standards in education was part of a 
wider Protestant interest in public morality and the religious character of Dutch life. For 
example, the ARP argued that the government should do all it possibly "can within the 
bounds of its authority that the people live according to the demands of the law of God" 
(Article 5). Public efforts to combat blasphemy, prostitution, gambling and excessive 
drinking were to be assisted. The CHU stated that the government has a duty to protect 
public morality from anything which is considered contrary to God's will and law 
(Article 13) and called for the protection of the nation's cultural and spiritual goods. 
It must be conceded that this section has presented a rather static picture of their 
programmatic identity of the Dutch confessionals in the post-war period, focusing solely 
on the last Beginseiprogramma of the three parties. While these programmes displayed 
relatively little change, important ideological developments were taking place. Zwart 
(1993) has argued that after 1955 political leaders from each of the three parties 
increasingly accepted that God's will was not objectively demonstrable in the political 
sphere. Religion was no longer seen as a direct guide for policy making, rather it was 
now viewed as "a source of inspiration" (p.32). Furthermore, the ARP in the 1960s 
moved to a much more radical standpoint and even the CHU shifted leftwards. This 
necessarily brief survey of the programmes of the Dutch confessionals has highlighted 
the contrasts between these parties and the development of the Christian Democratic 
thought in West Germany and the Netherlands. However, the changes which Zwart 
depicts brought all three parties closer to the identity of Christian Democratic parties in 
neighbouring countries as well as to each other. The actual explicit creation of this 
programmatic synthesis of the ARP, CHU and KVP, however, was not attempted until 
the 1970s. 
35 See also ARP Article 3. 
36 See earlier. 
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Tentative Beginnings: Programmatic First Steps 
Neither the CDU nor the OVP were programmatic parties: the CDU did not pass a basic 
programme (Grundsatzprogramm) in this period while the OVP's documents were also 
adjudged to fall short of a long-term statement of fundamental principles (Muller 
1997:277). Little attention was given to explaining the parties' understanding of 
humanity and their underlying principles. Nonetheless, the emergent ideology of 
Christian Democracy began to find fuller expression as the parties developed and it is 
still possible to delineate the contours of Christian Democratic thought amid the more 
immediate concerns. This is especially the case with the OVP whose programmes came 
much closer to encapsulating the political identity of Christian Democracy than its 
German equivalent. Such was Adenauer's dominance within the CDU throughout the 
1950s, he and the policies of his governments were almost a substitute for a proper 
programme (Kleinmann 1993:203). 
After early left-leaning programmes, the parties adopted the model of the social 
market economy as the prevailing guideline for policy. Demands for nationalisation 
were soon watered down or dropped entirely in favour of a greater stress on private 
enterprise. Yet despite the growing influence of the business wing within the parties, 
solidarity remained an essential part of their ideological identity and the parties balanced 
their belief in freedom and the market with an element of social concern. This was to be 
directed according to the principle of subsidiarity, a key element of social Catholic 
thought as shown in Chapter 1. Central government was, in theory at least, the last resort 
for solving social or economic problems. The family also emerged as an integral part of 
the Christian Democratic vision of society and was given strong support. Furthermore, 
both parties began to advocate the process of European integration although Austrian 
neutrality prevented the OVP from seeking Austrian entry. 
While the hallmarks of Christian Democratic thought can be uncovered in the 
programmatic documents, it must be reiterated that philosophical self-reflection was of 
marginal importance to the CDU. Indeed, speaking at the 1962 party conference, 
business manager Duthues declared that programmes were "a requisite for ideological 
parties of the 19th century", not for the COU (quoted in Bosch 2002:27). As suggested 
by its greater output, the OVP showed more interest programmatic questions. 
Nonetheless, by 1970, Christian Democratic faced a new era in which more extensive 
programmatic efforts appeared unavoidable. In one respect, it was necessary as public 
interest in ideological questions had increased. Moreover, as both parties were out of 
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government, the production of party programmes could playa vital role in maintaining 
party unity and mobilising grassroots supporters yet such work also threatened to trigger 
more intra-party disputes. 
The main distinctions between the Dutch parties and Christian Democrats 
elsewhere were the weaker commitment to democracy and individual rights and the far 
greater concentration on religious belief in the programmes of the former. The 
confessionals remained fundamentally bound to their religious communities. 
Government was responsible only to God and had to ensure that its authority was 
exercised in harmony with God's will. This stronger stance was accompanied by a 
closed attitude towards the rest of society and a more rigid moral outlook. However, 
these beliefs were already beginning to shift in the 1960s as the confessional parties 
moved closer to a Christian Democratic identity. 
IV. Party Organisation 
CDU 
The federal CDU party only came into existence in 1950, one year after Adenauer had 
become Chancellor. Throughout the following decade, Adenauer's influence on the 
nascent party was extremely strong. Centralised party organs were created but they 
never played the role ascribed to them. The Federal Executive (Bundesvorstand) was 
nominally supposed to be the leading controlling organ but due to its size and the 
infrequency of its meetings, it was unable to fulfil this role (Irving 1979:124)37. The 
Federal Party Committee (Bundesausschuss) was also outsized (213 members by 1959) 
and of little significance in directing party affairs (B6sch 2002:82). The Committee was 
intended as the primary communication link between the work of the party's central 
headquarters and the party in the Lander and accordingly, the Land party associations 
were heavily represented. While the Committee wielded little real authority, this did not 
mean that the Land parties were powerless for as long as they did not stray from the 
central tenets of Adenauer's policy, they had considerable autonomy, if insufficient 
financial and organisational resources. 
The party as a whole remained undeveloped, almost half-fonned in its 
organisation exemplified by the very low level of membership. Until 1967, the party had 
no General Secretary after Adenauer's early attempts to create the post had been 
37 During Adenauer's chairmanship, the number of members of the Executive continually 
increased until it eventually encompassed the party chairman and his deputies, the leader and 
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rebuffed by the Land organisations. Furthermore, the positions of the federal business 
manager (Bundesgeschiiftsfiihrer) and the federal business office were very weak, 
primarily limited to promotional material and party events. Adenauer's style of 
leadership and decision-making was based on informal discussions involving his 
advisers and some of the leading figures in the party, effectively bypassing the proper 
party organs. Even the parliamentary party, which theoretically was in a stronger 
position to influence policymaking, was largely compliant to the Chancellor's wishes. 
Admittedly, the CDU Fraktion showed less voting discipline than their equivalents in 
the SPD but this did was down to regional interests, personal rivalries and even tension 
between the denominations rather than the Fraktion developing a shared will to assert 
itself in decision-making. Its weakness in the Adenauer-era was fully exposed by its 
inability to force Adenauer from his post before 1963 despite the questions about his 
political judgement and his physical fragility. 
The patriarchal, authoritarian style of Adenauer did not mean that his power was 
unconstrained nor that the party exerted no influence. The plurality of different social 
groups within the party required that the Chancellor take account of their concerns. A 
number of auxiliary organisations existed within the structures of the Union to give a 
voice to different social groups. The Social Committees38 were formed in 1945 as an 
amalgamation of Christian trade unionists from the Weimar Republic. It represented the 
Union's workers and employees wing and was primarily concerned with social issues. 
The Business Association (Wirtschaftsvereinigung) by contrast stood for the interests of 
business and industry. Although not formed until 1956, MIT, the artisans and small 
business representatives (Mittelstandsvereinigung), quickly became another influential 
internal pressure group. The youth section of the party, Junge Union, was formed in 
1947 and the association for Christian Democratic women, Frauen Union, followed a 
year later. The expellee and refugee association (Union der Vertriebenen und 
FliJchtlinge) was a further strong lobby group within the COU. The final auxiliary 
association was the local government association (Kommunalpolitische Vereinigung) 
which sought to help small KPV s achieve the aims of Christian Democracy in their 
deputy leader of the parliamentary group, the eleven chainnen of the Land parties, the treasurer 
and the chainnen of the party's auxiliary organisations 
38 Also known as the CDA (Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft). To avoid confusion 
with the Dutch party, the tenn Social Committees will be used throughout the thesis. 
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locality. In addition to the auxiliary organisations, there was also a number of special 
organisations whose influence was not greae9• 
Adenauer was able to sustain the broad mixture of ideas and backgrounds in the 
union through the force of his own personality and through symbolic compromises to the 
different interest groups but even before the end of Adenuaer's chancellorship, some 
members of the party recognised the need to bolster the Unions' weak structures40• 
Finally, moves were made in 1962 to imbue the federal party with an independent life. 
Dutbues became the party's first business chairman (geschiiftsfohrende Vorsitzender) 
and a praesidium was formed consisting of the leading figures in the party. The 
praesidium proved a much more effective body at steering the daily life of the party and 
through Dufhues' work, the organisation acquired a new professionalism. Ironically, 
while the reforms produced a more transparent structure, the new-found independence of 
the party undermined the leadership of Adenauer's successor, Erhard41 • 
During the years of the Grand Coalition, party reform continued apace fuelled 
by generational change in the CDU, the need to come to internal agreements before 
cabinet talks and the introduction of the new party law (B6sch 2002:95-97). The party's 
constitution was revised and Bruno Heck was elected as the party's first General 
Secretary with a wide array of competencies42• The reform of the CDU in the 1960s 
made the party a more modem, democratic and transparent organisation less based on 
charismatic leadership and personality. However, arguably this made the party even 
harder to govern. Even when in office, CDU leaders faced the taxing challenge of 
integrating the range of different interests while concurrently giving the party clear 
leadership. 
()VP 
The rapid growth of the People's Party in the immediate post-war period was mainly due 
to its use of social and political networks that actually predated the party. Priority was 
initially accorded to rebuilding the structures of farmers, business and Christian trade 
39 For example, Protestant Working Group (Evangelischer Arbeitskreis der CDU/CSU) 
representing the special interests of Evangelic members of the Union and the Student Union 
(ReDS, Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studenten). 
40 The earliest calls for reform of the party came at the 1958 conference. 
41 See Section II. 
42 The General Secretary was responsible for the co-ordination of all party work from the local 
organisations to the associations and special organisations (Kleinmann 1993: 265). 
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unionist associations, rather than forming the actual party43. In September 1945, it was 
agreed to base the party on the Farmers' League, Business League and Workers and 
Employees' League (Ableitinger 1995:147-8). All members to the party were first and 
foremost members of one of the leagues. The leagues were to be financially independent 
and stood for election in their respective Chamber (Le. the Business League in the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Farmers' League in the Chambers of Agriculture and the 
Workers' and Employees' League in the Chamber of Labour). Furthermore, they had 
independent control over the collection of members' fees, the power of appointment 
over most party positions, the selection of candidates for elections and exerted crucial 
influence on party policy (Muller and Steininger 1994b: 12-13). While the League 
structure allowed the GYP to capture a broad spectrum of voters and members, the 
potential for divisive disputes was great, particularly as each league was separately 
represented in the nine Bundeslander. This could produce a plurality of interests and 
identities standing in the way of party unity. In addition to the three main leagues, the 
party also had three other sub-organisations (the youth party, the women's movement 
and the union of senior citizen) and numerous auxiliary organisations with weaker links 
to the main party. 
The party's central organs were its conference, the party executive (Vorstand), 
the party directorate and the party council. The major task of the conference was the 
election of the party chairman, general secretary and his deputy and the financial 
manager who were important figures in the executive. In practice, the executive was the 
principal decision-making body, meeting several times a month (Steiner 1972:150). Also 
included in the Vorstand were the Chancellor (if this was not the chairman), the GYP 
President of the Nationalrat, the chairmen and general secretaries of the Leagues, the 
parliamentary leader (Klubobmann) and a couple of representatives from GYP 
Govemers (Landeshauptmiinner). The party council only met sporadically and was 
given specified tasks while the party directorate, composed of roughly fifty members, 
including all of the party executive, every Land party chairman and leading figures in 
both houses of parliament, was given a policy-shaping and co-ordination role (Steiner 
1972:148-9). However, the directorate often faced hostility from the Land parties and 
the leagues and its power was limited. Overall, the central party organs were 
comparatively not particularly strong. Divisions within the central leadership could also 
hamper the effective use of this authority as, for example, when the posts of Chancellor 
and party chairman were not held by one man. 
43 For example, the formation of the C>AAB, Austrian Workers and Employees League, preceded 
the creation of the People's Party. 
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While the League structure of the People's Party could never be expected to 
produce a strongly centralist party, the strength of central party organs was further 
weakened by the considerable autonomy of the provincial parties. Especially where the 
party supplied the governor, there was a tendency for Land parties to develop separate 
identities and pursue regional interests not in line with the national party. Moreover, 
there was always a degree of tension between the Lower Austrian and Viennese parties 
who supplied many of the leading politicians in the 1945-60 period and those from the 
southern and western Lander. Consequently, in addition to the struggle for power 
between the constituent interest groups, there was also conflict between different 
regional groups. 
The effect of the party's structure was that "of all West European parties, the 
6vp is probably the most shaped by factionalism" (Muller and Steininger 1994b:2). 
Nonetheless as long as the party still held office, there appeared little need for reform. 
This began to change as the party lost its position of superiority over the Socialists 
within the Grand Coalition. In 1959, several proposals to increase centralisation and 
reduce the power of the leagues were made44, (Muller and Steininger 1994b:14). These 
were rejected although central organisation was bolstered in the 1960s by the 
recruitment of more personnel to the party's central headquarters and the collection of 
membership dues by the leagues at the federal level, rather than the Land level as had 
previously been the case. Provincial decline in the late 1960s prompted more debate 
about party reform. Among the proposals were an increase in the strength of the 6AAB 
in party organisations, an age limit on office-holding and the introduction of primary 
elections to select candidates. Few of the proposals succeeded and none of these 
challenged the power of the leagues within the party. It was clear to a number of party 
politicians that the structure of the party was impeding strong central leadership and 
fuelling factional disputes. Additionally, the party's organisation which mirrored the 
social character of the party at the time of its formation increasingly appeared out of step 
with Austrian society and hence a possible electoral liability. Yet these reformers were 
still unable to alter fundamentally the balance of the party while the 6vp was still in 
government. 
44 These included restricting the right of the leagues to nominate candidates and the collection of 
party dues by the central office. 
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Dutch Confessional Parties 
After WWII, the Dutch confessional parties did not face the same taxing questions of 
organisation as the Christian Democrats in Germany and Austria. There was little 
pressure to reform the structures of the ARP and CHU. With the immediate success of 
these parties in re-establishing their ties with their old electorate, there was little 
incentive to change. The ARP had been the first mass party in the Netherlands and had a 
large number of local associations in addition to the larger 18 national constituency 
associations. However the decision-making apparatus was fairly centralised and 
hierarchical. While the local and constituency associations sent representatives to a 
national congress which elected half the members of a national council, power was 
concentrated mainly in the party's executive committee and its praesidium which were 
responsible for the day-to-day steering of the party (Irving 1977:198). Like the CDU and 
the OVP, a number of auxiliary organisations representing specific interests existed 
within the party but these were not especially influential. In comparison, the CHU had a 
very weak organisation and there was a great deal of resistance to the structures of the 
mass party. Little centralised structure existed in the CHU and the party was essentially 
based on constituency-level electoral committees. As the Protestant parties remained 
closed to other denominations, there was less tension between different interests within 
the parties. 
The situation of the KVP was more akin to the problems faced by the German 
and Austrian Christian Democrats. Although the party was not confronted with the same 
degree of organisational plurality within its own structures, it still represented a diverse 
range of groups. The founding of the RKSP took place after the establishment of 
numerous Catholic social groups and "generally the Catholic party lagged behind the 
Catholic organisations in institutional development" (Bakvis 1981:65). The political 
party was the political instrument of the Catholic subculture rather than its master and 
accordingly, the General Assembly of the RKSP had been less a conventional party 
conference than a "mini-parliament of the Catholic world" (Irving 1977:200). When the 
Catholic People's Party was formed after the war, it attempted to limit the diffusion of 
power. Realising that the representation of a plurality of different social groups without 
strong leadership could hamper the party, post-war leaders sought to give more power to 
the party's central organisation, removing the final decision on party lists from local 
parties and placing it under the authority of a central electoral council. In addition, the 
party created a new national congress. An important difference with the fledgling 
Christian Democratic parties elsewhere was that the party's links with interest 
representation groups remained outside the organisation of the party. None of the 
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various Catholic groups (e.g. the Catholic Farmers' Association, Catholic Workers' 
Movement) were actually incorporated into the party's structure. This became crucial 
when the link between the party and the Church was severed. If the party had been based 
on an Austrian-style model of interest incorporation, it might have been possible for the 
KVP to retain a greater number of its electorate. However when the bishops retracted 
their automatic support for the KVP in the 1960s, this effectively kicked away the 
party's electoral crutch. 
V. Conclusion 
The rise of Christian Democratic parties in West Germany and Austria was staggeringly 
swift. Within two decades, the CDU and GVP had assumed and consolidated a powerful 
position in their respective political systems. With the brief exception of Renner in 
Austria, chief executives in West Germany and Austria were exclusively Christian 
Democrats between 1945-69. In government, Christian Democrats presided over a 
period of substantial economic growth as West Germany and Austria were reconstructed 
with American help. Moreover, a number of important reforms such as the pension 
reform in the FRG went some way to meeting the immediate social needs of the age. 
Christian Democratic electoral success was founded on the Volksparteien status of the 
parties. Both attracted a broad, cross-class electorate integrating the traditional right with 
social Catholics and liberals. Ideological questions were downplayed as the parties 
concentrated on government business. Nonetheless, programmatic documents began to 
articulate the fundamental features of Christian Democratic ideology (social market 
economy, freedom balanced by responsibility, solidarity, subsidiarity, family policy, 
European integration) identified in Chapter 1. As the influence of the social wing in each 
party waned, programmes edged to the right through the inclusion of a stronger market 
component. 
The rapid growth of Christian Democratic parties required the swift construction 
of an organisational framework. Decisions made at this early stage were to have 
significant ramifications later on. The CDU developed with two central features: a loose, 
decentralised structure and the dominance of Adenauer over the central party. 
Additionally, different interests were given a voice in the party through the auxiliary 
organisations requiring the party leader to maintain a balance. The OVP also developed 
a broad structure with in-built representation of diverse interests. The Leagues, however, 
wielded significantly more power than the CDU's auxiliary organisations: all members 
of the party were first and foremost members of a League and leading party positions 
were carved up between the three organisations. Like the German party, though, the 
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Austrian central party apparatus was weak. Although strong central party organs were 
eschewed in favour of loose federalised party networks, the potential for a form of 
"organised anarchy" (Wiesendahl 1999: 109) was constrained in the 1950s by a strong 
leader widely popular in the electorate. While Raab's scope for central leadership was 
limited by the power of the Leagues, Adenauer was able to guide the CDU relatively 
unencumbered by formal decision-making bodies. 
In the altered electoral and social circumstances of the following decade, the 
leadership style, programmatic neglect and organisational deficiencies of the parties 
were viewed more critically. The era of the patriarchal leader was over as Raab and 
Adenauer were eventually forced out from their positions. There were the first signs of 
economic difficulty while the growth of the extra-parliamentary opposition and the 
student movement highlighted that the Christian Democratic emphasis on stability and 
continuity was increasingly at variance with the beliefs of younger generations. 
Christian Democratic pre-eminence was under challenge from the invigorated parties of 
the centre-left. The loss of their charismatic leaders released pent-up tension within the 
CDU and the 6vp with younger politicians demanding fundamental reforms of both 
programme and party structure. Although some efforts in this direction were made, 
while the Christian Democrats hung on to power, self-examination could be postponed. 
Programmatic adaptation was thwarted and organisational changes failed to address the 
critical problem for each party. The CDU had yet to find a balance between strong 
leadership and an independent federal party whereas the power of the 6vp's central 
leadership remained critically circumscribed by the Leagues and the provincial parties. 
Therefore, both the CDU and 6vp entered the new decade facing major challenges. 
The influence of national contextual factors prevented the formation of a 
unified Christian Democratic party in the Netherlands in this period. Although the 
experiences of the war did generate several groups whose aim was to reshape the party 
system, their efforts floundered on the still powerful unity within the religious pillars. 
The separate confessional parties re-established themselves and played an integral role 
in the politics of the 1945-65 period, especially the KVP which was never out of 
national office. The programmatic identity of the confessionals differed in a number of 
crucial respects from the German and Austrian Christian Democrats. Unlike the 
Christian Democrats, the Dutch parties believed there was a direct link between the 
Bible and party policy and the emphasis on religion in each of the programmes was 
striking, also visible in their espousal of a much stronger moral agenda. Another contrast 
was the lack of a firm commitment to democracy and freedom in the confessionals' 
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platfonns. Section III also highlighted that the confessionals with the exception of the 
KVP did not face the same problems of organisation as the CDU and the OVP. By the 
late 1960s, it was nonetheless clear that the confessionals were not immune from the 
political change infecting Western Europe. Electoral decline was evident but more 
worrying was the mounting friction within the parties and the gradual breakdown of the 
pillarised system. Again, though, obstacles to change were substantial. Movement 
towards a common Christian Democratic party was still blocked by the gulf between the 
religious communities and their respective parties and by 1970 it was far from certain 
that the distance between the parties could be spanned. 
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Chapter 3. Beyond Halcyon Days:1970-1989 
I. Introduction 
By 1970 the golden years of Christian Democracy were unambiguously at an end. The 
political hegemony of the CDU and the 6vp was shattered as Social Democratic-led 
administrations took office, pushing the CDU and 6vp into opposition. This development 
challenged Christian Democratic self-identity and its integrative capacity. As parties 
knowing nothing other than governmental status, opposition required a complete rethink of 
strategy. The loss of office, however, threatened to unleash the loosely bound plurality of 
opinions and interests integrated within the parties. Although still in government, the Dutch 
confessional parties also faced serious difficulties as support for the KVP and to a lesser 
extent the CHU subsided dramatically as voters lost their political moorings. 
How the parties responded to these developments is the subject of this chapter. 
Section I will review political and electoral developments in this period, highlighting the 
struggle of the CDU and the 6vp to adapt as well examining the torturously slow merger 
negotiations of the Dutch confessionals. Both the CDU and the 6vp turned to the "old 
remedy of conservative parties: leadership change" (Milller 1988:103) without success. By 
the next decade, the political and economic conditions were more favourable as incumbent 
centre-left governments struggled with the crisis of the welfare state and their dwindling 
political legitimacy as "a neo-Liberal wind began to blow across the Channel and the 
Atlantic" (Dumoulin 1997:372). During the 1980s, the CDU, 6vp and CDA (re)established 
their credentials as government parties but as will be shown, the health of each party varied. 
Although leadership change was often the first solution considered, Christian Democratic 
parties also increased their programmatic work. Section II will consider the nature of the 
ideological revisions undertaken and appraise the role of Christian Democratic 
programmatic work in opposition and in government. The final aspect of the Christian 
Democratic reaction was organisational modification which will be covered in Section III. 
The specificities of the change vary according to national context but at the centre of the 
organisational dilemma was the tension between party cohesion and the integration of 
diverse interests and viewpoints within the structures of the party. 
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II. Political and electoral developments 
CDU 
Having lost its accustomed place in government, the COU was initially very slow to adjust 
to the role of opposition. There was a feeling that the party's natural right to govern had 
been taken away. "Possession of the Chancellorship had for too long been the basis of the 
COU/CSU's 'way of life', so that the sudden loss of this advantage produced a feeling of 
profound desperation" (Pridham 1977:190). The loss of power fundamentally challenged the 
successful earlier practices of the COU. Previous neglect of organisation and programme 
could no longer be sustained and the party required a clearer programmatic basis and further 
organisational reform. Change also took place at the top of the party. Parliamentary leader 
Barzel replaced Kiesinger as party chairman after a contest in 1971 with Rhineland-Pfalz 
minister-president Kohl. 
It is important not to overstate the enthusiasm for reform. The party's overall stance 
was one of intransigent opposition. The SPD-FOP government was viewed as almost 
illegitimate and treated accordingly, especially during the Ostpolitik debate (Irving 
1979:136). Ostpolitik caused the Union considerable difficulties with deep divisions 
between different factions 1. This was highlighted by the ratification debates of May where 
Union parliamentarians rebuffed their leader's negotiated settlement with the government, 
ensuring that the unity of the Fraktion could only be upheld through abstention on the 
crucial vote2• The atmosphere of polarisation peaked with the attempt to unseat Chancellor 
Brandt through a constructive vote of no-confidence in 1972. This failed but the continuing 
inflexibility of the Union prompted Brandt to force an early election in the same year by 
orchestrating his own defeat in a motion of confidence. 
The Union's strategy in the 1969-72 period had largely focused on blocking the 
government but had done little to revitalise the party's appeal. Barzel was an unpopular 
chancellor candidate with little power basis outside the Fraktion3 (Kleinmann 1993:321) and 
the Union was not in tune with the widespread public approval of Ostpolitik. Furthermore, 
the divergence of the increasingly self-confident CSU was problematic with its leader StrauB 
a consistently vehement critic of Ostpolitik. Therefore, despite favourable background 
1 For an extensive analysis ofCDU/CSU policy on Ostpolitik see Clemens (1989). 
2 See Pridham (1977:202-3) for further details. 
3 He was neither the chairman of a Land association nor of an auxiliary organisation. 
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conditions for an opposition party (falling growth, inflation, terrorist activity), the 1972 
election brought a resounding defeat for the Union as the SPD became the largest party for 
the first time, condemning the Union to another four years in opposition. Barzel was not 
replaced immediately but in the face of mounting pressure, he resigned as both Fraktion 
leader and party chairman in May 1973. He was replaced by Carstens in the former post and 
Kohl in the latter. Kohl's election coupled with the naming of Biedenkopf as General 
Secretary brought a new reformist impulse to the head of the party4. 
Under Kohl's leadership, the CDU began to adjust to being out of power. The 
earlier hard-line attitude was abandoned in favour of a more constructive strategy, 
organisational and programmatic work. Yet while the extra-parliamentary party was able to 
assert an authority and independence it had previously lacked, Kohl was not universally 
accepted as leader. More conservative members of the CDU thought him too left-wing, an 
opinion shared by the CSU which regarded the CDU programmatic renewal with suspicion 
(Mintzel 1992:202-3). Even among those Union members more receptive to his ideas, Kohl 
was seen as lacking oratory skills and electoral allure. The selection of the CDU/CSU 
candidate for the 1976 Bundestag election was, therefore, by no means certain with StrauB 
eager to challenge the CDU Chairman. Kohl did manage to secure the candidature of the 
Union parties in 1975 due to his wider popular appeal and the CDU's distrust of StrauB but 
his triumph poisoned relations with the CSU. 
The 1976 election brought mixed success for the Union: it was restored as the 
largest party following a confrontational campaign ('Freedom instead of Socialism'), 
achieving its second best result but it still remained in the wilderness of opposition. The 
CDU thus stood before the once unthinkable prospect of a third term out of national office. 
Although Kohl had managed to hold the CDU together during this difficult phase, his 
authority remained in question. The tension between the CDU and the CSU resulted in a 
temporary break-up of the common parliamentary group at the end of 1976. Friction 
between Kohl and Biedenkopf was also evident and following the latter's entry into the 
Bundestag, the post of General Secretary was filled by the provocative Heiner GeiBler. 
Many in the CDU shared Biedenkopf's doubts about Kohl's ability to lead the party back 
into government. The Fraktion regarded the chairman as too ready to compromise and weak 
(BOsch 2002: 115) and the Union was still failing to make a clear impact upon the SPD and 
4 See Huneeus (1996) for more detail on CDU reforms under Kohl's leadership. 
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its popular Chancellor Schmidt (Padgett and Burkett 1986:133). The question of the 
Chancellor candidate for the 1980 election was still unresolved. Recognising the weakness 
of his own position, Kohl sought alternatives to StrauB such as Albrecht. For the CSU, the 
whole alliance was at stake: either StrauB was candidate for the union parties or the 
Bavarian party would go its own way. The latter option was averted when StrauB was 
chosen as the candidate after a vote by the COU/CSU Fraktion in 1979. This was a setback 
for both the COU's organisational reformers and its social wing who were now expected to 
close ranks behind the arch-conservative StrauB even as it quickly became apparent that 
StrauB had little chance of ousting Schmidt from the Chancellory (Mintzel 1982: 151). 
StrauB's lack of appeal outside his Bavarian heartland was confirmed with crushing 
defeat in 1980 where the Union received its worst vote since 1949. Kohl's willingness to 
bide his time during StrauB's ascendancy paid off as StrauB accepted that Kohl would be the 
next Kanzlerkandidat. Kohl's performance was not without criticism within the party but 
with the social-liberal coalition plagued by internal disputes and a poor economic record, a 
swift return to power looked secure. Following the sole successful constructive vote of no-
confidence in the FRG's history, Kohl's long-cherished dream of a COU/CSU-FOP 
government under his chancellorship was finally realised and the new government received 
electorallegitimisation through its success in the early elections called in 19835• 
Upon becoming chancellor, Kohl promised a turning point (Wende) against a 
backdrop of a spiritual-moral crisis of fear, flight from reality and helplessness. This 
predicament also had an economic dimension and the main pledges of the new government 
promised an austerity programme of state cutbacks to restore health to an ailing economy. 
The increasingly influential economically liberal wing of the party were now steering 
programmatic innovation. A number of economic reforms were passed in the early days of 
the new government which indicated a more market-centred approach6• Yet the Wende did 
not entail a radical change of course for the CDU as a whole. The social Catholic roots of 
the party were not entirely abandoned and the social committees continued to battle against 
cuts in social spending (Zohnlhofer 1999; Webber 1992). Zealously pushing through radical 
reforms to free market forces was inimical to Kohl's style of political management which 
5 Kohl used the same tactic to stimulate an early election as Brandt had done in 1972. 
6 These included a reduction of tax on property and business and cutbacks in the budget of the Federal 
Institute for Work. 
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was essentially based on consensus (Clemens 1994; Huneeus 1996). Change throughout the 
1980s remained piecemeal and no attempt was made to restructure fundamentally the 
welfare state. Social expenditure stabilised in the mid-1980s (Seeleib-Kaiser 2001: 111) and 
a number of expansionary measures were enacted7• 
The return to economic and social stability in the 1980s in the FRG was sufficient to 
guarantee the CDUlCSU-FDP coalition re-election in the 1987 Bundestag election. While 
polls showed SPD candidate Rau more popular than Kohl, the Social Democrats still lost 
votes and lacked coalition options. Therefore, despite the inability of the Union to honour its 
1983 pledge to create more jobs and the damage of scandals8, the Christian Democrats held 
on to office despite a drop of 4.5%. Growing disillusionment with Kohl's leadership was 
evident both in the public and within the party. Echoing the rise of the NPD in the 1960s, 
the formation of the radical right Republikaner demonstrated that the integrative capacity of 
the Union on the right was waning but equally, Kohl's lack of a clear agenda also frustrated 
the Union's social wing. By 1989, the situation had become more critical. The CDU's vote 
had slumped in a number of Land elections while the Republikaner won seats in the 
European Parliament and the Berlin parliament. The coalition's achievements since 1982 
and the adaptation to being in government had disappointed many recently-joined members 
of the party (Haungs 1992: 177). Kohl's replacement of GeiBler as General Secretary by the 
less independent RUhe spurred on rebellion. Leading party members openly discussed the 
possibility of Baden-WUrttemberg minister-president Sp~ith challenging Kohl as chairman at 
the Bremen party conference. The attempt failed and although countless conference speakers 
were critical of Kohl's leadership, the Chancellor survived the abortive 'putsch'. The 
Bremen conference had significant repercussions: Splith returned to Land politics while the 
main rebels GeiBler and SUssmuth were henceforth sidelined as Kohl established a much 
stronger grip on the party (Conradt 1993:73». As the movement toward German unification 
gathered momentum, doubts within the Union about their leader evaporated as Kohl seized 
the initiative. 
7 For example, the duration of unemployment benefit was lengthened and housing benefit was raised 
(Schmid 1998) 
8 Most notably, the Flick sandal but also the Barschel affair. 
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QVP 
The path of the Austrian Christian Democrats into opposition a year later than their Gennan 
counterparts was also accompanied by considerable internal turbulence. Klaus was 
succeeded in 1970 by his General Secretary Wilhalm while Schleinzer took over this latter 
post. Many young refonners such as Mock and Neisser stressed the need for the party to 
carry out a thorough programmatic and organisational renovation but the new leadership 
team proved incapable of achieving this, instead blaming the electorate for their loss of 
office (Muller 1988: 103). The lack of adaptation to the party's new situation caused 
Wilhalm to resign in 1971. Schleinzer was elected new party chainnan and soon faced an 
early election brought about by Chancellor Kreisky. The new 6vp chainnan decided on a 
strategic gamble: the People's Party would seek the votes of a number of Freedom Party 
supporters by consciously moving to the right. This gambit failed badly, however, as the 
sp6 gained an absolute majority and fonned a single party government. After this setback, 
the 6vp spent the following years searching for a viable identity in opposition. Fresh ideas 
were discussed and incorporated into the party prograrnme9 as the party faced new issues 
and the decline of its core electorate. During this period, munnurs of discontent emanated 
from a number of sources. The Styrian Land party and the Business League expressed their 
reservations about the leadership and even the party executive rebelled against Schleinzer's 
choice of candidate for the 1974 Presidential electionlO• Nevertheless, until his death in 
1975, Schleinzer managed to retain the chainnanship of the party, achieving some unity 
through a more "liberal-conservative position" (Kriechbaumer 1995:58) 
After the unfortunate death of Schleinzer in the middle of the 1975 campaign, Josef 
Taus was elected as chainnan with Busek his General Secretary. Despite the 6vP's 
programmatic renewal, it was still unable to break the sp6's electoral stranglehold and the 
Socialists were again able to fonn a single party government. The sp6's success was 
founded upon Kreisky's wide appeal to all sectors of the Austrian electoratell . Even after 
Kreisky had suffered defeat in the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant referendum in 
November 1978, his standing in the electorate remained largely undiminished. The People's 
Party was unable to make political capital from the popular rejection of the plant in spite of 
9 See section III. 
10 See Kriechbaumer (1995:57). 
11 Throughout the 1970s, Kreisky's approval ratings in polls dwarfed those of his 'black' opponents. 
Kreisky was even positively evaluated among Christian democrat and Freedom Party voters. In 
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its more nuanced positionl2• The unnaturalness of opposition for the OVP continued to work 
against the leadership of the party. While the party criticised the budgetary policies of the 
SPO government, it was itself tied into the Austrian system of political-economic decision-
making through the social partnership and its provincial strength (Sully 1981 :96). Another 
demoralising defeat in the 1979 election prompted Taus to bemoan bitterly the lack of 
support he had received during the campaign from the party. His discontent led him to 
propose a far-reaching programme of organisational reforms designed to increase the power 
of central leadership. His suggestions, though, provoked an outcry from many sections of 
the party and intensified criticism of his leadership (Muller 1988: 1 08). Eventually, Taus 
resigned and was replaced by the chairman of the OAAB and Klubobmann Alois Mock. 
Mock, too, signalled a desire to tackle the structural deficiencies of the party albeit less 
confrontationally\3 . 
The early years of Mock's leadership seemed to point to a brighter future for the 
People's Party. The party had altered its political profile to appear more relevant and was 
now offering a clear alternative to the policies of the socialist government. With growing 
pressure on the Austrian economy and the gradual breakdown of Austro-Keynesianism, 
Kreisky's public image was finally tarnished. In the 1983 Nationalrat election, the OVP was 
the only party to gain votes, bringing the period of SPO single party government to an end. 
Although Kreisky stepped down as Chancellor, his influence on the SPO could still be 
discerned in its choice of coalition partner. The formation of an SPO-FPO government under 
Socialist Chancellor Sinowatz was the logical result of Kreisky's long-term strategy of 
splitting the bourgeois block by drawing the FPO into a more centrist position (Fitzmaurice 
1990:106). Nonetheless, the Christian Democrats' position in opposition was not 
disadvantageous. In conditions of growing unemployment, an expanding state deficit and 
Spa divisions, the aVp was at last able to play a more effective role, untouched by the 
scandals accumulating around the Spa and the crisis of the state industries. Emboldened by 
its gathering momentum in opinion polls, the OVP managed to break the Socialist 
dominance of the presidency in 1986. While Kurt Waldheim was actually an independent 
candidate, the OVP had broken the original plan for him to be a joint SpO-OVP candidate, 
addition, the SP{) under Kreisky gained in previously distant voter groups (e.g. the highly educated, 
women) (Rathkolb 1997:313) 
12 At various points in the discussion process, leading members of the party including Taus had 
expressed significant doubts as to the safety of the plant. 
13 See section IV. 
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resulting in the Socialists into putting up their own candidate. However, the election 
campaign unleashed a storm of controversy over Waldheim's wartime past, sharply 
polarising the political climate. The aftermath was equally unsettled: Sinowatz stood down 
as Chancellor and SPO leader in favour of former Finance Minister Franz Vranitzky. The 
mounting turmoil in the FPO culminated in the election of Haider as leader in September 
1986 and brought about the collapse of the coalition. 
The People's Party appeared well-positioned to profit from the government's 
difficulties: untainted by the economic failure and political scandals of the SPO, it had 
formulated a coherent response to the SpO's platform. Moreover, its greater emphasis on the 
market in the direction of privati sat ion and cutbacks in state expenditure seemed prescient in 
the wake of the troubles in the state industries. However, the 1986 election was a 
disappointment for the Christian Democrats. While the Socialists suffered badly at the polls 
dropping 4.6%, the OVP also lost votes. Before the election, Vranitzky indicated that a new 
Grand Coalition was his preferred outcome and throughout the campaign, the Christian 
Democrats were treated almost as government party which undermined their capacity to 
damage the outgoing administration (Muller 1988:114). Some observers pinpointed its 
failure of nerve as a cause of its relative lack of success in 1986. After the OAAB and even 
Business League voiced concern about the use of neoliberal themes, the People's Party 
backed away from a thematic campaign in favour of a personalised battle in spite of 
Vranitzky's greater popularity (Sully 1990:54-55). Thirdly, the FPO's rebirth under Haider 
immediately caused problems for the OVP. Haider used many 'black' themes (privatisation, 
freedom) in a much more populist way and through his condemnation of the corrupt political 
elite, associated the OVP with the scandals of the SpO. After the result, some elements 
within the OVP argued for a small coalition with the FPO but such views were only held by 
a minority and the expected Grand Coalition was formed. The Business League, in 
particular, believed that the difficult tasks the government faced required consensus and 
argued strongly for an alliance with the SPO which would help to smooth the transition to 
less state involvement in the economy and ensure the smooth working of the social 
partnership. 
For the 6vp, the coalition was soon wrought with problems, not least its continued 
electoral erosion. This was especially demoralising in view of the 6vP's success in realising 
aspects of its agenda (i.e. privatisation, state retrenchment, tax reform, EEC application). 
65 
The SPO had already absorbed many of its ideas and Chancellor Vranitzky received the 
acclamation for any successes of the administration (Sully 1990:59). The OVP lost its 
thematic pre-eminence and through its participation in government became caught up in the 
growing public debate about corruption among the political class. The party was also split 
between different factions: the OAAB and the Lower Austrian Land party favoured 
concentration on core supporters while the Styrian party and Viennese party chairman Busek 
called for an extensive rethink of Christian Democratic values and a renewal of the party's 
personnel to halt the decline of the party. The threat to the party caused by the erosion of its 
core electorate, the new challenge of the FPO and the growing public disquiet with the 
established parties was very real and after the disastrous Land elections in Carinthia, 
Salzburg and Tirol in 1989, the question of the party's leadership arose again. Mock clung 
on to his post as foreign secretary in government and became honorary chairman but was 
forced to hand over the actual leadership to Josef Riegler, the Agriculture Minister, in May 
1989. 
Riegler initially enjoyed some success in opinion polls but developments in 
Carinthia and Vienna highlighted the strategic dilemma faced by the OVP. In Carinthia, the 
party fell into third place and subsequently, helped to elect Haider as governor. Repeating 
this tactic at federal level was still too risky for most Christian Democrats, including 
Riegler. However, an alternative strategy employed by Busek in Vienna was also hazardous. 
Busek had attempted to create a more modem, open and liberal OVP in favour of greater 
public participation in politics. Initially, the party made significant electoral progress in the 
capital, reversing years of decline. Busek's efforts, however, came up against the resistance 
of the party's grassroots which snubbed his attempt to transform the party's identity and as a 
consequence, by 1987 the Viennese OVP was badly divided and losing votes (Kohler 
1995:482-483). The party was thus stuck in a strategic impasse and by the end of the decade, 
Riegler was struggling to retain his grip on the party was it passed from one defeat to 
another. 
CDA 
The problem confronting the confessional parties was not adaptation to opposition; rather 
their very existence seemed in doubt despite continued participation in government. Their 
response was slow but inexorable movement towards unity. Co-operation between the 
parties which had already begun towards the end of the previous decade was given further 
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momentum by the elections in 1971 and 1972. For the KVP and the CHU, the results were 
disastrous, the KVP, in particular, losing 8.8% over the course of the two elections. The 
1972 result brought about the progressive den Uyl cabinet bringing together the PvdA with 
the KVP and the ARP but excluding the CHU. Despite the split between the three parties 
over government participation14, preparation continued towards a common platform and list 
for the 1977 election and the Christian Democratic Appeal was established as a federation in 
1975. Nonetheless, the task of reconciling the different conceptions of the new alliance was 
onerous. The principle division was between the open volkspartij model favoured by the 
KRP and the CHU and the Aantjes wing of the ARP which insisted upon the primacy of the 
Bible and Christian revelation. The progressive current in the ARP had brought the party 
closer to the KVP, especially following the departure of rightist members to form the RPF1S 
in 1975, and even the CHU had moved in this direction after the resignation of its 
conservative chairman Beernink in 1966 (Koole 1996:124). The stumbling block, therefore, 
was less a progressive-conservative divide but whether members, functionaries and 
representatives should be required to recognise the Christian foundation of the new party. 
Eventually, a compromise was formulated whereby membership of the fledgling party was 
open to all but representatives and functionaries were obliged to represent the Christian 
principles of the CDA (Lepszy and Koecke 2000:148). 
Anti-Revolutionary reluctance still impeded further co-operation, putting the goal of 
a common list and platform for 1977 in doubt. However, it appeared that the hard-line of the 
ARP leadership was not shared by its grassroots. Many ARP members, together with their 
KVP and CHU counterparts, signed a petition in 1976 demanding more integration (Koole 
1996: 192). By the close of the year, the ARP's leadership had dropped their objections and a 
party list headed by KVP leader van Agt had been drawn up. An improved showing for the 
unified confessionals in the 1977 election was also interpreted as a mass endorsement of the 
alliance. The CDA had not stated a preference for any future coalition partner but after long 
negotiations with the PvdA finally broke down, the CDA instead formed a government with 
the liberal VVD with van Agt as Prime Ministerl6• This constellation and its concentration 
on budgetary austerity did not meet with the approval of everyone on the list and led to 
14 Even with this hinderance, the three parties fonned a working group in the parliament (Lepszy and 
Koecke 2000: 147). 
IS Refonned Political Federation. 
16 For a detailed account of the negotiations see Zonnenveld (1993). 
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seven parliamentarians 17, including Aantjes, rejecting the coalition agreement although 
pledging their loyalty to the administration. This potential schism was papered over by the 
election of Aantjes to the post of parliamentary leader. This helped to bind the dissenters to 
the nascent party and until he was succeeded by Ruud Lubbers in 1978, Aantje put aside his 
personal misgivings and helped unite the parliamentary party (jractie). 
Following further success in the EP elections, the final hurdle was the fusion of the 
party. Yet again, parts of the ARP remained lukewarm. For instance, Goudzwaard strongly 
criticised the drift toward conservatism and the lack of Christian social principles (Nieboer 
and Lucardie 1992). Such opposition made the last stages awkward but could not prevent 
the final union taking place on the 11 th October 1980. The settlement agreed upon stated that 
policy should be in harmony with the Bible but not directly guided by it while the principles 
of the party were to be justice, spread responsibility, solidarity and stewardship I8. The most 
problematic issue facing the party in government was the stationing of medium-range 
nuclear weapons on Dutch soil following the NATO 'double track' decision. A large 
majority of the Dutch population, the PvdA, D66 and the small left wing parties were 
against the weapons but the CDA was divided (Andeweg and Irwin 2002, pp.196-7). As the 
churches were opposed to the missiles, the CDA was vulnerable to accusations that it had 
already abandoned its religious origins were it to accept the missiles. To preserve intra-party 
harmony, van Agt and Lubbers' formulated their own 'double strategy': the missiles were 
accepted in theory and the party portrayed itself as a reliable NATO partner but the signing 
of the treaty with the US was delayed and hence the stationing postponed. 
The CDA's first election competing as a unified single party took place in 1981. 
The missiles issue was the dominant campaign theme but the PvdA avoided a fiercely 
polarised campaign in order to preserve their own coalition options (Gladdish 1991 :61). In 
the face of massive opposition to the missiles and the deteriorating economic situation, both 
government parties lost votes but the CDA still finished as the largest party. After 
protracted negotiations between the parties, a new administration was formed under van 
Agt's leadership with the PvdA and D66 joining the CDA. This uneasy combination of 
Christian Democratic, Social Democrats and progressive liberals proved highly unstable 
with unworkable animosity between van Agt and PvdA leader den Uyl. Just over a month 
17 Unsurprisingly, the 'loyalisten' comprised mainly ARP deputies with 1 KVP politician. 
18 See section III. 
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after the government had been formed, the PvdA cabinet members walked out following a 
budget dispute. Differences were temporarily patched up but the coalition collapsed again in 
1982 producing new e1ectionsI9• Although the CDA were unable to profit from the 
coalition's demise, the large gains made by the VVD did permit a centre-right coalition with 
Lubbers following van Agt as Prime Minister. The new 'no-nonsense' coalition agreed to a 
detailed agreement outlining the need to make cutbacks (e.g. civil service salary cuts, 
welfare freezes) (Wolinetz 1989:91). Despite this retrenchment, discord within the CDA 
jractie was more muted than previously. Fewer of the ARP hard-liners had been elected, 
some progressives had left for other parties20 and Lubbers established a good working 
relationship with his successor as parliamentary leader, Bert de Vries. 
Throughout the Lubbers era, the party's programmatic work was secondary to the 
practical business of government21 • Lubbers became the dominant figure in Dutch politics, 
achieving a pre-eminence rarely found in Dutch politics. His popularity undoubtedly played 
an important role in integrating the still youthful party through electoral success. Voters in 
the 1986 election campaign were asked to "let Lubbers finish his job". Where the prime 
minister was seen as modern and business-like, his PvdA opponent den Uyl was a 
throwback to the style and solutions of the previous decade. Even the unresolved problem of 
unemployment, which had crept up to 15%22, could not damage Lubbers. The Wassenaar 
accord between the unions and employers based on wage restraint and labour time reduction 
agreed in 1982 prevented serious industrial unrest and more new measures to combat the 
problem were announced before the election. This helped to blunt the PvdA's attack and 
throughout the campaign, the PvdA's prior advantage in polls slipped away. The CDA 
eventually gained 5.3% with a notable share of non-religious voters, helping to offset the 
losses suffered by the VVO. The Christian-Liberal centre-right alliance was resumed post-
election on more favourable terms to the COA and progressed along the lines of the 
previous administration with a strong market emphasis. While the CDA managed to 
maintain a reasonably harmonious accord between its members in cabinet and itsjractie, the 
19 See Hillebrand and Irwin (1999: 119-123) for more details. 
20 The EVP was formed in 1981 from those leaving the CDA while two of the most outspoken critics 
on the left of the party, Scholten and Dijkman, eventually left the parliamentary group to join the 
PvdA and the PPR respectively. 
21 See Section III. 
22 This figure almost certainly underestimated the number out of work in the Netherlands. Many firms 
shed much of their workforce through releasing employees who were able to claim a particularly 
generous incapacity benefit 
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VVD's intensifying problems in this regard caused friction within the government. The new 
VVD parliamentary leader Voorhoeve demonstrated on numerous occasions his 
independence from the cabinet, at times contradicting party leader and environment minister 
Nijpels. 
The CDA in Lubbers II seemed to have demonstrated its integration and viability. 
Elements within the party could indulge in self-critical analysis without imperilling the 
CONs existence. For example, de Vries adopted a more social agenda while the Scientific 
Institute worried about the dangers of the party becoming too technocratic and pragmatic 
(Lepszy and Koecke 2000:201-3). To address fears that the party was becoming too 
neoliberal through its concentration on retrenchment, the CDNs programmatic work 
stressed the role of the 'societal middle field' (Koole 1997: 151-2). However, with the 
government focused almost exclusively on day-to-day administration, a gap emerged 
between the programmes drafted by the extra-parliamentary party and the CDA members of 
cabinet 
In 1989, the turbulence in the VVD brought about the end of the coalition and new 
elections. The CDA campaign was uncontroversial with Lubbers again the centrepiece and 
the party registered a rise in support while the VVD and the PvdA suffered electoral losses. 
Changes in the PvdA, specifically the replacement of den Uyl with Wim Kok and their 
subsequently more centrist position23, enabled a far broader range of coalition options. 
Lubbers decided upon a coalition with the PvdA, reflecting the feeling among the Christian 
Democratic leadership that the VVD was no longer a reliable partner (Gladdish 1991:69). At 
the same time as the centre-left government was formed, however, the parliamentary party 
was shifting towards the right. Elco Brinkman became the leader of the fraetie, signalling a 
greater acceptance of privatisation, deregulation and the further reshaping of the welfare 
state. 
Thus by the end of the decade, the CDA appeared to have inherited the political 
flexibility of its confessional forerunners, encompassing a broad range of opinion under one 
political roof. It had concurrently stabilised the confessional vote and attracted a greater 
number of voters distant from the church. Dangerous obstacles like the Cruise missile issue 
23 For more detail on changes in the PvdA see Wolinetz (1996); Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen 
(2002). 
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had been defused and as the dominant party in government, the CDA had helped to initiate a 
number of important economic reforms. Overall, the degree of unity displayed by the newly 
fused party was remarkable. Splinter parties had been formed but the absence of major splits 
particularly after the troubled and prolonged merger was testament to the success of the 
party. 
III. Programmatic development of Christian Democratic parties 
The step into opposition by the German and Austrian Christian Democrats brought into 
question their role in their respective political systems. Holding national office had been 
crucial to the integrative powers of each party. Deprived of this, the parties turned toward 
programmatic work to bolster internal unity. However, the process of ideological renewal 
was also aimed externally. The allure of both parties had fallen in the previous decade as 
they failed to keep pace with social changes and remained wedded to the ideas of the 1950s. 
Reformers in both parties recognised that Christian Democratic identity was increasingly 
viewed as archaic and attempted to incorporate new political, economic and social demands 
into the parties' programmes in order to broaden the party's appeal. Evidence of this 
motivation can be found in many of the programmes: for instance, the Mannheim 
Declaration's preamble outlined "the far-reaching changes in the political and economic 
situation", the Salzburg programme mentioned the increased dynamism in all areas of life 
and the growing influence of science on society as factors influencing the composition of the 
document (Article 1.3) while the CDA's basic programme offered answers to "a transitional 
phase" marked by despondency and scepticism (Chapter 1). 
These two aims of programmatic activity, inner cohesion and adaptation, were often 
incompatible and the resultant tension was a recurring feature of intra-party debate which 
persisted even after the parties had returned to office. This section will analyse the major 
developments thematically to highlight innovation and continuity, cross-national similarities 
and variation. The Dutch party will again be treated separately on account of the exceptional 
circumstances surrounding its creation. The ideological dilemma for the Dutch confessional 
parties was more complicated than those faced by the CDU and 6vp. Certainly, electoral 
decline necessitated a re-evaluation of traditional party principles and adaptation to 
changing social issues and demands. The confessionals had already moved leftwards in 
accordance with the general trend in Dutch public debate but fresh issues such as 
environmentalism were arising which required a response from the parties. The critical 
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difference was that this adaptation was occurring simultaneously with the uniting of the 
separate confessional ideologies. Following this, the conclusion will summarise these trends 
and consider the significance of programmatic work in this period. 
CDU and OVP 
Principles and self-identity 
Throughout the 1970-89 period, the CDU and 6vp continued to assert the fundamental 
staples of Christian Democratic thought although the Austrian party's programmatic 
experimentation in the 1970s was greater. The Christian image of man remained the basis 
for the political ideas of both parties24 and has consistently led to a strong concern for the 
rights of the unborn child. It has also forced Christian Democrats to address new scientific 
technologies and possibilities. A major part of the CDU's "Politics on the Basis of a 
Christian Image of Man" (1988) concerns such scientific procedures, at times giving quite 
detailed responses2S• For example, the use of stem cells from a third party in infertility 
treatment was rejected (Article 6). Although the parties continued to base their policies on 
this Christian view of humanity, religion was not a direct guide. A classic expression of the 
place of religion in Christian Democracy is given in Article 5 of the CDU's 
Grundsatzprogramm which rejects a direct link between religious belief and policy. Instead, 
religious convictions give "an ethical basis for responsible politics". Furthermore, a greater 
openness towards all of society, religious and non-religious alike, was obvious. The 6vp in 
its Salzburger Programm declared its readiness to accept non-Christians who support the 
party's principles (Article 2.5). 
Each party continued to see themselves as a Volkspartei open to all classes and 
social groupS26. In this respect, the 6vp's adaptation went much further as influenced by of 
reformers, many from the left wing of the CV27 (Kriechbaumer 1990:429), it defined itself 
in the Salzburg Programme as a "party of the progressive middle" and of social integration 
(Article 2.4). This self-definition was controversial, however, and was not repeated in the 
later Zukunftsmanifest. While both parties continued to subscribe to core Christian 
Democratic ideas, some divergence was noticeable. In the Mannheim Declaration, the CDU 
24 See Salzburger Programm, Article 3.1.1; Zukunftsmanifest, Article 2.1; Grundsatzprogramm 
Article 1. 
25 See also Zukunftsmanifest Article 1.7. 
26 See Grundsatzprogramm Article 1. 
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stressed its basic values of freedom, justice and solidarity which have been maintained in 
subsequent programmes. These values would enable the free development of personality in 
society in line with social Christian teaching28• The Grundsatzprogramm three years later 
expanded on these principles. Freedom was recognised as being rooted in social life: the 
freedom of the individual was determined and circumscribed by the freedom of others while 
the idea of free development in the community, subsidiarity, and responsibility for oneself 
and others were further aspects of the Christian Democratic understanding of freedom. The 
principle of solidarity is the CDU's answer to the errors of individualism and collectivism. 
The individual deserved the help of the community but (s)he also carried a responsibility 
towards it. Justice is based on the equality of all people regardless of "power, achievement 
or failure" (Article 26). The conception of justice outlined by the CDU is not a justice of 
outcomes but a ''justice of chances" where "everyone is given the possibility to develop 
themselves differently in equal freedom" (Article 28). 
The more radical Salzburg Programme was slightly different. Certainly, the 
principles of freedom (Article 3.2), personalism (Article 3.1), solidarity (Article 1.2) and 
subsidiarity (Article 3.6.5) were present but where the CDU only spoke of justice29, the 6vp 
openly proclaimed equality as a goal. This did not mean uniformity as the People's Party 
emphasised equality of essence and dignity, responsibilities and possibilities. The inclusion 
of equality as a basic principle was an innovative step for the 6vp but by the following 
decade, it had fallen from the party's agenda30• Another innovative principle, participation, 
was to have a more long-lasting impact. The party now stressed that more public 
involvement in politics was desirable (Article 3.7.1) to be channelled not just through 
established social institutions and organisations but also through "spontaneous groups" 
(Article 3.7.5). The 6vp also recognised the idea of a dynamic democracy in which the 
potential for participation in decision-making is expanded through parliament, party, social 
27 Cartell-Verband der Katholischen Osterreichischen Studentenverbindungen- Austrian Catholic 
Students Association. 
28 See the section on Politische Aufgabe. 
29 Even in its discussion of opportunities, the CDU only mentions 'justice of chances' after all 
references to 'equality of chances' were removed (Kriechbaumer 1990:517). 
30 Even though the Zukunftsmanifest was structured quite differently and was not intended as a new 
basic programme. the complete omission of equality within it was indicative of the direction of the 
party since the late 1970s. 
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organisations and perhaps most interestingly, direct democracy (Article 4.10.1). This interest 
was retained by the party in later programmes3'. 
Economic and Social Policy 
The economic model of the CDU and the OVP remained the social market economy. This 
concept based on "achievement and social justice, competition and solidarity, self-
responsibility and social protection" (CDU Grundsatzprogramm, Article 66) still decisively 
shaped Christian Democratic economic thinking but subtle shifts in the relative emphases 
accorded to its social and market aspects were evident. In the CDU's Grundsatzprogramm, 
there is a strong stress on the role of the market after nine years of social-liberal government 
(Kleinmann 1993:69). An increasingly competitive market and structural change require 
greater efficiency and competition (Article 70), more private initiative (Article 75), less state 
involvement (Article 94), tackling the growing budget deficit (Article 93) and cutbacks to a 
swelling bureaucracy (Article 94) . By 1984, the emphasis on market liberalisation had 
become even more pronounced. The recession of the early 1980s gave economic liberals 
like Lower Saxony minister-president Albrecht the upper hand. This new mood shaped the 
Stuttgarter Leitsiitze which argued for the reduction of subsidies (Article 27), tax decreases 
(Article 28), more flexible working hours (Article 46), a reduction of non-wage labour costs 
(Article 43) and privitisation (Article 34). The later 'Politics on the Basis of a Christian 
Image of Man' did not deviate significantly from this agenda32• 
The OVP's move towards greater economic liberalism was also reflected in its 
programmatic output. There is a marked contrast between the Salzburger Programm of 1972 
and the later ZunkunJtsmani/est. In the former, the social market economy was affirmed33 
(Article 4.4) but far less space is dedicated to economic goals and policy than previous 
programmes. By 1985, the growing problems of the Austrian economy and especially the 
nationalised industries could not be ignored. Privitisation and a far-reaching consideration of 
the economic role of the state was demanded by the OVP (Articles 9.5, 9.6) as well as an 
end to the overburdening of business and private enterprise through bureaucratic regulations 
and excessively high tax (Article 6.3, Article 6.6). Choice emerged as a new People's Party 
theme in the 1980s: in services and goods (Article 8.5), in the media (Article 8.3) and in 
3' For example, see Zukunftsmanifest Articles 7.1, 7.2. 
32 See Articles 27-9. 
33 For example, the programme mentioned private property, currency stability, economic growth, full 
employment and the preservation of economic incentives as economic goals. 
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working hours. The proposals stopped short of a neoliberal makeover but still signified an 
important shift in the party's identity. 
Although the CDU and QVP moved towards a more market-centred vision in the 
1980s, this was not an abandonment of their middle way and social concern remained a 
component of Christian Democratic thinking. However, in programmatic terms there is quite 
a clear distinction between the initial opposition years and later. Within the CDU, reformers 
in the 1970s attempted to combat the CDU's image as the party of business through 
extending worker participation and through the 'New Social Question'. In each case, the 
ideas aroused considerable intra-party debate. The question of worker participation could 
not be settled until 1974 and the passage of a compromise resolution at the party 
conference34• Formulated by GeiI3ler and featured prominently in the Mannheim 
Declaration, the New Social Question identified a new source of social conflict in the 
growing divide between organised interests and those lacking representation through trade 
unions and interest groups. The real weak in society did not belong to anyone class (e.g. 
working mothers, guest workers and the disabled), were marginalised and without a political 
voice. The New Social Question was a bold attempt to restate the social credentials of the 
Union but it was viewed with displeasure by business representatives. It had already 
decreased in significance by the time of the Grundsatzprogramm but the social aspect of 
Christian Democracy was not neglected. Full employment through social partnership co-
operation was still a goal (Article 50) while it was imperative that working conditions 
remained humane through plentiful social contact and fewer unsociable working hours. In 
social policy, the party championed protection from poverty and need, safeguards for 
individuals against changes in their circumstances and the gradual improvement of living 
conditions. Even after the Wende, the social profile of the CDU was not loses. For example, 
the social side of the Stuttgarter Leitsiitze was expanded after the intervention of the Social 
Committees (BOsch 2002:46)36 and the 1988 programme dedicated a considerable amount of 
text to "Solidarity with the unemployed,m. However, compared to the previous decade, the 
social wing's interventions were primarily defensive, revealing the altered balance of power 
within the party. 
34 This granted parity to shareholders and workers on the board but in situations of stalemate gave the 
board chairmen the casting vote (Pridham 1977) 
3S This is particularly the case for family policy which is examined later. 
36 Article 10 concerned youth unemployment while Article 11 argued for the preservation of the 
social consensus, worker participation and for adaptation from both sides of industry. 
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A clear shift in the OVP's attitude to social expenditure took place between the 
Salzburg Programme and the Zukunftsmanifest. Article 4.6.6 of the former showed some 
concern that increased social expenditure could have negative repercussions but by the 
Zukunftsmanifest, the OVP stated plainly that the social state had exceeded the limits of 
sustainability and borrowing to finance expansionist social policy had to come to an end 
(Article 5.4). Even though work was recognised as integral to humanity, jobs in 
uncompetitive industries could not be protected (Article 2.4). Although intriguingly there 
was a hint of the New Social Question in Article 6.2 which mentioned "new poverty" among 
the disabled and large families, the emphasis in the programme was on ways to prevent the 
"explosive growth of costs of social insurance" through prevention of waste and more self-
provision in insurance (Article 6.9). Therefore, while the OVP's Zukunftsmanifest may have 
been an moderate "Austrianized" version of a neo-liberal agenda (MUller 1988:111), the 
shift from the Salzburg Programme was still apparent. 
Foreign Policy 
The chief innovation 10 foreign policy for the CDU was the "ambivalent adaptation" 
(Clemens 1989) to Brandt's Ostpolitik. The revised Berlin programme (1971) reaffirmed the 
CDU's commitment to unification through the overcoming of Europe's division (Article 7) 
but the stance adopted was slightly less hard-line than previously: there is a declared 
willingness to engage in negotiations and agreements which would make life easier in the 
divided land (Article 8). This incremental change continued into the Mannheim Declaration 
where the Union accepted treaties which had already been passed (Article 1.1). In addition 
to the acceptance of Ostpolitik, further novel elements of the Mannheim Declaration were 
the interest in development policy and the stress on European integration, neither of which 
had featured heavily in past Union documents. The Grundsatzprogramm mainly repeated 
the foreign policy section of the earlier Mannheim programme although there is a much 
bolder declaration of the eventual goal of unification as a part of the political union of a 
federal Europe (Articles 137-139). Later programmes (until 1989) added little to Union 
foreign policy which remained tied to the Western alliance and European integration. For 
the OVP, foreign policy was less of a concern. Nonetheless, the Salzburger Programm did 
promote the moral responsibility of Austria to provide developmental aid (Article 4.1.10)38. 
37 See Articles 36-43. 
38 See also Article 10.9 in the Zukunftsmanifest. 
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While the People's Party continued to support European integration, it still remained 
hesitant on Austrian accession, failing to declare clearly the party's position in either the 
Salzburger Programm or the Zukunjtsmanifesr9• 
Family Policy and the Role of Women 
Family policy has always been an essential component part of Christian Democratic 
programmes and this was maintained throughout the 1970-89 period. For example, the 
CDU's Grundsatzprogramm reaffirmed its support for the family as the foundation of 
society with extra state assistance for large families and those with disabled children (Article 
37-38) in addition to the normal compensation for families (Article 98to. For the 6vp, too, 
the family is the most natural form of co-habitation. As such, the Salzburg programme and 
the Zukunftsmanifest made a number of proposals made to bolster it, from the right of every 
child to a Kindergarten place (Salzburger Programm, Article 5.3.5) to the introduction of a 
form of child benefit for mothers staying at home and family-friendly tax laws 
(Zukunftsmanifest Article 9.2). 
However, Christian Democratic programmes have since the 1970s attempted to 
balance this traditionalism with a recognition of changing gender roles. The CDU's Berlin 
programme, for example, supported equal chances for men and women in education and 
promotion and demanded that both sides of industry ensure that women receive equal pay 
(Articles 93-94). The GVP, too, had responded to social developments. Women must be 
recognised as equal partners with a new understanding of gender roles. Their equality in 
education, professional position and wages must be guaranteed (Salzburg Programme 
Articles 5.2.2, 5.2.3). The adaptation to changing social norms, though, did not come easily 
to Christian Democrats. All mention of single parents in the CDU's Grundsatzprogramm 
were removed from the final document (Bosch 2002:39). Nevertheless, by the 1980s the 
CDU and OVP acknowledged the changing shape of family life. The People's Party in its 
ZUkunftmanifest accepted that the need for realism about the family and that single parent 
families, for instance, were also worthy of financial assistance (Article 9.2). Following the 
CDU's 1985 conference on the theme of "a new partnership between man and woman", the 
Union advocated a greater male role in domestic labour and urged solidarity with single 
39 See Article 12.4 in the Zukunflsmanifest; Article 4.11.6 in the Salzburger Programme. 
40 Other examples include Article 48 of the Stuttgarter Leitslitze which proposed a reform of the 
child benefit law. See also Articles 61-69 in PoUlik auf der Grund/age des christlichen 
Menschenbildes. 
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parents41 • There was no question that Christian Democrats were keen to see more women 
staying within the home but this was increasingly phrased in terms of giving women greater 
choice between career and family and an enhanced appraisal of domestic labour. Therefore, 
the CDU and the 6vp sought to combine their traditional family-centred policies with the 
an increased sensitivity to gender equality and the diversity of family life. 
Environmentalism 
The growth of environmentalism began to influence the programmes of both parties from 
the 1970s onwards. The CDU's Berlin Programme introduces the idea of qualitative 
economic growth which does not threaten the environment (Article 69) while environmental 
conservation was included as a goal although the actual instruments the CDU proposes to 
use to this end are unclear (Articles 84, 87 and 89). The 'greening' of the Union continued 
in the 1980s42 but this trend had limits. In contrast to the technological pessimism rife 
among environmental activists, the Union was a convinced advocate of the merits of 
technological developments (Stuttgarter Leitsatze Article 12) and favoured the use of 
nuclear power (Article 19). 
In comparison, environmental themes were taken much further by the 6vp. As part 
of the new interest in 'quality of life' themes, the Salzburg Programme stressed 
environmental protection. Environmental damage was to be combated through international 
treaties, legal authority, circumspect use of public expenditure, tax relief and cheaper credit 
(Article 4.8). This adoption of green themes was continued in the Zukunftsmanifest where 
environmental protection saturated the document. Conservation of the natural world was "an 
essential priority of future policy" (Article 3.5), indeed the "social question of our time". 
Government policy had to recognise that raw materials and energy sources were not 
inexhaustible and the development of renewable energy sources was necessary. However, 
the green tinge of the original proposals had faded somewhat by the final document. It was 
clear that the 6vp's environmental strategy involved little government interference. 
Essentially, the 6vp still believed that the solution lay in the social market economy 
(Article 5.3, Article 4.2). Competition and innovation of the market can be harnessed 
towards eco-friendly production and consumption. The incorporation of green themes was, 
41 See Article 68 of Polilik auf der Grundlage des chris/lichen Menschenbildes which promised 
freater support for single parents. 
2 See, for example, Articles 41, 42 in the Stuttgarter Leitslitze 
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therefore, dictated by "the limits of economic feasibility" (Muller 1988: 11 0). However, the 
stronger green credentials of the OVP were still evident later in the decade as party leader 
Riegler promoted the new eco-social market concept. 
CDA 
The movement towards closer confessional co-operation had begun in the latter half of the 
1960s but a number of fundamental problems were unsolved. The fact that the parties no 
longer believed that God's will was objectively demonstrable in politics removed one 
obstacle (Zwart 1993:32) but the ARP's hard-line stance persistently hindered discussions. 
For the Aantjes wing of the Anti-Revolutionaries43, the Bible and the revelation remained 
the touchstone for the party's identity. This religious dimension was complicated by the fact 
that many of the so-called loyalists in the Aantje group were also on the left of the party 
(Lepszy and Koecke 2000: 150). Such resistance to a unified party waned only gradually. 
The first common programme was produced by the CDA in 1975 after the 
Federation Congress but it was not until 1978 that work began on a programme of principles 
that would serve as the foundation for the party. Baron bon Verschuer (CHU) put forward a 
report on principles and political business and a year later, a new commission was 
established to create the Programme of Points of Departure (Program van Uitgangspunten). 
A group formed borrowing their name from the title of the 1977 CDA election programme 
"Not Through Bread Alone" with the intention of re-establishing the validity of the 
aforementioned programme against the parliamentary grouping. The NBBA dissidents, led 
by Goudzwaard, opposed what they saw as the rightward drift of the CDA (e.g. in the 
nuclear weapons debate) and argued for a coalition with the PvdA (Nieboer and Lucardie 
1992:149-167). Although some concessions were made to the left of the ARP, the final 
programme drew extensively on the earlier Verschuer documents (Lepszy and Koecke 
2000:152). 
Principles and self-identity 
The Programme of Points of Departure (1980) relied on the compromise formula created 
earlier. The appeal to the Bible remains important for the new party but it is stressed that it 
is an appeal rather than a guide for policy (Chapter J). The party does not seek to impose a 
set of beliefs on society but rather desires that the path to serving God and the world is open. 
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The emphasis on the Bible and indeed the religious component of the programme in general 
is still stronger than the CDA's continental cousins44 but the programme marks a reduction 
of Dutch singularity. Although the Bible remained a reference point, an important step 
towards a more orthodox Christian Democracy is taken with the statement that the pledge 
that the CDA was not subordinate to any church authority (Chapter I). The guiding 
principles were to be justice, spread responsibility, solidarity and stewardship, all 
recognisably Christian Democratic albeit with a Dutch flavour. Justice was not simply a 
question of distribution; instead, it entailed the creation of conditions which allow for the 
individual to take on responsibility. Spread responsibility has often been described as a 
fusion of the Calvinist notion of sovereignty in one's own circle with the Catholic idea of 
subsidiarity. The core of the concept is that government cannot nor should not be 
responsible for solving all social problems. Other social institutions from the family to the 
church have a vital role in assuming responsibilities. As part of this, diversity was vital and 
must be protected from the threat of commerce, majorities, professionals and technocrats. 
The influence of personalism was clear in the CDA's explanation of solidarity. People "find 
their purpose and fulfilment" in each other which produces reciprocated concern and help. 
Solidarity was, thus, understood as mutual connectedness and was not to be confused with 
the search for equality (Chapter V). The final foundation of the Dutch Christian Democrats 
is stewardship, reflecting the Dutch Protestant tradition of viewing the government as a 
servant of God. The task of the government was analogous to the role of man as an 
administrator and steward of God's creation (Lucardie 1993:49). 
Economic and Social Policy 
Like the programmes ofthe confessionals, the CDA did not dwell on the details of economic 
policy making and proposals were quite vague. Nonetheless, the programme announced a 
shift away from then-current direction of economic policy which was orientated to solving 
the problems of the 1950s and 1960s. In order to combat inflation, unemployment, unjust 
income distribution and stimulate economic growth, social economic questions must be 
tackled at a lower level than central government with greater involvement at regional levels 
and within branches of industry on questions like investment and work conditions income. 
The dispersal of responsibility was not just about unburdening central government; the CDA 
also wanted more employees and workers involvement in decision-making. 
43 See Section II this chapter. 
44 See for example Articles 1-3. 
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Change in the organisation of the welfare state was also imperative. Social security 
had developed an expansionist dynamic that political parties eager to satisfy the demands of 
their electorate had fuelled. Despite ever increasing expenditure, the social policy of the 
1970s was no closer to solving society's problems. Indeed, more people than ever suffered 
from isolation and loneliness. The Christian Democratic answer to this predicament was a 
reorientation of policy according to the guideline of solidarity, shifting away from 
anonymous, collective organisation to more locally based or industry-specific provision. 
Adjustment was also critical in labour policy. The importance of work for personal 
development and society was acknowledged but the CDA stressed that the chief means for 
combating unemployment was flexibility in working hours and practices, income and 
training. To some extent, then, the stress on adaptation in the Programme of Points of 
Departure anticipated the direction of social and economic policymaking under the Lubbers 
government. 
Foreign Policy 
The CDU and OVP's discovery of developmental aid and international solidarity was more 
than matched by the CDA, reflected in the long passage on international solidarity which 
emphasised the need for respect of fundamental human rights, for a new international 
economic order, more help from the developed nations to the poorer states, a revision of the 
global monetary system and a further reduction of protective tariffs in the developed nations. 
In addition, the CDA argued for a global redistribution of welfare, a task that the West bears 
a special responsibility for. The strong concern for ethics within foreign policy did not 
extend to nuclear weapons despite the admission that they are fundamentally unethical as 
disarmament could only be multilateral. Foreign policy remained orientated to NATO and 
the EEC although the tone concerning Europe was more probing and critical than the 
CDU45• 
Family policy and the role of women 
Marriage and the family still retains special significance in the Christian Democratic 
approach (Chapter IIIc). However, even by 1980 the CDA had accepted that other forms of 
communal life also require comparable legal protection if based on enduring relationships 
45 For example, the party sought more democracy within European institutions and warned against 
Europe turning its back on the rest of the world (Chapter IIId). 
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and mutual responsibility. This adaptation is far more radical than the CDU and OVP's 
acceptance of increasingly diverse patterns of domestic life. On the role of women, the CDA 
pledged to ensure equal treatment of all citizens and to remove legal and social barriers 
preventing equality. 
Environmentalism 
In common with the CDU and the GVP, the CDA took up green themes. The principle of 
stewardship was invoked to call for a more responsible attitude to natural resources. The 
government could no longer be solely concerned with growth at any cost. Furthermore, new 
energy sources and more conservation were essential and there was an explicit rejection of 
an expansion of nuclear power. Aside from energy use, however, the programme devoted 
little attention to environmental issues. 
Christian Democratic Programmes: unobtrusive accompaniment music? 
The 1970s marked a transitional phase in Christian Democracy in each of the three countries 
and this was manifested in party programmes. The assimilation of new ideas into Christian 
Democratic thinking was by no means uncontroversial. There was resistance to the more 
radical formulations and even by the end of the decade, some of the more divisive 
innovations had been dropped or lost significance. Furthermore, the main tenets of Christian 
Democracy remained in place: key ideas such as the Christian conception of humanity, 
solidarity, subsidiarity, freedom and justice continued to be the guidelines for Christian 
Democratic ideology; the social market economy with support for the family and a pro-
European, anti-Communist foreign policy the distinctive features of policy. Nonetheless, 
Christian Democrats developed a green tinge, accepted to a limited extent the changing 
shape of family life and began to focus on correcting excessive state involvement in the 
economy, trends which became even clearer in the 1980s. In some cases, the changes 
introduced resembled superficial grafts of contemporary relevance (e.g. the COU's 
environmentalism) but undoubtedly, programmatic consideration did acquire a new 
relevance for the various parties. The drafting process involved extensive consultation with 
a wide variety of social groups as well as with each party's grassroots. The net effect was a 
mixture of cohesion-centred continuity with a limited ideological adjustment. Accordingly, 
Bosch's (2002:41) evaluation of the COU's Grundsatzprorgamme ("it was not a 
'Godesberg"') is valid for each of the programmes although the OVP's swing from a social 
reformist agenda to a neo-liberal influenced perspective was more striking. The COA's 
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Programme of Points of Departure was much more of a decisive step, establishing the 
party's Christian Democratic foundation but also, like the other parties, addressing emerging 
problems (nuclear weapons, green issues, developmental policy, social atomism). 
In all three parties, the enhanced role of programmatic work of the I 970s was lost in 
the following decade. For the CDU and the CDA, this was the result of a focus on 
government activity. Party programmes were still produced on a regular basis and generally 
included a stronger free market component but such documents had lost their impact. Under 
Lubbers' no-nonsense government, self-examination of CDA ideology dwindled in 
importance frustrating the more programmatically inclined party members46. During the 
1982-9 period, the growing distance between the CDU reformers and the party in 
government was symbolised by the increasingly chilly relations between Kohl and Geimer 
(Clemens 1998:6). Geil31er's thematic leadership47 could not hide the increasing irrelevance 
of CDU programmes to the party in government, mere "accompaniment music" to "the 
laborious compromises of a coalition government" (Haungs 1992:190). The C>VP's 
programmatic identity in the 1980s was more clearly delineated. The party had moved from 
what Busek had mockingly described as "socialism minus 20% but with a one year delay" 
(quoted in Kohlmaier 1999:43) to demanding a Kurswechsel (change of course). However, 
participation in government served to blunt the party's programmatic profile. The SPO 
absorbed much of the GVP's economic rhetoric, the theme of participation was increasingly 
the preserve of the Greens and the FPO while even Austrian membership of the European 
Community caused deep divisions within the party. Therefore by the end of the decade, the 
party had lost its thematic leadership (Kriechbaumer 1995b: 129) and programmatic 
concerns were increasingly overshadowed by strategic ones, i.e. the question of co-operation 
with the FPC>. By the end of the 1980s, then, programmatic work had undoubtedly slipped to 
the fringes of party activity in each case. 
46 For instance the leader of the CDA scientific institute Arie OostIander warned that concentration on 
the technical, day-to-day running of the country could reduce the party's Christian Democratic values 
(Lepszy and Koecke 2000:20 I). 
47 For example, through his forceful interjections in various public debates (e.g. the legitimacy of the 
Greens) and his adoption of new issues (e.g. promoting the state financing of women's refuges) 
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IV. Party organisation 
CDU 
Analogous to the programmatic task facing the Union in opposition, there was also a need 
for the CDU to develop a stronger organisational framework to consolidate and strengthen 
its position. Neglected in the Adenauer era, the central party apparatus had acquired more 
power since the mid-1960s yet the Union remained a relatively undeveloped structure48• 
With the loss of the chancellorship, it was clear that in order to avoid the mire of factional 
squabbles, reform was imperative. However, the party's initial organisational reforms 
stalled. Fundamentally, many Christian Democrats did not believe they would be out of 
office for long and resisted change. Following the election defeat of 1972 and the election of 
Kohl as chairman the following year, reform was once more on the agenda. Kohl had 
overseen the rapid growth of the Rhineland-Palatinate CDU in the 1960s and as federal 
chairman, he encouraged a similar expansion of the party at the national level. Membership 
had remained under 300,000 throughout the 1960s but by 1976, the Union included 652,000 
members49 bringing a new youthfulness to the party. Under the less ambitious leadership of 
Carstens, the influence of the Fraktion waned while the Federal party executive assumed a 
new significance (Langguth 2001:49). The post of General Secretary also acquired a new 
centrality. Biedenkopf and later GeiBler provided the party with thematic leadership, 
stimulating debate in the Union and the wider public. This together with the increased 
personnel and financial resources of the federal business office and its resultant 
professionalisation helped to remedy the former weaknesses of the central party (Korte 
2000:712). This helped ensure that stripped of government participation, the party did not 
dissolve into internal dissension. 
The CDU's reforms were far-reaching and transformed the party but it would be a 
mistake to overstate the degree of centralisation in the Union. The organisational and 
opinion pluralism within the CDU still restricted the power of the central party. Kohl 
managed to retain the chair of the party throughout the 1970s but his authority was 
circumscribed by the multifarious interests and organisations that constitute the party. "Such 
heterogeneity in structure, interests and ideas mitigated against rigidly hierarchical 
leadership" (Clemens 1998b:96). Complaints about Kohl's weak leadership came from 
numerous sources: the Fraktion, Junge Union and the social committees. Former allies 
48 See chapter 2, section III. 
49 See chapter 4, section IV. 
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frequently turned against him. Biedenkopf and GeiBler's independence as General 
Secretaries and their different political perspectives undermined their relationships with 
Kohl leading to their eventual departures. A constant thorn in the side of the CDU 
throughout the 1970s was the CSU under the leadership of StrauB. The CSU had little cause 
for programmatic or indeed organisational re-examination as it continued to dominate the 
Bavarian political landscape. The innovations of CDU programmes were viewed as 
dangerous concessions to the left. The fractious and fraught relationship of the sister parties 
was another limitation on the power of the party chairman. In addition, Kohl had to take the 
opinions of the regional parties and the auxiliary organisations into consideration. 
Kohl's skill was the ability to maintain a network of contacts spread throughout the 
organisation of the party. He effectively placed himself between the various competing 
regional, factional and interest groups. However, although he had presided over many of the 
organisational reforms in the Union, Kohl's commitment to continuing this process, for 
example by further bolstering the decision-making power of the federal party, shrivelled the 
longer he remained in office. After 1982, both the Fraktion and the structures of the federal 
party lost importance. The chancellor's office became the centre of decision-making with 
many of the Chancellor's closest advisors coming from outside the party leadership. Kohl's 
style of governing shunned established institutions of decision-making in favour of the 
informal discussions with individual ministers and members of the Fraktion. Both the 
Praesidium and the party executive met less often than in opposition (Bosch 2002:125). The 
Fraktion enjoyed a good relationship with the Chancellor but was increasingly bypassed, 
often "reduced to merely ratifying coalition agreements" (Clemens 1999:101). 
Parliamentary leader Dregger was a Kohl loyalist and the parliamentary group showed 
remarkably little dissent in Bundestag votes. By 1987, the golden age of party reform of the 
1970s seemed a distant memory. The CDU once more appeared outdated and remote from 
society. A GeiBler-initiated reform commission uncovered a widespread loss of motivation 
amongst functionaries in local parties and a gross under-representation of women but these 
findings were toned down when Kohl himself took over the chairmanship of the committee. 
This suppression of self-criticism within the party could not hide the crisis signs in the party 
and in Kohl's leadership. The abortive 'putsch' at the 1989 Bremen party conference 
revealed that discontent with Kohl and concern about the state of the party were present in 
the CDU but most delegates were unwilling to risk the momentous consequences of 
unseating their leader. 
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6vp 
After the loss of the 1970 election, many young Christian Democrats demanded reform and 
modernisation of the party. Reorganisation of the party's structure had taken place in the 
1960s but had stalled50• Under the new General Secretary Schleinzer, a shadow cabinet was 
established and the General Secretary's office was modernised and professionalised 
(Kriechbaumer 1995:55). This work, however, was overshadowed by the infighting which 
consumed the party and it was not until the party suffered a further defeat in 1971 that work 
on party restructuring began in earnest. In 1972 the youth party and the women's 
organisation were given the same formal status as the Leaguessl and officially designated as 
constituent organisations. This alteration did not have the desired effect and did not 
seriously diminish the power of the Leagues (Muller and Steininger 1994:88). Amongst 
other changes, each Land party was to produce a list of members and each League to keep 
the local party informed of its membership (Muller and Steininger 1994b:19). The net effect 
of the reforms, however, failed to fundamentally redress the overwhelming power of the 
Leagues who continued to assert their independence from the central party. Some of the new 
rules were not fully observed and the new statute that "the interests of the federal party takes 
precedence over those of the sub-organisations" sounded hollow given the established might 
of the vested interests (Sully 1981 :78). 
The issue of party organisation refused to go away as the 6vp continued to languish 
in opposition throughout the 1970s. The dispute over the vacant parliamentary leader post in 
1978 revealed the continuing dominance of the Leagues and the difficulty of the party in 
finding a unified line. Taus initially wanted the post in order to combine the roles of party 
chairman and Klubobmann but this was opposed by the Leagues and it was eventually 
6AAB leader Mock who was elected as the new Klubobmann (Kriechbaumer 1995:61). 
This highlighted both the weakness of the central party and its chairman and the deep 
factionalism which pervaded the party. After the third successive defeat in 1979, Taus 
seized the initiative and campaigned within the party for a far-reaching restructuring of the 
party. The chairman's suggestions were indeed radical, for instance a reduction of the 
Leagues' status to working groups (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) whose central operation was to 
be the choosing of candidates for chambers elections in which they would campaign under 
so See Chapter II, section IIIb. 
51 A sixth Teilorganisation was created in 1977 with the addition of the Pensioner's League. 
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the OVP party labels2 (Kriechbaumer 1995:64). The proposals, if implemented, would have 
reigned in the powers of the Leagues, asserting the primacy of party. The chairman's ideas 
were rejected by the party executive, the Leagues and even by other reform oriented party 
members leading to the resignation of Taus. 
The actual reforms introduced by Taus' successor Mock were a greatly diluted 
version of the original suggestions (Ableitinger 1995:160). No fundamental reorganisation 
of the Leagues' structure took place. The chairmen of the Leagues were no longer 
automatically deputy chairmen; they were now elected by the conference. The party council 
was also abolished and a new praesidium was created consisting of the chairman, general 
secretary, parliamentary leader and the three deputy chairmen (Sully 1981:80). Although 
members were now de jure party members first and League members secondly, most 
dealings with members were still the preserve of the Leagues. Furthermore, the central party 
apparatus was accorded only 10% of candidate nomination and most senior party positions 
were allocated proportionately between the Leagues. The central party had been bolstered 
but in comparative perspective, the 6vp was still an exceptionally divided and factional 
party in which the Leagues were the leading intra-party actors. 
Throughout the 1980s, the OVP tried to furnish its federal party with a modem 
apparatus, for example, with the introduction of survey research and public relations 
agencies (Muller, Plasser and Vlram, forthcoming). Nonetheless without tackling the power 
of the Leagues, this was little more than window-dressing. The more favourable political 
context of the 1980s allowed the Christian Democrats to claw back some of its lost support 
and helped push party reform back off the agenda. In addition to the unsolved dilemma of 
the Leagues, the federal basis of the party was becoming increasingly problematic in the 
1970-89 period. With the national party out of office for much of this period, Land parties, 
particularly those in Land government, grew in influence and autonomy. For example, the 
Styrian party has long been a troublesome local party, resisting policies agreed by the 
federal party such as the stationing of new jets at Styrian air basess3• This trend was 
reinforced by the greater personalisation of politics. Land governors became central figures 
in regional and national politics. Where the Landeshauptmann was a Christian Democrat, 
S2 Other suggestions were introducing exclusively direct membership of the party and a far greater 
role for party conferences in selecting leadership posts. 
S3 See Binder (1995). 
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this was a further restriction on central authority. As the decade drew to a close, it was 
increasingly clear that the GVP had not solved its organisational difficulties. Despite the 
party's gains in policy terms, it could not make electoral capital from this. Instead, its image 
was of an outdated, paralysed party trapped in factional disputes and leadership turmoil. 
CDA 
As explained in chapter II, party organisation was a less influential factor in shaping the 
fortunes of the Dutch confessionals and this was also true of the newly merged Christian 
Democrats. As a firmly hierarchical mass party, the CDA most resembled the organisation 
of the ARP (Koole 1997: 145). The absence of federalism in the Netherlands has typically 
meant that Dutch parties do not face the same degree of geographically-centred dissent as 
their German or Austrian counterparts. Accordingly, the CDA's organisation did not grant a 
great deal of autonomy to its grassroots structures. The lowest regional organisation is the 
municipal section whose principal task was the preparation of campaigns for communal 
elections. They also have a role in the construction of electoral programmes but Krouwel 
(1993:71-2) found that in comparison with other Dutch parties, the CDA municipal 
organisations had less influence due to proscribed limits existing on which aspects of the 
programme can be revised. Initially, candidate selection was according to the 'bloed-
groepen' principle, that is the central party ensured an equal distribution between the three 
confessional parties. After 1980, selection was altered and responsibility for candidate 
selection was formally given to municipal organisations. Nonetheless, considerable 
opportunity exists for the party executive to steer this process (Krouwel 1993:72). At the 
next level are the regional organisations which are largely administrative with marginal 
political significance (Lepszy and Koecke 2000: 157). 
At the national level, the maIO organs of the party are the party council, the 
executive and congress. According to the statute, the latter is the highest decision making 
within the party yet in operation, the council54 is the body with the greatest significance with 
a decisive role in the preparation of election programmes and the list of candidates. The 
congressSS must meet at least every two years and has quite narrowly delineated powers. It 
54 The council is made up of delegates from the regional organs, the party executive, leading figures 
in the special party organisations and commissions. 
55 The congress is mainly composed of representatives from the municipal sections, members of the 
council and the executive members of the auxiliary associations as well as members without voting 
rights such as parliamentarians from both cambers and members of commissions. 
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can approve or reject councilor executive resolutions, elects only the chainnan of the party 
council and in exceptional circumstances alter an already prepared candidate list (Lepszy 
and Koecke 2000:159). The party executive, composed of the chainnan, two deputies, a 
group of members selected by the party council and others by regional and auxiliary groups, 
is supposed to give leadership to all political and organisational activities of the CDA. The 
day-to-day running of the party is in the hands of a smaller business executive. 
Despite its fonnal importance, the executive is not viewed as important by the 
Dutch public and its activities receive little media coverage. The incompatibility of post-
holding within the party with membership of either chamber of parliament or ministerial 
office relegates the party's administration to a side role in its internal life. The dominant 
person within the party is not the chairman but rather the prime minister (if (s)he is from the 
CDA) or the leader of the CDA parliamentary group in the Tweede Kamer. The weak 
position of the CDA chairman was exemplified in the figure of Wim van Veizen who 
became party chainnan in 1987. Van Vel zen saw the party as being antiquated, rewarding 
loyalty rather than ability and in desperate need of modernisation. His attempted recruitment 
of non-party business people and scientists caused substantial anger particularly among 
fonner ARP members who decried the newcomers as 'yuppies' and 'careerists,S6. Van 
Velzen's campaign of modernisation subsequently floundered on his lack of power within 
the CDA and he restricted himself to a less public role. 
Centralised power, then, is not in the hands of the chainnan but organisational 
plurality was not the limiting factor that it was in other Christian Democratic parties. Direct 
party organisationsS7 do not unduly limit the power of the party leader. Auxiliary party 
organisations such as the Scientific Institute, Woman's Association and the youth party, do 
play more of a role in internal political debates, intervening in the internal discussion 
process, developing policy ideas and stimulating debate58• However, it is significant that 
these auxiliary organisations do not include representatives of business or trade unions. 
Without direct ties to these groups, the CDA has greater scope for action than, for example, 
the 6vp. This is not to deny that the CDA continued to have strong links with particular 
56 See Metze (1995:128-156) for a full account of van Velzen's problems. 
57 Such as the political instruction institute (Steenkamp Institut) or the foreign commission 
(Buitenlandcommissie). 
S8 For example see the clashes between the Vrouwenberaad and the party about the discussion of the 
theme of emancipation and individualism (van de Streek 1993:202-4). 
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social groups (e.g. agrarian interests) with many parliamentarians having a background in 
such organisations (Woldcndorp 1993:154). What had changed was the nature of the 
relationship between the societal middle ficld and the party. The CDA was now in a stronger 
position to assert the primacy of politics, a position far removed from its Austrian 
counterpart. 
While the CDA was less encumbered by problems resulting from the dominance of 
interest incorporation, the powers of the leadership were significantly circumscribed by 
another Dutch political feature: the separation between cabinet office holding and 
parliamentary representation. The complete separation of cabinet and parliament produces 
an inherent tension for all government parties. Parliamentary parties will frequently deviate 
politically from the representatives of the party in government, particularly if the 
government is carrying out unpopular policies (Daalder 1987:236). During the 1980s, the 
relationship between the CDA in government and the parliamentary fractie was not without 
tension. Parliamentary leader de Vries was often uncomfortable with the social implications 
of the Lubbers government's cost-cutting measures and at times expressed this openly 
(Metze 1995:99-101). The relationship between the party in executive and the party in the 
legislature must be taken into consideration at all times by the prime minister. Admittedly, 
the ability of Tweede Kamer fractie leader to playa quasi-oppositional role may assume a 
constructive function within the internal dynamics of the party by allowing for a certain 
level of criticism. Yet as Dutch political history testifies, this is a delicate balance to 
maintain. 
v. Conclusion 
Christian Democracy in the 1970s and 1980s : Tempora Mutantur, Nos Et Mutamur 
In lilts? 
Post-1970, Christian Democratic parties entered into a new phase. Parties that had politically 
matured in office lost this orientation and were consequently thrown into disorder. The 
initial impulse of the CDU and GVP was to see their problems as short-term and correctible 
through leadership change. When this brought neither electoral reward nor silenced internal 
dissension, the parties turned to programmatic and organisational renewal. As office-
inclined parties, this reluctance to consider more far-reaching change was not surprisingS9 
but successive electoral dcfeats and the extended sojourn in opposition were enough of a 
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shock to stimulate reform. For the Dutch confessionals, the merger of the parties was caused 
by electoral losses and resulted in organisational and ideological transformation. 
Reform was not straightforward: programmatic change aimed at both inner party 
harmony and adaptation. The GVP's reforms went further but both parties assimilated a 
range of new concerns into their programmes, signifying an opening to and engagement 
with new social concerns and demands. Admittedly, adaptation did not fundamentally alter 
the profile of the parties. The pillars of Christian Democratic identity remained untouched 
and programmatic work aimed more for internal unity than radical reconsideration. 
Nonetheless, the new-found programmatic zest of Christian Democrats did lend the parties a 
fresh relevance. The extent to which this contributed to the Christian Democratic resurgence 
is questionable but the involvement in programmatic work did help preserve intra-party 
unity. As Social Democratic-led governments experienced mounting economic problems in 
the 1980s, Christian Democratic thinking again demonstrated its malleability through an 
increasing emphasis on free market policies. The barriers to programmatic change for the 
CDA were even larger but the eventual modification was momentous, overcoming 
historically-based religious divisions and bringing the party into line with other Christian 
Democratic parties in terms of its basic principles and its response to the challenges of 
environmentalism, feminism, third world development and the crisis of the welfare state. 
Organisational reform was also awkward as entrenched interests existed in both 
parties, blocking the empowerment of a central party able to co-ordinate opposition to the 
government. What was necessary in opposition was a greater degree of centralised co-
ordination of the organisational pluralism inherent in the Volkspartei model. The CDU was 
more successful in this respect, breathing more life into its central organisation and greatly 
expanding its mass membership. Due to its greater degree of inveterate factionalism, the 
OVP never solved the difficulties caused by its structure and the central party continued to 
be restricted by the degree of independence enjoyed by its sub-units. For both parties, 
however, the social breadth and autonomy of party sub-units continued to narrow the 
options of the leadership. The CDA's leadership, though not free of organisational diversity, 
faced considerably less restrictions on its independence. 
59 See Chapter 1 Section V. 
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In government all three parties attempted welfare retrenchment and market 
liberalisation as the social wing of Christian Democracy found itself on the defensive. This 
trend was mirrored in party programmes, especially the CDU and {)VP's. However, in all 
three parties, the spirit of renovation and innovation wilted the longer the party spent in 
government. In the second half of the 1980s, programmatic work continued but was of 
marginal significance and there were few significant organisational reforms. By 1989, the 
state of the parties varied quite markedly. The GVP's situation was most grave: faced by the 
moderate Social Democracy espoused by Vranitzky and the populism of the FPG, it 
stagnated in its position as junior coalition partner. The CDU was in a more favourable 
position but even it had appeared on the brink of a crisis until the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989 eased its difficulties. In contrast, the CDA seemed robust and revitalised. Despite some 
tensions over the growing irrelevance of programmatic work, Lubbers' popular authority 
was still unchallenged and the party was central to the formation of any coalition. Yet such 
national dissimilarities, however, concealed common trends in the electoral support of 
Christian Democratic parties. As was shown in Table 1.1 (p.2), the parties only managed to 
consolidate their vote in the 1980s; in no country did the average result actually improve. 
One explanation for this was that Christian Democratic parties were still reliant on the 
electoral support of key social constituencies. This electoral core had, however, been 
shrinking for a number of years and therefore regardless of the apparent rejuvenation of 
Christian Democracy in the 1980s, there had been no return to the golden age of the 1950s. 
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Chapter 4. The Draining Reservoir of Christian Democratic Support 
I. Introduction 
Chapter 3 revealed the problems of Christian Democratic parties as their political 
dominance began to slip. In the foreign environs of opposition, the CDU and 6vp 
struggled to come to terms with their new roles. Despite remaining in office (except in 
the case of the CHU), rapid electoral decline convinced the Dutch confessionals to put 
aside historical differences and merge. Yet in each of the three countries, Christian 
Democrats were able to re-establish themselves in government and consolidate their 
electoral support in the 1980s. While the parties themselves contributed to this through 
their programmatic and organisational adaptation in the 1970s, the swing to the Christian 
Democrats reflected the "mood of pessimism [which] prevailed at the beginning of the 
1980s" in which "it became possible publicly to articulate conservative ideology" 
(Girvin 1994:208-209). In addition, a policy consensus emerged "based on neo-liberal 
and monetarist views of economic management" (Chandler 2002:7). Thus, at both 
electoral and policy levels, the 1980s appeared to be "a decade of conservative 
dominance" (Girvin 1988: 1). 
The return of the centre-right to power in Germany and Austria and the 
consolidation of the newly created CDA in the Netherlands did not signal, though, a 
return to the golden-age of earlier decades. The foundations of this success did not have 
the same solidity as previously. This vulnerability of the Christian Democratic renewal 
derived in part from the difficulty of reconciling the broad social basis of Christian 
Democracy with programmatic initiatives requiring austerity and cutbacks. However, a 
further complication was that key social constituencies comprising the core of the 
Christian Democratic electorate were in long-term decline. There is no automatic 
relationship between socio-structural, demographic and attitudinal transformation and 
the electoral success of political parties. The loss of core support groups need not sound 
the death knell for a political party. Indeed, political parties across large parts of Western 
Europe have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Few of the largest parties have 'failed' 
and indeed Yanai (1999) inverted Lawson and Merkl's question (1988) to ask "why do 
political parties survive?" Nevertheless, it is assumed here that if a party's core 
electorate is decreasing, the party faces a major problem. As Wilson (1994:270) notes, 
not all parties will respond but for office and vote-seekers, such as Christian Democrats, 
the logic of electoral competition is inescapable and requires action. 
93 
Chapters 5-7 will analyse the nature of the adaptation of the CDU, C>VP and 
CDA by analysing party developments in the 1990s. The aim of this chapter, then, is 
first to illustrate the common features of the Christian Democratic electorate and 
membership in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. This will be followed by an 
overview of the most relevant social and economic changes in the three countries. 
Finally, indicators of the decomposition of the Christian Democratic core (partisanship, 
membership) will be considered. As chapters 5-7 will make clear, there is no simple 
correspondence between social and economic changes and the decline in the Christian 
Democratic vote and contextual short-term influences have influenced the fortunes of 
the CDU, C>VP and CDA in the 1990s to a considerable extent. Yet the erosion of the 
most reliable groups of Christian Democratic voters cannot be ignored as an important 
factor. Chandler's warning (2002:21) against viewing structural change as having 
"systematically disadvantaged one side of the political spectrum" is justified and indeed, 
the social and economic transformations affecting the Christian Democratic electorate 
have to be viewed against the broader picture of entire electorates increasingly devoid of 
strong affective party ties. The hitherto enduring bond between voters and the 
established parties has weakened as socio-economic change, rising educational levels 
and living standards and the more powerful role of the mass media have brought about a 
process of partisan dealignment (Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984; Dalton 2000). 
Nonetheless, the consequences of this have often been examined solely for the centre-
left or in terms of new parties. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to explore the 
implications of such change for Christian Democrats. 
II. The Christian Democratic Electorate 
Religiosity 
One of the most characteristic features of the archetypal Christian Democratic voter 
across all of Western Europe is hislher strong link to a church. Where membership of the 
church remains prevalent in the whole population (e.g. Austria), the outstanding feature 
of the Christian Democratic electorate is their behavioural religiosity. Additionally, in 
countries where church membership itself has substantially decreased (e.g. the 
Netherlands), there is also a link between membership of a denomination and voting for 
a Christian Democratic party. The religious dimension of Christian Democratic support 
will be examined in each of the three countries under study, illustrating that this 
powerful bond between religion and Christian Democratic voting persists into the 
present day. 
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Table 4.1 shows that the traditionally strong association between German 
Catholicism and Christian Democracy is still evident (e.g. 47% of Catholics supported 
the CDU/CSU in 1998 compared to 35% in the total electorate). However, the statistics 
also reveal that regardless of denomination, CDU/CSU support is higher among the 
religiously active. Those Catholics and Protestants whose church membership has 
ceased to be anything other than nominal were far less inclined to vote Christian 
Democratic. Conversely, it can also be seen that the CDU/CSU is distinctly under-
represented among the un- or dechurched segment of the population with only 22% of 
such voters backing the party in 1998. Some evidence that the relationship between 
church attendance and CDU/CSU voting is fading can be found. In 1976 81 % of regular 
Catholic church-attenders voted CDU/CSU as did 65% of Protestant regular attenders 
(Conner 1991:87) compared to 70% and 48% respectively in 1998. Nonetheless, this 
decline has been gradual and has not eroded the enduring association between 
behavioural religiosity and CDU/CSU voting. 
Table 4.1 CDU/CSU support by denomination and church attendance 
1994 1998 
Total CDUICSU vote 41.5 35.1 
Catholic: all 52 47 
Catholic: frequent attendance 74 70 
Catholic: occasional attendance 54 50 
Catholic: non-attendance 37 35 
Protestant 37 32 
Protestant: frequent attendance 47 48 
Protestant: occasional attendance 42 36 
Protestant: non-attendance 32 29 
No religion 28 22 
Source: Politbarometer statistics, adapted from Glbowskl (1999:30). 
Austria lacks Germany's religious heterogeneity. Catholics account for nearly 80% of 
the population while the Protestant minority is only 4.7% of the population (Austrian 
census 2001). Nonetheless, a broadly similar pattern can be discerned. The Austrian 
statistics are less detailed than the German equivalents with studies tending to divide the 
electorate into Catholics close to the church (i.e. weekly attendance), less religiously 
active Catholics (Le. rare or non-attendance) and those who profess no denominational 
allegiance. As can be seen from table 4.2, the percentage of regular churchgoers voting 
6vp has remained steady throughout the 1990s. The party is also far less popular among 
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those more distant from the church with only 20% of irregular churchgoers and a mere 
6% of those entirely without church ties voting for the aVp in 1999 (Plasser, Seeber and 
Vlram 2000: 16). Again, the degree of behavioural religiosity is a more reliable indicator 
of willingness to vote Christian Democratic than church affiliation alone. Further proof 
of this is the strong support given to the Spa by those religiously inactive Catholics. In 
1990 almost every second voter in this group voted for the Spa (Plasser, Vlram and 
Grausgruber 1992:33). 
Table 4.2 aVp support among churchgoers 
Regular churchgoers Total (j VP support (%) 
1990 60 32.1 
1994 59 27.7 
1995 59 28.3 
1999 59 26.9 
Source: Fessel-GtK. exit polls cited in Plasser, Vlram and Sommer (2000:75) 
Table 4.3 CDA support by denomination and attendance 
1994 1998 
Total CDA vote 22.2 18.4 
Catholics: all 40 34.2 
Catholics: weekly churchgoers 65 69.4 
Dutch Reformed: all 30 28.5 
Dutch Reformed: weekly 54 49.0 
churchgoers 
Gereformeerde: all 50 41.9 
Gereformeerde: weekly 50 42.3 
chuchgoers 
No religious affiliation 7 2.6 
Source: 1994 DNES figures taken from Lepszy and Koecke (2000: 184-6) and Irwin and 
van Holsteyn (2000:87); 1998 DNES, Steinmetz Archive. 
Three features of Table 4.3, which breaks down CDA support according to 
denomination and church attendance, are quite striking. While support for the CDA is 
higher among members of the different religious groups than in the general population, 
this is far less than in the past. For example, in 1966, 81 % of all Catholics intended to 
vote for the KVP and 74% of gereJormeerde for the ARP (Middendorp 1991:303). The 
linkage between the religious denominations and the separate parties weakened in the 
following decade but even in 1981 after the fonnation of the CDA, 55% of Catholics 
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and 68% of gereformeerde supported the Christian Democrats (Middendorp 1991: 307). 
The subsequent period has seen the progressive erosion of this bond. Admittedly, a 
greater proportion of Catholics, Dutch Reformed and gereformeerde vote CDA than in 
the whole population yet by 1998, the CDA is no longer supported by an absolute 
majority within any religious group. The second prominent aspect of the table is that in 
the case of Catholics and Dutch Reformed members, the relationship between weekly 
church-attendance and CDA voting is much stronger. This has not changed drastically in 
the last two decades. For example, in 1985 72% of Catholics, 52% of Dutch Reformed 
members and 70% of gereformeerde attending church on a weekly basis voted CDA 
(Middendorp 1991 :310). Behavioural religiosity is therefore becoming a more reliable 
guide to CDA voting than church-membership alone. The final feature of the table to 
stand out is the dismally low support for the CDA among those without any religious 
ties. This has varied since the formation of the CDA. In 1981, support was 5% but the 
success of Lubbers drew extra secular voters to the party, peaking at 12% in 1986 
(Middendorp 1991 :308) but by 1998, this had fallen to a dismal 2.8%. 
Occupational characteristics 
Despite Christian Democratic parties' ambitions to represent all segments of the 
population, certain trends in the composition of Christian Democratic electorate in terms 
of occupation are also clear. Typically, such parties draw many votes from farmers, the 
self-employed and civil servants but are less successful with blue-collar voters. Support 
from white-collar employees is less easy to generalise with more national and temporal 
variation. 
The structure of the vote according to occupation in Germany has been 
complicated by unification. While clear trends existed beforehand, these were to some 
extent blurred by voting behaviour in the East. This can be seen by comparing pre-1990 
statistics with those following Gemlan unity. 
97 
Table 4.4 CDU/CSU support by occupation 
1990 1994 1998 
West East West East West East 
Total 44.3 41.8 42.1 38.5 37.0 27.3 
CDUlCSU 
Blue-col/ar 39 49 35 41 31 27 
workers 
White-col/ar 43 36 40 32 34 24 
employees 
Civil servants ... ... 44 30 41 34 
Self-employed 57 48 53 48 46 43 
Farmers ... ... 65 59 75 43 
• not asked in 1990 
Source: Gibowski (1996:46); Gibowski (2000:210). 
The Union parties have consistently been the electoral choice of a majority of farmers 
(e.g. in 1969 the difference between the CDUlCSU and the SPD was 68) and the self-
employed. Although the CDU/CSU has always received some blue-collar votes, the 
Union parties lag behind the SPD (e.g. in 1980 the CDU/CSU only received 30% of 
blue-collar votes, Conner 1991 :94). Competition with the SPD for white-collar 
employees and civil servants is more intense but the Union parties are still typically the 
most supported party amongst these groups. Treating civil servants and white-collar 
employees as one group, there were only three elections before 1990 when the SPD 
outpolled the union amongst this group (Conner 1991 :95). For both white-collar 
employees and blue-collar workers, trade union membership is a further useful 
explanatory variable with non-union members in both groups giving far greater support 
to the CDU/CSU. For example, in 1998 only 23% of trade union members voted 
CDUlCSU compared to 40% of non-unionised workers and employees (Gibowski 
1999:28). Eastern voting patterns initially reversed the pattern of party support in the 
west with the Union stronger among blue-collar workers and the SPD the most popular 
party for white-collar employees and civil servants. Over the decade, however, there 
were some signs of convergence in the voting behaviour of occupational groups as the 
gap between blue collar workers in east and west narrowed. 
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Table 4.5 OYP support by occupation 
1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 
Total(JVP 41.3 32.1 27.7 28.3 26.9 
Blue-collar 27 19 15 13 12 
workers 
White-collar 36 27 25 28 23 
workers 
Civil servants 33 30 23 20 30 
Self-employed 60 51 40 39 41 
Farmers 93 85 73 72 87 
Source: Fessel-Gfk Institut data cited III Plasser, Vlram and Sommer (2000:67) for 
1999; Luther (1998:140-1) for 1995; Plasser and Vlram (1995:356) for 1994,1990 and 
1986. 
Similar trends in Austria can be detected in Table 4.5. The proportion of farmers voting 
OYP is even higher and the party is strong among self-employed voters. On the other 
hand, after 1986 the party lost votes among the self-employed who are increasingly 
drawn to the FPG. While the GYP's share of civil servants has remained steady, the 
party faces strong competition from the SPG and the Greens for the votes of both this 
group and those of white-collar employees. The GYP could not claim that it was the 
party of civil servants or white-collar employees. In each election between 1986 and 
1999, the Christian Democrats lagged behind the SPO in these two groups (Plasser, 
VIram and Sommer 2000:69,72). Whether white or blue collar, trade union membership 
shapes the GYP vote. While only 19% of all union members voted for the People's Party 
in 1999, the party was the joint most popular party with the FPO among non-members, 
taking 30% of the vote. 
Dutch election surveys pay less attention to the varieties of employment and 
more to subjective feelings of class. Moreover, occupations are categorized differently to 
the German/Austrian divisions and in any case the importance of occupational 
classifications in structuring the vote has generally not been rated as significant. This is 
particularly the case in regard to the Christian Democrats where "apart from their 
religion and church attendance, CDA voters differ little from the average Dutch voter" 
(Lucardie and ten Napel 1994:60). For example, in the 1998 election, the CDA won a 
fairly even spread of voters across all classes. In contrast to the VVD who won 
negligible support from the working class (6.1%) and the PvdA whose success in the 
upper class was very limited (9.1 %), support for the Christian Democrats never falls 
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below 13.1% nor exceeds 22.7% in anyone class. This can also be analysed by looking 
at the composition of the party's electorate against that of the population as a whole. 
Table 4.6 The class structure of CDA support 
CDA 1986 Total electorate CDA 1998 Total electorate 
1986 1998 
Upper and upper- 15 15 15 18 
middle class 
Middle class 53 49 61 57 
Upper-working class 10 11 7 7 
Working class 23 24 18 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: 1986 DNES cited in Daalder (1987:226-7) and 1998 DNES. 
Table 4.6 confirms the remarkable resemblance between the class balance within the 
Christian Democratic electorate and in the population as a whole. Nevertheless, CDA 
voters do share some characteristics with other Christian Democratic electorates around 
Europe. Self-employed voters account for 19.5% of the total CDA electorate, a 
proportion well beyond that in the whole population. In addition, the party retains a 
connection to self-employed farmers although as shown by the very small numbers in 
the survey! this group is of marginal electoral importance. The majority of Christian 
Democratic voters are employees despite the party's lack of consistent success in this 
group. In 1998 the party came fourth in this group behind the PvdA, VVD and D66. 
Table 4.7 splits the middle class by union membership which reaffirms the general 
tendency of Christian Democrats to be more popular among non-union members 
although caution must be taken when interpreting the results as the vast majority of 
those polled are either not active or non-members. 
Table 4.7 CDA middle class vote by union membership 
Middle class 
Union Very Reasonably Not active Not member 
membership active active 
CDA vote 
0 10 17 18 
1998 
Source: 1998 DNES, Steinmetz Archive 
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Demographic characteristics 
A further core element of Christian Democratic support has come from pensioners and 
older voters in general. This continues to be the case and Christian Democratic parties 
are badly underrepresented among younger voters. In the past these parties also attracted 
a disproportionate amount of support from women. However, as will be shown here, this 
trend is less evident in contemporary elections and Christian Democratic voters are more 
evenly drawn from the sexes. 
Table 4.8 CDU/CSU support by age group 
1990 1994 1998 
West East West East West East 
Total 44.3 41.8 42.1 38.5 37.0 27.3 
18-24 36 33 35 29 35 20 
25-34 34 37 33 31 30 25 
35-44 38 40 37 36 32 25 
45-59 48 43 46 41 38 28 
60+ 53 47 50 46 45 35 
Source: adapted from Gibowski (1996:40-41) and Gibowski (2000:24-5). 
Table 4.9 CDU/CSU support by gender 
1990 1994 1998 
West East West East West East 
Men 40 39 42 37 37 27 
Women 44 43 43 40 37 27 
Source: adapted from Gibowski (1996:40-41) and Glbowski (2000:24-5). 
Table 4.8 clearly shows that the German Christian Democrats have been strongly 
supported by older voters throughout the 1990s. With the exception of the 25-34 bracket 
in the West in 1994 and 1998, the proportion of CDU/CSU voters increases as the age 
group rises. Interestingly though, the age gap within the CDU/CSU electorate may be 
diminishing as in the west at least, Christian Democratic support among the youngest 
age group has remained steady in comparison to CDU/CSU losses among older voters. 
The elections since unification have also witnessed increasing congruence between male 
and female Christian Democratic voting patterns. Apart from the election of 1980, 
women have always been more likely to vote for the CDU/CSU than their male 
1 N=22, almost half of whom voted CDA. 
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counterparts but the gender gap since the 1970s has been far less pronounced (Connor 
1991: 112) and this trend towards increasingly uniform electoral behaviour was 
continued in elections in the 1990s. 
Electoral backing for the Austrian Christian Democrats is also stronger in older 
age groups. In contrast to the CDU/CSU, however, the OVP's main losses have been in 
the youngest two age ranges while the proportion of older Austrians voting for the party 
has been more stable. Therefore, there has been no sign that the age gap in OVP support 
has disappeared although the People's Party vote has become more evenly balanced 
between male and female voters in the 1990s as Table 4.11 shows. 
Table 4.10 OVP support by age group 
1990 1994 1995 1999 
Total 32.1 27.7 28.3 26.9 
18-29 24 19 18 17 
30-44 32 26 25 23 
45-59 34 30 33 32 
60-6~ 34 33 36 35 
70+ 32 31 
Source: Fessel-Gtk Instltut data cited III Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (2000:67) for 
1999, Luther (1998:140-1) for 1995, Plasser and Ulram (1995:356) for 1994 and 1990. 
Table 4.11 OVP support by gender. 
1990 1994 1995 1999 
Men 29 25 26 26 
Women 33 30 29 27 
Source: Fessel-Gtk Institut data cited in Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (2000:67) for 
1999, Luther (1998: 140-1) for 1995, Plasser and Ulram (1995:356) for 1994 and 1990. 
The statistics for the CDA in table 4.12 confirm the same general trend with a marked 
difference between the voting behaviour of the youngest and eldest cohort. This was 
evident in 1994 as the party sustained a severe loss of support (-18%) in the youngest 
age group with a less damaging decline in the 65+ range (-9%) despite the party's hastily 
amended promise to freeze the basic pension. This disturbing trend intensified in 1998 
as the party fell to the fifth most popular party in the two youngest age groups while 
continuing to poll heavily among elderly voters. The disproportionately high level of 
female voters in the CDA's electorate seems to be dropping. In 199456% of the CDA's 
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voters were female (Lepszy and Koecke 2000:184) while in 1998 the balance between 
women and men was almost exactly 50-50. 
Table 4.12 CDA support by age group 
1994 1998 
Total 22.2 18.4 
18-24 16 9 
25-34 20 9 
35-49 17 12 
50-64 27 21 
65+ 34 43 
Source: 1994 figures taken from Lepszy and Koecke (2000: 184) and 1998 DNES, 
Steinmetz Archive. 
The preceding section has shown that clear trends in the Christian Democratic electorate 
can be detected in all three countries. Core Christian Democratic voters are the 
religiously active, the self-employed, farmers and older voters. The gender make-up of 
the parties' support has become less female in recent elections with men and women 
voting Christian Democrat in almost equal proportions. Nonetheless. trends in Christian 
Democratic support in the 1990s do show some variety. A perceptible weakening of the 
relationship between church attendance and Christian Democratic voting has taken place 
in all three countries but the CDU/CSU and the CDA are better supported by 
churchgoing and non-churchgoing Catholics than the OVP. The CDU/CSU is by far the 
most successful in attracting voters without church links with both the OVP and the 
CDA worryingly weak among secular voters. All three parties are also popular among 
white-collar employees and civil servants but the support of these occupational groups 
has not been consistent over time and across countries. For example, the CDU/CSU 
despite fluctuations in its support among these groups has been far more successful in 
attracting the votes of civil servants and employees than the OVP. The Union parties 
support is also based on a more significant blue-collar element than the Austrian 
Christian Democrats. A direct comparison of vote by occupation was not possible in the 
case of the Netherlands but analysis of the class structure of the CDA votes suggested 
that irrespective of the party's very serious electoral problems. it was at least able to 
maintain a broad cross-class appeal. Christian Democrats have always drawn support 
from older voters but demographic divergence was also noticeable in the 1990s. 
Whereas the CDU/CSU remains able to attract about a third of young voters, the OVP 
2 For 1990 and 1994, the oldest category of voter is 60+. 
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and the CDA have haemorrhaged voters in the youngest segment of the electorate with 
the result that the electorate of both parties was increasingly elderly by the late 1990s. 
III. Membership 
Some of the same trends in Christian Democratic support are visible in the make-up of 
the various parties' membership. There have not been many detailed studies of 
membership characteristics and it is not always asked in political surveys3. Here, data 
from Bosch (2002) and Miiller, Plasser and Ulram (1995) will be employed for the CDU 
and the OVP respectively while statistics from the 1998 DNES supply the basis for the 
analysis of the CDA. Unfortunately, this does not give a completely comparable list of 
demographic and social variables and there is the recurring problem of small ~. 
Nonetheless, such figures do at least give an impression of the structure of the Christian 
Democratic membership. 
Table 4.13 Structure of CDU Membership 
1969 1985 1996 
Gender Men 86.9 78.0 75.1 
Women 13.1 22.0 24.9 
Religion Catholic 73.6 58.8 52.7 
Protestant 23.0 34.5 35.9 
None/other 3.4 6.7 11.4 
Occupation Workers 12.1 10.0 9.9 
Employees 23.4 28.0 28.7 
Civil 13.3 12.5 11.4 
Servants 
Self 30.3 24.4 21.6 
Employed 
Age Under 30 - 8.3 4.9 
30-59 - 68.5 58.8 
60+ - 23.2 36.3 
Source: Bosch (2002:215). 
3 For example, the Politbarometer series do not ask whether respondents are members of parties. 
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Table 4.14 Structure ofOVP membership 
1976 1985 1993 
Gender Men 66 57 69 
Women 34 43 31 
Occupation Worker - 9 7 
Employee/Civil 
-
27 22 
Servant 
Self Employed 
-
8 5 
Farmer - 17 20 
Housewife - 16 17 
Pensioner/not 
-
24 28 
employed 
Age Under 30 28 21 18 
30-44 29 29 30 
45-59 26 29 20 
60+ 17 23 32 
Source: Miiller, Plasser and Ulram (1995: 189). 
Table 4.15 Structure ofeDA membership 
1998 
Gender Men 62.5 
Women 37.5 
Religion Catholic 42.2 
Dutch Reformed 18.8 
Gereformeerde 26.6 
No religion 3.1 
Class self-image upper 1.6 
upper-middle 14.3 
middle 71.4 
upper-working 4.8 
working 7.9 
Age 18-24 0 
25-34 3.1 
35-49 18.8 
50-64 40.6 
65+ 37.5 
4 Including former members of the CDA, the sub-sample of CDA members in the 1998 DNES 
was only 64 respondents which severely restricts the conclusions which can be drawn. Even in 
Muller, Plasser and Ulram's study, N was still less than 200. 
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Source: DNES 1998, Steinmetz Archive. 
Common features of the parties are the pronounced over-representation of men and older 
segments of the population. However, while for the CDU at least, the gender gap seems 
to have narrowed over time, Christian Democratic party membership has become even 
more based on the elderly. Roughly a third or over of members are older than sixty while 
the number of members under thirty is minute. The CDA suffer most acutely from this 
with nearly 80% of members over fifty. This would suggest a stagnation of Christian 
Democratic recruitmentS which receives more support from the continued over-
representation of certain occupational groups, i.e. the self-employed in the CDU, farmers 
in the 6vp. Certainly, employees constitute the largest group in both parties but 
membership is still disproportionately drawn from the traditional bases of Christian 
Democratic electoral support. This is also the case in terms of religion. The CDU has 
undergone a process of Protestantisation and has additionally become less religious but 
members are still predominantly Catholic. The ties of the CDA to religious communities 
are even closer and there are few non-religious members6• Again, small N alerts us to the 
hazard of drawing strong conclusions from this but the results do correspond to prior 
expectations. 
IV. Social and economic change 
Parts I and II of this chapter have shown that both the electoral and membership bases of 
the CDU, 6vp and CDA have a distinct social and demographic profile. This section 
will investigate the long-term disintegration of this foundation. 
Religious change 
While secularisation is far from an uncontroversial concept, the impact of religious 
institutions on daily life has unquestionably dropped. There has been no widespread shift 
towards atheism but "the overwhelming evidence of the last thirty years is that fewer 
and fewer people are attending church, that respect for Church traditions and norms has 
declined rapidly and that even amongst the remaining 'faithful', the motivations for and 
justifications of 'religious behaviour' are often mixed and blurred" (Broughton and ten 
Napel 2000:2). Membership of a church, however nominal, does remain high in a 
number of countries but as shown in the previous section, behavioural religiosity is more 
closely linked to Christian Democratic voting and this is dropping almost everywhere. 
, Absolute membership figures will be explored in the final section of this chapter. 
6 Unsurprisingly, this was also the case in the past. Not a single delegate at the 1979 CDA 
conference responding to a questionnaire described himself or herself as non-religious (Hajema, 
van Schurr and Voerman 1993: 101). 
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With the exceptions of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Italy, frequent churchgoers now 
constitute a minority of the population throughout Western Europe (Girvin 2000:22). 
Between 1960 and 1980, church membership remained relatively stable in West 
Germany. Some decline, particularly among Protestants, was evident but as Table 4.l6 
demonstrates, it is only in recent years that the numbers have begun to slide more 
drastically undoubtedly fuelled by unification. The incorporation of the former GDR 
expanded the ranks of the unchurched within Germany massively. In 1990, only 36% of 
easterners described themselves as Protestants with 5% Catholic. This can be seen from 
Table 4.17 which tracks the development of non-confessional respondents in 
Politbarometer surveys. Roughly two-thirds of eastern voters are entirely without church 
ties. However, the increasing willingness of westerners to opt out of the church (and 
with that the paying of the church tax) is also apparent. 
Table 4.16. Denominational membership in Germany 1980-1996 (%). 
1960 1970 1980 1989 1990 1994 1996 
Catholics 44.3 44.6 43.3 42.7 35.4 34.3 33.6 
Protestants 51.6 46.7 42.3 40.1 36.4K 34.6 33.7 
Source. Church membershIp statistics from Statlstlches Bundesamt and populatIOn 
figures from Ministry of Health and Social SecuritylO. 
Table 4.17 Non-church members in Germany 1980-1998 
1980 1984 1990 1994 1998 
West 5.3 6.0 10.8 13.6 16.2 
East - - 57.9 66.9 65.8 
Source: Politbarometer Surveys 1980-1998, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 
Undoubtedly, weekly church attendance has dropped in the post-war period. Where 18% 
of Protestants and 61 % of Catholics regularly went to church in 1953, the equivalent 
figures for 1976 were 5% and 40% respectively (Connor 1991 :90). More recent decline 
can be illustrated using the F orschungsgruppe statistics covering the 1977-1999 period. 
Table 4.18 illustrates that the numbers of very or quite regular Catholic attenders has 
diminished further while interestingly, Protestant attendance has been steadier, actually 
rising in the 1990s. However, this does not obscure the overall trend which is clearer by 
7 The first membership figure is actually from 1963. 
8 Figure is for 1991. 
9 www.~esis,onUDauerbeobacbtun&/SozialindikatorenlPublikationenlDatenreportlvdf files/l-
01J2df accessed 15105/03. 
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looking at all voters. By 1998, a majority of the electorate were at the most rarely in 
church while actual weekly attendance was 13% for Catholics and 3% for Protestants. 
As with church membership, unification has therefore accelerated an already existing 
trend. Protestant church attendance has been low throughout the post-war period while 
the decline in Catholic regular attendance was also already underway. 
Table 4.18 Frequency of church attendance in Gennany 1980-1998 (%) 
1980 1983 1987 199011 1994u 
Catholics 
(Almost)Every 35.0 36.3 33.1 29.1 27.3 (29.2) 
Sunday 
Now and then/ 40.6 41.3 43.5 42.0 44.6 (37.1) 
Once a year 
(Almost) Never 24.2 22.2 23.4 28.5 27.8 (32.5) 
Protestants 
(Almost)Every 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.9 8.9 (8.2) 
Sunday 
Now and then/ 43.6 46.5 48.7 52.9 52.9 (48.5) 
Once a year 
(Almost)Never 49.3 46.3 44.0 39.0 38.1 (42.8) 
All voters 
(Almost)Every 19.4 19.8 19.0 16.6 15.8 (4.6) 
Sunday 
Now and then/ 39.7 41.5 42.9 42.2 41.6 (15) 
Once a year 
(Almost)Never/J 40.6 38.4 37.9 40.9 41.8 (80.1) 
Source: Politbarometer, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1980-1998. 
Although church membership rates remain higher in Austria than Germany, a similar 
contraction of the faithful is taking place. Since 1981, the proportion of the population 
without religious ties has doubled. As in Germany, the number of people formally 
leaving the church has increased in the 1990s. In 1995 alone, 43,527 members left the 
10 http;//www.bm2s.bund.de/download/statistiken/stattb2002/0 II 1.0 I.pdf accessed 15/06/03. 
J 1 Separate surveys were carried out in the east and west in 1990 and 1994. Eastern respondents 
were not asked about church attendance in 1990. 
12 First number is for old Llinder only. The second figure in brackets is for the former GDR. 
13 Those not asked the question after indicating they were not a member of any denomination 
have been added to the 'rarely/never' category. In this way, a more accurate estimate of the 
percentages of each category in the total population can be achieved. 
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1998 
25.5 
45.7 
28.2 
9.0 
53 
37.5 
12.9 
36.1 
50.3 
Catholic churchl4• Nonetheless, in tenns of identification with religion, Austria remains 
a strongly Catholic country. A recent survey found that 75% of Austrians regarded 
themselves as religious, compared to 18% declaring themselves irreligious and 2% as 
committed atheists (Europaische Wertestudie 1999, 6sterreich I5). This finn Catholic 
identity has not prevented the decline of regular church attendance which continued 
apace during the 1990s and with a mere 9% of Austrian youth attending church on a 
regular basis l6, the prospects for a reversal of this trend appear slim. In view of the 
6vP's weakness among inactive Catholics and the non-religious, this decline of 
churchgoing was a serious threat to the party's electoral base. 
Table 4.19 Denominational membership in Austria 1971-2001 
1971 1981 1991 2001 
Catholic 87.4 84.3 78.0 73.6 
Protestant 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.7 
No religion 4.3 6.0 8.6 12.0 
Source: STA TISTIK AUSTRIA. 
Table 4.20 Weekly Church attendance in Austria 1950-98 
1950 1970 1990 1995 1998 
% attending 40 25 21 19 16 
church weekly 
.. Source: 1950 and 1990 figures from Muller and Stemmger (1994:94); 1970 from dIe 
Presse (9/10/1999); 1995 and 1998 from 6sterreichischen Katholischen Presseagenturl7• 
The two tables below (4.21 and 4.22) show the percentages of church 
membership and attendance in the Netherlands. The first illustrates clearly the 
continuing fall in membership across all religions (with the exception of "Other" which 
is almost certainly the result of immigration) and throughout the period covered by the 
Dutch election studies. Especially noteworthy is the substantial rise in the proportion 
declaring no religion. It is also important to bear in mind that the process of 
depillarisation had started prior to 1971 so the statistics may not even fully represent the 
scale of the trend. This is con finned by Table 4.22 which uses figures quoted by 
Middendorp (1991 :25) on frequency of church attendance. The fall between 1966 and 
14 Kirchenaustritte figures from bttp:llwww.kathpress.atlinfozone accessed 02/06/03. 
1 shttp://www.unjyje.ac.atlpastorallbeolo~je/ stud jen/werte-data/pdf/fra~e2 8. pdf accessed 14/02/02 
16 http://religion.orf.atltv/news/neOl0625wertestudie.htm 
17 http;/lwww.kathpress.atljnfozoDe/index.php?z~stat95a and 
http://www.kathpress.atlinfozone/index.php?zl:=stat98a accessed 15/02/02 
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1986 is extremely strikingl8, especially amongst Roman Catholics and members of the 
Dutch Reformed Church. 
Table 4.21 Denominational membership in the Netherlands 1971-98 (%) 
1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 
Roman 35.5 34.0 33.9 35.7 34.1 31.0 29.1 25.2 
Catholic 
Dutch 21.2 22.4 20.0 17.4 16.2 14.4 14.5 14.4 
ReJormed 
GereJormeerde 9.1 10.3 9.0 8.9 7.9 5.8 8.2 5.8 
Other 4.5 3.5 2.4 3.2 4.9 4.2 5.4 3.7 
No Religion 29.4 29.6 33.8 34.4 36.6 44.2 42.7 50.4 
Source: DNES codebooks 1971-98. 
Table 4.22 Weekly attendance at church 1966-86 (%) 
1966 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 
All religions 88 63 50 41 38 32 
Roman 93 70 53 42 32 28 
Catholic 
Dutch 67 39 29 23 25 25 
ReJormed 
GereJormeerde 96 86 81 76 81 70 
Source: 1966 Godsdlenst In Nederland Study; 1971-86 DNES quoted In Mlttendorp 
1991:25) 
It could be argued that Table 4.22 only measures the attendance of the very active 
church members and that this possibly obscures the persistence of less frequent 
attendance. Data, though, from the most recent Dutch election survey from 1998 would 
suggest that this is not the case, i.e. that church attendance as a whole has fallen to very 
low levels. Moreover, the difference between 1986 and 1998 indicates that the decline 
has not yet come to an end. 
18 Even though the 1966 figure was taken from a different survey, there is no reason to question 
its accuracy as between then and the 1970s was precisely the period in which momentous change 
began to occur. 
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1998 
27.7 
10.9 
6.8 
7.2 
47.2 
1986 
33 
28 
32 
63 
Table 4.23 Church attendance in the Netherlands 1998 (%) 
At least once a 2 or 3 times a Once a month Several times a (almost) never 
Week month year 
Roman 
13.6 8.9 14.6 41.9 21.1 
Catholic 
Dutch 
26.5 13.9 6.1 17.8 35.7 
Reformed 
Gereformeerde 59.4 8.4 7.0 10.5 14.7 
Total 
(religious & 13.8 5.2 6.3 21.6 53.1 
non-religious) 
Source: 1998 ONES, Steinmetz Archive. 
Calculating the percentage of the entire electorate regularly attending church, it can 
clearly be seen that the religiously active now constitute a small minority of the Dutch 
population. Less than a fifth now attend church at least two or three times a month while 
a majority virtually never attends. This clearly represents a serious problem for the CDA 
which is confronted by a largely dechurched society. 
Socio-economic change 
The dynamic industrial growth of the post-war period in Western Europe brought about 
far-reaching change to previously rigid class structures. Associated with this 
transformation was a change in the relative balance of economic sectors. Initially, there 
was a swing away from the agrarian sector towards the industrial and then, starting from 
roughly the 1960s, a decline in the industrial sector in favour of the tertiary sector. The 
implications of this development and its translation into the political realm remain 
highly contentious within sociology and political science. However before the 
problematic issue of the continuing relevance of class structures is addressed, it is worth 
considering the less controversial consequences of the contraction of the agricultural 
sector. 
As shown earlier, a second bastion of Christian Democratic support has been 
farmers. While even before the early post-war period there was an unmistakable 
shrinkage of agriculture, this drift has carried on to the point where the rural economy is 
of peripheral economic importance in most Western European economies even if 
agrarian activity maintains a symbolic importance in a number of countries. The table 
below shows that although the nations did not have comparable rates of employment in 
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the agrarian sector in 1950 (Austria still having a comparatively large primary sector), 
the shift away from rural work has affected the three countries in a similar way. 
Table 4.24. Employment Structure in Austria, West Germany and the Netherlands 
1= Agriculture 11= Industry 111= Services 
1950 1960 1970 
I II III I II III I II 
Austria 34.0 35.4 30.6 24.2 39.7 36.1 18.8 40.3 
West Germany 22.2 43.0 34.8 13.8 48.2 38.0 8.5 48.4 
Netherlands 13.9 40.2 45.9 11.1 39.1 49.8 7.0 37.7 
Source: Kirby (1999:83). 
Kirby (1999:84) also quotes more recent statistics which highlight that the transition of 
the economy is still in progress. By 1991, agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing was 
responsible for only 7.4% of all employment in Austria, 3.3% in unified Germany and 
4.6% in the Netherlands. From these figures, it is apparent that the farmers are now of 
marginal importance electorate as a whole. This has important consequences for 
Christian democratic parties: not only do they face an erosion of a social group which 
has traditionally been a source of loyal supporters, but in some cases, they must also 
address this group's continuing disproportionate influence within the party. The 6vp's 
dilemma in this regard is greatest, as the party structure continues to support the 
incommensurate power of the party's Farmer's League (OBB). At the opposite end of 
the scale is the CDA whose centralised structure was created long after the agrarian 
sector had shrunk into insignificance. Yet even in the Dutch context, representation of 
farmers and gardeners interests is still taken seriously by some members ofthe partyl9. 
A further important aspect of socio-economic change connected with the post-
war transformation of Western European economies has been the diminution of the 
proportion of the workforce self-employed. As the section I demonstrated, the electoral 
behaviour of this segment of the electorate consistently leaned towards Christian 
Democracy20. While the quotient of salaried white-collar workers rose dramatically, 
there was a corresponding decrease in the percentage self-employed. In Austria this 
group represented 35% of all employed Austrians in 1951 but thirty years later, this had 
declined to 14% (Plasser, Vlram and Grausgruber 1992:20). In Germany, the proportion 
19 For example, Agriculture minister Bukman's attempts to shield farmers and gardeners from a 
rise in the price of natural gas in 1994. 
20 The connection with the small, self-employed businessman was especially important in the 
formation and appeal of the first modem Dutch political party, the Anti-Revolutionaries. 
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III 
40.9 
43.1 
55.3 
of the working population self-employed fell from 28.3% in 1950 to 11.8% in 1985 
(Connor 1991 :94) although the Politbarometer data indicates the number has not 
continued to decline. The proportion of self-employed people has been even smaller in 
the Netherlands since the 1970s and by 1998, stood at 7.6% (DNES 1971-98). In all 
three nations, then, the electoral significance of the self-employed has faded. 
While the effect of the decline of the primary sector and the proportion of the 
working population self-employed on Christian Democratic support is unambiguous, the 
influence of other social structural changes is not so easily summarised. For some 
observers, the shifting structure of the advanced industrial democracies had created a 
post-industrial society (Bell 1974), undermining in the process the basis of the class 
cleavage. It was argued that the expansion of the service sector had created a new group 
of well-educated, socially mobile, salaried white-collar workers, a 'new middle class'. 
This concept was devised to take account of the different work experiences, attitudinal 
characteristics and most contentiously, political behaviour of this group. The political 
sympathies of the new middle class have been identified with the New Left (e.g. Dalton, 
Beck & Flanagan 1984:5; Kriesi 1993) or post-materialist politics (e.g. Voerman 
1995: 120-121) yet at the same time, the votes of this segment tend to be split between a 
number of parties, both materialist and post-materialist, left and right. 
The lack of a consistent political profile of the new middle class suggests two 
possible explanations. The salaried middle class might be particularly volatile and more 
likely to be floating voters or alternatively, the concept is, as Kitschelt (1994:25-6) 
believes, "deeply flawed, because it subsumes heterogeneous experiences under a single 
category" and as such is unlikely to produce a category with distinctive political 
preferences. Evidence can be found to support both interpretations. For example, in the 
1999 Austrian election, a disproportionate number of voters changing parties were 
employees21 • On the other hand, it was shown earlier that the voting behaviour of white-
collar employees became more predictable if trade union membership was included. It is 
not within the scope of this work to analyse the persuasiveness of the new middle class 
concept as an analytical tool and regardless of which explanation one favours, it can still 
be accepted that for Christian Democratic parties, the rise of a salaried middle class was 
neither universally advantageous nor disadvantageous. In Germany, the CDU/CSU has 
often been the most supported party among this group but this advantage has neither 
been sizeable nor consistent (Connor 1991: 100). Competing in the more fragmented 
21 38% of vote-shifters were employees while they made up only 31% of the whole electorate 
(Plasser, Vlram and Sommer 2000:56). 
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party systems of Austria and the Netherlands, the 6vp and CDA face stiff challenges 
from the left and right for the votes of this group. The 6vP's exile in opposition in the 
1970s was in part attributable to the success of the sp6 under Kreisky in attracting the 
votes of the new middle class (Pelinka 1989:31). Since then, however, the sp6 and 6vp 
had to compete against an increasing number of rivals. Challenges have come from both 
the left (Greens), the right through Haider's populist rejuvenation of the FP6 and 
briefly, the centre (LiF). In the Netherlands, the growth of the new middle class has been 
major factor in the increasing popularity and influence of the liberal-conservative VVD 
(Rochun 1999: 103) but such voters are also drawn towards the PvdA, D66 and Green 
Left22. Therefore, white-collar employees have not shunned centre-right parties but 
neither could Christian Democrats claim to be monopolise their support in the manner of 
earlier core groups. 
Demographic Change 
Whereas the effects of the social and economic change outlined here for Christian 
Democrats are either ambiguous (rise of salaried middle class) or threatening (decline of 
religiosity, self-employed, fanners), demographic developments, at least, seem to be 
more favourable for these parties. Across Western Europe, declining birth rates and 
advances in medical science have contributed to an ageing of populations. 
Table 4.25 Demographic Balance in Gennany, Austria and the Netherlands 1960-99 
Under 15 15-64 65+ 
1960 1999 1960 1990 1960 1999 
Germany 21.3 15.5 67.8 67.8 10.8 16.7 
Austria 22.0 17.1 65.8 67.5 12.2 15.4 
Netherlands 30.0 18.4 61.0 68.2 9.0 13.4 
Source: OECD in Figures (2001). 
The table above illustrates clearly the shifting demographic balance within Gennany, 
Austria and the Netherlands. This development has important electoral consequences: 
older voters, who are more likely to tum out at elections anyway, acquire a greater 
significance. The greater weight of the 'grey vote' in contemporary elections offers an 
opportunity for Christian Democrats to offset the loss of other core social constituencies. 
However, it must be questioned whether the traditional link between Christian 
Democratic voting and old age is the result of a life-cycle or cohort effect, that is 
22 In the 1998 ONES, middle class voters with a university education supported each of these 
parties in almost equal number. 
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whether voters switch to parties of the centre-right in later life or whether the over-
representation of the elderly in Christian Democratic electorates is down to the 
collective experiences of certain generations producing a distinct party identity. Again, 
limitations of space prevent anything other a brief consideration of this question. 
Detailed analysis would require panel surveys to assess whether voters shifted their 
political preference as they age but tables 4.26, 4.27 and 4.28 do show that the support 
of the second (third in Austria) oldest age group has waned markedly in recent years, 
exceeding the decline in the electorate as a whole. Without more comprehensive 
statistics, it is difficult to draw any categorical conclusions from this but it does seem 
likely that this trend is due to generational replacement to some extent. As voters 
socialised in a later era move into this age range, it seems plausible to suggest that they 
bring with them different patterns of political behaviour. If this is the case, the ageing of 
society may not produce the expected benefits for Christian Democrats. Their grip on 
older voters has already begun to loosen and in the future might possibly slip away 
altogether. 
Table 4.26 CDU/CSU support among older voters (west only) 
1983 1990 1998 Change 
Total CDUlCSU 48.8 44.3 37.0 -11.8 
45-59 50.1 47.6 38 -12.1 
60+ 52.6 53.1 45 -7.6 
Source: Gibowski (1996:40-41) and Glbowski (2000:24-5). 
Table 4.27 OVP support among older voters 
1986 1995 1999 Change 
TotalOVP 41.3 28.3 26.9 -14.4 
45-59 48 36 32 -16 
60-69 44 32 35 -9 
70+ 43 32 31 -12 
Source: Fessel-Gtk Instltut data cited III Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (2000:67) for 1999; 
Luther (1998:140-1) for 19861995. 
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Table 4.28 CDA support among older voters 
1989 1994 1998 Change 
Total CDA 35.3 22.2 18.1 -17.2 
50-64 40 27 21 -19 
65+ 43 34 43 0 
Source: 1989,1994 figures taken from Lepszy and Koecke (2000:184) and 1998 DNES, 
Steinmetz Archive. 
This section has demonstrated that key social constituencies of Christian 
Democracy have declined in size through the post-war period. Social and economic 
change has reduced the significance of active churchgoers, farmers and the self-
employed in the electorate and has forced the CDU, CDA and 6vp to appeal beyond 
these networks of partisans. The scale of this transformation might not be uniform across 
each of the three countries but the direction of change is unmistakeable. The expansion 
of the group of salaried white-collar workers has complicated the task of these parties. 
While the validity of the new middle class concept is not incontestable, what is clear is 
that the political loyalties of this amorphous new group are flimsy and inconsistent. 
The CDU/CSU's greater success with such voters is an intriguing aspect of the 
comparison. Clearly, the character of the German party system has been more conducive 
to the Christian Democratic attempt to win over the new middle class. The dominance of 
the CDUlCSU on the centre-right contrasts favourably with the additional competition 
confronting the 6vp and the CDA. The Austrian Christian Democrats faced the further 
difficulty of a party organisation which cemented the powerful position of agrarian 
interests impeding in the process efforts to open the party up to new social groups. 
Though the CDA did not suffer from this organisational rigidity, the party's reliable core 
vote was essentially still founded on religious networks. The party under Lubbers 
successfully appealed beyond this core support, hiding the still shrinking size of this 
electoral nucleus. Following the departure of Lubbers from national politics, however, 
the threadbare remains of these networks were exposed. The shifting demographic 
balance towards increasingly elderly populations helped to counteract the attenuation of 
the Christian Democratic electorate yet continued disproportionate support in older age 
groups can no longer be counted upon. Voters in the 45-59 age range proved to be no 
more loyal than the rest of the population in recent elections and it remains to be seen 
whether this marks the beginning of a generational change reconfiguring the pattern of 
party preferences in older age groups. 
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In interpreting the data presented above, caution is needed. One hazard of a 
study of party change which stresses social and economic factors as independent 
variables is that we risk reducing the study of politics to what Sartori (1969) called "the 
sociology of politics", implying that we see political changes, in this case the fortunes of 
parties, as merely dependent variables shaped by social forces beyond anyone's control. 
As shown by their longevity, parties have the capacity to adapt to altered circumstances. 
We should, therefore, be wary of reading socio-economic change as inevitably entailing 
political transformation. As will be stressed in chapters 5-7, the contraction of the 
Christian Democratic core support was certainly a factor in their electoral problems in 
the 1990s but contemporary policy dilemmas, circumstantial political events and 
leadership instability were also significant influences. Before these chapters party 
identification and party membership statistics will be examined. Even bearing the 
aforementioned caveats in mind, if we are correct in identifying erosion at the core of 
Christian Democratic support, then this should be discernible in non-electoral indicators 
of partisanship. 
V. Political change 
It has been argued that the decline of the agrarian sector, the diminishing proportion of 
the working population self-employed and the decomposition of religious sub-cultures 
have weakened the foundations of Christian Democratic support. Moreover, Christian 
Democrats, in common with all other parties, are confronted by a more sceptical, 
independent electorate lacking the strong affective political attachments of the past. In 
part, the new behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of West European electorates 
can be traced to the socio-structural change that was discussed earlier although 
increasing educational levels and the greater role of the mass media have also brought 
about this change. Old party allegiances based on membership of a sub-cultural world 
have been increasingly superseded and as a result, a greater proportion of the electorate 
are potentially available. Accordingly, we should be able to see evidence of a decline in 
the established parties 'on the ground'. In this section, evidence of political change both 
at the level of the respective Christian democratic parties in Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands level and of the party system will be considered. 
Party Identification. 
A frequent tool used by political scientists to measure political change is party 
identification. The concept, transplanted from its original American environment 
(Campbell et at 1980), is used to evaluate the strength of the ties that bind voters to 
parties. Its application in the West European context, though, has frequently been 
117 
dismissed as inappropriate. It has been argued that even though the concept was useful 
in the United States to show deep-rooted, long term political sympathies which survive a 
short term vote transfer, the idea of party identification had less meaning in Western 
European elections, for if a voter switched parties at an election, their party political 
identification tended to follow accordingly. These objections have not prevented the 
further use of the concept23 and despite the criticism, figures of party identification will 
also be used here. The concept may have greater limitations in a West European political 
environment but it could still be of value in conveying changes within the electorate. For 
example, if the proportion of strong party identifiers is continuously decreasing, this 
might provide some support for theories of political change. It was argued in Section III 
that an erosion of distinctive Christian Democratic milieux has taken place. From this, 
we would expect a corresponding drop in Christian Democratic party identification, 
regardless of the party's electoral strength. All three parties have had some success in 
balancing out unfavourable social and economic trends by drawing in new middle class 
and secular voters but as was shown earlier, this support is frequently transient and 
inconsistent. It would seem unlikely, therefore, that many of these voters would declare 
strong party ties. 
The greater success of the CDU/CSU in securing the votes of white collar 
employees, non-religious voters and the young (see Section I) would suggest that the 
Christian Democratic party identifiers might remain more prevalent than elsewhere. 
These expectations are borne out to a large extent by the table below. Over the 1977 to 
1999 timeframe, a decrease in the proportion of CDU/CSU identifiers is perceptible but 
inconsistent. If 1990 is ignored due to its exceptional status, then there does seem to be 
decline in "very strong" and "quite strong" CDU/CSU identifiers with moderate 
identifiers more stable pointing to the plausible conclusion that a growing distance has 
emerged between electorate and party even if the suspicion remains that current voting 
preference is not unconnected to current partisanship. 
23 Party identification questions are asked at election studies in each of the three countries here 
and analysed in much of the literature drawing from such quantitative work. 
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Table 4.29 CDU/CSU party identifiers 1977-99. 
Total CDUlCSU V. strong Q. Strong Moderate 
identifiers24 (%) CDUlCSU CDU/CSU CDUlCSU 
identifiers (0/0) identifiers (%) identifiers (0/0) 
1977 28.8 4.0 12.2 11.0 
1980 25.1 4.4 10.7 8.7 
1983 27.0 3.7 11.3 10.3 
1987 24.9 2.7 10.2 10.5 
1990 26.6 4.2 10.1 11.6 
199425 22.4 2.8 7.6 10.9 
1998 20.5 2.7 6.9 10.0 
Change -8.3 -1.3 -5.3 -1 
Source: Politbarometer 1977-99, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 
Identification with the GYP appears to have been more stable at least until 1986. 
After this point, the disintegration of partisan milieux coupled with the rising tide of 
political disillusionment have had an impact upon identification with all parties 
suffering. While 60% of respondents identified with a party, by 1999 this had fallen to 
51 %. The effect of this development can be seen clearly in the drop from 28% to 17% 
for the GYP. 
Table 4.30 GYP party identifiers 1976-94. 
6 VP Identifiers 
1976 28 
1984 28 
1986 28 
1990 17 
1994 17 
Change -11 
Source: Fessel + Gfk-InstItut statistics quoted in Milller, Plasser and Ulram (1995:169) 
In the case of the CDA, party adherents have declined in number almost 
continuously since 1971 notwithstanding small rises in 1982 and 1989 and by 1998, the 
number of party adherents was very small (7.8%). The proportion of people attracted to 
the CDA follows a similar trend since 1989. Although Table 4.31 conforms to our 
expectations about the withering of the Christian Democratic core, it is necessary to 
24 Voters were offered the choice between identification with the CDU or with the CDUlCSU. As 
more than half of those choosing the latter were from outside Bavaria, the two figures have been 
combined here. 
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introduce a note of caution. Analysis of party identification covering the entire electorate 
has indicated that the concept was not particularly effective in the Dutch context (see 
Thomassen 1976; van der Eijk and Niemoller 1983) and the statistics for the CDA do 
nothing to dispel this suspicion as the patterns of party adherence and attraction mirror 
closely the electoral support for the party i.e. when voters change parties, their party 
identification follows suit. 
Table 4.31 CDA party identification 1971-98 
Party Adherent Attracted to party Total 
1971 16.9 10.6 27.5 
1972 14.6 9.8 24.4 
1977 12.1 11.5 23.6 
1982 14.1 7.1 21.2 
1986 10.9 10.9 21.8 
1989 11.1 11 22.1 
1994 9.3 7.3 16.6 
1998 7.8 6.3 14.1 
Change -9.1 -4.3 -13.4 
,lb Source. DNES 1971-98 . Pre-CDA figures calculated by addmg the totals for ARP, 
CHU and KVP. 
In each of the three countries studied, the proportion of Christian Democratic partisans 
has declined in the electorate over the past two decades. This drop does point towards a 
shrinkage of the core Christian Democratic vote as we would expect from Sections II 
and III. However, in view of the limitations of party identification in the Netherlands 
and to some extent Germany, the findings can only be accepted with reservations. 
Party Membership 
Although party membership statistics are being used here as an indicator of the declining 
Christian Democratic core, it is important to realise that membership decline can occur 
for reasons other than social-structural changes in the electorate. As Milller (1994:68) 
argues, parties have contributed to their own decay through scandal or their lack of 
responsiveness. In any case, parties may be less interested in maintaining their mass 
basis given the costs it involves (Scarrow, 2000). Nevertheless, membership figures 
provide another means of gauging Christian Democratic strength in the citizenry. The 
ageing of the CDU, OVP and CDA membership highlighted in section III was 
25 1990 and 1994 figures for the western Lander only. 
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suggestive of declining recruitment and Tables 4.32, 4.33 and 4.34 confirm that 
membership has dropped. As shown in Chapter 3, the CDU was a late developer in 
building a mass membership and this is clear from Table 4.33 where the peak in absolute 
numbers is not reached until the early 1980s (excluding the effects of unification). Since 
then, the party has lost members fairly rapidly. Membership of the 6vp was stable for a 
twenty year period between the 1960s and 1980s but has subsequently started to drop. In 
contrast, membership decay set in much earlier for the Dutch confessionals and their 
merger has not prevented a further shrivelling of the mass basis. Christian Democratic 
parties are, of course, not alone in enduring this loss of members but the decline still 
points to the erosion of key social milieux. 
Table 4.32 CDU Membership 1955-98 
Year CDU Membership MIV 
1955 197,142 2.0 
1958 234,725 2.0 
1964 279,770 2.3 
1969 303,532 2.5 
1972 422,968 3.2 
1976 652,010 4.5 
1980 693,320 5.3 
1983 734,555 4.9 
1987 705,821 5.4 
1990 784,656 (129,556)~7 4.6 
1994 671,890 (78,193) 4.2 
1998 626,257 (60,839) 4.5 
Noles: 
I The MIE column is a standardized figure representing the number of members as a percentage 
of the CDU electorate in the respective year or closest election year. Where the data does not 
correspond to an election year (i.e. 1955, 1958, 1964), the closest election has been chosen (Le. 
1953,1957,1965). 
Source: adapted from Bosch (2002:214); electoral figures from 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/erl:eb.htm . 
The standardized MN ratio measures how successful parties are at incorporating their 
supporters (Scarrow 2000:87). For example, Table 4.33 illustrates the incredible degree 
of organisation of the 6vp where well over a quarter of its voters were also party 
26 In 1981 the question wording was changed and it has therefore not been included. 
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members. However, in the case of membership and electoral decline as in the Christian 
Democratic parties in the 1990s, the ratio has an additional meaning. Where the MN 
ratio rises despite absolute membership loss (as it does for the OVP and the CDA), this 
suggests that the party is not just suffering from a contraction of its core clientele, it is 
also seriously failing to appeal to voters outside these groups. This results in critical 
strategic questions concerning the extent to which the party opens up to other groups and 
the continued focus on a declining section of the electorate. As chapters 5, 6 and 7 will 
show, this has been a key intra-party debate for the OVP and the CDA in the 1990s. 
Table 4.33 OVP Membership 1949-94 
Year 6vp Membership 6vp Membership MIV 
(Max/s (Min.) Max Min 
1949 485,000 439,000 26.3 (23.8) 
1953 505,000 441,000 28.3 (24.8) 
1956 565,000 498,000 28.3 (24.9) 
1959 590,000 509,000 30.6 (26.4) 
1962 655,000 532,000 32.4 (26.3) 
1966 700,000 543,000 31.9 (24.8) 
1970 720,000 561,000 35.1 (27.4) 
1971 715,000 564,000 36.4 (28.7) 
1975 715,000 562,000 36.1 (28.4) 
1979 720,000 560,000 36.3 (28.3) 
1983 720,000 552,000 34.3 (26.3) 
1986 695,000 528,000 34.7 (26.4) 
1990 670,000 488,000 44.4 (32.3) 
1994 579,000 433,000 45.2 (33.8) 
Sources: Muller (1992:40-49), Luther (1998: 127), Plasser and Ulram (2000: 198). 
27 Figures in brackets represent the number of members in the five new LAnder, which are also 
included in the first figure. 
28 As the CVP is still largely a party of indirect membership, the party membership statistics are 
not judged to be particularly accurate. Consequently Muller's figures (1992) which provide a 
range between maximum and minimum number of members have been repeated here 
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Table 4.34 Membership of the ARP, CHU, KVP and the CDA 1950-98 
Year Membership of confessional parties Mlvt 
ARP CHU KVP CDA 
1950 102,737 50,0002~ 319,419 17.9 
1960 97,980 48,000 385,500 18.0 
1970 80,695 28,900 97,300 8.9 
1980 54,500 26,000 49,353 143,0003u 5.3 
1982 152,885 6.3 
1986 127,849 4.0 
1989 122,486 3.9 
1994 107,000 5.4 
1998 89,000 5.6 
Notes: 
IWhere the data does not correspond to an election year (i.e. 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980), the closest 
election has been chosen (i.e. 1948, 1959, 1971, 1981). Before 1982 the membership figures and 
electoral results for the three fonnerly separate parties have been added together to produce one 
statistic. 
Source: Membership Figures from Daalder (1987:234) and DNPP 
http:Uwww.ru~.nl/dn~p/themas/ledental1cn/pcrpartij/cda-1t Electoral statistics from 
Mackie and Rose (1991:336), Mackie (1991:160) and Lucardie and Voerman 
(1995:428). 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the core electorate and membership of the German, 
Austrian and Dutch Christian Democrats share certain social, occupational and 
demographic characteristics. The religiously active, self-employed, farmers and elderly 
have habitually offered strong support to the Christian Democrats. As Section IV made 
clear, however, three of these groups are in long term decline and are therefore of 
diminishing electoral relevance. Even among older voters, there are signs that Christian 
Democratic parties have lost their distinct advantage. The growth of a salaried middle 
class does in certain contexts help to balance these losses but where the party system is 
more crowded, Christian Democratic success amongst this group has been limited. The 
effect of falling church membership and attendance is less ambiguous. Remaining 
29 There is some confusion about CHU membership figures in the early post-war period. The 
1950 figure actually represents 1947 and is quoted from the DNPP 
http://www.ub.rui:.nlldnpp/polpartlcda/ltchu.btml accessed 15104/02. 
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dependent on the church faithful for the bulk of their vote, Christian Democratic parties 
draw little support from the unchurched or religiously inactive. 
As a result of these changes, the Christian Democratic support is increasingly 
unrepresentative of the shape of the electorate as a whole. This generates the dilemma 
which lay the heart of Christian Democratic strategic discussions in the 1990s: should 
the parties concentrate their efforts on the numerically declining group of core partisans 
or should it appeal beyond this 'natural' constituency. Yet the latter option offered no 
obvious means of achieving this and asked searching questions about the nature of 
Christian Democracy. How, for example, were Christian Democratic parties to address 
their chronic weakness among the non-religious or youthful voters? Discarding their 
religiously inspired ideological baggage would surely undennine the basis of their 
distinctiveness and jeopardise the support of the core supporters. Regardless of this 
ongoing intra-party debate, Section V showed that Christian Democratic partisanship 
and membership has receded in the past two decades although influences other than 
socio-economic change cannot be ruled out as contributory factors. 
The lack of temporal correspondence between the onset of socio-economic and 
cultural change and developments in the electoral arena warns us that a mechanistic 
understandings of politics as a function of sociological change is of little value. Social 
changes are filtered through political structures and parties as actors are able to 
counteract unfavourable social developments. Established parties of government have a 
distinct advantage in this respect, with the ability to act as a cartel excluding new 
competitors (Katz and Mair 1995). Political and electoral stability need not be 
undennined by social change. This account of the Christian Democratic electorate, 
therefore, has explained only that change was possible but not why the CDU, OVP and 
CDA were unable to respond successfully to the challenges they faced in the 1990s. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will explore precisely this question through detailed case studies of 
these parties in the 1990-9 period. 
30 The 1980 CDA membership figure includes the membership tallies of the ARP, CHU and the 
KVP as well as those members who had already joined the newly united party. 
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Chapter 5. The Christian Democratic Union 1990-8 
I. Introduction 
The internal discord mounting within the CDU in 1989 which culminated in the abortive 
putsch against Kohl at the Bremen party conference was rapidly overshadowed by the chain 
of events in the GDR later that year. As the legitimacy and stability of the Communist 
regime crumbled in the face of popular opposition, unification suddenly became a realistic 
possibility. After initial hesitation, Kohl took charge of the process, removing international 
obstacles through effective diplomacy whilst limiting the involvement of alternative 
domestic viewpoints by restricting decision-making to small, informal groups of key 
players. Kohl's dominant role in unification boosted his popularity immensely and internal 
criticism within the Union was silenced. Many of his most prominent critics now found 
themselves on the fringes of the party. Amongst the electorate, too, Kohl assumed a new 
standing as the unification chancellor, a historic title which to some extent veiled his past 
unpopularity and provincial image. However, the CDU's previous difficulties had not 
disappeared; in fact as will be shown in this chapter, rapid unification brought with it new 
challenges as well as exacerbating older ones. Over the course of decade, the CDU in 
government had increasing difficulty reconciling its response to these developments with the 
preservation of its Volkspartei identity. This chapter will explore three dimensions of the 
party's reaction to the altered circumstances it found itself in: policy response, 
programmatic change and organisational developments. 
Section II of this chapter will examine political and electoral developments affecting 
the Union in the 1990-1998 period. While the electoral decline of the German Christian 
Democrats was less severe than its Austrian and Dutch counterparts, this chapter will show 
that the CDU's Volkspartei identity was nonetheless under considerable strain in the decade. 
This will be done through an examination of certain key events as well as electoral analysis. 
It will be contended that the economic pressure on Modell Deutschland brought about 
significant changes in the Union's social-economic priorities and that the reform programme 
attempted in the final years of the Kohl government marked a shift from the more cautious 
agenda of the previous decade. Traces of continuity should not be ignored nor should the 
extent of the change be dramatised. The CDU remained firmly within the boundaries of the 
European Christian Democratic party family. Nevertheless, the tension within the party was 
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unmistakeable. Furthermore, this reform programme was not popular amongst the 
electorate. The CDU was identified as lacking social compassion and it will be argued here 
that in addition to more short-term influences this was a key reason for its remarkable 
electoral defeat in 1998, the sole example of a governing coalition losing office as the result 
of a Bundestag election. 
Section III will scrutinise programmatic developments in the 1990s, primarily 
focusing on the content of the new Grundsatzprogramm of 1994 and the ZukunJtsprogramm 
four years later. The decline of the Communist bloc prompted the reworking of the party's 
Grundsatzprogramm but as will be shown here, continuity remained the thread which bound 
the programme together and apart from the addition of a green tinge, revisions remained 
modest. In contrast, the ZukunJtsprogramm sought to answer the challenges of unification 
and globalisation and included a number of novel features. It did not mark a radical 
departure but in its omissions and altered emphases, it signalled one possible programmatic 
path for the party at the end of the Kohl-era. 
Section IV will consider the impact of organisational changes on the CDU's ability 
to integrate a diverse array of social interests within the party. Though the party has not 
reverted to a Kanzlerwahlverein, the central apparatus of the party did decline in 
significance throughout the 1990s and the party's internal life tended to be overshadowed by 
the government-Fraktion nexus. This subservience to the government and parliamentary 
group occurred, however, at the same time as the Union's identity was fragmented further 
by unification. The incorporation of the five new eastern Lander into the FRG entailed that 
the CDU build the party in the east upon the rather shaky foundations of the old bloc party. 
An additional problem concerned the changing balance of the auxiliary organisations where 
current trends, if continued, threatened the organisational basis of the Union's Volkspartei 
identity. 
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II. Political and Electoral Developments 
1990 Bundestag Election 
The unpredicted and swift progress towards unification averted a possible leadership battle 
and helped resuscitate the CDU's electoral prospects. Nonetheless, the impact of unification 
was felt comparatively late in the run-up to the first ever all-German elections in December 
1990. Land election results at the beginning of the year had not been particularly 
encouraging and even after the CDU had unexpectedly won a clear victory in the March 
Volkskammer election, Lafontaine maintained a lead over Kohl until June (Norporth and 
Roth 1993:218-9). After Kohl had secured Gorbachev's approval over unification, however, 
public opinion swung decisively towards Kohl and the Union parties. 
The dominance of the unification theme in 1990 relegated previously salient issues 
like unemployment, health and pensions policy to the margins. Indeed, in the run-up to 
the election, the CDU/CSU experienced a unification bonus as voters began to evaluate the 
Union's competence more favourably across a wide variety of issues (Norporth and Roth 
1993:217). In view of his successful international diplomacy, Kohl's reputation was 
transformed almost overnight. The CDU was able to capitalise on this new mood through a 
highly personalised election campaign in which Kohl personified the issue of unification 
(Conradt 1993:68). In contrast, the SPD's greater reservations on unity and in particular the 
ambivalence of its leading candidate Lafontaine was also advantageous for the Union. 
Lafontaine had favoured a slower pace for unification and did not share popular enthusiasm 
for the process· while the SPD's campaign was badly misjudged and centred on post-
materialist social and ecological themes (Roberts 1997: 115-6). In addition, a number of 
senior party figures were explicitly critical of Lafontaine. 
By election day, the result was not in doubt and the Union parties triumphed 
comfortably despite a small drop in support since 1987. The Union preserved its strength in 
the east although its electorate there was significantly more blue-collar. Even in the west, 
though, the CDU made notable gains among workers, even those in trade unions. The 
exceptional nature of the election was also emphasised in the FDP's best result since 1961 
I For example, it was noticeable that SPD campaign material did not use the national colours, the 
national anthem was not sung at rallies and Lafontaine disliked the use of the word 'Fatherland' 
(Conradt 1993:70). 
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as it benefited from the wide popularity of Foreign Minister Genscher. Those parties more 
sceptical towards unification, on the other hand, suffered catastrophic results. The SPO 
dropped to its lowest level since 1957 while the West German Greens, internally split 
between fundamentalist and realist wings, failed to return to parliament. The influence of 
unification on the election had revived the fortunes of the coalition which had more than 
trebled its parliamentary majority. However, as the initial exhilaration of unification faded 
and the extent of the task became clear, the government faced serious difficulties. 
The Costs of Unification 
The nature and subsequent implications of German unification have been extensively 
examined in the academic literature and so the consideration of its impact here will therefore 
be fairly brief. The highly optimistic view of unification taken by Kohl and the government 
in general was punctured swiftly by the extreme problems encountered by the former East in 
the transition to a market economy. Currency union at a 1: 1 conversion rate for wages and 
prices and for savings up to 4000 Ost Marks massively overvalued the GOR's currency and, 
along with the loss of trade with the Soviet bloc and the preference of eastern consumers for 
Western goods, immediately put pressure on the east's economy. With the collapse of large 
amounts of eastern industry, official unemployment stood at 16% in the new Lander by 
1992 with unofficial figures including short-term workers and recipients of public subsidies 
more than twice as high (Seibel 1993:119). The government's dilemma was multifaceted: 
the east required a large amount of investment in infrastructure in order to increase its 
attractiveness as an economic location (Padgett 1992: 197) thus necessitating considerable 
government involvement; the pressure to push for wage equality for political reasons and to 
prevent massive migration to the west was near irresistible despite its detrimental effect on 
investment (Czada 1999); similarly, the extension of the West German welfare system into 
the east had been politically unavoidable but financially costly, particularly with the rapid 
growth of unemployment; and finally, unemployment quickly reached such levels that the 
government was compelled to act. 
Less than a decade after the promises of a balanced budget and state cutbacks 
promised in 1983, the CDUlCSU-FDP coalition thus found itself embroiled in a process 
which required a large amount of state involvement. Transfer payments from West to East 
totalling on average 4.5% of West German GOP were used to improve the East's 
infrastructure and government expenditure as a percentage of GOP which had dropped from 
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49.8% in 1982 to 45.3% in 1989 had risen to 50.6% by 1993 (Czada 2002:221). Increased 
government outlay was financed primarily through a mixture of public sector borrowing and 
increased social security contributions2 although the Solidarity Tax was also introduced as 
temporary measure. Unification therefore upset the previous direction of government policy 
and signalled the commencement of the "second phase" of the Kohl era (Schmid 1998:96). 
Policy solutions resulted not from party programmes but were rather the outcome of a 
largely improvised strategy which reflected West German behavioural norms fundamentally 
rooted in consensus politics. Consequently, the previous decade's cuts in social spending 
were entirely reversed so that by 1995 social expenditure as a percentage of GOP had risen 
back to the level of 1975 (Seelcib-Kaiser 2002:28-29). Equally, labour market policy was 
developing in a way which contrasted sharply with the previous approach of the Kohl 
government. Already by 1992 a more active labour market strategy was being adopted. 
Expenditure on active measures rose from 1.04% of GOP in 1990 to 1.69% of GOP two 
years later (OECO data cited in Schmid 1998b: 142) and by this point some 388,000 
easterners were involved injob creation schemes with a further 489,000 being trained3• 
Nonetheless, previous policy commitments were not completely dropped in this 
period. The use of active labour market policy fell away as its results seemed ambiguous at 
best while the problem of the mounting budget deficit forced a certain amount of 
consolidation, notably in the freezing of civil service wages. Moreover, the COU/CSU-FOP 
government was able to pass some further elements of privatisation e.g. the railway reform 
of 1993 (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2000) and the division of Bundespost into three independent 
joint-stock companies in 1994 (ZohlnhOfer 200 I). 
1994 Bundestag Election 
Unification had given a short-term fillip to the Union with the 1990 election. Even 
Wolfgang Schauble, the leader of the parliamentary party from 1991, admitted later that 
unification was responsible for prolonging the COU's stay in office (cited in Langguth 
2001:142). However, as economic problems increased, the popularity of the government 
parties withered. This was especially marked in the east where Kohl's promises now 
2 For example, unemployment insurance contribution rate was raised by 2.5% in 1991 (Manow and 
Seils 2000:153) 
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sounded empty and where the Union was now in disarray (Clemens 1993; see also section 
III) but even in the west the CDU was now left in only one Land government, Baden-
Wilrttemberg, and even here its vote share dropped nearly 10% between 1988 and 1992. 
As the leading party in government the Union suffered particularly acutely from the 
mounting "crisis of trust in politics" (Heiner Geil3ler quoted in Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 
9/04/1992) which was aggravated by "the so-called 'tax lie' ... , the treatment of asylum 
seekers, insurance against invalidity in old age, the deployment of German troops outside 
the NATO area and the seemingly inexorable rise in crime" (Roberts 1996: 10). A symptom 
of this was the disturbing rise of extreme right parties in the 1991-2 period. While extremist 
parties floundered on their inability to unite and the lack of protest potential on asylum 
issues after the 1993 constitutional revision, the prospects for the CDU still looked shaky 
approaching Superwahljah/ of 19945• At the beginning of 1994, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 
polls suggested that SPD candidate Scharping held a sizeable advantage over Kohl in both 
east and west and that public expectations about the economy were still very pessimistic 
(Gibowski 1996:32-34). 
Throughout the election year, both Kohl and the CDU/CSU began to overhaul 
Scharping and the SPD's lead in the polls. Through a highly candidate-centred campaign, 
the Union parties managed to re-establish Kohl's reputation based on his professional 
qualities and experience (Zelle 1996:71) but the Christian Democrats also benefited from 
signs of economic improvement. The economic upswing seemed crucial to the Union's 
success: as economic indicators improved, so too did the COU's standing in the polls 
(Gibowski 1996:36). The CDU also utilised events in the east to boost their support. After 
the decision of the SPO in Saxony-Anhalt to form a minority red-green Land government 
reliant on the PDS in July, General Secretary Peter Hintze found an ingenious way to 
compensate for the loss of the former integrative force of anti-communism. The 'red socks' 
campaign attempted to taint the Social Democrats with the state socialism of the GDR, 
3 OECO figures from 
http;llwww,oecdobserver.or~/news/flillstQry'12hp/aid/l 48(Gettin~ Germany back to work.btml 
(accessed 13/02/03). 
41994 was to contain an unprecedented 18 different elections within unified Germany. 
S See, for example, Suddelltsche Zeitung (6/12/1993) which portrays a nervous "run-down party" on 
the eve of the election year exhibiting "the classic signs of an exhausted government after 10 years of 
consuming power, the pressures of a coalition in which compromises become ever harder because 
they blur what little image remains", 
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suggesting that the SPD could not be trusted due to their link with the fonner communists. 
While controversial, leading figures in the party undoubtedly believed it to have been a 
success6• 
The final result demonstrated that Kohl's Unity Chancellor status had not yet been 
electorallyexhausted. The CDU/CSU's share of the vote dropped from 43.8% to 41.5% but 
in view of the severity of the economic problems and the general mood of political 
disenchantment, this was a success. In particular, the Union's support in the east held up 
remarkably (-3.3%) given the economic and social devastation wrought by unification. 
However, the strong gains made by the POS in the east and the large number of easterners 
who saw little wrong in a nonnal role for the ex-communists' indicated that the COU's 
denunciations of the POS risked alienating eastern voters. 
Overall, the state of the party after the 1994 election was healthier than in the 
previous couple of years. A new Grundsatzprogramm had been passed at the Hamburg party 
conference at the beginning of the year and while offering little innovation8, it did manage to 
bring about a reconciliation of the various factions within the party (Bosch 2002:61). In 
addition to the 2.5% drop in national support, the Union had lost in virtually all Land 
elections9 in 1994 but these were less severe than expected and with the economic forecast 
appearing brighter, the party and population in general seemed to be emerging from the 
pessimism of the 1991-3 period (e.g. 71 % of Gennans rated 1994 as a good year personally, 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung 17/12/1994)10. While Kohl was re-elected as party chainnan with 
94.4% of the votes in the Bonn party conference in November 1994, he seemed to have 
con finned during the final stages of the campaign that the election would be his last as 
Chancellor (Siiddeutsche Zeitung 5/10/1994), finally offering the chance for leadership 
6 For example, see Deutschlandfunk's interview with Angela Merkl in 1998 at 
http'llwww dradjo.de/c\:j-bjn/es/ncu-intcryicwwochc/46 html (accessed 10.03.03) 
, According to the Politbarometer surveys, 57% were in favour of the PDS being represented in the 
Bundestag, 62% felt that PDS success in the east would have no impact on investment by businesses 
and 43% approved ofa SPD minority government with PDS support atJederallevel. Politbarometer 
Ost Wahlstudie ZA 2559 available at 
bttp://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/pol itharometcr/ coclcbuchls2 5 5 9cb.pdf (accessed 13.03.03) 
8 See Section III. 
9 The CDU's share of the vote only increased in the Landtag elections in Saxony and the Saarland. 
10 The election analysis of the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen spoke of the "end of dissatisfaction" 
(SUddeutsche Zeitung 18/10/1994). In the months following the election, the Union improved its poll 
results although a growing distinction between trends in the west and east was also noticeable 
(SUddeutsche Zeitung 17/12/1994). 
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change. The party's Bundestagsfraktion now included a number of younger members ll and 
Junge Union called for radical renewal within the party immediately after the election 
(Siiddeutsche Zeitung 25/10/1994). However, such hopes about both party and economy 
were quickly extinguished. The stormy reception given to Frauen-Union leader Rita 
Siissmuth as she called for the party to introduce quotas for women at the party conferences 
in 1994 illustrated that many functionaries would resist fiercely any attempts to reform the 
partyl2 and Kohl subsequently made ambiguous remarks about staying in office beyond 
1998. Furthermore, the expectation that Germany was now emerging from the economic 
difficulties was crushed as the nation's economic situation became ever more parlous from 
1995 onwards. 
The Standort Deutschland Debate 
The first references to the Standort debate or question appeared in the early 1990s when it 
became apparent that the transition difficulties surrounding unification were far deeper than 
anticipated13• The Standort Deutschland debate essentially centred around Germany's 
attractiveness as a business location but by extension also questioned the sustainability of 
the German welfare state. While the discussion was undoubtedly brought to public 
consciousness through the widespread unemployment induced by unification, Germany's 
predicament was also closely linked to increased competition resulting from globalisation 
(see Harding 1999; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001 2002). Unification, according to Czada (1999:8), 
was not the sole source of the problems, but "reduced the ability (of the government) to 
solve any of them". A growing number of German companies were investing abroad rather 
than domestically and with its high labour costs, Germany was thought to be an unappealing 
location for foreign investment l4. A major part of the problem was that successive 
governments since the 1970s had progressively shifted the burden for the social budget on to 
insurance contributors, a trend exacerbated by unification. Non-wage labour costs were 
consequently very high in Gernlany and were a disincentive to the creation of low wage 
employment (Manow and Seils 2000). 
\I 15 of the CDU/CSU Fraktion were now under 35 including a number of former Junge Union 
chairmen, sucb as Grobe, Klaeden and Po fall a (Wagner 1998:31). 
12 See Section IV. 
13 See, for example, CSU parliamentary leader Michael Glos's comments in 1991 (SUddeutsche 
Zeitung 3/01/1992); presidcnt of the Association of Gcrman Chambers of Commerce (DIHT) Hans 
Peter Stihl in the following year (Siiddeutsche Zeitung 18/02/1993) 
14 A report published in Die Welt (19/08/1996) stated that labour costs were 80% higher than in the 
US and more than 50% highcr than those in Britain. 
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Unification initially stimulated a fairly broad consensus amongst and within the 
parties on the appropriate response to the problems faced. However, as the budget deficit 
spiralled to new heights, unemployment continued to rise and GOP growth became more 
sluggish in the years following the 1994 election (Bundesbank data cited in Silvia 2000: 1-
5), agreement began to erode. In its place developed conflict between the social partners and 
the parties over the extent of Germany's difficulties and how best to tackle the employment 
crisis. The Standort debate was of particular significance for the COU: the party in 
government began to push for more reform of the welfare state but this exposed the 
diminishing influence of the social wing of the party and its champion in government, 
minister for employment Norbert BHim. In addition to the factional imbalance within the 
party, a more market-orientated Union risked the displeasure of voters. The reforms the 
coalition embarked upon in "Phase III" of the Kohl erals (Jochem 1999) lacked widespread 
public support. Politbarometer data showed 50% in favour of more social security with only 
22% for more free competition (SOddeutsche Zeitung 17/12/1994). At the same time ,the 
measures undertaken did not go far enough to satisfy increasingly vociferous business 
groups. The COU's attempts to play the role of a Volkspartei of the middle therefore came 
under increasing strain as the political environment became more polarised. Furthermore, 
the growth of the public debt was particularly concerning in view of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria, possibly jeopardising Kohl's cherished project of European monetary 
union. 
As mentioned earlier, the expansion of active labour market policy was a temporary 
response by the government to the pressures on Standort Deutschland but in 1993, severe 
cuts in the budget of the Federal Labour Office were announced. Two laws on "Savings, 
Consolidation and Growth" that year further signalled the government's intention to combat 
unemployment through cost-cutting. These reduced the maximum duration of 
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) for previous non-contributors to a year while 
the amount received was also cut (SOddeutsche Zeitung 30106/1993). However, the Standort 
debate did not really commence until the economic optimism of the 1994 election campaign 
had been fully eradicated in the following year. From 1995 onwards, the government's 
15 Even when confinning the continued Gennan commitment to the middle way, Schmidt (2001 :8) 
states that "there was also a remarkable discontinuity in fiscal policy and social policy in the second 
halfofthe 'Kohl era' from 1990 to 1998". 
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social and economic policies were increasingly dominated by cost-cutting and the trend 
towards organising work for the unemployed. 
Welfare Retrenchment and Alliance for Jobs (Biindnis fUr Arbeit) 
Increasing fears about Gcrmany's competitive economic position and the expansion of 
unemployment since unification stimulated a number of proposals to counter these 
problems. While many centred on market liberalisation, the idea of a tripartite agreement to 
aid the creation of jobs was also suggested. This developed from a offer made by Klaus 
Zwickel, leader of IG Metall, at the end of November 1995. Zwickel proposed that through 
an Alliance for Jobs trade unions would moderate their wage claims in return for a 
commitment from the government to abandon cuts in social spending and a pledge from 
employers to create over 100,000 jobs. Signals from the CDU were generally positive if 
slightly mixed. While Bli.im and Schauble greeted the idea enthusiasticallyl6, Kohl pledged 
merely to examine all sensible ideas about employment and the business wing was reserved. 
Talks did take place in the first couple of months of 1996 with some progress made in 
certain areas such as the agreement on a replacement of the expensive early retirement 
scheme. However, the rather limited co-operation of the coalition was evident in its 
continued attempt to push welfare reform through the Bundestag regardless of the outcome 
of the negotiations. The government's production of a fifty point programme for 
employment hastened the end of the Alliance. The package, denounced by the SPD 
parliamentary leader Scharping as "socially obscene" (Siiddeutsche Zeitung 27/04/1996), 
was introduced in April and showed that the government was unwilling to comply with 
Zwickel's request to refrain from further cutbacks. This effectively ended the talks and 
further appeals to the trade unions later in the year to participate in discussions were greeted 
with derision by the unions. 
The fifty point programme developed into 'The promotion of growth and 
employment law' and 'the reform of unemployment assistance' of 1996. These introduced a 
spate of new measures including easing regulations about short-term work17, limitation of 
16 Blum indicated that he was prepared to negotiate about reductions in social policy (Silddeutsche 
Zeitung 25/1111995) while Schauble praised the initiative at the Baden-Wilrttemberg Land party 
conference (Die Welt 27/11/1995). 
17 The maximum length of these contracts was doubled to two years. 
134 
protection against dismissal 18 and the reduction of sick pay from 100% of prior wage to 80% 
(Jochem 1999:32-34, 45). The onrush of austerity measures stood in contrast to the more 
tepid reforms of the 1983-89 period. Unlike this earlier period, reform proposals were not 
subject to a revision process dictated by consensus. To a large extent, the expansion of the 
reform agenda ofthe Christian-Liberal coalition was shaped by circumstance. By the start of 
1996, the government faced the worst employment crisis of the Federal Republic's history 
with over 4 miIlion unemployed and at least a further million in hidden unemployment (Die 
Welt 07/03/1996). Clearly, such a scenario could not continue and as the COU's support in 
polls slumped, the electoral pressure to act intensified. Nonetheless, it is highly significant 
that the reforms were passed in a very different way to the negotiated compromises of the 
previous decade. 
One crucial difference was the hardline adopted by the FOP (Soe 2000:66-68). It 
had failed to capitalise on its initial success in the new Lander, losing votes in the 1994 
Bundestag election and speculation mounted as to its future as it dropped closer to the 5% 
threshold in opinion polls. A series of unpromising Landtag elections loomed in which the 
Liberals faced the loss of regional parliamentary representation. Research suggested that one 
cause of their difficulties was the lack of a clear political profile (Die Welt 11/03/1996), an 
ever-present danger for a junior coalition party. The employment crisis offered a clear 
opportunity for the FOP to shape government policy according to its own agenda and press 
its coalition partner for a strongly market orientated reform: there was a lack of coherent 
alternative strategies and the party was emboldened by the increasingly firm attitude of the 
leading figures of employers' associations 19• Indeed, the FOP had been bolstered by 
unexpectedly good results in Landtag elections in March (Bosch 2002:64) and were more 
antipathetic to compromise than in the past. 
The Union, by contrast, was more divided on the legislative package. The business 
wing naturally was wholly in favour of the package. They received the crucial support of 
parliamentary leader Schauble who, according to Langguth (2001: 136), was instrumental in 
18 The law now only applied to firms employing more than ten employees rather than the five 
required previously. According to OEeD figures, this increased the number of enterprises falling 
outside the law by 15%. 
19 While divisions between employers were present (chiefly between the far more neo-liberal BOI and 
the more consensual BDA) (Streeck and Hassel 2003:8), the increasingly strident tone of the BOI was 
also quite apparent. 
135 
persuading Kohl to proceed with the 50 point programme. As in the previous decade, the 
social wing were far from enthusiastic about the proposed cutbacks. Admittedly, the Social 
Committees had revised its position on the utility of short-term contracts in combating 
unemployment but it retained its scepticism towards reducing protection against dismissal 
and cuts in sick palo (ZohlnhOfer 200 I b: 11-13). Such critical attitudes could not, however, 
significantly alter the content of the legislation. Personnel and organisational changes in the 
party as a whole had altered the balance of power between the auxiliary associations21 . 
Under these new conditions and in perilous times of record unemployment, the 
inexperienced Social Committees leadership, unlike their precursors the previous decade, 
was unable to wield an effective veto on governmental policy. One sign of its weakness was 
its reluctance to criticise the Union in government explicitly, choosing instead to vent its 
displeasure at the FDP and business groups and employers associations22• Minister of 
Labour Norbert Blum, in particular, was in an awkward position as the one remaining 
representative of the social wing in a leading position. Blum, who since the end of 1995 had 
come under increasing pressure from the FDP, the CSU and the business wing of his own 
party23 to improve the employment situation, supported his Chancellor and fully endorsed 
the package. Similarly, other members of the Social Committees felt uneasy about the 
reforms but refrained from directly criticising them. First deputy chairman of the Social 
Committees, Josef Arentz, warned of the dangers of the "naked market" and emphasised 
that social partnership and social peace were important prerequisites in German economic 
success (Die Welt 16/10/1996) but the eventual support of the Social Committees's 
chairman Eppelmann for the measures was indicative of the weak position of the social 
wing. 
The Aftermath of the Failure of Bundnis fOr Arbcit 
Although GeiBler and Langguth both trace the CDU's electoral problems of 1998 back to 
the failure of the Alliance for Jobs, neither takes into account both the inability of the 
20 See, for example, Social Committees chairman Eppelmann's comments in Berliner Zeitung 
(22/08/1995); vice chairman Link in Die Welt (15/05/1996). 
21 See Section IV. 
22 Social Committees economics expert Wolfgang Vogt published a paper in which he affirmed the 
Social Committees's determination to resist the attempt by the FDP and business groups to lead 
Germany on a market radical course (Siiddeutsche Zeitung 10/04/1996). 
23 For example, see the comments of von Voss (the main chairman of the Economic Council within 
the CDU), CSU General Secretary Protzner and CDU parliamentarian Haungs (Berliner Zeitung 
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representatives of employers to compel firms to create work and the difficulty of co-
ordinating social policies and wage bargaining in the German constitutional framework of 
free collective bargaining (Hassel 1999:71). Whether negotiations could have achieved 
results even with more enthusiasm from government is therefore debatable. Nevertheless, 
the government's behaviour did create the impression of intransigence and fatally damaged 
relations with the trade unions. 350,000 protestors demonstrated against the government in 
June, the largest demonstration in the history of the FRG and more mass rallies against the 
austerity package were organised later in the year. While the government pressed ahead with 
its plans, the trade union fedcration's strategy now switched to uncompromising opposition, 
actively campaigning for a change in government. 
The proposed law also brought the government into conflict with the churches. The 
two churches had already been sufficiently concerned by the direction of government policy 
in 1994 to publish a joint paper which warned against a 'winners and losers' society and 
expressed disquiet about mass unemployment. The conflict escalated when a number of 
leading COU members responded with counter-attacks. Although efforts were made to 
repair the damage, the problematic relationship continued after the failure of Alliance for 
Jobs. The churches offered their support to the trade unionists and to an extent also backed 
the social charter published by the DGB and the social associations (Die Welt 09/05/1996). 
Moreover, in the following year the churches once more joined together to issue a joint 
statement on economic and social policy ("For a Future in Solidarity and Justice") 
(Silddeutsche Zeitung 0 I /03/ 1997) which again caused consternation amongst CDU 
politicians24. 
The pressure on the social wing of the party did not abate in 1997. The Social 
Committees again were unable to block the pension reform of that year. In addition to 
general pressure to reform to secure Standort Deutschland and the exhaustion of all pension 
reserves following unification, demographic changes also compounded the demand for 
change. The law, intended to come into force in 1999, introduced a drop2s in the 
replacement rate for the standard pension from 70 to 64 %, a change which would have 
11/12/1995) and the criticism of BlUm by Julius Louven, the chairman of the Fraktion's social-
f,0litical working group (Der Spiegel 8/04/1996). 
4 The chairman of the COU's EAK (Protestant Working Group) and Bundestag member Jochen 
Bochert lamented the churches' lack of consideration of business interests (Die Welt 01/03/1997). 
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increased the number of pensioners reliant on means tested social benefits (Seeleib-Kaiser 
2002:31; 2001:111; Jochem 1999:34). While Blum and the Social Committees were able to 
resist the demands of Health Minister Seehofer (CSU) and the FOP that contribution 
increases be shouldered solely by employees, they also fundamentally accepted that reforms 
were necessary. This was also true of the failed tax reform of 1997: whereas the social wing 
of the party had previously spoken out against further reductions of the top level of tax, by 
the time of the unsuccessful 1997 plan the social wing of the Social Committees accepted 
that tax decreases were essential in order to encourage investment (ZohlnhOfer 2001 b: 11). 
The German government, then, carried out an array of cost-cutting measures in 
social and economic policy in the post-1994 period. The legislation embraced the Christian 
DemocraticlLiberal themes of the previous decade but crucially went much further in 
adapting the German model. The extent of the change has been contested by a number of 
welfare state specialists26• Schmidt (2001) concludes that Gemany's political economy is 
still on the "middle way" in the new century while Schmid (1998) argues that the socio-
political balance of the Kohl government can best be summarised as ambivalent, containing 
elements of continuity, expansion as well as contraction. While Alber's (2000) rejection of 
the more extreme theories of "a conservative transformation of the welfare state" seems 
justified, such debates need not be dwelt upon here. In terms of the COU, what is critical is 
that the party's social profile faded noticeably in the last third of the Kohl era. Policy 
initiatives emanated from the business wing of the party, the FOP and the CSU. In view of 
the serious economic difficulties experienced by Germany, this was not especially 
surprising. However, the social wing of the party were manifestly unable to prevent or 
significantly weaken such proposals. The 'soeial motor' of the COU was now being towed 
by the rest of the coalition. Blilm's efforts to protect the 'ordinary man' from the 'economic 
Rambos' present amongst government ranks struck some observers as increasingly token27 
and his closeness to Kohl offered little in the way of protection as the chancellor mainly 
delegated responsibility for the domestic agenda to Schauble. 
25 The Schrlkler government postponed the implementation of this law upon assuming office in 1998. 
26 See Alber (2000) for a review of the different interpretations of the social policy of the Kohl era. 
27 See, for example, Pragal's critical commentary on Blum's role in the coalition in Berliner Zeitung 
21112/1996. 
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There was a risk that the party as a whole might be seen to have transformed "from 
the party of social market economy into the party of social coldness making ever new 
concessions to business" (Bosch 2002:65). However, amongst the signs of change were 
important elements of continuity in the government's social policy. For example, a number 
of legal changes improved the position of the family and took greater account of time spent 
raising children in pension assessments, building upon the measures enacted by the 
government in the previous decade. Most notably, compulsory nursing care insurance for 
anyone who has health insurance was introduced in 199428, a highly important policy for the 
CDU and especially its social wing. It expanded the welfare state to provide extra care for 
the elderly and as sueh demonstrated that the party retained a Christian Democratic social 
conscience. Even here, though, controversy arose over the financing of the scheme and in 
order to pacify irate employers who were displeased about being required to contribute to 
such a scheme, the government agreed to the cancellation of the only officially recognised 
Protestant holiday, the day of prayer and penance (Buf3- und Bettag)29. This was a 
particularly bitter pill for many in the party to swallow and led to protests across the 
country, contributing to the general decline in the relations between the CDU and the 
churches. 
1998 Bundestag Election 
By 1997, then, the Union was in serious difficulties. Unemployment continued to dominate 
the political agenda but no consensus existed on fighting it. The gap between the opinions of 
the trade unions on one side and the representatives of employers on the other seemed 
unbridgeable. The CDU in government leaned more toward the position of the latter but in 
assuming such a stance, the Christian Democrats risked alienating the blue collar element of 
their electorate, which after all accounted for a third of their voters. In addition, the party's 
relationship with the churches was more volatile than ever. Thus, two elements of its 
successful formula (its broad, socially inclusive Volkspartei nature and its political 
philosophy drawn from religious inspiration) were under more pressure than ever before. 
Additionally, the CDUlCSU-FDP coalition found its opportunities circumscribed by an 
intransigent SPD majority in the Bundesrat, a by-product of the CDU's dismal run in Land 
28 Those in need of nursing care now receive cash and non cash benefits while the insurance position 
of carers was also improved. 
29 Interestingly, Saxony refused to cancel the holiday and as a result only employees pay into the 
nursing care insurance. 
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elections. The failure of the Bundesrat to pass the government's tax reform created the 
impression of Reformstau (reform jam), further denting public perception of the 
government's competence and adding to the general mood of political disaffection30• Yet 
following Kohl's decision to stand again in April 1997, the party clung to the hope that their 
long-standing leader could once more defy predictions of his political demise and preserve 
his already record-breaking stay in the Chancellor's office. Kohl's rather autocratic 
announcement was not without criticism yet once he had expressed it publicly after minimal 
consultation with his party, the COU had little alternative but to unite behind him despite his 
dire poll ratings (Gibowski 2000: 19-22). 
With Kohl as chancellor candidate, the party's coalition options were very 
restricted. The alliance with the FOP had been one of Kohl's chief aims when assuming the 
chairmanship in the 1973 and he remained devoutly faithful to the liberals, refusing to 
embrace or even tacitly encourage speculation about other post-election possibilities. The 
flirtation of younger COU politicians with the Greens whether in the Bundestag31 or in the 
Llinder (such as von Beust and Muller) was not encouraged by the chancellor nor party 
chairman Hintze and the common enthusiasm for citizenship reform and an eco-tax 
discovered by the younger COU and Green politicians was certainly not shared by more 
senior Union figures32• Moreover, Kohl refused to countenance any possibility of a Grand 
Coalition with the SPO despite Schauble's enthusiasm. This not only tied the COU to the 
current unpopular coalition but also more or less ruled out any attempt to forge a broad 
consensual alliance to pass painful social-economic reforms. An election triumph for the 
government parties promised further reforms and further polarisation with serious 
implications for the COU's social profile. 
The government continued to wish for the signs of economic recovery which had 
resurrected the 1994 campaign yet these hopes were to be unfulfilled. Even had such an 
30 Throughout 1997, satisfaction with government lagged far behind satisfaction with the SPD, the 
CDU/CSU dipped below the SPD in polls and Kohl's approval ratings remained poor (Gibowski 
2000:14-19). Public perception of the nation's economic prospects were much more pessimistic than 
in 1994 and the numbers suffering from Politik- and Systemverdrossenheit were substantial (see 
statistics in SlOss and Neugebauer 1998: 13) 
31 The so-called Pizza Connection was a short-lived series of informal meetings between young Green 
and CDU members (Wagner 1998). 
32 The eco-tax did have its advocates in the upper reaches of the federal party, such as Schl1uble and 
Merkel. 
140 
upswing materialised in time, the government's credibility in economic problem-solving 
was in question. Maier and Rattinger (2000:38-9) suggest that this was less due to an 
erosion of perceived COU ability in economic affairs than to the greatly improved image of 
the SPO in this regard. Nonetheless; the government had lost its advantage in this area and 
whether a clearer economic upturn could have saved it is doubtful. Once more, the 
CDU/CSU ran a very personalised campaign concentrating on Kohl but where this had been 
an advantage in 1994, the incumbent chancellor now faced a very different opponent in 
Gerhard Schroder. Schroder's modest policy ideas, skilled use of the media and professional 
campaign capitalised on the atmosphere of discontent without alienating centrist voters. 
Schroder was able to maintain a wide lead over Kohl throughout the campaign. Kohl had 
finally lost his unique 'unification chancellor bonus' and even as Schroder's advantage 
decreased in the final weeks of the campaign, a clear gap between the two candidates 
remained. 
The boost that the COU received in the final weeks of campaigning was not 
sufficient to prevent a thorough defeat for the pal1y. In an election of unprecedented political 
change in the FRG, the SPO overtook the COU/CSU for only the second time, outpolling 
the Union parties by 5.8%. The losses were sustained disproportionately by the CDU: the 
CSU slipped 0.5% whereas the COU dropped 5.8% (over two million votes). The result was 
the second worst for the combined sister parties in the history of the FRG. The Christian 
Democratic share of the vote in the east was particularly bad, illustrating both the problems 
of rebuilding the region and the difficulties experienced by the COU in the new Lfulder. The 
CDU/CSU lost disproportionately high support from trade unionists (both white and blue 
collar) in the west, from blue collar workers in general in the east and from the self-
employed in the west. In both regions, support dropped noticeably amongst older age 
groups33 (Gibowski 2000:24-30). 
Many explanations of the election focused on the candidates34: SchrOder's youth, 
greater charisma and promise of a fresh approach was thought to have been crucial to the 
SPD's success. Some commentators speculated whether Schauble, whose popularity ratings 
were roughly on a par with Schroder's, would have been able to defeat the SPD challenger. 
While undoubtedly the SPD ran a better, more disciplined campaign than previously, 
33 See Chapter 4 for more detailed statistics. 
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especially in comparison to the jumbled chaos of the Union's effort, such analysis neglects 
deeper causes of the CDU's failure. The cutbacks in virtually all aspects of social spending, 
the piecemeal but frequent reforms of the welfare state and the alterations to the pension 
system in the 1994-1998 period had eroded a great deal of public trust in the CDU's 
management of the German social welfare system (Bosch 2000: 19). Moreover, there was 
little sign of the promised economic benefits of such changes. There was a clear drop in 
assessments of the government competence in solving social problems: between 1994 and 
1998 evaluations of the government's ability to solve unemployment dropped 18 points 
behind the opposition while the opposition was also rated more highly on pension problems 
(figures from Wiist 2003:29). 
Eith (2002) argues that in part the SPD's success in 1998 derived from the high 
value placed on social justice by German voters3S• According to one poll, 40% of western 
and 64% of eastern SPD voters in 1998 based their decision on their desire for more social 
justice (p.II). Eith also points to the significance of research on favoured models of the 
welfare state. A 'Christian Democratic' model based on state responsibility for protection 
against the risks of old age and illness and for ensuring equality of opportunity was the 
favoured model for only 15% of the west Germans asked in 1996 (admittedly this was an 
increase of 5% from 1985) but the dominant preference (57%) was for a 'Social 
Democratic' model including not just the provisions of the Christian Democratic ideal but 
also full employment and equality of result. In contrast, the east Germans questioned were 
far more in favour (68%) of a Socialist welfare state with additional state intervention, for 
example in wage controls with only 27% and 4% in favour of Social Democratic and 
Christian Democratic models respectively (p.13). These figures suggests that in attempting 
to carry out its reform agenda, the Christian-Liberal coalition contradicted the wishes of the 
majority of the electorate. 
Both the CSU and the FDP were relatively insulated against an electoral backlash. 
The CSU remained the dominant party in Bavaria with a strong connection to a broad 
section of voters while FDP voters would rarely be in favour of an expansive welfare state. 
34 For example see Jung and Roth (1998); Gabriel and Brettschneider (1998). 
JS He does not deny the importance of the leadership pairing of Schr5der, the innovative force of the 
'new middle', and Lafontaine, the guarantee against a neo-liberal course, in appealing to a wide 
spectrum of voters. 
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For the CDU, however, the risk of losing its social appeal was great. As Walter and Bosch 
(1998:55) state "Christian Democrats need the settled lower middle class, they need the 
social Catholics, they need the pensioners, the local dignitaries in order not to lose a large 
part of their electorate. Supporters of a radical economic reform are not to be found in these 
juste milieu". The difficulties in preserving this broad spectrum of support while carrying 
out a programme of social cutbacks were exemplified by the CDU's problems in the 1998 
election. The CDU/CSU's losses among trade unionists, blue collar workers and older 
voters would seem to indicate that the CDU in 1998 suffered at least in part due to the 
policies it had pursued in the previous legislative period. 
III. Programmatic development (1990-98) 
The steady production of programmatic documents in the first part of the Kohl era continued 
after unification. The platform "Ja zu Deutschland - Ja zur Zukunft" was passed at the 1990 
Hamburg conference when east and west parties were formally merged. This document, 
however, was less a real programme than an election manifesto and signalled no major 
change of direction with even the rebuilding process in the east not meriting a great deal of 
attention (Schmid 1994:7). A further document, the Dresdner Manifest, was produced the 
following year but again, it included little innovation. The Dresden paper offered an 
invitation to activists and members of the party in the new Lander to bring their own 
experiences and perspectives into the construction of the Grundsatzprogramm (Schoch 
1996:5) but as Bosch notes (2002:57), in practice, the Dresdner Manifest ignored a number 
of themes (e.g. abortion) important to easterners. Analogous to the course of unification as a 
whole, the content and programme of the unified Christian Democrats seemed to be 
dominated by western ideas. In one area, though, the western elite was happy to delegate 
responsibility to the new members in the east. Previous members of the bloc party in the 
GDR were encouraged to question their behaviour in the old regime but there was to be no 
western-led 'decontamination' of old GDR loyalists. Apart from this attempt to conclude the 
debate about the incorporation of the former bloc party members, the one major 
development in the programme was the express support for a tightening of the constitutional 
right to asylum which was subsequently carried out in 1993. 
Of more long-term significance to the party was the work of the new 
Grundsatzprogramm commission. The creation of the 1994 document differed in a number 
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of key respects from the earlier composition process. Firstly, it was not motivated by the 
loss of office. Kohl's decision to install the commission was impelled by massive changes 
external to the party, primarily unification and the collapse of communism. Undoubtedly, 
this constrained the commission's freedom from the start. While in opposition previously 
marginal voices were heard, participation in government constrained the work of the 
commission. Kohl had always prioritised government business far ahead of party 
programmes and although he initiated the process, he also sought to steer the discussions 
more than he had in the 1970s. Secondly, the Union leadership now lacked intellectuals 
comparable to the likes of Biedenkopf and Geimer. Many of the most prominent figures, 
such as Siissmuth, had been damaged by the failed attempt to unseat Kohl. Neither the 
General Secretary at the time of unification, Volker Ruhe, nor his replacement when he 
became defence minister in 1993, Peter Hintze, attained the stature of their predecessors in 
the job and were criticised for their lack of autonomy from the party in government and 
parliamene6• Thirdly, the commission set up in 1990 never managed to establish its 
independence fully. The original chairman, Lothar de Maiziere, had initially attempted to 
introduce some novel topics into the discussion but following allegations concerning his 
links with the Stasi, de Maiziere stood down. His successor, Reinhard Gohner, was not an 
experienced politician at the federal level and his surprise nomination by Kohl fuelled 
complaints that the chancellor was seeking to control the design of the programme. 
Accordingly, the new Grundsatzprogramm was characterised by continuity with little 
innovation. Nonetheless, the process of the Gnmdsatzprogramm's creation was not without 
controversy. Gohner, for example, sparked a vigorous debate with his proposal that equality 
be added to the three key values of freedom, solidarity and justice. Not surprisingly, this 
suggestion was eventually rejected. The Social Committees were also disgruntled by the 
initial draft which they considered to be too market dominated. For many of the newer 
eastern members, the programme's statements on the former bloc party were far too 
forgiving37. 
As well as the new Grundsatzprogramm, this section will also analyse 1998's 
ZukunJtsprogramme. The hints of change present in the 1994 document were clearer by the 
later document which adopted a theme of change albeit still within a broadly Christian 
36 Hintze was himself a Bundestag member. 
37 Article 5 granted that "many members (of the bloc party) were able to retain their integrity and 
independence despite the discrimination and personal risks which this involved". 
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Democratic framework. The ZukunJtsprogramme, written by a commission headed by 
Schauble, was neither an electoral platform nor a replacement basic programme. It was 
intended to serve as the basis for a shorter electoral manifesto and enunciate the party's aims 
for the next four years in government but at the same time it included an analysis of 
globalisation and of contemporary social, economic and cultural trends. The fears of one 
time CDU advisor Wanfried Dettling that the COU was drifting rightwards have so far not 
been borne out (Schmid 1994) but it will be shown here that the party's self-description as 
Volkspartei of the middle has come under strain programmatically in the 1990s. 
Principles and self-identity 
The opening section of the Grundsatzprogramm was very similar to the preamble and 
opening articles of the 1978 programme, reaffirming the Christian roots as the "ethical basis 
for responsible policies" (Article 2). A subtle refinement came with a greater openness to 
"all who affirm the dignity and freedom of mankind and support the basic beliefs which we 
derive from these for our policies" (Article 2) but it was clear from the programme's 
numerous religious references38 that the COU continued to abide by their religious image of 
man. An obvious illustration of this was the party's insistence that the dignity of the unborn 
child was inviolable (Article 46) and the programme also repeated earlier concerns about 
genetic manipulation (Article 147)39. The principles of freedom, solidarity and justice 
remained the basis of the party's beliefs and their definition was virtually unaltered from 
1978 although the concept of solidarity was extended to relations between old and new 
Lander and between current and future generations in terms of the environment. 
Furthermore, the CDU still stressed its role as a Volkspartei open to all regardless of class. 
The ZukunJtsprogramm asserted the continuing validity of the Grundsatzprogramm 
and its values and so gave little attention to questions of principles. Spektrum (p.l3, Nr.16 
15/04/1998), a Protestant news magazine, noticed that the COU's standard description of 
their policies as being "based on the Christian understanding of Man and his responsibility 
before God" (Article 1 Grundsatzprogramm) was shortened to just "the Christian 
understanding of Man" and responsibility before God was only mentioned in the closing 
paragraph. This cut, it was argued, was symptomatic of the reduced role of religious values 
38 Even excluding the opening section, references to Christianity are scattered throughout the text (see 
Articles 34, 38, 53, 58, 63, 67, 70, 96, 105, 106, 119, 120, 121, 141, 143, 144, 147, 154, 161 and 162) 
39 See Chapter 3, section II. 
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in the programme and in the political thought of Wolfgang Schauble. Admittedly, such a 
critique may be overstated yet it did highlight that as the relationship with the churches 
declined in the 1990s, the continued claim of the CDU to religious values was increasingly 
in question. 
Economic and social policy 
The Grundsatzprogramm introduced the eco-social market economy as the fundamental 
concept of the CDU. The 'eco' appendage did signify an increased interest in green issues 
(see later section) but did not alter the essential shape of the social market based on 
competition, private property and social justice. Nonetheless while the challenges facing 
newly unified Germany were to be addressed using "tried and tested principles' (Article 32), 
German unification still offered an opportunity for the party to correct some of the "wrong 
turnings of the past" (Article 35) and "return to the virtues and values" of the past (Article 
37). These malformations were excessive bureaucracy and regulation, an overly large public 
sector and unreasonable tax burden (Articles 73-76). The CDU, therefore, strongly 
advocated deregulation, privatisation, cuts in state subsidies and tax reform to facilitate the 
regeneration of the east and face the challenge of globalisation (Article 72). In addition, the 
programme contained numerous references to encouraging private health and social 
insurance schemes in order to promote self-responsibility and to relieve the onus on the 
state. 
Although the influence of the Standort debate on the programme is noticeable in 
such statements, it is clear that these reforms were not intended to alter the basic foundation 
of CDU economic and social policy. Indeed, the Union had pledged more deregulation, 
privatisation and less tax in the 1978 programme and the 1994 document did not differ 
greatly in this regard from the programmes of the 1980s4o• Moreover, the social component 
of policy remained vital as "the market alone cannot create social justice. The performance-
related justice of the market is not the same thing as social justice" (Article 68). However, 
while the state had "to protect and ensure the rights of the powerlessness and the minorities 
in our society in the battle for access to material and immaterial resources" (Article 91), the 
programme also advocated a restructuring of the social state to concentrate benefits on the 
needy (Article 92). The distance between Christian Democracy and a purely market-based 
40 See Chapter 3, section III. 
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philosophy was also illustrated by other commitments to extend the social state, notably 
through the introduction of nursing care insurance (Article 104), family policy (see later 
section), the goal of full employment (Article 94) and co-determination (Article 96). 
The later ZukunJtsprogramm emphasised the need for greater adaptation due to 
social, economic and technological changes which would "not leave our society and 
economy unaltered". The party still remained wedded to the concept of the eco-social 
market economy but sought a "new confidence in the effectiveness of competition and the 
market principle" in order to cope with the challenges to Standort Deutschland. The 
government's policies since 1994 were praised for encouraging greater self-responsibility 
and subsidiarity, reducing bureaucracy and decreasing state spending as percentage ofGDP 
but further action was still necessary. After the tax reform debacle of 1997, the CDU firmly 
stated its intention to carry the "Petersberger Model''''· out successfully in the next 
legislative period, pointing to the economic success brought by similar tax reductions to the 
USA, the UK and the Netherlands (Article B2). The level of state expenditure also had to be 
reduced to encourage private initiative (Article B9) with the aim of creating "a lean state" 
(Article B23). The Union's welfare state policy still aimed at providing social security 
against illness, unemployment and poverty in old age but the ZukunJtsprogramme stressed 
more firmly the need for the system to be restructured in order to secure its stability. The 
growth of social insurance contributions must be reversed (Article B 18) while more 
encouragement of private insurance and pensions was also necessary. 
Drawing on a suggestion made at a conference of the Social Committees the 
previous year, the ZukunJtsprogramm also attempted to redefine the social question. As 
unemployment among those willing to work was "a great social injustice", measures which 
create employment must be considered "social" (Article Bl1). By this means, the Union 
attempted to defuse criticism of its austerity policies since 1994 and to justify further 
cutbacks in state spending. Regardless of the party's success in achieving this42, there was, 
nonetheless, a marked change in the party's rhetoric concerning employment. Where the 
Grundsatzprogramm stated that "we are in favour of having full employment as an 
41 Entry level taxation would drop from 25.9% to 15% with the highest tax band at 39% instead of 
53%. 
42 As was argued in section II, the 1998 election result suggested that government explanations were 
not accepted many voters. 
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economic and social objective which the state ... management and unions have a particular 
responsibility to achieve" (Article 94), the ZukunJtsprogramm proposed only that "an 
acceptable chance of employment must be open to everyone" (Article B 11). This shift was 
in part a reflection of changed economic realities but together with the markedly smaller 
social element of the programme, it hinted that a deeper change in Christian Democratic 
beliefs could be approaching. 
Foreign policy 
German unification may have removed one of the planks of CDU foreign policy but it did 
not diminish the party's commitment to European integration. The Grundsatzprogramme 
sought further integration towards a federal Europe based on subsidiarity (Article 124) with 
monetary union and a common foreign and security policy (Article 126) although it also 
desired greater democracy within European institutions (Article 125). In addition, German 
ties to NATO, the US and the UN were reaffirmed (Articles 132-133). The CDU's role as 
"the party of European integration and Atlantic solidarity" (Article 25) remained a vital 
element of the ZunkunJtsprogramm. Further European initiatives to fight crime, protect the 
environment and develop common security policy were required while the party gave 
support to the expansion of the EU. 
Family policy and the role of women 
Support for the family was still a key concern for the Union and the Grundsatzprogramm 
mentioned a variety of measures to improve its status, for example making child's allowance 
index-linked, giving tax breaks to families with children and offering the legal entitlement to 
a kindergarten place (Article 46). Many of the ideas devised in the 1980s were also 
integrated into the programme, such as greater job flexibility for men and women for 
increased compatibility between career and child-raising (Articles 48-49). Limited 
adaptation was evident in the fact that the Union explicitly mentioned respect for unmarried 
couples (even if denying them equivalent legal status) (Article 44) and equal rights for 
children born outside marriage (Article 45). The greater concern for women's rights since 
the 1985 commitment to "A New Partnership between Men and Women" was visible in the 
addition of a brief pledge on free development of personality for both sexes and Articles 40-
42 which concern sexual equality. However, the contemporary intra-party discussion of 
quotas was circumvented through an inconclusive assurance that "we Christian Democrats 
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are in favour of women being permanently involved at all levels within our party" (Article 
41). The 1998 programme added little to the Union's policy, praising past achievements but 
seeking more compatibility between family life and employment. 
Environmentalism 
The COU's adoption of environmental themes carried on into the Grundsatzprogramm with 
an entire chapter devoted to "Creation and its Preservation" and its rejection of "living at the 
expense of nature" (Article 143). Most symbolically of all, though, the COU developed the 
idea of an ecological and social market economy (Article 70) in which pollution caused by 
production or consumption is punished chiefly through market means thus bringing about "a 
synthesis of economy, social justice and economy". Effective environmental legislation was 
necessary (Article 142) but where possible, the Union wanted market solutions (Article 
153). Furthermore, the adoption of green themes did not stop the COU from advocating the 
responsible use of nuclear power (Article 86). The same approach of eco-protection through 
primarily market means was also the basis of the Union's environmental policy in the 
Zukunftsprogramm. Instead of state interference, the value of voluntary agreements was 
emphasised while the international dimension of environmental protection was heavily 
stressed. Schauble had initially attempted to include an eco-tax in the programme but 
business representatives and the CSU were very unhappy at this and only Kohl's 
intervention helped restore some inner harmony. The Chancellor categorically rejected the 
introduction of an eco-tax at the national level and instead, his proposal that such an 
additional charge could only be introduced at the European level was accepted. 
Crime and Security 
An increasingly salient theme in the 1990s was crime and security. In previous programmes, 
this had not been a particularly prominent topic. This received some attention in the 
Grundsatzprogramm which in the face of new challenges like international crime and 
increased drug use, advocated modern methods of fighting crime (Article Ill) and the value 
of prevention (Article 112). However by 1998, security issues received far more attention 
with an extended section dedicated to crime-fighting. The COU slated SPD and Green calls 
for decriminalisation of pretty offences and instead, argued for stronger measures to prevent 
alcoholism, drug use, graffiti and vandalism. After the success of the far-right OVU in the 
Saxony-Anhalt election in April, the rhetoric of the programme on crime was hardened, 
149 
even going so far as to adopt a CSU slogan "Zero tolerance for law-breakers and violent 
criminals" (Article B22). This hard-line stance was also evident in concerns about the 
number of foreign criminals and the promise to deport those foreigners found guilty of 
illegality. The adoption of such rhetoric in the Zukunjtsprogramm was a striking addition to 
the CDU's programmatic profile. 
Programmatic continuity and change: Und weiter so? 
Reaction to the Grundsatzprogramm when it was passed at the 1994 Hamburg party 
conference was largely negative. For many, the CDU had "few innovative answers to the 
current challenges like mass unemployment, the crisis of the social state, the completion of 
Gennan unity ... it depended too much on the status quo and the motto: something for 
everyone" (Jox and Schmid 2002:8). To some extent, much of the criticism was based an 
unrealistic vision of party programmes where such documents offer coherent and novel 
solutions to contemporary problems. However, in essence, the 1994 programme differed 
little from the earlier Grllndsatzprogramm despite the massive domestic and global changes 
since 1989 .. The party's image of humanity and its fundamental principles remained 
unchanged. The party continued to push for deeper European integration. Limited policy 
adaptation to changing gender roles and family situations had taken place and there was a 
stronger element of free market thinking but these changes were already visible in the 
previous decade's documents. One of the few innovations, the addition of the 'eco' to the 
social market economy, was not welcomed by either the business wing or the Social 
Committees while for many younger party members, the green dimension was not extensive 
enough43• Nonetheless despite the conflict caused by its creation, the programme eventually 
did have an integrative effect within the party (B6sch 2002:61). 
Although the ZUklllljtsprogramm was ridiculed by SPD Bundesgeschnftsfllhrer 
Milntefering as yet another "We iter So Programm", this description was to some extent 
inaccurate. This strong emphasis on change and the need for social and economic adaptation 
at the beginning of the programme heralded quite a significant deviation from the structure 
of standard CDU platforms. While the programme added little to CDU thinking about its 
43 A comparison of the federal party's Grundsatzprogramm with that of Junge Union passed the 
following year reveals a discernibly stronger stress on environmental issues (for instance, Article 19 
of the latter states that "protection of the environment must be accorded an accentuated significance 
compared to other goals in political decision-making"). 
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principles nor to foreign or family policy, the emphasis on the market, the reduction of 
bureaucracy and welfare state reform was conspicuously enhanced. Furthermore, the theme 
of crime and security was a novel ingredient in CDU programmes and together with the 
greater market liberalism suggested a movement to the right. The production of the 
ZukunJtsprogramm in an election year helped to minimise internal disagreements about its 
content although the eco-tax debate did cause considerable rancour. von Beust, chairman of 
the Hamburg CDU Fraktion, was not alone in his assessment of Schauble's original 
suggestion as a tactical mistake (Die Welt 16/04/1998) restricting the ability of the Union to 
play upon fears of the Greens in government and contradicting Hintze's attempt to portray 
the party as a Tankstellen-Parte; (gas-pump party)44. Perhaps of more significance was the 
virtual silence of the social wing about the programme despite the apparent shift rightwards. 
Facing a choice between an unabashed market liberal party and a more social Union based 
on traditional values (Gauland 1999), the apparent embrace of globalisation and the greater 
stress on the market within Zukunjtsprogramm could be interpreted as one step in the 
direction of the fom1er option. The social wing having lost ground throughout the decade 
put up little resistance to the new programme. However, a less social version of Christian 
Democracy would can in question the party's Volkspartei identity and there was little 
indication that such a move would be popular. The sober, technocratic analysis offered by 
Sch1iuble at the party conference of 1998 met with applause borne more from duty than 
enthusiasm (Die Welt 20/5/1998) and as shown in Section II, such a strategy could also have 
dangerous electoral implications. 
IV. Organisational Developments 
During the last decade of Kohl's chancellorship, the party appeared to be regressing as an 
organisation. A number of commentators argued that the party was once more a simple 
'Kanzlerwahlverein,45. Such a description, however, cannot be justified. The CDU was still 
a dense, pluralist organisation weakly controlled by centralised structures. Competition 
between "regional organisations and interest groups, parliamentary parties and members of 
governments, working groups and bodies of experts, political groupings and wings" (L6sche 
1998:75) remained a critical organisational feature. Yet although the CDU was more than 
just a vehicle for their chancellor, a number of organisational changes and trends can be 
identified which have endangered the integrative capacity of the Union. 
44 See for example Stiddcutsche Zcitung 14/03/1998. 
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The integration of the eastern party brought a number of GDR-era politicians, 
functionaries and members into the CDU with tarnished personal histories together with a 
younger generation actively seeking renewal and self-scrutiny. In addition to the 
problematic history of many eastern CDU politicians, adaptation to the rules of political life 
of the FRG also caused problems. Both of these difficulties were apparent in the flurry of 
resignations which afflicted the eastern party organisations46 (Clemens 1993). The new 
Lander also brought further diversity to the party. The party in the east drew far more 
support from workers and lower-middle employees and the eastern party organisations 
developed a more liberal social profile (e.g. on abortion) than their western equivalents. This 
liberalism did not extend into the economic domain where the eastern Christian Democrats 
were more committed to state intervention, favouring subsidies and price controls. 
Therefore, a by-product of unification for the CDU was greater internal complexity. The 
independent identity of the eastern CDU branches developed further following the 
government's package of social cutbacks and the failure to reduce unemployment, not 
helped by the renewed attacks against the PDS in the 1998 campaign in the 'red hands' 
billboard poster and western indifference to eastern attempts to stimulate debate about the 
inner-party relationship between cast and west47• 
The internal balance of power within the CDU as a whole was not just affected by 
the addition of the Eastern bloc party. The string of poor Christian Democratic Landtag 
results diminished the power of the Land parties and contributed to the ''worst leadership 
crisis of their history" (Bosch 2002: 138). This position of weakness limited their ability to 
provide a counterweight to the influence of the chancellor. Nonetheless, from the middle of 
the decade onwards, a number of younger Union politicians came to the fore in the Lander, 
the so-called "Young Wild Ones" (Junge Wildet8. This group, whose contact with one 
another remained informal, primarily comprised Koch, Wulff, Milller, Bohr, von Beust and 
Oettinger. While many were willing to criticise Kohl publicly, their influence was limited. 
There was no suggestion that they sought Kohl's removal and apart from hunger for power, 
4S For example, see Pragcl's comments in Berliner Zeitung (28/06/1995). 
46 For instance, Brandenburg alone lost a party chairman (de Maiziere), a deputy chairman (HliBler) a 
farliamentary leader (Diestel) and a General Secretary (Klein) due to scandals. 
7 See for example the efforts of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania parliamentary leader Rehberg in 1996 
(Sllddeutsehe Zeitung 9/2/1996). 
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they did not develop a common political line49 nor did they share a vision of the party after 
Kohl. 
A more significant organisational development was the shift in the relative weight 
of the auxiliary organisations. As shown earlier, the Social Committees were on the 
defensive throughout the decade, unable to block the reforms demanded by the business 
wing, the FDP and the CSU. After Blum's resignation as chairman in 1987, successive 
leaders of the Social Committees struggled to assert any independent authority. His 
immediate successor, Fink, was a critic of Kohl but he polarised opinion within the Social 
Committees and in a break from past custom, he was not elected onto the CDU executive. 
Dissatisfaction with Fink led to his replacement by Schreibner whose chairmanship was cut 
short through a scandal which also cost him his job as Saxony-Anhalt social minister. 
Although this leadership crisis was brought to an end with the election of Rainer 
Eppelmann, he was unable to reverse the declining influence of the Social Committees. 
Already close to Kohl, Eppelmann's autonomy was compromised further by the 
government's narrow majority after 1994 which potentially raised every issue into a vote of 
confidence thus limiting the freedom of Bundestag member Eppelmann to voice opposition 
to government plans. However, as Schroeder (1998) has argued, the Social Committees had 
deeper problems as well. Membership declined faster than membership of the whole party. 
Between 1980 to 1997, it had nearly halved in absolute numbers despite unification (p.183) 
highlighting the failure of the Social Committees to establish itself in the new Llinder. 
Another crucial factor was that the parameters of Christian Democratic discussions of 
reform were no longer determined by the social wing. Instead, the concept of reform became 
synonymous with the agenda of the market liberal clements within the party (p.182). The 
alliance with Junge Union also shattered as the youth party adopted a more market-
orientated, liberal line under Klaus Escher (Monath 1998:28). JU now became a partner for 
the business wing, pushing for a more thorough reconstruction of the welfare state. 
In April 1995, the representatives of small businesses and artisans (MIT) and the 
Business Association merged to form the Association for Medium Sized Firms and Business 
48 As Llische (1998:77) sardonically notes, the group seems neither especially young nor wild and der 
Spiegel (20110/1997) mocked their contribution to the 1997 party conference as the "Junge Milde". 
49 Milller, for example, was one of the foremost advocates of black-green coalitions whereas Koch's 
chief interest was in tax reform. 
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(Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung). The fusion, which was strongly supported by 
Schauble, consolidated the strength of the business wing within the CDU. The new MIT 
now had nearly double the membership of the Social Committees (ZohlnhOfer 2001 b: 12). 
Although the newly unified association was swiftly plunged into disarray following a 
damaging financial scandal 50, long-term damage to MIT was limited and stability was 
restored initially by Doss and then Rauen as chairmen. As very few detailed examinations of 
the role of the business association in the CDU exist, it is difficult to ascertain how 
influential it is or the extent to which it functions as a unified quasi-pressure group. 
Nonetheless, reform as a concept was now in the hands of the party's business wing and 
many of the young politicians in the Union had links to MIT. 
A further change in the strength of the various auxiliary organisations was the 
growing prominence of the Women's Union (FU) under the leadership of Rita Siissmuth. 
The more assertive mood within the FU challenged the unity of the CDU as debates on 
abortion and the adoption of a quota within the party caused considerable turbulence. On the 
first issue, the FU was itself split. Some (such as Siissmuth) advocated the adoption of a new 
law on abortion which balanced the FRG's guidelines with the more liberal GDR position 
but others continued to back the FRG's mixture of prohibition in theory and limited 
toleration in practice. The issue was finally resolved in 1992 when the Bundestag passed a 
law for the whole country which allowed for abortion within the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy but only after taking obligatory advice51 • The controversy was indicative of the 
new problems the Union faced in accommodating women's interests while at the same time 
upholding its socially traditionalist beliefs. This was also evident in the discussion of quotas 
which followed in 1993. Here the FU was united and received the support of GeiBler and 
General Secretary Hintze but faced opposition from a large proportion of the male members 
of the party as well as those female politicians such as Merkel and Nolte whose political rise 
had been achieved without such help. Discontent about the idea was very obvious at the 
1994 party conference and at the conference the following year the proposed introduction of 
a quorum requiring a third of all posts to be reserved for women failed. Although the 
so This forced the resignations of chairman Bregger and the main business leader Helmes. 
51 After a decision by the Constitutional Court, this was later modified to ensure that abortion 
remained illegal but with no threat of prosecution ifadvice is received by the woman in question. 
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quorum was eventually passed in 1996, the regulation had been watered downs2, The 
consternation among sections of the party over the quota issue again demonstrates the taxing 
task of reconciling traditional Christian Democratic beliefs with growing demands for 
greater representation for women and for women's issues. 
The CDU's organisational dilemma in the latter part of the Kohl era then was 
threefold. The party was faced by a succession crisis. Kohl had effectively named Schauble 
as his chosen heir yet this de facto enthronement was greeted with dismay by reformers who 
felt it illustrated the lack of democracy within the party, Moreover, Schauble was not 
universally popular. Kohl's strength lay in his ability to act as a mediator between the 
different groups and factions yet Schauble was arguably too close to the views of the 
business wing to play this role, for example in his belief that adaptation to international 
competition should take priority over questions of distributive justice within GermanyS3, His 
lack of strong religious connections also concerned those party members with strong ties to 
social Catholicism and his relationship with the CSU was quite volatile. Nonetheless, the 
blossoming of a number of young CDU politicians in the Lander ensured that the Union 
would not be short of future politicians of stature even if there was no real shared vision of 
the party, The CDU's problems in this regard were thus largely short-term. 
More serious to the party's future was the falling level of participation at all levels. 
Membership of the party continued to fall steadily although especially in the eastS4, 
Deprived in most cases of office, the predicament of the Land organisations was particularly 
acute. This stimulated a series of proposals for reform which can be split into three 
categories: limitation of the resources and power of the party leadership, the introduction of 
elements of direct democracy; and making the party more open and flexile (Bosch 
2002:143; Kie/3ling 2001:32-34). Although various Land organisations experimented with 
all three options, when suggestions such as a consultative poll of members on factual issues 
were put to a vote at federal party congresses they were rejected. Implementation of 
innovative schemes to encourage greater popular involvement was therefore problematic 
S2 As well as only applying for a five year time period, it also stipulated that on those party bodies 
where female representation did not reach the required level, a second vote would be necessary in 
which the required representation could be lower (Bosch 2002:259). 
S3 Quoted in Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt (15/05/1998). 
S4 See Chapter 4, Table 4.32. 
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and in any case there was no guarantee they would successfully reverse the stagnation of 
participation. 
Perhaps the most dangerous trend was the increasing strain on the party's ability to 
integrate a diverse range of social groups into its organisation. The account of the auxiliary 
organisations above illustrated the divergent tcndencies of the associations. The strain on the 
COU's Volkspartei image undoubtedly incrcased in the 1990s as JU and MIT clamoured for 
more radical market reforms, FU pushed for greater representation of women and the Social 
Committees struggled in vain against its internal problems and against the direction of 
government policy. By 1998, even Kohl, the master of intra-party compromise, could not 
longer obscure the increasing power of the market liberal faction. The vulnerability of the 
COU in this situation was shown by the extent of the party's loss. In attempting to balance 
the demands of different groups yet still pushing ahead with its programme, the chancellor 
and his government had alienated many and satisfied few. 
V. Conclusion 
The devastating election defeat of 1998 brought the Kohl era to an end. The loss of office 
and the end of Kohl's chairmanship of the party ensured that discussions about the party's 
identity and direction which had long been postponed could no longer be avoided. This 
process of self-examination, however, threatened to unleash pent-up centrifugal forces 
which could undermine the coherence of the party. While the Union had always been "a 
pragmatic polyarchy" (Clemens 2000: 117), it nonetheless required a skilful leader at the 
helm to tender and preserve the party's multifarious identity. Kohl's ability in this was 
unquestioned, putting himself at the centre of a network of personal relationships stretching 
across all wings of the party and down to the most local level. Regardless of their other 
personal characteristics, neither Schauble nor any of the young pretenders could claim a 
similar ability but this was not just a question of personal qualities. Managing the diverse 
interests within the party and balancing the different viewpoints became trickier in the 
1990s. Admittedly, compared to the predicament of other Christian Democratic parties 
around Western Europe, the COU's position was not perilous. There was no threat of 
disintegration and the open factional battles evident in other such parties were not present 
during the Kohl era. The Union's losses were less severe than other Christian Democratic 
parties and as Chapter 4 illustrated, it was more successful at attracting voters from outside 
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its core support. Nonetheless, the preceeding account of political and electoral developments 
has shown that the fate of a Christian Democratic Volkspartei became less certain in 1990s 
Germany. 
Section I demonstrated that through the refoml programme of the final years of the 
Kohl era, the Union in government moved clearer to the right of centre. Yet with the balance 
between 'social' and 'market' increasingly weighted in favour of the latter, the CDU was 
out of step with the electorate. This, it was argued, was an underlying cause for the CDU's 
unprecedented defeat in 1998 although short-term factors should not be overlooked. In 
programmatic terms, less change was obvious at first. Key elements of Christian Democratic 
self-understanding (principles of freedom, responsibility and justice; Christian image of 
man; social market economy; European integration; subsidiarity; support for the family) 
were still at the heart of the CDU's new Grundsatzprogramm. Greater recognition of 
changing gender roles and the adoption of the 'eeo' prefix to the social market economy 
were the main developments since the 1978 Grundsat=programm. However, even these 
alterations were effectively just adopting themes explored in the previous decade into the 
basic programme. The slight shift towards more market-orientated thinking became clearer 
by the time of the next election. Schauble's ZlikunJtsprogramme offered a more technocratic 
vision of the party's ideas with a firmer stress on adaptation and change. As was shown 
earlier, this did not entail the party jettisoning its Christian Democratic baggage entirely but 
it is far from certain that such an approach carried further is a suitable ideological 
foundation to support a Volkspartei. Finally, Section III argued that the incorporation of an 
array of socially diverse interests within the party was complicated by unification, economic 
developments and changes within the auxiliary organisations themselves. Increasing 
divergence within its constituent organisations threatened party cohesion and the danger 
existed that the internal balance bctwecn the various interests would disappear resulting in 
the loss of the Union's social integration capabilities. Embarking upon life in opposition, the 
post-Kohl era for the CDU, then, offered the opportunity of reconstruction but also the threat 
of uncertainty. 
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Chapter 6. The Austrian People's Party 1990-9 
I. Introduction 
The development of Austrian politics in the 1990s was undoubtedly dominated by the 
rise of the Freedom Party. The rebirth of the party under Haider had begun in 1986 but 
its maturation into an equivalent electoral force to the two major parties accelerated as it 
promoted and capitalised on the prevailing mood of political disquiet. Despite relative 
economic prosperity and successful entry into the EU, growing frustration with elements 
of Austria's consociational system was clear. The extensive penetration of interest 
groups, the bureaucracy, the media and the economy by political parties was called into 
question as numerous instances of corruption were exposed, more independent media 
outlets developed and popular opinion turned against formerly dominant behavioural 
patterns (Luther 1999: 131). However, the growth of the FPO was also at least in part a 
consequence of the failing integrative power of the OVP and the SpO. This chapter will 
concentrate on the difficulties of the Christian Democrats. 
The OVP, caught in a whirlpool of electoral decline, faced the actual possibility 
of disintegration. Its predicament led to a change in the strategy of the party's federal 
leadership, eventually resulting in the ground-breaking 'black-blue' coalition in 2000. 
The actual coalition negotiations of 1999-2000 will not be covered in any depth here l 
but this chapter will explore why the party was willing to engage in such a risky gambit 
through an account of the party's difficulties throughout the decade. Contrary to the 
claims of the opposition, the decision was not based purely on the desire for power of its 
leader, Schiissel, but rather on the impasse within the Grand Coalition, the OVP's 
electoral malaise and the growing congruence of OVP and FPO ideas. Accordingly, the 
Section I will look at the three elections between 1990 and 1995, the resultant leadership 
instability and the decade-long flirtation with a small 'bourgeois' coalition. During the 
1995-99 period, the party's strategy under Schilsscl and parliamentary leader Khol 
brought a coalition with the FPO closer. Differences with the FPO were narrowed and 
the Grand Coalition became increasingly unworkable due to the chronic conflict within 
the coalition. The main elements of the Schilssel-Khol course will therefore be analysed 
before a consideration of the 1999 election. In electoral terms, the pay-off of the new 
OVP strategy was ambivalent. The party consolidated its core support but failed to 
increase its share of the vote and fell into third place. However, Schiissel's leadership 
I See Bohm and Lahodynsky (2001), Sperl (2000) and Welan (2000) for detailed accounts of the 
opening 'sounding-out' talks, the failed attempt to reconstruct the SpO-OVP government and the 
swift OVP-FPO negotiations which led to the 'black-blue' government with Schilssel as 
chancellor. 
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did allow the party to finally recover the chancellorship in early 2000, a development 
crucial for generating greater inner party unity. 
Section II will look at the programmatic profile of the OVP in the 1990s. As 
with the CDU, the fall of Communism and the collapse of the USSR prompted a 
revision of the party's Grundsatzprogramm. The programme updated and adapted the 
Salzburg programme to take account of environmentalism, Austrian accession to the EU 
and growing public anxieties about security. The blend of economic and social 
liberalism, traditionalism and Catholic social concern, however, was unenthusiastically 
received and was to have little impact on the party's ideological direction. More 
important were the ideas of Khol, once dubbed the Austrian Newt Gingrich (Profil 
Nr.12, 1995), whose belief in a Christian Democracy with conservative values was 
increasingly influential. 
The continuing attempts to reform the organisational structure of the OVP will 
be the focus of Section III. As in the 1970s, the party's structure was once again the 
subject of internal scrutiny and debate although this time the party remained in office. 
The reforms which have been introduced have produced a slightly stronger central party, 
especially once Khol as parliamentary leader instilled a more disciplined line in the OVP 
Klub. Nonetheless, the central party's ability to act freely was still strongly 
circumscribed by the power of the Leagues and the auxiliary organisations. Not only did 
this continually threaten the party's unity but the balance between the Leagues (i.e. the 
over-representation of farmers and business interests) also remained problematic in view 
of the OVP's Volkspartei self-image. The question of how to remodel the party's 
structure without alienating traditional voter groups essentially remained unresolved. 
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II. Political and Electoral Developments 
1990 Nationalrat Election 
Despite an impressive economic record, the Grand Coalition parties did not enter the 
1990 election campaign in especially strong positions. Persistent squabbling between the 
SPO and the OYP undermined any attempt to promote their achievements (reduction of 
the budget deficit, improved growth rates and productivity, falling unemployment, tax 
reform and a substantial restructuring of the state economies) to the electorate. In 
addition, the lingering cloud of political scandal refused to clear2. Although the 
Socialists were primarily affected, the People's Party were also tarnished, both through 
association and some embarrassments of their own. Party leader Riegler'S reputation, for 
example, was sullied by a revelation about his earlier illegal receipt of a severance 
payment. 
Early polls suggested that both the major parties would lose support to the 
Freedom Party and the Greens (Sully 1991 :77). The OYP tried to counter this through an 
aggressive campaign depicting the party as the policy innovator of the coalition 
frustrated by the SPO's unwillingness to reform. The party's scope for action, though, 
was limited. First, Riegler was firnlly against any coalition with the FPO under Haider. 
Without changes in the leadership of either the FPO or the OYP itself, the party, in spite 
of its divisions on the matter, was effectively committed to a continuation of the Grand 
Coalition despite its flaws (Kriechbaumer 1995:79). Second, its own policy 
competencies were neutralised by Yranitzky's use of many of the same issues. The 
Chancellor, for instance, firmly emphasised the need for further privatisation, tighter 
monetary and fiscal measures and an far-reaching pension reform (Financial Times 
04/10/1990). Furthermore, the SPO's campaign strategy turned the election into a 
plebiscite on Yranitzky's rule. Perhaps unwisely, the OYP tried to counter this with their 
own personality-based campaign. Riegler's unassuming, provincial image failed to 
excite voters when pitted against the more urbane and statesmanlike Yranitzky on one 
side and the aggressive popUlism of Haider on the other. 
The result of the election was disastrous for the OYP as it fell to just 32% (-
9.2%) while despite its tribulations, the SPO lost less than a percentage (-0.3%). The 
chief beneficiary was the Freedom Party which achieved its best ever result with 16.6% 
(+7%) and 33 seats. Support for the OYP fell in virtually all segments of society but 
particularly heavy losses were sustained amongst housewives, the age group between 
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45-59, lower employees and those with Fachschule or Berufschule education (Plasser 
and Ulram 1995:356). Although traditional core supporters of the OVP (active 
Catholics, farmers) were more loyal, this was of little comfort to the party after its worst 
ever electoral performance. Indeed, as the social bases of OVP support were in long 
term decline3, the party was in danger of becoming more unrepresentative of society. 
Leadership Instability and Party Reform 
Although the Grand Coalition was increasingly detrimental for the OVP, the 
"constellation of policy, parties and people" (Welan 1994:20) prevented any escape to 
an OVP-FPO coalition. After Vranitzky had been handed the task of forn1ing a 
government, a resumption of the SPG-GVP coalition was inevitable. Riegler's position 
was now very weak4 and amidst a period of deep party soul-searching, the GVP's 
predilection for leadership change once again surfaced. Riegler resigned in May 
accompanied by General Secretary Solonar. Unusually for Austrian parties, an open 
contest for the party chairmanships developed (MUller and Meth-Cohen 1991) after all 
efforts to avoid a divisive battle failed. 
The internal friction crystallised around the candidacies of Bernhard Garg and 
Erhard Busek, the former supported by the powerful Lower Austrian party and the 
OAAB while Busek was principally promoted by the Styrian organisation. A sign of the 
party's predicament was the lack of other party heavyweights willing to put their name 
forward for the thankless task of rebuilding the party while still ensconced in 
government. Neisser, Klestil and Prall all refused to enter the contest and as Gorg was a 
Quereinsteiger (a candidate outside the party to be parachuted in), Busek was the only 
candidate from within the party hierarchy. Busek stood for a more open, liberal party but 
this stance was resisted by the Lower Austrians and the so-called 'steel-helmet faction' 
who favoured concentrating on core Christian Democratic social groups and themes. At 
the party's June 1991 congress, Busek triumphed winning 56% of the vote. This far 
from resounding success illustrated the polarised reaction Busek produceds and his 
leadership of the party was from the outset hamstrung by these divisions. 
2 For example the SPG lost two central secretaries, Heinrich Keller and GUnther Sallaberger, after 
revelations about their dubious financial practices as well as their Minister of the Interior Karl 
Blecha (Sully 1990:136-140). 
J See Chapter 4. 
4 This was apparent in his inability to control a rebellion by the party executive over the SPG's 
rroposed justice minister (see Kriechbaumer 1995:81-2). 
The book by Kohlmaier (former GVP General Secretary, GAAB chairman and parliamentarian) 
on the problems of the GVP contains a fairly cutting portrait of "the most problematic leader of 
the GVP" whose aloof manner alienated many (1999:48-50). 
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As the quick progression from Mock to Riegler to Busek demonstrated, 
managing the GYP as junior partners in the coalition was extremely difficult. The strong 
factionalism rooted in the federal and League-structure of the part/ undermined party 
discipline and without the chancellorship the central party apparatus often struggled to 
harmonise the different regional and social interests. As Yranitzky was accredited for 
government successes but the coalition partners blamed equally for perceived failures, 
the Land parties had little reason to put the interests of party unity above their own 
regional interests. Dissension in the regions was further fanned by the party's relentless 
drop in popularit/. In only one Landtag election (Carinthia) between the 1990 and 1994 
federal elections was the GYP able to reverse its slide8• Moreover, at no point did the 
party exceed 26% in opinion polls (Ulram and Muller 1995:31). The Yiennese election 
was an ominous sign for Busek's future. He had earlier revived the fortunes of the GYP 
in the capital but his ideas had been divisive and by 1991 the GYP fell into third place. 
In the wake of the 1990 election defeat, organisational changes were again 
contemplated. During the conference which elected Busek in 1991, a number of reforms 
were incorporated into the party statute9• However, as with earlier reforms, many of the 
measures did not contain satisfactory means of enforcement. This together with the 
inability to halt the gains of the FPO ensured that the "overpowering inertia in the 
catholic-conservative camp" identified by Sully in 1989 (1989:433) persisted under the 
new leadership. Although Busek was not without a clear vision of the party's direction, 
his strategy of greater openness and liberalism did not generate internal consensus and 
was not fully effected. Consequently, the stated aims of the OyP during the period of 
Busek's leadership did not differ fundamentally from its strategy pre-1990 (Ulram and 
Muller 1995:15). 
Neither un cordon sQnitaire nor blauell Sockell: The OVP's relations with the FP{) 
After a succession of poor Landtag elections, 1992 marked a potential turning point for 
the GYP. For the first time in the history of the 2nd Republic, an GYP candidate was 
elected to the presidency 10. The surprising triumph of Thomas Klestil in defeating SPO 
candidate Streicher suggested that the Christian Democrats were not locked into an 
irreversible tailspin. However, Klestil's success was based less on party than on his own 
6 See chapters 2 and 3 and section IV of this chapter. 
7 Already by 1988 the Lower Austrian party executive blamed the party's local electoral 
rroblems on the government responsibility of the federal party (Dippelreiter 1995:453) 
See Appendix for full details of Land elections in the 1990s. 
9 For more details, see section III. 
10 Kurt Waldheim had been an 6VP-supported candidate rather than a political figure drawn from 
the party establishment. 
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qualities as a presidential candidate (i.e. his diplomatic career, his image of transcending 
party labels). More significantly, his win in the run-off owed a considerable amount to 
Haider's endorsement of his candidacy after the FPO's Heide Schmidt had been 
defeated in the first round. This was an early sign that an OVP recovery was perhaps 
only possible through some form of alliance with the Freedom Party. 
The prospect of such an alignment polarised opinion within the party. Busek, 
like Riegler, was hostile towards a 'black-blue' coalition and indeed, since the 1990 
election the FPO's credentials as a future government party had been further undermined 
by a number of factors. In 1991, Haider was forced to resign as Carinthian governor 
after a series of controversial remarks". The FPO's xenophobic campaign in the 1991 
Viennese election did nothing to assuage OVP wariness towards a 'bourgeois' 
coalition l2• Recognising public concern over immigration, the government tried to 
negate the relentless campaigns of the Freedom Party by enacting new measures aimed 
at curbing illegal immigration. Despite this, the FPO still pressed ahead with its "Austria 
First" people's initiative13 at the end of 1992 which among other measures envisaged a 
temporary end to immigration, the immediate deportation of foreigners breaking the law 
and the introduction of a constitutional provision stating that Austria was not a country 
of immigration ("Austria First" People's Initiative, reproduced in Sully 1997:87-88). 
The persistent FPO flirtation with xenophobia and anti-Semitism and its unpredictability 
rendered it a hugely problematic coalition partner. In addition, in February 1993 
Schmidt and four other FPO parliamentarians left to form Liberal Forum after the 
introduction of the "Austria First" initiative. Their departure meant that few liberal 
counterbalances to the right-wing populist element of the FPO remained. 
The OVP was deeply divided over how to handle the FrO. For General 
Secretary Maier, a close confidant of Busek, a black-blue coalition was not an option l4, a 
viewpoint repeated by his successor Molterer (1993-4) and Upper Austrian governor 
II In September 1990 Haider had addressed the annual Ulrichsberg War Veterans as "Dear 
friends" and the following year praised Nazi employment policies as sound in a debate in the 
Carinthian legislature in which he praised Nazi employment policies as sound. 
12 Worries about the FPO's connection to extremism were also inflamed by the candidature of 
Diethmar Sulzberger. a former spokesman for the National Democratic Party in Lower Austria 
and a writer for the far-right paper "Halt". 
13 The People's Initiative (Volksbegehren) is a constitutional instrument of direct democracy that 
can be introduced by a specified number of voters or (prior to 1998) federal or regional 
parliamentary representatives. If 100,000 signatures are collected, the Nationalrat must have a 
debate on the proposal although this entails no obligation to introduce a law (Muller 1999:304; 
Pelinka and Rosenberger 2000:70) 
14 He ruled out this out two years in advance of the 1994 Nationalrat election (00 Nachrichten 
06/08/1992) 
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Ratzenbock. In contrast, Mock, Hirschmann (managing chairman of the Styrian OYP), 
Kuckaka (ex-General Secretary) and OAAB chairman Hochtl all argued for either 
strategic flexibility or some form of openness to the FPO. Although the grouping against 
a FPO coalition held the more important federal party positions, Busek was in no 
position to end the endless public debate by members of the party given his weakness 
and the diffusion of power in the party. The choice confronting the OYP offered no clear 
solution: either the party continue to support the Grand Coalition with the risk of further 
electoral haemorrhage or it could end the FPO's ostracism through a black-blue coalition 
and gamble that the more extreme sections of the FPO would be tamed by office. Yet 
such a choice was fraught with risk as was shown in Carinthia in 1994. It emerged that a 
secret deal had been struck in which OYP governor Zernatto would be re-elected with 
FPO support on the understanding that Haider would be allowed to accede to the 
position at some future point. The resultant public outcry forced the OYP to back out of 
this deal and Zernatto was only elected with SPO support and after lengthy obstruction 
by the FPO (Luther 1995: 126). 
The option of black-blue became yet more problematic with Austria's move 
toward EU accession. After an initial two year assessment of Austria's suitability, the 
European Commission informed the government in 1991 that subject to agreement on 
the thorny question of neutrality, the application was viewed very favourably. The 
process proceeded slowly due to the delays within the EU member-states over the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and negotiations for Austrian entry did not begin 
until 1993. By this point, Haider had brought about a striking U-turn in FPO European 
policy. Once the most adamant advocate of Austrian membership of the EU of all 
Austrian parties 15, the FPO after 1992 opposed accession 16. The new position of the FPO 
made a black-blue coalition more unlikely. For the OYP leadership, discussions with the 
EU would be jeopardised by an alliance with the Freedom Party. After the negotiations 
had been concluded in little more than a year, a constitutionally required referendum 
was due to be held in June 1994. Again, this made any shift in party strategy highly 
problematic. To seek a 'black-blue' coalition at the same time as presenting a united 
front with the SPQ for a 'yes' vote in the referendum might have undermined the pro-
IS The FPO, for example, had been the first parliamentary party to demand entry negotiations in 
1987. 
16 The change only emerged slowly, firstly with increasingly critical remarks by Haider about the 
possible negative consequences arising from membership (budget problems, agricultural refonn, 
traffic, democratic deficit) and the FPO's vote against the EEA treaty in parliament before it was 
confimled by General Secretary Meischbcrgcr that the FPO would resist EU accession at the 
current time (Kurier 29/08/1992). 
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EU campaign and would have certainly compromised the party's beliefs at a crucial 
juncture. 
1994 N ationalrat Election 
The run-up to the Nationalrat election was filled with mixed signals for the Grand 
Coalition parties. A number of Landtag elections (Carinthia, Salzburg, Tyrol and 
Vorarlberg) took place in March. In each election, FPO gained support while the SPO 
and OVP lost ground everywhere except Carinthia. However, the results for the People's 
Party were not as disastrous as had been predicted. Whether this relative stabilisation 
had any meaning outside the regions was unclear. In Tyrol, for example, the OVP 
governor Weingartner had renamed the party the Tyrolean People's Party, stressing the 
lesser role of the Leagues and advocating policies contrary to the federal party (Gehler 
1995 :697). If the minimisation of losses resulted from this regional distinctiveness, then 
the result was little cause for optimism for the federal party. On the other hand, the 
referendum on EU accession produced an unexpectedly pro-entry result with just under 
two thirds of voters supporting Austrian membership. The scale of EU-enthusiasm 
caught most observers by surprise due to the opposition of the FPO and the Greens, the 
fears over environmental standards and the lingering doubts about the compatibility of 
EU membership and neutrality. The government parties, but especially the OVP in view 
of Foreign Minister Mock's prominent role in the negotiations, hoped that the victory 
would bring political benefits in the autumn election and that the Haider's rise had 
finally been stopped. 
The OVP decided against running another candidate-centred campaign after the 
ill-fated efforts of 1990 and focused on a thematic campaign focusing on three central 
ideas: economy, security, homeland (Schaller and Vretscha 1995: 172). However, the 
thematic campaign neither caught the public's attcntion nor prevented the widespread 
impression that the party was on the defensive. One problem was that public perception 
of Christian Democratic problem solving competence had dropped even further. By 
1994 the OVP was not rated highest in any of the most important policy areas l7 (Ulram 
and Muller 1995:24). Its attempt, therefore, to base its campaign around these issues was 
very risky. The party was unable to reverse public perceptions of it and the use of 
themes specifically chosen to counter the FPO (e.g. the pluralistic vision of homeland, 
Heimat, against the xenophobic nationalism of Haider) ultimately failed. 
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Arguably, the party's greatest difficulty was again its disunity. Statements by 
ex-general secretary Kuckaka, Styrian party chairman Hirschmann, Bartenstein and 
OAAB leader Hochtl 18 all undermined Busek's authority. Dusek had ruled out the option 
of the small coalition and at the party's congress committed the party to the Grand 
Coalition "ohne Wenn und Abcr" (Kriechbaumcr 1995:89) due to the FPO's anti-EU 
agenda and desire for a "Third Republic,,19. This unambiguous declaration did not end 
the relentless speculation about a possible OVP-FPO coalition which the SPc) was 
happy to encourage20• Although the dissenting members of the party establishment 
declared themselves loyal to thcir leader, party members continued to discuss coalition 
strategy openili. This disarray of the OVP campaign was all the more frustrating as 
Vranitzky now appeared vulnerable. The SPO again ran a heavily candidate-centred 
campaign but its chancellor bonus appeared to be exhausted. However, given its own 
problems, the People's Party was not in a position to capitalise on this and instead, it 
was the FPC) who took advantage, particularly during the innovative televised debates22• 
The result for the Grand Coalition partners was calamitous. Both the SPO and 
the C)VP fell to their worst ever results (34.9% and 27.7% respectively) while the 
Freedom Party made the largest gains (+5.9%, 22.5%) and the Grcens also increased 
their vote. Liberal Forum also easily passed the 4% threshold, securing its existence in 
the short-term. The result brought unprecedented change to the Austrian political 
system. Five parties were represented in parliament for the first time and the party 
system seemed to be gradually shifting towards three medium sized parties with two 
smaller parties. The coalition also lost the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to 
17 It was rated second behind the SPO on securing pensions and job creation, 2nd behind the FPO 
on fighting corruption and only 3'd on stopping waste, the foreigner problem and environmental 
~rotection. 
8 Kukacka warned that the reduction of the party's options would reduce the party to its social-
Christian core while Hirschmann expressed his preference for an OYP-FPO coalition if it was 
mathematically possible. His fellow Styrian Hartenstein believed Haider was capable of learning 
and would likely act very differently in government than in opposition. Hochtl spoke out against 
making firm assertions before the election and declared parts of the FPO capable of co-operation 
(Kurier 13/0511994). 
19 The Third Republic idca was proposed in "Weil das Land sich andern mull!", a book published 
by research section of the FPO. Among other suggestions it mooted a vastly enhanced role for the 
federal president. For more dctails see Sully (1997). 
20 sp6 Federal Business Manager Josef Cap, for example, argued on many occasions that there 
was a danger ofa black-blue coalition (Schaller and Yretscha 1995:210). 
21 For instance, finance ministry state secretary Johannes Ditz argued that should the OyP be 
under 30% it should refrain from government participation while deputy parliamentary leader 
Walter Schwimmer ruled out a Grand Coalition if the distance between the two parties increased 
(06 Nachrichten 12/09/1994). 
22 Haider's clever use of these slots was highlighted when he took the opportunity to confront 
Yranitzky live on air with evidence of corruption in the Styrian Chamber of Labour instantly 
pushing this theme back into public consciousness. 
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pass constitutional laws23 while the oppOSitIOn, if united, could now appeal against 
legislation to the Constitutional Court (Pelinka 2001:47). For the QVP, the fact that the 
gap between themselves and the SPQ actually narrowed was of little consolation. The 
party had failed to achieve its goal of remaining above 30% (Schaller and Vretscha 
1995: 172). 
In addition to falling support among women in employment, younger voters and 
those in education, pronounced losses were also sustained among core QVP groups 
(farmers, self-employed and free professionals, civil servants)24. The loss of key groups 
caused alarm within party circles and raised major doubts about the wisdom of Busek's 
strategy. His desired opening to the liberal middle seemed to have alienated traditional 
party supporters without simultaneously enhancing the party's attractiveness to 
employees, secular voters or even workers. Most OVP voters deserting the party had not 
been lured to another party but had instead not voted (Neuwirth 1995:461). The party 
seemed to be confronted by two options: a concentration on core supporters or the 
modernisation option of appealing to wavering and unaligned voters (MUlier, Plasser 
and ULram forthcoming). Neither choice was without risk: the former entailed appealing 
to groups in society whose numbers continued to dwindle while the latter could 
potentially cause electoral oblivion. The division was exacerbated as advocates of one or 
other strategy also tended to think similarly about the 'black-blue' question. 
Traditionalists were more inclined to a small coalition while modernisers were more 
favourably disposed to any other option. Again, the consequences of such actions were 
incalculable. An alliance with the FPO might return a Christian Democrat to the 
chancellery but this would contradict the wishes of 65% of the electorate who favoured 
another Grand Coalition (Ulram and Muller 1995:28). Furthermore, Kriechbaumer 
(1995:90) attributed the desertion of 74,000 former OVP voters to the Greens and the 
LiF just before the election to the growing fear of an OVP-FPO alliance. Caught 
between strategic alternatives with uncertain pay-offs, the party entered into coalition 
negotiations with the SPO in a desperate state. 
The First Collapse of Grand Coalition government 
The OVP-SPQ government was resumed as anticipated although its creation was 
protracted and difficult. The Social Democrats were divided over the issue of budget 
23 This is more significant than may first appear. The Austrian constitution has been subject to an 
extensive number of amendments (roughly 100, the majority of which have been since 1970), 
special constitutional laws and constitutional regulations in ordinary law and state treaties (WeI an 
2001 :71). For example, legislation on schools effectively falls under constitutional law and thus 
requires a two-thirds majority. 
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cuts and Vranitzky's detachment from party was now a weakness rather than a vote-
winner. The l>VP was equally plagued by difficulties. Always a contentious choice as 
leader, Busek's position now looked untenable. Leading figures in the party (such as 
Lower Austrian Landeshauptmann Prall and the deputy party chairman in Upper 
Austria, Piihringer) speculated publicly and privately about leadership renewal. 
Eventually, Prall was charged with the chairmanship of an internal commission whose 
task was to investigate leadership options. In the period running up to the party 
conference, the scene of the decisive vote, three candidates, Schiisscl (fornler General 
Secretary of the Chamber of Business and Economic Affairs Minister since 1989), Khol 
(recently named parliamentary leader) and Leitl (the designated Upper Austrian deputy 
party chairman), were discussed by the commission. Schiissel enjoyed the highest 
standing in polls (Kriechbaumer 1995:94) and so despite his connection to Busek25 and 
the regional and organisational differences his candidacy provoked26, he was elected 
unopposed by the conference in April 1995 following the commission's endorsement. 
Schiissel's maiden speech in which he declared his deternlination to become chancellor 
and to make the l>VP number one again instilled some hope into the ailing party even if 
such targets looked unrealistic at a time when the l>VP had fallen to third place in 
opinion polls. 
The change in leadership initially helped to avert the possible collapse of the 
government as the new vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister established a reasonable 
working relationship with Vranitzky and a reshuffle brought fresh faces from both 
parties into government27• Nonetheless, popular dissatisfaction with politics had not 
disappeared and was given further sustenance through Austrian entry into the EU. The 
coalition's previous estimates of the costs and benefits of EU entry had been very 
optimistic. The anticipated price drops failed to materialise and the cost of membership, 
estimated at 12 billion Schillings in 1994, was roughly four times as much (Rosner, van 
der Bellen and Winckler 1999: 147). This together with the continuing problem of transit 
led to "an Alpine variety of Euroscepticsm" (Sully 1997: I 07). Moreover, budget 
problems resulting from the earlier miscalculations also shattered the short-lived 
harmony of the coalition. Open conflict developed between the SPl> Finance Minister 
24 See Table 4.5, Chapter 4. 
25 Of the candidates, he was thought to be closest to Busek in terms of his ideas about policy and 
the party. 
26 He drew more support from the western and southern Land parties, the Business League and 
the Farmers' League. The eastern parties and the QAAB were split between Leitl and Khol. 
27 On the GVP's side both Busek and Mock left cabinet to return to their parliamentary seats 
while Johannes Ditz took Schiissel's fornler post as economics minister. Another interesting 
change was the party's replacement of Maria Rauch-Kallat as ministry of environmental 
protection by Martin Bartenstein. 
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Staribacher and the ~YP-run Economics Ministry over the scale of the budget deficit 
and over the means to combat this. Since 1993, Austria's compliance with the 
Maastricht criteria had been in doubt as the budget deficit and state debt increased. In 
order to conform to EMU's convergence requirements, the OYP pushed determinedly 
for cutbacks in social spending. The SPO, though willing in principle to accept some 
cuts in expenditure, pressed for tax increases to offset the austerity measures and looked 
to extend cutbacks to OYP social constituencies, such as farmers and small 
businessmen. Bolstered by its encouraging recovery under Schiissel, the People's Party 
refused to back down and in October 1995, it withdrew from the negotiations, resulting 
in the dissolution of parliament and new elections scheduled for December. 
1995 Nationalrat election 
Schiissel's decision to end the life of the government was the first clear sign of his 
willingness to gamble rather than let the party drift into electoral oblivion as a 
permanent prop for the SPO. The collapse of the government, however, provided further 
ammunition for Haider's anti-establishment rhetoric. The inability of the government to 
solve Austria's problems using the same tried and trusted methods and its improbable 
estimates of the costs of EU accession imparted FPO claims with a certain legitimacy. 
Most predictions therefore envisaged further FPO gains. It was also uncertain whether a 
Grand Coalition could be resurrected after such a loss of trust. The campaign 
unsurprisingly was quite polarised and focused on the cause of the dissolution of the 
government. The SPO accused the OYP of plotting the end of coalition in order to form 
an alliance with the FP028 and presented its own "socially just" programme of budget 
cuts. The OYP's campaign centred on its 'Schiissel-Ditz' course29, promising extensive 
cutbacks in order to preserve Austria's competitive situation. Yet declarations about the 
necessity of change lacked credibility coming from a party which had been In 
government for eight years (Sully 1996:637). The FPO once more constructed its 
campaign around Haider and the paramount themes of political corruption and 
privileges. This was less successful than the previous year, however, as the budget issue 
and questions of social justice and pensions dominated the political agenda. The 
prevention of waste of public funds did remain an issue (rated third in importance by the 
electorate) but the foreigners question was no longer as salient. In addition, Haider's 
Krumpemdorf speech to former Waffen SS members onee again cast doubt upon the 
democratic legitimacy of the FPO and its leader. 
28 For example, Vranitzky described every vote for the OVP as a vote for the FPO. 
29 This was a deliberate echo of the Raab-Kamitz course from the 19505. 
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While opinion polls correctly predicted that fewer votes would be exchanged 
between the parties, the impressive gains of the SPO (+3.2%) came as a surprise and 
despite the dissatisfaction with such an early election, both government parties won 
votes with the opposition losing ground (FPO -0.6%, Greens -2.5%, LiF -0.5%). The 
OVP's modest gains (+0.6%) halted its disturbing descent but were slightly 
disappointing in view of its aims. As the SPO had recovered more of its former 
supporters, the declared goal of becoming the largest party was even more remote. The 
party's stronger stance in the budget negotiations did bring the OVP some electoral 
return. Gains were made at the expense of Liberal Forum and the Greens30 and voting 
shifts were also registered in analysis by social group. Among white collar workers the 
OVP expanded its voting share although still remaining behind the SPO (Plasser and 
Ulram 2000:24). However, the OVP continued to lose favour among women in 
employment, young voters, civil servants and employees in public service and workers31 • 
In view of this decline, it was apparent that the Christian Democrats were still struggling 
to formulate a broad, socially inclusive appea\. 
Although many observers before the election had anticipated a black-blue 
administration, this coalition option no longer seemed as plausible after the election. 
Haider's comments in Krumpendorf seemed to confirm his critics' worst fears about the 
FPO's connection to right wing extremism and for a time speculation abounded about 
his possible prosecution and/or forced resignation from parliament (Sully 1997: 129). 
Again, the OVP found itself confronted by the co-operation/exclusion dilemma but this 
time the mood within the party seemed to be more negative. In one meeting of the party 
executive before the election four members (Carinthian leader Zernatto, Tirolean 
chairman Weingartner, Economics Minister Ditz and parliamentary leader Khol) were 
reported to have registered their unWillingness to take part in any 6VP-FPO coalition 
(Kurier 18/10/1995). The party as a whole had not discounted a possible black-blue 
alliance during the campaign but in the summer of 1995, Klubobmann Khol imported 
the concept of the 'constitutional bow' from post-war Italy to explain why he regarded 
the FPO as an unsuitable coalition partner. As the FPO, according to its recent policy 
documents, advocated a 'Third Republic' with an entirely new constitution, it could not 
be considered a party fit for government (see Sully 1997: 143-147). Following the outcry 
about Krumpendorf, the resumption of the Grand Coalition was virtually unavoidable. 
Nonetheless, the suspicion that the OVP was secretly awaiting the first available 
opportunity to ally with the FPO persisted, especially after the controversial academic 
30 Analysis of vote shi fls between parties at 
http://s\lnsite.univje.ac.at/ Austria/elections/orw9 5/orwstr9 5. hIm I accessed 09/03/03. 
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and FPO parliamentarian Brauneder was elected as the third president of the Nationalrat 
with the help of the OVP and conversely, the FPO helped elect the OVP's Waltraud 
Klasnic as governor of Styria. It was also clear that Khol's model did not rule out co-
operation with the FPO per se. If the party were to drop its more radical plans, it would 
once more become an acceptable coalition bedfellow. 
Inevitably, the budget plan was the maIO subject during the SpO-OVP 
negotiations. A compromise solution was agreed although it was generally believed that 
the new budget was closer to Christian Democratic demands. Most of the financial 
consolidation came from spending cuts with some increased revenue (primarily an 
energy tax and increases in capital taxation). Cutbacks stretched across almost all areas 
of government spending, including less access to and reduced unemployment payments, 
decreased family spending and changes in the pension system. The reforms introduced 
were successful in consolidating the budget and bringing the country into line with the 
Maastricht criteria yet as the first election for Austria's European Parliament 
representatives illustrated, these cost-cutting measures did nothing to endear the 
coalition to the public. 
The EP election in October 1996 was won by the OVP with 29.7%, narrowly 
relegating the SPO into second place but the Christian Democratic triumph was 
overshadowed by the success of the FPO which polled 27.5%. The swing to the FPO in 
this election confirmed that the party had overcome the temporary setbacks of the 
previous year. The drift away from the Grand Coalition parties was once more evident in 
the Viennese local elections in 1996. In what had always been its traditional stronghold 
the SPO lost 8.7% and the OVP fell by 2.8% while the FPO gained 5.4% to 27.9%. 
While locked into an unhappy marriage, the coalition partners could not prevent this 
trend and signs of tension multiplied. Disputes broke out over the representation of the 
nation in the EU between Chancellor Vranitzky and Foreign Minister and vice-
Chancellor Schussel, over the introduction of an annual toll for motorways32, changes in 
military service and over the privatisation of the Creditanstalt-Bankverein through its 
sale to the Bank Austria. The last of these disputes was by far the most serious and 
threatened to bring down the coalition. 
For many years plans had been made to privatise Austria's second largest bank, 
Creditanstalt, regarded as the 'black' counterpart to the 'red' Bank Austria. However, 
31 See Tables 4.5, 4.10 Chapter 4. 
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the scheme caused serious coalition conflict when the socialist-dominated Bank Austria 
put in the best offer. The OYP saw this as an attempt to expand the SPO domain rather 
than genuine privatisation. It initially discussed with the FPO a possible alliance to 
prevent the sale and organised a special sitting of parliament to this end. A parliamentary 
defeat for the sale of CA engineered through the OYP and the FPO would effectively 
have broken the coalition. This was prevented through the intervention of President 
Klestil who called on the coalition parties to avoid new elections and then through a long 
coalition committee meeting which sanctioned the sale if specific provisions were mee3• 
While the deal enabled a way out of the crisis, it had a number of significant 
consequences. SPO Finance Minister Klima who had played a prominent role in the 
negotiations now became Chancellor as a wearied-looking Yranitzky stepped down. For 
the GYP, the sale could not be interpreted as anything other than a humiliating defeat 
and a reminder of the party's weakness while still junior partner to the SPO. Although 
the change at the top of the SPO leadership temporarily helped restore some personal 
trust between the two parties, the affair left a lingering feeling of resentment among 
Christian Democrats. 
Schiissel-Khol Course 
The CA fiasco was a demoralising blow to the party and inevitably gave rise to 
speculation about a possible leadership challenge. Although the party's position in the 
polls had stabilised to an extent, it was neither able to cut into the SPO's lead nor 
prevent the gains of the FPO. Schussel's position was further undermined later in 1997 
when he was reported to have made derogatory remarks about Bundesbank president 
Tietmeyer and other foreign diplomats at an EU summit. For once, the GYP's propensity 
for leadership renewal was kept in check and Schlissel clung on to both the party 
chairmanship and the foreign minister's office34• To some extent, this was due to the 
new discipline being exerted in the federal party. Fomler General Secretary Michael 
Graff commented that a chairman debate was taking place but not in public as any party 
members speaking out would find themselves "flattened" (Der Standard 07/07/1997). 
Crucial to this new central authority was Klubobmallll Khol. The parliamentary party 
had become the dominant source of new ideas while the extra-parliamentary national 
32 This also divided both the parties as well however with a number of regional party leaders 
seeking exceptions and changes. 
33 The main concessions offered to the OVP were the reduction of the Viennese municipalities' 
share in Bank Austria and guarantees about CA employees' jobs (Der Standard 13/0111997). 
34 A parliamentary motion of no confidence in Schussel was defeated with the help of the SPO. 
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party apparatus was now viewed by most as weak3s • Such was the power of the 6vp 
parliamentary leader, it was suggested that Khol did not need to strive for the party 
chairmanship as he already had it de facto (06 Nachrichten 11/12/1997). 
The Schiissel-Khol duo was initially assumed to be a marriage of convenience 
between the liberal and conservative factions. Schilssel represented, in the opinion of 
most observers, a continuation of Busek's ideas while Khol was renowned as one of the 
party's foremost traditionalists whose preference was for a 'Christian Democratic 
Volkspartei with conservative values'. Khol's vision of the party seemed to be an 
attempt to shift the 6vp to the right to head off the challenge of the FP6. The right-
wing tinge to Khol's rhetoric was at times unmistakable. For instance, he criticised the 
extremist links of the Greens and declared his desire "to get people out of their social 
hammocks" and into work (Die Presse 07105/1998) while in his confrontations with the 
Social Democrats, he frequently resembled an opposition politician. Family policy 
assumed a vital role within the 6vp's policies but the party's tum towards populist-
laced traditionalism was equally visible in its rejection of a number of sp6 suggestions 
(e.g. lowering of the homosexual age of consent, reduction of the legal limit of alcohol 
for motorists, abolition of blame from divorce cases) and in its push for stronger controls 
on immigration and asylum. In addition, the 6vp continued to advocate a more 
comprehensive privatisation programme on one side and welfare and pension cutbacks 
on the other. In this respect, the party had not entirely abandoned its market-centred 
1995 platform. Indeed, Khol outlined his conception of "Bilrgergesellschaft", a version 
of civil society in which the state's tasks would be further reduced to be replaced by 
voluntary social engagement (Sperl 2000: 166). However, the Bilrgergesellschaft debate 
lacked popular resonance and in any case, economic restructuring was secondary to the 
new emphasis on traditionalism, much to the irritation of the Business League. 
In contrast to Khol's frequent and prominent interjections, Schiissel did not 
provide the party with strong leadership. Schilssel often preferred to sit out political 
controversies and as foreign minister was also tied up in EU affairs, particularly during 
the Austrian EU presidency. Nonetheless, earlier assessments of SchOssel as a typically 
Austrian consensus-based politician appeared to have underestimated his willingness to 
gamble and his desire for change (Sperl 2000: 16). On this there was broad agreement 
3S For example, regional parties irritated by the lack of energy and ideas coming from the central 
apparatus attempted to put pressure on Schilssel to replace the two general secretaries Maria 
Rauch-Kallat und Othmar Karas (Der Standard 12/02/1997). 
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between Schiissel and Kho136• Contrary to expectations, there was no real federal 
counterbalance to Khol's influence and the party seemed to have embarked upon a more 
right-wing course. The resignation of Johannes Ditz, one of the most prominent liberals, 
in 1996 had brought a swift end to the former Schiissel-Ditz course and in its place 
developed the less liberal, more traditionalist Schiissel-Khol course (Profil Nr.25, 1996). 
Schiissel himself now described the GYP as "a conscious conservative party" which 
would not "run after any new target groups" (Kurier 09/04/1997). 
Khol's desire for a disciplined Klub also put strong pressure on parliamentarians 
to follow the conservative path. Consequently, a number of internal dissenters spoke out 
against the "new fundamentalism" of the party. The Platform for Open Politics was 
formed in 1996 as a pressure group seeking more liberalism within the GYP and 
Austrian politics in general37• This development was also welcomed by the chairman of 
the Young People's Party (JYP), Werner Amon, who warned against the ideological 
constriction of the party in 199638• Such complaints were not totally ignored. For 
example, Schiissel, responding to the new group, stressed in 1996 that he wanted the 
GYP to present itself as the open middle (Der Standard 23/10/1996) and the following 
year General Secretary Rauch-Kallat also announced initiatives to enhance the party's 
appeal to liberal voters (Der Standard 14/04/1997). However, these interjections were 
greeted with scepticism by the dissident liberals and failed to prevent the widespread 
impression that the politics of the national party increasingly corresponded to the beliefs 
of its parliamentary leader. By the start of 1999, the political scientist and occasional 
GYP adviser Fritz Plasser described the GYP's policy positions as "arch-conservative" 
(Profil Nr.3, 1999). 
1999 Nationalrat Election 
Throughout 1998, the FPG had been entangled in problems. Its infrastructure spokesman 
and parliamentary treasurer Rosenstingl fled to Brazil after a financial scandal while the 
central party eventually had to step in to re-impose order on the fractious Salzburg Land 
party. The FPO's attacks on the EU had not been especially successful and the attempted 
Volksbegehren on keeping the Schilling flopped (Bohm and Lahodynsky 2001: 117). 
Nonetheless, neither of the government parties took the opportunity to benefit from the 
36 The theme of an unavoidable "Wende" is central in Khol's account of the failure of the Grand 
Coalition and the shift towards black-blue (KhoI2001). 
37 More about the group's aims can be found at http;//www.plattform.or.atlindex2.html accessed 
20105103. 
38 Nationalrat president and former GVP Klubobmann Neisser's critical comments about a lack 
of openness and intolerance were also widely interpreted as criticism of Khol's leadership of the 
parliamentary group although Neisser later denied that this (Der Standard 0711211996). 
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FPO's woes. As the elections of 1999 loomed, tensions over issues such as NATO, state-
controlled media appointments, the handling of the EU presidency and even the timing 
of the Nationalrat election were increasingly aired in public. Several observers compared 
the relationship between the parties to a married couple either rowing in public 
(Thurnher 2000:20) or immediately before a separation (Bohm and Lahodynsky 
2001: 109) with the OYP the more belligerent of the partners. According to General 
Secretary Karas, the OYP had to portray itself as the only future-orientated party by 
sharpening its profile (00 Nachrichten 26/1111998) but for many the incessant feuding 
gave the impression that the election campaign had already started. 
Although the OYP approached 1999 with some trepidation, the state of the party 
was not as critical as it had been in 1994. Schussel, as outlined earlier, had not given the 
party strong direction and had been damaged by earlier scandal but with no apparent 
alternatives, he was reasonably secure at least until the election. Possible successors 
such as Agriculture minister Molterer or Khol himself remained loyal to the vice-
chancellor. Although in 1998 the EU Commissioner Franz Fischler criticised the 
reduction of the OYP's themes to a "minimal conservatism" based on law and order and 
the family, there was no indication he wanted to return to national politics. Even the 
powerful Lower Austria leader Proll seemed content with provincial politics and despite 
disagreements with Schussel refrained from directly undermining him. In most opinion 
polls the OYP had consolidated its strength and was once again above the FPO and 
election results in the provinces in 1998 were moderately encouraging39• There was, 
however, little hope of realising Schussel's goal of becoming number one. The public 
relations acumen of Klima and his business manager Rudas appeared to insulate the 
Social Democrats from the various scandals continuing to surround the party. In 
addition, the stricter line on asylum taken by Interior Minister Sch16g1 helped the Social 
Democrats combat the Haider-factor. 
During 1999 the Grand Coalition was again tainted by incessant squabbling. 
Even though Schiissel had earlier appeared to confirm that a resumption of the Grand 
Coalition was his preferred choice40, growing tension over budgetary policy began to 
cast doubt upon this outcome. The OYP argued for more money to be given to families 
and for a tax reform, even hinting that a resumption of the coalition might depend on the 
SPO's willingness to concede paid maternity leave for all. SPO finance minister 
39 See Appendix. 
40 For example, early in January he was reported to have said that realistically the FPO was not a 
viable government party due to its anti-European ism (Oer Standard 07/0111999). 
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Edlinger initially resisted the ~YP's demands but conceded the tax reform in the wake 
of the Landtag elections in March. 
None of the Landtag elections brought much joy to the governing parties but the 
provincial election with the most national significance took place in Carinthia where the 
FPO dramatically recovered from its difficulties of the previous year to finish first. 
Despite previous assurances from the Carinthian OYP leader that the People's Party 
would not support Haider's claims to be governor, the OYP effectively sealed Haider's 
election through its refusal to back the SPO candidate. This complicity in Haider's 
success together with the renewed gains of the FP041 caused further anxiety in the 
coalition. Rather than compete on Haider's favourite issues, both the OYP and the SPO 
now attempted to counter the FPO by attacking each other. Thus, in the European 
election in June, the SPO derided Christian Democratic plans to take the country into 
NATO. The result (SPO gains, FPO losses) seemed to justify this confrontational 
strategy and consequently, both parties adopted it for the Nationalrat election42• 
However, in doing so, the already strained relationship between the parties was further 
soured and many commentators doubted whether a Grand Coalition was now actually 
feasible43• 
The ~YP's campaign reflected many of the programmatic developments of the 
previous years. The main electoral themes were very much in line with the agenda 
promoted by Klubobmann Khol. Family policy and the demand for paid maternity leave 
for all was central to the ~YP's platform but in addition, the party also focused on 
Austria as an economic location and law and order issues (most notably, in the proposal 
that repeat sex offenders be treated medically). However, the campaign was dominated 
by personalities and coalition speculation rather than policy ideas as the SPO accused 
the OYP of plotting a black-blue alliance with occasional counter-accusations coming 
from the Christian Democratic camp about the secret Social Democratic desire for SPO-
Green, SPO-FPO or even SPO-Green-LiF governments. 
Schussel, in contrast to his predecessors Busek and Riegler, was keen to leave 
all post-election options open. Not all in the party were as enthusiastic about sharing 
power with the FPO as Martin Bartenstein whose campaign role was diminished after he 
41 In all three March elections the FPO won votes even in Salzburg where the party had been 
hopelessly divided. 
42 See Der Standard 13/07/1999. 
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advocated black-blue too strongly. However, many key national figures (e.g. Khol, 
Gehrer) agreed that the party should remain flexible and while some prominent 
Landesfiirsten (regional party barons) were against FPO government participation 
(Piihringer, Gorg), there was no provincial consensus as others stressed (Proll, 
Sausgruber) that OVP could not restrict itself before the election. However, having been 
relegated to third in polls by the recovery of the FPO, Schiissel signalled a strategic 
rethink by declaring that if the party finished third, it would go into opposition. 
Schiissel's declaration did mobilise many voters44 but was not sufficient to 
prevent the party from finishing behind the FPO by 415 votes. The final result was the 
worst ever for both the SPO (33.2%, -4.8 since 1995) and the OVP (26.9%, -l.9) and a 
new high for the Freedom Party (26.9%, +5). The Greens also gained an unprecedented 
share of the vote (7.4%, +2.6) while the Liberal Forum fell below the 4% threshold and 
lost all its seats in parliament. The proportion of people voting for a different party 
actually fell in comparison to 1995 but this masked the extent of change as a record 
number of voters abstained which particularly hit the SpO. Closer analysis of the OVP's 
support illustrated the ambiguous electoral pay-off of the Schiisscl-Khol strategy. The 
OVP recovered much of its former popularity among civil servants and public service 
workers, narrowing the SPO's lead to 3 points (Plasser, Vlram and Sommer 2000:72). 
Among farmers too, the OVP successfully countered the challenge of the FP045• 
Although this is difficult to connect directly to the OVP's direction in recent years46, it 
does seem to confirm that the party did manage to consolidate among its traditional core 
constituencies. On the other hand, the party lost 5% among white collar employees and 
while its losses among workers were small, it remained very much the minority party in 
this social group. Indeed among young, male blue collar workers, the party polled a 
mere 10% (Plasser and Vlram 2000:30). 
The shift to the right had not enhanced the party's competence on typical FPO 
issues in the eyes of the electorate. According to polls conducted throughout the 1990s, 
the GVP had not made significant gains by 1999 in assessments of its competence on 
preventing waste of public funds, fighting corruption and privileges, fighting crime and 
43 Particularly significant in this respect was the statement by second Nationalrat president 
Neisser, an byp politician favourably inclined towards the Grand Coalition, that the alliance 
with the spb had had its day (Der Standard 17/07/1999). 
44 According to Fessel-Institut figures 40% of byp voters included this as a motive for voting for 
the party (Plasser, VIram and Sommer 2000:60). 
45 See Table 4.5, Chapter 4. 
46 Among the Fessel-Institut's alternatives for voting motivation is "because (the party) represents 
my interests best of all, i.e. following tradition" which 69% of byp voters mentioned as a reason 
(Plasser, Vlram and Sommer 2000:60). 
177 
dealing with the issue of foreigners and it trailed the SPO and the FPO on all four issue 
areas (Muller 2000:34). In addition to this failure to tackle FPO issues successfully, the 
party's economic competence (securing jobs, securing pensions and reducing the tax 
burden) declined (Muller 2000:35). Although the Schussel-Khol course had restored the 
party's popularity in some of its core social groups, the adoption of a more traditionalist 
and conservative position had not boosted its general competence ratings. The 
disproportionately heavy losses among white collar employees also suggested that there 
was also a risk that such a strategy could antagonise other groups. 
III. Programmatic Development (1990-99) 
Throughout the decade, the OVP made several attempts to re-market its appeal under 
Busek who demanded a "new formation" of the party and then later Schussel using the 
slogan "OVP-Neu". In addition to these efforts to freshen the party's image, a new 
Grundsatzprogramm was passed by the 1995 party conference. It will be argued in this 
section, however, that while the Grundsatzprogramm contained some interesting 
developments and subtle changes, its importance within the party was very limited. 
From 1995 onwards, the party's ideological identity at the national level was largely 
determined by Klubobmann Khol. As mentioned earlier, the General Secretary position 
was increasingly bypassed and it was noticeable that few major programmatic initiatives 
emanated from the federal party apparatus. Instead, the tone was increasingly set by the 
parliamentary leader. Therefore, this section will initially look at the 
Grundsatzprogramm, comparing it to the earlier Salzburg programme and the 
Zukunftsmanifest before analysing more recent trends. 
Grundsatzprogramm 
In the aftermath of the 1990 defeat, the party initially concentrated on organisational 
questions47 but by the autumn of 1993, a new commission was set up under the 
leadership of defence minister Fasslabend to engage in a dialogue about the future with 
young people and representatives of Austria's spiritual life. After this a draft programme 
was discussed by the leaders of the Leagues and provincial leaders and then presented to 
the party conference. The aim was to incorporate the ideas of the Zukunftsmanifest 
(1985) and the new concept of the eco-social market as well as take account of new 
social developments. While the stress was on continuity, Fasslabend argued that a 
change in the hierarchy of values was necessary, for example, through a greater 
emphasis on security (00 Nachrichten 28/07/1993). What, in Fasslabend's view, 
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remained crucial was that the party remained in the centre. The programme would not 
herald any "lurch to the right" (Kurier 02/04/1995) and its target audience was the entire 
population (00 Nachrichten 14/03/1995). 
The writing of the programme caused some problems. Khol wanted the 
programme to include his description of the party as a Christian Democratic party with 
conservative values but was resisted by regional leaders. Conversely, Khol did succeed 
in removing explicit mention of homosexuals from the section on tolerance. The eco-
social market model which had almost entirely dropped out of public consciousness was 
also viewed sceptically by business representatives48• Moreover, both the Business 
League and the OAAB were critical of the ambivalent commitment to the social 
partnership in early draft versions (Kurier 07/0111995). As well as correcting this, the 
revision process also significantly enhanced the prominence of ideas about the family 
within the programme. The debate about the programme, however, was completely 
overshadowed by the electoral debacle of 1994. With a leadership battle unavoidable, 
programmatic considerations were largely ignored both in the party and in the wider 
public but despite this, Viennese party boss Gorg's suggestion to delay the programme 
to allow for more discussion was rejected. 
Principles and self-identity 
While the 1995 programme restated many of the established formulas of Christian 
Democracy (Christian image of man and social justice - Article 1.1; freedom limited by 
responsibility- Article 1.2; personalism- Article 3.1), subtle changes were also visible. 
Interestingly, this was the first time that the OVP described itself as a Christian 
Democratic party. Less conspicuous was the change from an "understanding of man and 
society based on Christianity" (Salzburg Programme 3.1.1) to an image of man based on 
"Christian-humanistic" ideas (Article 3.1), signalling a further opening to society. The 
party's environmentalism was also incorporated into its understanding of humanity: 
people were a part of creation but also had a responsibility towards it (Article 3.1). In 
addition, the OVP's Europeanism acquired a new centrality in its thinking. Like the 
Zukunftsmanifest, the programme avoids the "progressive middle" label but the GVP 
still viewed itself as people's party based on social integration and open to people from 
different regions, professions and ages (Article 1.5). 
47 Busek believed that the Salzburg programme (which was still the valid Grundsatzprogramm) 
was fine in terms of contents (00 Nachrichten 02/07/1991) whereas the organisational condition 
of the party (both financially and with regard to the distribution of power) was far poorer .. 
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The party's principles were also subject to some revision. Freedom, 
responsibility, sustainability, justice, achievement, security, partnership, subsidiarity, 
participation and tolerance were now its basic values. The most significant alterations 
were the substitution of justice for equality which had never been fully accepted within 
the party, the incorporation of the green theme of sustainability and the addition of 
security. The lengthy list of principles49 illustrated the difficulty in balancing essential 
Christian Democratic values (freedom, responsibility, subsidiarity) with concessions to 
liberals (participation, diversity and tolerance) and to traditionalists (security). The 
growing influence of the last group could also be seen in the programme's concern that 
society be oriented to durable virtues like "decency, honesty, thriftiness, courage, 
endeavour, willingness to take responsibility and reliability" (Article 2). 
Economic and social policy 
Economic policy was to be based on the concept of the eco-social market founded on 
freedom, achievement, responsibility and solidarity. The principles of the social market 
model fundamentally remained in place but with an added environmental dimension (see 
below). The greater stress placed upon market mechanisms in the Zukunftsmanifest was 
maintained in the new Grundsatzprogramm. State involvement in the economy was to 
be limited to a minimum and where a service could be better provided by the private 
sector, the state should withdraw. Tax revenue must be used in an effective and frugal 
way (Article 4.1,5.4) while finance policy was to be guided by fighting inflation, budget 
consolidation and structural improvements (Article 5.4). There was, however, still a 
considerable social element to the GVP's economic thinking. The aim of the government 
was still full employment and while greater flexibility in work was necessary, employees 
and workers had to participate in these decisions (Article 5.3). However, like the 
Zukunftsmanifest, there was a stress on the need for adaptation in social policy: ever 
increasing expenditure could not be sustained, abuse of welfare was to be punished and 
pension reform was essential (Article 6.7). 
Foreign Policy 
The chief development in GVP foreign policy was its new enthusiasm for European 
integration. Earlier programmes had backed moves towards closer co-operation but 
limited by Austrian neutrality, had not actually advocated accession. By 1995, however, 
the GVP had moved to an orthodox Christian Democratic position on EU integration. 
48 For example, the leader of the Business League, Leopold Maderthaner, argued that 
environmental controls could only be achieved in international co-operation and the costs of such 
measures could not be borne solely by business (00 Nachrichten 28/07/1993). 
49 The contrast with the CDU is quite striking. See chapter 5, section III. 
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Pro-European ism has become part of its self-identity and the party staked its claim to be 
the European party in Austria (Article 1.4). Furthermore, it backed moves towards 
currency and political unity as well as the accession of Austria's eastern neighbours as 
soon as possible (Article 9.1). 
Family Policy and the Role of Women 
Family policy continued to playa significant role in Christian Democratic ideology. The 
GVP still promoted the traditional family but with concessions to changed gender roles. 
Equality for women was vital but so was more appreciation of domestic work (Article 
6.2). The two parent family continued to be the ideal which carried out "indispensable 
tasks" in society. Other forms of co-habitation were recognised and to be supported if 
necessary but financial support was primarily aimed at traditional families to ensure that 
raising children was not financially prohibitive (Article 6.3). More flexibility in work 
and greater childcare facilities were also called for to create a more family-friendly 
environment. In essence, this limited form of adaptation did not deviate substantially 
from the earlier Zukunftsmanifest. 
Environmentalism 
The greening of the GVP which had begun in the 1970s carries on with the introduction 
of the eco-social market concept. The addition of the 'eco' prefix entailed recognising 
the polluter principle, tax policy which took into account limited supplies of raw 
materials and energy sources, a ban on environmentally polluting products and support 
for greater use of renewable energy sources (Article 5.1). Environmental protection, 
furthermore, was to "playa role in every decision" (Article 7.3) and the party clearly 
rejected nuclear power. The eco-dimension of the programme was not as extensive as 
the ZukunJtsmanifest but the party's commitment remained fairly strong. 
Crime and Security 
As noted earlier, security was included as a principle for the first time and Article 4.6 
called for quicker legal proceedings against criminals, for appropriate punishment and 
for a battle against drug abuse. Moreover, there was also a populist tinge to some 
sections such as commitment to stamp out abuse of the social system (Article 6.7) and 
stop illegal immigration (Article 6.6). The amount of space dedicated to such issues was 
not extensive but it still signalled a new programmatic direction for the GVP. 
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A Threadbare Ideological Patchwork? 
Overall, the Grundsatzprogramm reflected the different strands of opinion within the 
party (market liberalism, social Catholicism, cultural traditionalism, cultural liberalism). 
Earlier programmatic adaptations (environmentalism, more market-centred economic 
policy, limited acknowledgement of non-traditional families) were repeated with little 
new innovation. Aside from the party's pro-Europeanism, the most striking feature was 
the growing influence of Khol and the other traditionalists which could be seen in the 
inclusion of law and order themes. However, the section on foreigners also upheld the 
right to asylum and the influence of the liberal wing was also evident in the espousal of 
tolerance, diversity and the support for young people (Article 6.4). This programmatic 
balance is not surprising: the primary aim of programmes is internal cohesion50• 
Inevitably, in creating this balance, differences of opinion were underplayed and 
controversial positions eschewed in the interests of party cohesion (Muller 1997:281). 
Yet the 1995 document was seen as especially bland and had negligible impact, 
particularly in comparison to media and popular interest in the revisions of the SPO and 
FPO's programmes later in the decade5!. However, even in terms of intra-party 
integration, the programme made little contribution as the divisions over the leadership 
question entirely overshadowed the passing of the Grundsatzprogramm. Therefore, 
during the 1995 party conference celebrating the 50th year of the OVP's existence, 
hardly any discussion took place about the new programme. As the following section 
will show, the programme's significance dropped even more in subsequent years. 
Post-1995 Programmatic Developments 
At roughly the same time as the Grundsatzprogramm was going through a final stage of 
reworking, parliamentary leader Khol chose to outline his ideas to Profil (Nr.13, 1995). 
His vision of the OVP does not differ radically from that presented in the 
Grundsatzprogramm yet the tone was more provocative and the assertions more certain. 
The family based on marriage was "unique", taxes had to be "consistently reduced" and 
state property and industry had to be privatised. The populist edge was also stronger: 
illegal immigration was a strong concern; immigrants committing crime were be 
consistently deported; scope for police initiative was essential; and drug abuse had to be 
tackled. Over the following legislative period, it was clear that the party's priorities were 
being set chiefly by Khol as shown in section II. The reluctance of the party to endorse 
new legislation on weapons, the obsession with family policy, the heightened interest in 
law and order issues and the debate about civil society all illustrated the influence of the 
50 See chapter I. 
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parliamentary leader. The direction of the GYP under the Schiissel-Khol team was seen 
by some as a loss of orientation and a lack of consistency (e.g. Profil Nr.50, 1997; 
Business League General Secretary Mitterlehner found the party's embrace of family 
policy inconsistent with its failure to endorse stricter weapons regulations) while others 
viewed it as a lurch to the right (e.g. der Standard editor Gerfried Sperl). The latter view 
was to some extent shared by members of the party, such as JYP leader Werner Amon 
who feared the ideological constriction of the party could lead to an excessively 
conservative image. 
The relative insignificance of the Grundsatzprogramm was exemplified by the 
fate of the eco-social market concept so central to the party in the early 1990s (Muller 
1997:281). The GYP's rejection of demands for an eco-tax in 1998 was indicative of the 
fading green credentials of the party. The Greens had adopted the eco-social economy 
model and it was revealing that former oyp leader and foremost proponent of the 
model, Riegler, was quite vocal in his praise of Green party leader van der Bellen (der 
Standard 07/08/1998). The Christian Democratic perspective seemed to be summed up 
by another former leader, Taus, who believed that environmental themes were not of 
paramount importance and that contrary to expectations the limits of growth had not 
been reached (der Standard 28/0111999). The OVP Environment Minister, Bartenstein, 
was also adjudged to lack both interest in the topic and an appropriate background52 and 
was not rated highly by environmental organisations (Profil Nr.47, 1996). Admittedly, 
the decreased significance of green issues within OYP policy and programme in the 
second half of the decade was not out of step with the Austrian public. After 1995, 
environmental protection was no longer in the five most important political priorities 
among the electorate (MOiler 2000:38). Nevertheless, the return to 'grey' themes and the 
downplaying of the eco-social market concept after 1995 did highlight the OVP's failure 
to develop durable programmatic ideas capable of generating consensus. Therefore, only 
a few years after its publication, the Grundsatzprogramm appeared largely irrelevant. 
Whereas it had woven together the different aspects of the party's identity, under the 
Schussel-Khol axis, traditionalist themes were stressed above all else. 
IV. Organisational Developments 
The defeat of 1990 prompted the Christian Democrats to enlist a professional company 
to analyse the party organisation and suggest changes. Many of the proposed ideas were 
51 Anton Pelinka's assessment of the Grundsatzprogramm as "a modest contribution which would 
excite no-one" (quoted in 00 Nachrichten 24/03/1995) was not untypical of most evaluations. 
52 Previously employed in the pharmaceutical industry, he had also been industry spokesman for 
the bvp between 1991 and 1994. 
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incorporated into the party statute in 1991, including an explicit commitment of the 
Land parties and the Leagues to acknowledge the centrality of the central party, abide by 
its resolutions and co-operate on election campaigns, the introduction of direct 
membership (i.e. without affiliation to an auxiliary organisation) and the re-introduction 
of policy committees. Though the reforms were not entirely ineffectual, as Muller and 
Steininger (1994:22-23) point out, there was no means of enforcing the new rules about 
the priority of the central party. Thus, they failed to stop the numerous public squabbles 
between leading factional and regional party figures which continued unabated. 
The most obvious example of an GVP Land party failing to put the interests of 
the central party above its own was in Tirol where the party was now know as the 
Tirolean People's Party but other instances abound. Where the party was regionally 
strong and supplied the governor (e.g. Prall in Lower Austria, Piihringer in Upper 
Austria) the leaders tended to have considerable autonomy from the central party. Yet 
even in those Lander where the party was struggling electorally, the power of the federal 
party was not much stronger53• Not only did Land party organisations zealously guard 
their own distinct identities, they also meddled in national affairs. Throughout the 1995-
9 period, the utterances of the main 'regional barons' were incessantly analysed for 
implicit or explicit criticism of Schi.isseI54• Although no Landesforsten explicitly called 
for Schtissel's removal, the position of the vice-chancellor often looked contingent upon 
the continued support of the regional parties. The unity of the party was also undermined 
by disputes between the different regions. One of the most fiercely contested internal 
battles broke out in 1998 between the Lower Austrian party and the Styrian organisation 
over the Semmering tunnel which linked the two provinces. The controversy was 
eventually defused by referring the matter to the constitutional court (Fall end 2000) but 
once again the conflict amply demonstrated the inability of the central party to contain 
such problems. 
The power of the Leagues was also still problematic for the GVP in the 1990s 
with the Business League an especially awkward organisation. On several occasions, 
threats were made by leading members of the League that if their aims were not met 
S3 Even in Carinthia where the bvp had been third party throughout the decade, the central party 
had little influence and campaigns centred around local issues or candidates such as the popular 
Landeshauptmann Zematto 
S4 For example, in the wake of Schtissel's alleged criticism of Tietmeyer, Weingartner suggested 
that Schtissel required a business manager to relieve some of his burdens while Styrian 
Landeshauptfrau Klasnic rather undiplomatically (Schiissel had always denied making the 
remarks) observed that Christians were allowed to lie as well. 
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then they would consider leaving the partl5• In addition to despair about the general 
state of the party, there was also concern that the necessary economic reforms were not 
being undertaken. While these threats were not acted upon, many business 
representatives became restive with the limitations of Grand Coalition government. The 
position of the OAAB was less powerful and like the Social Committees of the CDU, it 
was also under pressure through the welfare cutbacks made by the government (Sperl 
2000: 167). After the resignation of Josef Hochtl56 (leader of the OAAB between 1991 
and 1996), the OAAB was headed by Defence Minister Fasslabend. Fasslabend's double 
role was criticised by many in and outside the League. Some felt that, for example in the 
case of the pension reform, Fasslabend was going through the motions of criticising the 
government's proposals from an employee and civil servant perspective after having 
been jointly responsible for drawing up the original plans (see Profil Nr.41/1997). The 
pension reform put Fasslabend under pressure as many within the OAAB were unhappy 
about the longer period of 'best years' in the calculation of the pension and cuts to early 
pensions. However, after the reforms were watered down, Fasslabend managed to see 
out the crisis. The tension, though, was symptomatic of the difficulty of reconciling a 
commitment to spending cuts with a broad, socially inclusive party structure. The 
OAAB had also lost its reputation as a generator of new ideas as Khol took over the 
mantle of chief ideologue. While the OAAB was instrumental in pushing for greater 
support for the family, it is questionable whether this policy would have been espoused 
so fervently by the GVP had it not also been part of Khol's agenda. Regardless of its 
ever shrinking clientele, the Farmers' League remained an effective and well-organised, 
if less demonstrative, auxiliary organisation whose continued power was evident in the 
pronounced emphasis on agrarian issues in the Grundsatzprogramm. 
The party undertook a number of additional organisational reforms yet in each 
case the impact was limited. The introduction of primary elections for the selection of 
candidates took place in advance of the 1994 elections but the impact was modest. The 
GVP Klub had a larger intake of new members of parliament as a result of its primaries 
but in some cases the regional party organisations refused to accept the results and for 
the most part established party favourites won their contests (Nick 1995:97-100). 
Irrespective of its limited success, the practice was discontinued in the following year's 
elections and has not been repeated subsequently. 
SS The first warnings were made in 1991 by WB leader Maderthaner while in 1995 General 
Secretary Mitterlehner flirted with the idea of a business-minded interest group which was also 
represented in parliament (Profil NrJ, 1995). 
S6 Hochtl was found to have drawn a wage for university teaching for twenty years without 
having actually lectured once (Sully 1997: 161-2). 
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The 1995 Grundsatzprogramm also committed the party to the aim of one third 
of public mandates being held by women. This aim was not, however, written into the 
party statutes nor was it expressly stated that this level of female representation should 
also apply to party bodies (Steininger 2000: 144). The result has been mixed: 
representation in parliament has increased but at 19.2% after the 1999 election (23.1 % 
after government ministers had given up their seats), it fell some way short of the goal 
(Steininger 2000: 156) while in the party executive the number of women had increased 
more dramatically largely due to the earlier chronic under-representation of women. 
Although the incorporation of an informal quota (albeit one without any sanction against 
failure) into the party programme did show that the bvp was not unresponsive to the 
changing political demands of female voters, this did increase the strain on the party. 
The launching of the women's popular initiative which sought "the realization of a 
comprehensive programme designed to provide equal treatment of the sexes" (Muller 
1998:38) and the increasing gender gap in electoral behaviour (Plasser and Ulram 
2000: 188) illustrated the political potential of gender issues. At the same time, however, 
the bvp was heavily stressing the concept of the traditional family. Although leading 
female Christian Democratic representatives conceded that the party should do more to 
implement the quota57 and Rauch-Kallat campaigned against the under representation of 
women at the highest management levels (der Standard 04/05/1998), this did not spare 
the party from fierce criticism from the independent women's forum (UFF), who had 
launched the popular initiative. 
The final significant organisational development was the increased power of the 
Klubobmann vis-a-vis the general secretaries. Khol quickly established his reputation as 
a strong disciplinarian, reportedly quizzing those bvp parliamentarians with poor 
attendance records and pressurising those Christian Democrats suspected of deviating 
from the party Iine58• However, in addition to his taskmaster reputation, Khol also 
developed his programmatic ideas in interviews and through the publication of two 
books. In contrast to the strong position of Khol, bvp General Secretaries struggled 
throughout the 1990s. Mirroring the instability at the top of the party, the VP had no 
fewer than 7 General Secretaries in the 1990-9 period although for two periods, 1991-3 
(Maier and Korosec) and 1995-9 (Karas and Rauch-Kallat) two General Secretaries were 
in place. The latter duo failed, however, to stamp their authority upon the party and were 
57 See interview with Education Minister Elizabeth Gehrer in Der Standard (26/08/1998). 
58 For example, on the vote on lowering the age of consent for homosexuals only one bvp 
representative departed from the party line despite the unease many felt rejecting the law (Profil 
Nr.51, 1996). 
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at times fiercely criticised by leading figures within and outside the partl9, particularly 
the Land party organisations. According to Profil (Nr.2611997), the work of the General 
Secretaries was now closely supervised by Schussel with all central party initiatives 
coming under his scrutiny before approval. Further confirmation that the General 
Secretary's post had lost significance came in 1999 when General Secretary Karas was 
given the job of election campaign manager but with the media researcher Peter Diem as 
a "minder". Within the party apparatus at the national level, then, it was clear that the 
post of parliamentary leader had become more important while the General Secretary 
post no longer carried the same amount of power as it once had. 
The question of the GYP's structure was once again very pertinent in the 1990s. 
Changes made in the aftermath of the 1990 defeat failed to bring about a significant 
reconfiguration of internal power. Indeed, the weakness of the federal party structure 
was exacerbated by the continual cycle of defeat as regional leaders increasingly sought 
to distance themselves from the national party. In view of the its weaknesses, the federal 
party had become, in the eyes of some critics, a Briefkastenfirma (an offshore company 
with only a postal address) (Profil Nr.l, 1997). Nonetheless, the growing influence of 
parliamentary leader Khol did at least provide a national counterbalance to the powers of 
the Leagues and the Land parties. However, Khol not only brought unity but also a strict 
conservative line to the parliamentary party which strained the party's heterogeneity. 
V. Conclusion 
In 1997, Muller (1997:284) sketched three possible scenarios for the GYP: stabilisation, 
decline or disintegration. Two years later the party again lost votes despite consolidation 
among core groups and the party's fate hung in the balance. Perhaps the party's last 
chance to avoid further decline or worse still disintegration lay in leaving the Grand 
Coalition. Yet although Schussel had stated that the party would go into opposition if it 
finished third, under pressure from President Klestil and perhaps mindful of previous 
Christian Democratic experience with being out of government, the GYP opened 
negotiations with the SPG in December 1999. The subsequent breakdown of talks was 
not preordained despite the pre-existing contact between certain members of the GYP 
and the FPG (e.g. between Bartenstein of the GYP and the FPG's leading candidate 
Prinzhorn). However, the break with the Grand Coalition (and the speed with which the 
GYP-FPO coalition agreement was concluded) was made much more likely by the 
predicament of the GYP. Although the party was taking a very large gamble, it was now 
59 The fonner General Secretary of the Austrian industrialists association, for example, accused 
the pair of having gambled away the 6vP's economic competence (Profil Nr.26, 1997). 
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one which many were willing to take. Even the Platform for Open Politics was not in 
principle against a 'black-blue' alliance. As was shown in Section II, the willingness to 
consider such a risky option was a consequence of the dire state of the party in the 1990s 
and its lack of strategic options. 
During the 1990s, the GYP tested a variety of means to escape from its 
perpetual electoral crisis. Leadership renewal, policy change, less flexible coalition 
bargaining and organisational innovation were all employed yet as election results 
through the decade highlighted, none of these methods actually stemmed the flow of 
voters away from the Christian Democrats. The problems of the GYP resulted from 
social-structural and cultural change, from increased competition and from its 
unfavourable strategic position. The reservoir of GYP supporters was drying up with the 
contraction of crucial social constituencies. The increasingly congested party system 
ensured greater competition for the GYP. In the centre-ground the SPG absorbed many 
People's Party themes while the LiF briefly threatened the GYP's hold on liberal voters. 
The FPG developed into a serious rival on the right and even the Greens were a potential 
challenge. The functioning of the Grand Coalition became increasingly awkward and 
brought no reward for the GYP yet the party lacked alternatives. The 'black-blue' option 
polarised opinion within the party and throughout the 1990s, the party's attitude to the 
Freedom Party was marked by inconsistency and ambiguity, neithcr systematically 
excluding the FPG nor embracing it. 
In addition to outlining the Christian Democrats' electoral problems, Section II 
also illustrated that the collapse of the Grand Coalition and the formation of the 'black-
blue' coalition were linked to the ideological direction of the GYP under the Schiissel-
Khol leadership team. The Schiissel-Khol course of traditionalism spliced with populist 
touches and free market liberalism between 1995 and 1999 essentially meant defeat for 
the liberal Christian Democratic project (personified by Busek) to open the party to 
society. It was not surprising, then, that election analysis from 1999 demonstrated that 
the party remained reliant on core supporters. Consolidation amongst declining social 
groups, however, did not offer a long-term solution to the party's problems. Section III 
highlighted both the essential continuity of the GYP's programmatic work and the 
marginal relevance of the Grundsatzprogramm in defining the party's identity. It was 
instead chiefly parliamentary leader Khol who determined the GYP's priorities in the 
latter half of the decade. The greater level of discipline and central control exerted by 
Khol was not necessarily detrimental to a party so torn by factionalism and helped 
prevent a leadership battle breaking out. Nonetheless, Khol's interpretation of Christian 
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Democracy was narrow and alienated many party members. For example, Werner 
Suppan, a member of the Platform for Open Politics, described Khol as representing 
only one "wheel" of the GVP and questioned how long the party could travel on only 
one wheel (Ocr Standard 18/05/1998). While the recovery of the chancellorship was 
likely to curtail intra-party feuding, the coalition with the FPO, however, offered no 
guarantee of recover and so stabilisation, decline or disintegration were still all possible 
outcomes for the party. 
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Chapter 7. The Christian Democratic Appeal 1990-8 
I. Introduction 
At the beginning of the decade, the CDA's essential position within the Dutch party 
system looked unassailable. The party had consolidated its support among the 
religiously active section of the population and had even made inroads among secular 
voters. Under the leadership of the widely popular Lubbers, the party in government had 
effected significant social and economic reforms while the programmatic basis 
formulated during the merger of the three confessional parties had endured. The unity of 
the CDA, therefore, now seemed assured. Furthermore, the stability of the Dutch 
political system appeared to have been re-established, so much so that Lijphardt (1989) 
reversed his previous prediction of Dutch consociationalism's demise, instead extolling 
its vitality and continuing relevance. Nonetheless, signs of difficulty were reappearing, 
most obviously the problem of the mounting disability crisis. Tension between the 
coalition partners was a constant feature of the CDA-PvdA government. Yet no-one 
anticipated the scale of the 1994 electoral earthquake which brought about the first 
Christian Democratic/confessional-free government since the introduction of universal 
suffrage. For the rest of the decade, the CDA struggled to find its bearings as the main 
opposition party, suffering from internal divisions over the party's leadership and 
strategy. A further electoral defeat in 1998 intensified the uncertainty within the party 
about its identity and future, raising serious questions about the viability of a socially 
inclusive Volkspartei built on Christian Democratic principles. 
The political and electoral developments of 1990-8 will be the focus of Section 
II within this chapter, with specific attention given to the disability crisis, the growing 
distance between Lubbers and his nominated successor Eleo Brinkman, the disastrous 
1994 Tweede Kamer election campaign, the CDA's failure to adapt to opposition and 
the successes of the 'purple' coalition. The traumatic defeat of 1994 stimulated a new 
debate about the party's identity and especially its social profile, resulting in a 
substantially different policy stance in 1998 but this failed to resonate with an electorate 
broadly satisfied with the work of the purple coalition. The credibility of the new party 
identity was also open to question but stuck in the middle of a contracting political 
spectrum, the CDA had little opportunity to stake a distinctive appeal, particularly in the 
strategically unfavourable position of opposition. 
Section III will examine the programmatic work of the party in this period. A 
new Programme of Points of Departure was prepared in the early part of the decade as 
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the party responded to the fall of Communism. The programme relied in essence upon 
established Christian Democratic thought with only marginal changes to a programme 
which was only twelve years old. After the shock of losing office, the party redoubled its 
programmatic work. Although the title of the 1995 programme 'Nieuwe Wegen, Vaaste 
Waarden' (New Ways, Firm Values) might indicate yet more continuity, programmatic 
initiatives in the years following the 1994 defeat did herald a greater adaptation of the 
party's ideas. 
As noted earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, the organisational dimension of Dutch 
Christian Democracy was less significant in comparison to other members of the party 
family. As interest groups were not integrated into the party structure, party leaders were 
less constrained by internal pluralism. The centralised structure of the Netherlands also 
limited the organisational resources of intra-party geographical interests. Nevertheless, 
organisational questions were not ignored in the CDA's period of self-examination after 
1994 with suggestions made to increase the accountability of the party elite and 
stimulate greater grassroots participation. More importantly, the CDA's first experience 
of opposition also encouraged the public airing of divisions and a change in the internal 
balance of power. 
II. Political and electoral developments 
WAO crisis 
The new coalition brought the PvdA back into office in 1989 after it had renounced the 
polarisation strategy it had pursued since the early 1970s and toned down its policy 
demands I. However, the new government came into office at an unfavourable time as 
economic growth had slowed, limiting the scope for government action (Lepszy and 
Koecke 2001:208). Politically too, within a few months the mood seemed bleaker. With 
the lowest ever turnout, the March 1990 municipal elections brought losses for the PvdA 
and gains for the far-right. The following year's provincial elections were not dissimilar 
as the turnout was again at a historic low, the PvdA dropped to its worst ever result and 
regional parties and the extreme right Centre Democrats made gains (Lucardie, Nieboer 
and Noomen 1992: 15). This mood of economic uncertainty and political disaffection 
was compounded by the escalation in the numbers claiming long-term disability benefit, 
WA02. The extremely generous provisions of the law (80% of former income) and its 
wide applicability (the law eventually covered stress-related illnesses as well as physical 
I For more on the PvdA, see Wolinetz 1996; Pedersen and van Kersbergcn 2002; Hillebrand and 
Irwin 1999. 
2 Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering. 
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disabilities and made no distinction between occupational and social causes of disability) 
made it an attractive option for employers and employees as an alternative to 
unemployment. An earlier attempt to reform the law dropping the replacement rate to 
70% had failed to stem the rising number of claimants as most collective agreements 
topped this figure up to 80% and beyond in some cases. By 1990 the figure was nearing 
one million WAO-ers out of a workforce of seven million (Hemerijck 2001:104) and 
Lubbers himself declared that the country was 'sick'. The coalition had already had 
difficulty in 1990 on agreeing on the extent of the social cutbacks to be made and 
cabinet tension was strained further by the W AO crisis. 
In the spring of 1991, CDA parliamentary leader Brinkman demanded that 
action be taken to combat social insurance expenditure and by July, Lubbers and vice-
prime minister Kok agreed that benefits for those under fifty would henceforth be for a 
limited timespan with no compensation for the initial period. The outcry in the trade 
unions and in the PvdA's grassroots caused the Labour cabinet members to reconsider 
their support for the measures. Although the CDA accepted an amended version of the 
reforms whereby the new regulations would only apply to new applicants, this did not 
satisfy the unions who organised one of the biggest post-war demonstrations in response. 
The crisis threatened to bring down the government and Kok's position as PvdA leader 
was seriously threatened. Throughout 1992, the collapse of the government looked 
imminent, primarily over the WAO question but also through differences in wage and 
foreign policy. For the government parties, the effect of the W AO crisis was more 
serious for the PvdA. Polls suggested catastrophic losses in the event of the cabinet 
falling and membership numbers dropped dramatically (Hillebrand and Irwin 
1999:133)3. However, the CDA was not unaffected by the issue. Its opinion poll ratings 
also dropped (Irwin 1995:74) and the WAO question opened up serious divisions in the 
party. 
An earlier sign of internal discord came with the rejection by the First Chamber 
led by CDA member Kaland4 of the health reforms named after PvdA state secretary 
Hans Simons. Members of the Scientific Institute for the CDA evaluated the Simons 
plan positively as had members of the parliamentary Jractie initially (Versteegh 
3 The Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen recorded a loss of nearly 13000 
members (or nearly 14% of the membership) in 1991. 
http://www.rug.nlldnpp/politickcPartijen/pvda/documentairelnfonnatic/[lvda-It accessed 
14/06/2003. 
4 The proposed refoon would have introduced a universal insurance scheme incorporating 
competition between insurers although with the government fixing the basic guidelines. 
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1999:92). However, press reaction was not so favourable and the CDA senator Ad 
Kaland introduced a motion which effectively shelved the bill. The W AO crisis brought 
further CDA disagreements to light. Parliamentary leader Brinkman saw the issue as a 
'test-case' for the coalition: if a CDA-PvdA cabinet was unable to solve the problem, 
then another coalition was preferable. Although open rebellion within the CDA against 
the reforms was confined at first to the youth organisation (CDlA) and those CDA 
members (such as senator van der Meulen) with close links to the Christian trade union 
CNV (Lucardie, Nieboer and Noomen 1992:22), Brinkman's uncompromising attitude 
was by no means shared by many leading CDA figures. Social minister de Vries shared 
many of the concerns of his PvdA cabinet colleagues and Lubbers appeared committed 
to preserving the alliance with the Social Democrats if at all possible. At the beginning 
of 1993, the W AO question had still not been resolved. The PvdA parliamentary party 
was not yet wilJing to accept the cabinet's ideas and facing this continued deadlock, the 
CDA jractie led by Brinkman opened negotiations with the VVD parliamentary party. 
At the eleventh hour, though, a deal saving the coalition was hammered out5, The 
agreement allowed two bills on the W AO issue to be presented to parliament which 
were passed later in the year6 and preserved the coalition for another year but caused 
great resentment in the VVD who accused the CDA of breaking its word and intensified 
existing tensions between Lubbers and Brinkman. 
Lubbers-Brinkman: a strained alliance 
The popularity of Lubbers across almost all groups of Dutch voters was advantageous 
for the CDA but towards the end of the 1980s, some members of the party worried that 
the prime minister's success was obscuring latent problems. The party in government 
seemed divorced from the programmatic basis and distant from the concerns of the 
grassroots. Even Lubbers later seemed to concur with this judgement, accepting that the 
'no-nonsense' programme of the 1980s had led to a certain impersonal style of politics 
(,Christian-technocratic' as it had been dubbed by critics) and had not strengthened 
social values7• Furthermore, the party was soon to be confronted with a potentially 
5 See Metze (1995: 11-28) for more details. 
6 These were the Act on the Reduction of Disablement Benefits Claimants and the Disablement 
Benefit Claims Reduction Act. Although a report by the influential advisory group the Social and 
Economic Council had advised against the cabinet's proposals, the laws eventually passed 
contained a number of the original ideas. Amongst the most important changes were the 
introduction of an obligation for claimants to accept work which was suitable for their current 
abilities rather than their previous skills, a penalty/reward system for employers which was to 
encourage the hiring of disabled workers and discourage the transferral of existing employees to 
disability allowance and the regular examination of those WAO-ers under 50 (van der Veen and 
Trommel 1999:301). 
7 See his quotes in Versteegh (1999:87). 
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traumatic succession. Lubbers had backed Brinkman as his preferred choice as successor 
in 1992 but relations between the two during the Lubbers III cabinet were never easl. 
Brinkman had been responsible for raising the W AO issue in 1991 and on a number of 
subsequent occasions he pressed for stronger reforms, most notably in 1993 when he 
unsuccessfully tried to reopen the disability discussion (Lucardie, Noomen and Vocrman 
1994: 16). 
As the nominated 'crown prince', Brinkman seemed assured of succeeding 
Lubbers not just as CDA leader but also as prime minister when the latter stood down at 
the end of the parliamentary term. Yet following the longest serving prime minister 
since the introduction of parliamentary democracy in 1848 was an arduous task, 
particularly for the relatively inexperienced Brinkman. Many within the party doubted 
his ability to unite the party. Despite coming to office promising spending cuts and fiscal 
responsibility, Lubbers was not completely removed from the social wing of the party. 
This was apparent in the inclusion of the PvdA in the third Lubbers cabinet as well as 
the appointment of de Vries as Social Minister. Brinkman, however, was viewed by 
many as an advocate of unabashed neoliberal policies and frequently attacked the 
cabinet for not doing enough to counter growing social expenditure. His hard-line in the 
W AO issue was one example of this but his growing frustration with the compromises 
of the third Lubbers-led government had been evident before, for example in his 
declaration that "playtime was over" in February 1992 (Andeweg 1995:164) and his 
repeated demands that coalition show more energy and decisiveness. Towards the end of 
1993, Brinkman again provoked disquiet among the social wing of the party with his 
proposal that the minimum wage be abolished or at the very least reduced. 
In addition to the resistance to Brinkman's policy ideas, his style was 
controversial in CDA circles. In close collaboration with his adviser Frits Wester, 
Brinkman developed a media-focused style of presentation which aimed at attracting 
new, unattached voters (Metze 1995: 172). For example, Wester, having observed the 
1992 campaign of the British Conservatives, urged Brinkman to use a wireless 
microphone enabling him to wander across the stage, which resulted in the infamous 
'Brinkman shuffle' during the 1994 campaign (Metze 1995:204). Brinkman also gave 
interviews based on his personal life with popular entertainment magazines and 
television programmes. Such instances of Wester-inspired image building alienated 
many within the CDA grassroots and caused annoyance among the party elite (van Praag 
8 Indeed, Brinkman, according to reports, found Lubbers' declaration of trust in his abilities 
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jr 1995: 107), particularly when combined with Brinkman's hard-line attitude toward 
social cutbacks. 
The potential awkwardness of the transition from Lubbers to Brinkman had been 
recognised at an early stage and so in order to put an end to relentless media and intra-
party speculation9 about other possible leading candidates for 1994, the party executive 
unanimously decided to propose Brinkman as the leading candidate in March 1993. The 
unusuaIIy early decision was confirmed at a meeting of the party council in May leaving 
only the party congress's formal ratification of Brinkman's list position until January 
1994. Brinkman's selection was not universaIIy welcomed at the time, both for the 
manner of the process and the actual choice of lijststrekker'o. Yet despite the doubts 
about Brinkman's leadership capabilities, it appeared that the choice once made would 
not be reversed. However, Lubbers subsequently revealed that following Brinkman's 
behaviour and the COA's poor ratings during 1993, he had attempted to force the fractie 
chairman to renounce any claim to the premiership after the 1994 elections. Instead, 
according to the Lubbers' plan, Brinkman would remain parliamentary leader, Lubbers 
would take the chairmanship with either Andriessen (Economic Affairs minister) or 
Kooijmans (Foreign Affairs minister) becoming prime minister. This was rejected not 
just by Brinkman but also within the CDA (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1996:39). The 
COA, thus, entered the election year split by personal antagonisms as well as disputes 
over the party's direction. 
1994 Tweede Kamer Election 
The COA's campaign for the 1994 elections was judged by most observers to be nothing 
short of catastrophic ll . Questions remained about Brinkman's ability to mobilise the 
grassroots and there was little sign that any losses there could be equalised through other 
gains. Brinkman was rated far behind both Kok and 066 leader van Mierlo at the 
beginning of the year (Irwin 1995:75) and the COA's poll results were alarming. 
Moreover, divisions had also already risen over the draft electoral programme "Wat echt 
telt" (What really counts) presented in August 1993. The three main themes were 
employment, security and environment but the most controversial proposals were the 
abolition of the minimum wage and an expansion of the differences between wages and 
surprising and not entirely truthful (Metze 1995:46) 
9 For example, both Justice Minister Hirsch-Ballin and Scientific Institute director Klop 
expressed misgivings about Brinkman's leadership abilities (Lucardie, Noomen and Vocrman 
1993:23). 
10 The CDJA, in particular, were vocal about their doubts about Brinkman (Lucardie, Noomen 
and Vocrman 1994:26). 
195 
social benefits. The fonner suggestion was resisted by Lubbers, de Vries, the party's 
women's and youth sections and was eventually dropped in December after a decision 
by the party executive (Lucardie, Noomen and Voennan 1995 :28). 
The draft programme was further revised at the start of the election year as the 
party leadership responded to the deteriorating economic situation. The party council 
reluctantly accepted all social benefits (including pensions) and civil service salaries 
should be frozen. The proposals met with a furious response from pensioners 
associations such as the Protestant PCOB and the Catholic KBO. Discontent spread 
beyond those immediately affected, moreover, as one poll showed 72% of CDA 
supporters were against the plan (Hippe, Lucardie and Voennan 1995:35). The idea had 
an immediate political consequence too as pensioners' parties (AOV and PU55+) 
competed for the first time in local elections achieving some success. The CDA's losses 
in these elections further increased the pressure on Brinkman but with the parliamentary 
fractie loyal to their leader, the sole casualty of the pension revolt was party chainnan 
van Velzen, who was replaced in the short-tenn by Lodders-Elfferich. Although the 
CDA backtracked somewhat on the original proposalsl2, the affair was undoubtedly 
damaging to Christian Democratic prospects and caused a rethink on the main themes, 
i.e. security was dropped (van Praag jr. 1995: 108). 
The calamitous campaign was further damaged by Lubbers' growing distance 
from Brinkman l3 and by the scandal erupting a month before the elections over 
Brinkman's membership of the board of trustees of Arscop, a company under 
investigation for fraud. Although Brinkman was not held personally responsible, his 
refusal to leave the board cast further doubt upon his political judgement. Justice 
Minister Hirsch-Ballin added further confusion to the campaign with his emotive 
comments about euthanasia policy under a coalition without the CDA, i.e. that a 'purple' 
PvdA-VVD-D66 coalition would bring about a eugenics-regime (Versteegh 1999:102). 
The parties under attack reacted bitterly to Hirsch-Ballin's remarks and the relationship 
between the Christian Democrats and their potential future coalition partners was 
soured. Hirsch-Ballin's criticism exposed not only the chaos within the CDA campaign 
but also the growing Christian Democratic fear that the antagonisms between the VVD 
and the PvdA could be now overcome in a coalition of the 'French Revolution' as it was 
II See for example van Praagjr. (1995: 105-9); van Kersbergen (1995:92); Andeweg, (1995: 164) 
12 The freezing of the pension was compensated to some extent by a reduction in the 
contributions to long term care insurance (A WBZ). 
13 Lubbers, for example, remarked that PvdA leader Kok would be no worse as Prime Minister. 
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called by members of the CDA Scientific Institute. Although numerous studies have 
argued that Dutch politics can only be understood using a two axis model (i.e. a left-
right division and a religious-secular dimension), national coalitions had only been 
formed along a left-right socio-economic axis, that is since 1952 the VVD and the PvdA 
had not worked together in government. By 1994, however, the move towards the centre 
by the PvdA under Kok opened up the possibility that local alliances between the PvdA, 
VVD and D66 (e.g. in Amsterdam, Leiden, Groningen and South Holland) could be 
repeated in the Hague. 
Regardless of the divisions within the CDA over strategy and policy, the 
election result still came as a shock to the party and most experienced observers of 
Dutch politics14• The CDA fell to 22.2% of the vote, a drop of 13.1 % and a record 
number of seats lost by one party (20). This ensured that the PvdA became the largest 
party in the Tweede Kamer for the first time since the 1982-6 period despite its own 
heavy losses (-7.9%). Together the government parties lost more seats than any previous 
cabinet while D66 gained 7.6% and its largest allocation of seats (24, + 11 again a record 
increase for one party). Turnout fell to the lowest ever level while total volatility reached 
20.4. The success of the smaller fringe parties (Centre Democrats, Socialist Party, Union 
55+, AOV) also indicated the extent of disillusionment with the government parties and 
contributed to the rise in the fractionalisation (5.7 effective parties15) within the Dutch 
parliament. This fragmentation fell short of the political instability in the 1967-72 period 
but still highlighted the degree of change brought by the election. 
Irwin and van Holsteyn' s analysis (1997) revealed that the structured model of 
voting behaviour (i.e. active Catholics and Protestants vote CDA, secular workers vote 
PvdA and secular middle class vote VVD) had lost much of its explanatory power. 
Whereas in 1968 the structured model still accounted for 60% of all votes, by 1994 this 
had fallen to 36% (p.95). Even more dramatic figures were discovered if the secular 
middle class (whose 'pillar' -qualities were always disputed) and older voters were 
excluded leading Irwin and van Holsteyn to predict the demise of the structured model 
rather than its decline. The structured model was dying through the relative decline of 
those social groups at the heart of the pillarised system (i.e. the secular working class, 
the religiously active) but also as a result of the wavering loyalty of voters. Not only 
14 For example, Irwin and van Holsteyn (1997) compare the tepid conclusions about political 
change drawn by a range of authors in 1989 with the far-reaching consequences of the 1994 
result 
15 This is using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) method. 
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were typical bastions of Christian Democrat support in decline, the party could no longer 
count as confidently on the support of those remaining within these milieux. For 
instance, CDA support among Catholics dropped substantially, a trend exemplified by 
the heavy losses suffered in the southern, largely Catholic provinces of North Brabant 
and Limburg. Support from church-going Protestants was more stable although still 
showing decline l6• Although the CDA electorate remained dominated by older age 
groups, the pensions controversy and the subsequent success of the pensioners' parties 
challenged even the CDA's pre-eminence in these groups 17. Of small consolation to the 
party was that the class composition of its electorate was still broader than any of its 
competitors. However, the Lubbers-era advances made among secular voters were lost 
as only 7% of the electorate without church ties voted CDA. 
The 1994 election exposed the flimsy foundations of the success of the Lubbers 
years and exposed the vulnerability of the CDA in an age of a largely unaffiliated 
electorate. Not only had the Brinkman strategy aimed at attracting younger, unattached 
voters failed entirely but the party had also been unable to preserve its strength in its 
core social constituencies. To some extent, the damage was self-inflicted: an unruly 
campaign full of mixed messages coupled with an unpopular leading candidate were 
obvious disadvantages compared to the professional campaign of the PvdA 18 and the 
wide popularity of Kok and D66 leader van Mierlo. In addition, many voters were 
clearly punishing the party (and the PvdA) for unpopular policies pursued in office. 
Only 13.9% evaluated the government's economic record favourably with 32.3% 
viewing it unfavourably (DNES codebook 1994:41). Employment policy was judged 
even more damningly with only 8.3% of respondents believing the government to have 
made a favourable impact in this area compared to 53.9% rating the influence negatively 
(DNES codebook 1994:41). 
In conclusion, then, the CDA's sudden decline could be attributed to both 
structural and contextual factors (van Kersbergen 1996). Deconfessionalisation 
increasingly shrank the size of the traditional Christian Democratic core support, but 
CDA losses were also caused by more short-term factors. While "the social-group logic 
of religion, class and tradition has been replaced by a logic based on issues and party 
performance in government" (Rochun 1999: 115), this transformation in voting 
16 See Table 4.3, Chapter 4. 
17 See Table 4.12, Chapter 4. 
18 The 'Kies Kok' campaign of the PvdA was, according to van Praag (1995: 103), one of the 
most professional efforts in Dutch electoral history. 
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motivations need not necessarily result in the erosion of the established parties' support. 
However, as shown earlier the preceding coalition had been unpopular and robbed of 
Lubbers' electoral magnetism, the CDA was riven by personal and policy 
disagreements. Further decline was not inevitable but the trauma of 1994 did not end on 
election night. 
The CDA in opposition: Purple Hague- 'lately things just don't seem the same'? 
Although the CDA had lost their position as leading party, their historic exclusion from 
government was by no means certain. 066 had the strongest desire for a Christian 
Democrat-free cabinet but the first effort to create a purple coalition of the PvdA, VVD 
and 066 broke down in late June over disagreements on economic policy. A few 
members of the CDA openly advocated going into opposition (Kaland, van der Linden) 
but having won the backing of the parliamentary party, Brinkman sought a coalition 
with the VVD. This strategy was highly contentious within the CDA The party 
executive expressed its unhappiness that Brinkman had effectively ruled out a coalition 
with the PvdA (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1995:40) and interim party chairwoman 
Lodders-Elffrich increasingly distanced the party apparatus from Brinkmanl9. When 
Kok was chosen by the Queen as informateur, the limitations of Brinkman's strategy 
were exposed. Kok had previously been open to a possible alliance with the CDA but 
with Brinkman defiantly clinging to the hope of a CDA-VVD coalition, the Christian 
Democrats had effectively ruled themselves out of government. 
Other factors weighed against the CDA. Each of the three other likely coalition 
parties nursed resentments against the Christian Democrats. CDA parliamentarian Joost 
van Iersel's infamous off-the-cuff comment in 1986 that "we run this country" was 
frequently cited as typifying the party's arrogance in power. For the VVD and 066, this 
ill-will originated in their treatment during 1989 with the former aggrieved by the break-
up of the coalition and the latter irritated by their exclusion from the subsequent 
negotiations. VVD leader Bolkestein, too, expressed his dissatisfaction with the soft 
consensual ism of Lubbers and the lack of firm principles. On the side of the PvdA, the 
behaviour of the CDAfractie, the failure of the Simons-plan and the manner in which 
the disability row had been conducted had all annoyed the Social Democrats (Versteegh 
1999: 100). A further stain on the CDA's credentials as a serious discussion partner was 
the party's instability and lack of cohesion. Therefore, regardless of the fact that analysis 
of election programmes suggested that the CDA remained the most likely partner for the 
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VVD (Thomson 1998: 159) and despite the lack of historical precedent, a purple 
coalition was formed at the second attempt and sworn in on the 22nd August. 
The CDA's immediate response to the crushing defeat of 1994 was to initiate a 
commission (the 'commissie-Gardeniers') to investigate its causes. The report was 
presented to the executive in July as coalition negotiations were still in progress. The 
intervening European election had brought the party some relief as its loss of votes had 
been far less severe yet the results were difficult to compare. Turnout was dismally low 
for the EP election (which typically boosts the CDA) and the pensioners' parties did not 
compete. The Gardeniers commission, therefore, was not blinded by this result and was 
explicitly critical of the CDA's transformation into a "complacent government party", 
the loss of the party's social profile and the lack of unity within the party. Brinkman was 
not criticised by name but under increasing pressure from interim chairwoman Lodders-
Elfferich and the party executive, he eventually resigned on the 16th August. He was 
replaced as fractie leader by Enneiis Heerma who beat Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Heerma 
signalled a change in the political mood of the fractie, representing the centrist, social 
wing of the party in contrast to the more conservative line of Brinkman. 
Rather than promote Heerma as the sole leader, the party initially decided on a 
more collective style of leadership comprising the new fractie chairman, the party 
chairman, the leader of the CDA group in the Senate and the leader of the CDA group in 
the European parliament. The interim party chairwoman Lodders was succeeded by 
Hans Helgers while former minister Maij-Weggen had been the party's leading 
candidate in the 1994 EP election. However, the party's experiment with a collegial style 
was quietly abandoned in 1995. Maij-Weggen's reputation had been damaged by her 
comments about Bolkestein when she had compared him to the leader of the extremist 
Vlaams Blok in Belgium after the VVD parliamentary leader had called for a stricter 
asylum policy, (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1996:33). Many in the party found the 
comparison too much and the results of the provincial elections in which the CDA lost 
nearly 10% and the VVD became the largest party also indicated that Maij-Weggen's 
remarks lacked popular resonance. Heerma's relationship with Helgers was also 
problematic. Helgers had similar political convictions to Heerma20 but he was also 
19 Former Prime Minister Biesheuvel and the CDJA also openly showed their dissatisfaction at 
this decision. 
20 For example, he criticised the Kok government's neoliberal economic delusions at the 1995 
party congress 
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competing for intra-party power and had grave doubts about Heerma's abilities as a 
prospective leading candidate (see Versteegh 1999: 121). 
The awkward functioning of the collegial leadership and the mounting 
dissatisfaction in the parliamentary party and the party's grassroots ensured that the 
CDA turned towards a clearer fractie-based form of opposition in 1995 where Heerma 
had responsibility for the current policy of the party while Helgers was in charge of 
mainly organisational affairs. The clarification of responsibilities did not end the 
problems faced by Heerma though. Dissatisfaction with thc party's inability to counter 
effectively the government's policies grew throughout the parliamentary tcrm. The 
party's problems stemmed from three factors: ineffectual leadership, the CDA's 
unfamiliarity with the role of opposition and the success of the 'purple' coalition. 
The Lack of a Charismatic Leader 
At no point did Heerma appear to have the parliamentary party, much less the whole 
party, firmly under his control. To some extent, Heerma's misfortunes were the result of 
his ill-fortune in having to lead the party in its darkest hour. Deeper internal divisions 
were virtually unavoidable once the party was deprived of national office. For example, 
Tweede Kamer parliamentarian van der Linden discussed the possibility of a break-up of 
the CDA if the party did not adopt a more conservative-social position (Hippe, Lucardie 
and Voerman 1996:34). Furthermore, in February 1995 the Catholic Political Party 
(KPP) was formed by the former CDA EP candidate van Boetzelaer21 • The new party's 
success, however, was very limited and like earlier Catholic splinter parties, it failed to 
make a breakthrough. Some divisions were not unexpected but nonetheless, Heerma's 
indecisive leadership stimulated internal party discord. Versteegh (1999: 118-128) uses 
Heerma's role in the Article 23 debate to highlight his lack of talent for confrontational 
politics. After VVD Home Affairs Minister Dijkstal had appeared to question the 
continuing need for Article 23 of the Constitution (freedom of religious education from 
governmental interference), Heerma, in an interpellation debate, firstly sternly 
questioned Dijkstal about his position and then introduced a motion of censure. 
However, following Dijkstal's fairly clear response, Heerma was forced into a 
humiliating climb-down after he was informed that the small Protestant parties would 
not support his motion. This incident was only one of a series of missed opportunities 
and mistakes in parliament which characterised Heerma's time asfractie leader. 
21 The KPP according to Lucardie (1999:124) did not differ greatly from other Catholic and 
Christian Democratic parties although it took a firmer stance on cultural-moral issues like 
abortion, euthanasia and drugs. 
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The lack of a consistent strategy was also a factor in Heerma's problems. He had 
first announced that the CDA would follow a "governmental opposition" path (van 
Kersbergen 1995:92) but this failed to boost the party's poll ratings and was unpopular 
with grassroots supporters. The parliamentary group had therefore resolved in 
September 1995 to be more vigorous in drug, social security and income policy (Hippe, 
Lucardie and Voerman 1996:37). Heerma, though, seemed ill at ease in such a role, 
lacking charisma and confidence in front of the media and many believed him to be 
nothing more than an stopgap leader. Possible other candidates waited in the wings, such 
as de Hoop Scheffer, Leers and van der Camp, and Helgers had apparently informed 
Heerma in August 1995 that he had little chance of being leading candidate in 1998 
(Versteegh 1999: 121). After Heerma criticised the stream of anonymous critics within 
the jrae/ie, rumours of his impending resignation circulated at the end of 1995. From 
this point onwards, Heerma looked a 'lame duck'. Lubbers announced in March 1996 
that he did not expect Heerma to be leading candidate in 1998 while other CDA 
politicians sought to force a quick change (Hippe, Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 
1997 :28). Eventually in March 1997, the party executive decided to cut short the 
previously agreed time-scale for the selection of lijststrekker for 1998 and proposed de 
Hoop Scheffer, upon which Heerma resigned both the fraerie leadership and his 
membership of the Tweede Kamer. 
De Hoop Scheffer's performance as chairman of the CDA fraetie's Foreign 
Affairs commission marked him out as a representative of the right of the party and from 
previous statements he was expected to lead the party with more vigour and 
combativeness than Heerma22• However, his comments soon after his election indicated 
broad agreement with the ideas of his predecessor. For example, shortly after becoming 
parliamentary leader, he spoke out against a reduction of the minimum wage and against 
introducing too much privatisation into the provision of social welfare (de Boer, 
Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 1998:25). Furthermore, there was no sign that he was 
any more popular than his uncharismatic predecessor. Rated on a 7 point scale where 0 
equals no faith and 7 is a lot of faith, only 9.7% of respondents in the 1998 election 
survey had a lot of trust in de Hoop Scheffer (Le. 6 or 7 on the scale) compared to 79.1 % 
for Kok, 23.9% for Bolkestein and 15.1% for D66 leader Borst (DNES 1998). The 
comparison with Borst illustrated the extent of the Christian Democrats' difficulties in 
opposition. Els Borst had only recently become D66 leader, lacked the wide appeal of 
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her predecessor van Mierlo and had the difficult task of leading the progressives' list as 
the party's popularity waned23. Despite this, she was still rated above de Hoop Scheffer. 
The CDA's unfamiliarity in opposition 
The ill-fated governmental opposition strategy and its subsequent abandonment reflected 
the difficulty of the Christian Democrats in adapting to its new role of opposition. Since 
the merger of the confessionals, the party had been in office continuousll4• The purple 
coalition forced the CDA into an almost totally unfamiliar environment. The initial 
response of governmental opposition can be seen as the continuation of ingrained 
behavioural habits: the party effectively carried on as if it were still in office. Yet even 
when the party's slump in the polls and the poor results in local and provincial elections 
forced a re-evaluation of the approach, a sharper critique of government policy did not 
come easily to many Christian Democrats. 
One problem was that the parliamentary party had become less influential in the 
1980s, becoming what Hans Hillen called the party's 'B-team' (quoted in Versteegh 
1999: 135). The problem was not necessarily that the quality of the parliamentarians was 
poor but that fractie-culture now centred around defending government, rather than 
questioning and attacking it. In addition, there was a strong tradition in Dutch Protestant 
thinking of respect for the government as God's servant, a belief not easily reconciled 
with fierce attacks on government representatives. Versteegh (1999:144-153) highlights 
two other organisational factors which prevented the CDA from becoming a more 
effective opposition. The parliamentary decision-making process was time-consuming, 
exacerbated by the need for CDA parliamentarians to go through the chairman of the 
relevantfractie commission and the CDA parliamentary leader or deputy before asking a 
written or oral question. In addition, the loss of instant access to valuable information 
sources was also a blow as the party tried to acclimatise to opposition. 
Although the fractie had a sizeable group of members with governmental 
experience, not many adapted successfully to role change. For different reasons, Hirsch 
Ballin, Brinkman and van Rooy all left the Tweede Kamer before the end of the 
parliamentary term. The loss of such talents was a further blow to an already weakened 
22 For example, de Hoop Scheffer had called for fiercer fonn of opposition at the beginning of 
1996 (Hippe, Lucardie, Noomen and Voennan 1997:28). 
23 066's experience in government in 1981-2 had led to the subsequent loss of more than half of 
the party's support and polls predicted a similar outcome in 1998. 
24 Even before then the KVP had been in govemment continuously post-1946 and all three 
confessional parties participated in government more often than not. See Appendix. 
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group. The need for personnel renewal was recognised by party chairman Helgers in 
1995 who suggested that the parliamentary party needed roughly thirteen new members 
with no-one serving more than three terms. Despite the angry reaction to Helgers' 
comments, the provisional list drawn up in 1997 reflected his ideas, with no-one 
standing for a fourth term and half of the electable places on the list being filled by 
newcomers (de Boer, Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 1998:26). Admittedly, not all 
members of the parliamentary party were incapable of the adjustment. For example, de 
Hoop Scheffer and Hillen were amongst the most effective opposition politicians yet 
their performance also illustrated the divisions in the fractie. De Hoop Scheffer 
represented the party's right wing and was the preferred choice of leader for those who 
still regretted Brinkman's forced departure while Hillen was always a controversial 
figure on account of his firmly traditionalist views25• Hillen was also suspected by Maij-
Weggen of being at the centre of the group within the parliamentary party who sought to 
topple Heerma (Versteegh 1999:139). 
Throughout the COA's first term in office, the party was incapable of matching 
its supporters' expectations of it. A commonly heard complaint was that the media 
devoted most of their political coverage to the government parties and especially to 
intra-coalition controversies (e.g. 066 and the VVO's dispute over the introduction of a 
corrective referendum) with little concern for the standpoint of the opposition26• In many 
instances, Heerma's role as leader of the largest opposition party was effectively usurped 
by VVD parliamentary leader Bolkestein. Bolkestein's adept use of the media and 
willingness to counter the coalition's policies contrasted greatly with the cautious, 
prudent approach of the CDA. Even where the government parties were united in 
parliament, the leader of Green Left, Paul Rosenmoller, was often more successful than 
Heerma in attacking the coalition. For example, in autumn 1997 it was the GL rather 
than the CDA who exploited the differences between the coalition partners on the matter 
of cutbacks for surviving relatives (Versteegh 1999:145). The inability of the CDA to 
counter the government in the parliamentary arena and simultaneously increase its own 
profile continued even after Heerma was replaced by de Hoop Scheffer and the after-
effects of the 'culture shock' of the loss of office were felt throughout the 1994-98 
period. 
25 See, for example, his criticism of the lack of discipline in modem families which caused a 
public outcry in 1993 (Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 1994:24). In an interview with the 
author, Hillen also bemoaned the "decadent" nature of Dutch society. 
26 Hans Hillen mentioned in an interview with the author the example of a CDA initiative on 
health policy. When the policy was launched at a press conference, only two journalists were 
present. 
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The Success of the Purple Coalition 
In addition to the CDA's own difficulties in coming to terms with its new position, the 
successes of the PvdA-D66-VVD administration minimised the scope for the opposition. 
By 1994, there was a great deal of consensus over the broad direction of socio-economic 
policy among the parties. One complication faced by the CDA in adopting a strategy in 
opposition was that many of the policies the government enacted were in essence not 
especially different from those pursued by the CDA in office (Lepszy and Koecke 
2000:224). Bolkestein had half-jokingly called the new cabinet "Lubbers IV without 
Lubbers" in 199427 (Andeweg 1995:164) and Lubbers confirmed in the International 
Herald Tribune in 1997 that the purple coalition was pursuing policies similar to those of 
his earlier cabinets. The coalition agreement foresaw cuts in public spending of 17.7 
billion guilders, promised to lower the minimum wage and create jobs through lower 
labour costs. This offered no obvious means of attack for the CDA. Criticising the 
coalition from a right-wing standpoint was difficult with the VVD in government and in 
any case, the Gardeniers report had concluded that the loss of the CDA's social profile 
had influenced the 1994 defeat. However, the adoption of a more left of centre approach 
jeopardised the unity of the party and the fractie and was not necessarily credible with 
core supporters. The party under the combined influence of Heerma and Helgers leaned 
toward the latter option but even in 1998, only 15.8% of those intending to vote CDA 
placed themselves left of centre (DNES 1998). Differences between the coalition and the 
CDA on cultural-moral issues were clearer but while such issues did arise during Kok I, 
such as drug policy and longer shop opening hours, there was little evidence to suggest 
that CDA could profit electorally from its more traditionalist stance. 
One of the CDA's problems was that the purple coalition proved to be far more 
stable than most observers' expectations. The formation of the coalition itself had been 
relatively easy. Admittedly, the formation lasted III days, the fourth longest duration in 
post-war Dutch history. Yet as Andeweg (1995: 155) argues, the creation of the 1994 
cabinet does not appear inordinately protracted compared to the post-war average of 83 
days and especially in view of the momentous change brought by the result and the 
historic novelty of the coalition configuration. Minor cabinet crises arose through the 
1994-8 period but at no time was the continuation of the coalition seriously in doubt. 
Tensions over the proposed route for the high speed Paris-Amsterdam train link, 
27 Interestingly, the Dutch election survey of 1998 found that more than a quarter of respondents 
believed that the CDA actually were in government during the 1994-8. by far the highest 
incorrect response rate for all the parties the respondents were questioned about (DNES 1998) 
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agricultural reform after a pig epidemic and the lingering divisions over the corrective 
referendum were peacefully resolved. Even the resignation of scandal-tarnished VVD 
state secretary in social affairs and employment Linschoten failed to upset the coalition's 
steadiness as Bolkestein explicitly stated that his departure would have no consequences 
for the cabinet. The relative stability of the government, therefore, offered little 
opportunity for the CDA to benefit from coalition disagreement. 
A further difficulty for the CDA was that the PvdA-VVD-D66 government 
came to office at a favourable economic time. The internal harmony of Lubbers III had 
been disturbed by the difficulty of satisfying the PvdA grassroots' expectations with the 
political priorities of the right wing of the CDA in a time of falling growth rates and 
rising unemployment. In contrast, the purple coalition was faced by fewer hard 
decisions. The government froze the level of the minimum wage and social benefits until 
1996 but the levels were subsequently reconnected to average wage increases 
(Haverland 2001:320). That the coalition was able to take this decision was indicative of 
the upsurge in the economy after 1993. GDP growth between 1994 and 1998 averaged 
about 3% per year, well above the average within the EU (Economist 2113/1998), while 
the government reduced the public sector deficit which fell from 4% to 1.5% (Economist 
2/5/1998). The purple coalition felt sufficiently confident of reaching the Maastricht 
criteria that it introduced tax cuts in 1998 rather than prioritise further budget deficit 
reduction. The rate of unemployment was amongst the lowest in Europe at 5.5%. The 
government not only carried on the restructuring of the welfare state initiated by the 
CDA and VVD in the 1980s but also attempted to stimulate employment through more 
active labour market policies (van der Veen and Trommel 1999). While the coalition 
exceeded its own promises through the creation of roughly 500,000 between 1994 and 
1998 (Economist 2/5/1998), it was widely accepted that the low unemployment rate still 
obscured a substantial amount of hidden redundancy. Even in this respect, however, the 
Kok government carried on the reforms of the earlier Lubbers cabinets, with further 
moves towards privatisation of social services28• 
In the eyes of the international press, the image of the Netherlands changed 
radically as descriptions of the 'Dutch disease' gave way to appraisals of the Polder 
model and its possible utility in other national contexts (Cox 2001; Toonen and Hendriks 
2001). The success of wage restraint and the expansion of part-time and temporary jobs 
appeared to have reaffirmed the strength of consensus government (Andeweg 2000). For 
28 See van der Veen and Trommel (1999:302) for more details 
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the Christian Democrats, the fact that the consensual system could function smoothly 
without their participation was a disturbing development. The drift of the Labour Party 
into the centre and its acceptance of limited welfare state retrenchment undermined the 
CDA's previously unchallenged claim to a role in any governmental constellation. 
Admittedly, the PvdA's continued occupation of a centrist position was by no means 
certain. Despite Kok's wide popularity, signs of some discontent in the ranks were 
apparent29• Notwithstanding such minor disturbances, the coalition was remarkably 
stable and its successes simultaneously made the task of the CDA more arduous and 
raised more fundamental questions about the Christian Democrat's pivotal position in 
the centre of Dutch party politics. 
1998 Tweede Kamer Election 
The CDA began its preparations for the election relatively early and compared to 1994, 
the campaign was relatively harmonious. However, controversies still developed over 
the strategy to be adopted and the party's electoral programme. The party made the 
decision to revamp its electoral research strategy. Rather than focus on groups defined 
by their specific social or economic characteristics, party researchers turned their 
attention to lifestyle groups. Five of the eight groups identified were potential targets for 
the party (,religious-altruistic', 'modest social involvement', 'dependent security', 
'educated hedonists' and 'careful post-materialists') but debate broke out among the 
extent to which the party should devote its attention on anyone group. Dc Hoop 
Scheffer and his supporters were more concerned about attracting the individualist 
'educated hedonists' while the head of the Scientific Institute and the party's youth wing 
(CDJA) sought to win over more post-materialists (van Praag jr. and Penseel 1999: 118). 
Eventually, the party decided on not prioritising the post-materialist vote although the 
dispute was not conclusively ended. 
The second contentious aspect of the CDA's preparation was its electoral 
programme ('Samenleven doet je niet aileen'). After a process involving consultation 
with the party's supporters, church representatives and social organisations, the 
programme was presented in October 1997. It gave strong support to the family and the 
community, reaffirmed the party's belief in personalism and also contained prominent 
environmental themes (de Boer, Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 1998:27). The 
programme contained a mixture of social welfare and traditionalist issues, particularly 
29 Most complaints centred on the attempts of party chairman Rottenberg to transform the 
organisation of the party. The revolt of the grassroots eventually culminated in the election of the 
Leiden academic and party traditionalist Ruud Koole as chairman in 2001. 
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law and order30• A number of commentators thought the programme more left-wing than 
the PvdA on social issues (van der Brug 1999: 184; Irwin 1999:272). This apparent lurch 
to the left at least on social matters was seized upon by Bolkestein who called the CDA a 
"leftist party" with "a dramatically bad electoral programme" (de Boer, Lucardie, 
Noomen and Voerman 1998:27; 1999:32). The programme was not as controversial 
within the Christian Democrats3'. Even the normally critical CDlA were more positive 
in their appraisal although they and some local party branches sought unsuccessfully to 
liberalise asylum policy. Overall, the adoption of a programme labelled "Christian-
social" by vice-chairwoman Lodders aroused surprisingly little argument. While the 
conflict over whether the party should target post-materialists or individualists revealed 
the presence of old tensions, the right wing of the party seemed to accept that following 
the debacle of 1994 and in view of the social wing's strong presence in the party 
apparatus, there was little alternative to a more socially oriented party. 
Moderate losses in the March local elections were too disheartening and the 
CDA still hoped to be able to stabilise its position. Polls, however, suggested that the 
battle was chiefly between PvdA and VVD which threatened to push the CDA into third 
position for the first time. The PvdA again ran a very professional and expensive 
campaign but the CDA was not far behind in campaign spending. The main CDA 
themes were family policy, care, education, security and solidarity (de Boer, Lucardie, 
Noomen and Voerman 1999:33). The campaign, however, was undermined by the 
refusal of the other parties to countenance a coalition including the CDA. The VVD's 
reaction to the CDA's election programme appeared to rule out any possible coalition 
and the PvdA, too, sought a continuation of the purple coalition32 • Further damage to the 
party's credibility came with the judgement of the Central Plan Bureau that the CDA 
programme would not lead to any new employment while the plans of the government 
parties would create roughly 100,000 jobs (de Boer, Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 
1999: 18). Moreover, although the party had avoided the catastrophic personal divisions 
of 1994, the party still suffered from an unpopular leader as shown above. During the 
1994-8 period, the CDA had been confronted for the first time by the limited 
opportunities given to opposition leaders in Dutch politics and neither Heerma nor de 
Hoop Scheffer had been able to rise above this disadvantage. 
30 One of the most disputed proposals was the idea that children as young as 11 could stand trial 
for crimes. 
31 Interviews conducted with members of the Scientific Institute revealed that regardless of the 
election result, the manifesto was regarded with some pride. 
32 PvdA party research had indicated that leaving open the possibility of a PvdA-CDA alliance 
was not popular with Labour supporters (van Praag jr. and Pense I 1999: 105). 
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The election result was undoubtedly a disappointment for the CDA. The party 
fell to third behind the PvdA (29%, +5) and the VVD (24.7%, +4.8) who both profited 
from the success of the purple coalition. D66 also lost badly (9%, -6.5), but while they 
could still draw comfort from what was after all their third best performance ever, the 
CDA dropped to its lowest ever level (18.4%, -3.8). The result was even more serious 
when contrasted to the worst combined result of the confessional parties (31.3% in 
1972). Analysis of the election result confirmed the party's failure to adapt to opposition 
and successfully counter the achievements of the governmene3• Evaluation of the 
government's success in economic and employment was very positive (60% rated the 
government's influence on the economy favourably, 63.7% viewed its employment 
record positively). Such positive appraisals were also common among CDA voters and 
adherents. The lack of a prominent and attractive leading candidate was also a problem. 
Very few CDA voters mentioned de Hoop Scheffer as a reason for their vote in contrast 
to the popularity ofKok among PvdA voters. Instead, religion, tradition, party manifesto 
and party identification were far more likely to be mentioned as motivations for voting 
Christian Democratic. Despite this, further erosion of the Christian Democratic hold on 
religious communities was evident. Support among Catholic, Dutch Reformed and 
Calvinist voters all declined with an especially disturbing fall among Calvinists34• The 
CDA continued to draw most of the support of the religiously active but in view of the 
shrinkage of this group, this was little cause for celebration. The most serious failing, 
though, was the party's chronic lack of support among those who rarely attended church 
(5.1 %) and those who declared no church affiliation (2.6%). 
Although some questions remained over the reestablishment of the purple 
coalition with D66 wary of the possible effects on its popularity and some disagreements 
between the VVD and the PvdA on socio-economic policy, the Kok II cabinet was 
inaugurated on the 3rd August after a formation period of 87 days. The CDA thus faced 
another demoralising parliamentary term in opposition. The intention of the new 
government to liberalise euthanasia policy and to introduce gay marriage promised some 
clear opportunities for the CDA to resist cabinet policy. Yet following the succession of 
setbacks suffered in the 1994-8 period, serious doubts about the CDA's capabilities as a 
party of opposition lingered. 
33 All statistics in the following section come from the 1998 Dutch National Election Survey. 
34 This fall in Gereformeerde voters might be connected with the increasing difficulty in 
maintaining a balance between the denominations. For the first time, both the fractie leader (de 
Hoop Scheffer) and the party chairman (Helgers) were Catholic. For voting by denomination, see 
Table 4.3, Chapter 4. 
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III. Programmatic Development (1990-8) 
As outlined in chapter 3, the CDA in government under Lubbers became rather distant 
from the work of the Scientific Institute, leading to complaints that the party was 
neglecting its programmatic profile. This rift was still visible at the beginning of the 
1990s when the party executive concluded that to counter the loss of votes in the heavily 
Protestant areas in the north-east of the country, the party should emphasise its Christian 
roots. However, Lubbers and the parliamentary party were fearful of alienating non-
Christian voters and warned against dogmatism (Lucardie, Nieboer and Noomen 
1992:20). The question of the 'c' in the CDA was again raised when the Bishop of 
Haarlem left the party in 1993 in disgust at the party's failure to push a more visibly 
Christian agenda on abortion and euthanasia. Not surprisingly then, the decision of party 
chairman van Vel zen to revise the party's basic programme was not welcomed by all 
within the party. Many were anxious about unleashing another fierce ideological debate 
within the party (Metze 1995:154). The 1980 programme had bound the party together 
but only after substantial exertion over a long time period35• Nonetheless, from 1990, 
honorary chairman Steenkamp had headed a commission charged with writing a new 
programme. The fall of Communism did not produce a thorough revision of Christian 
Democratic ideas in the CDA (Lucardie 1993 :40) although the structure of the 
programme was quite different from the 1980 effort. After being forced into opposition, 
the CDA once again reconsidered its ideological foundation. The programme of the 
Strategic Advice working group "Nieuwe wegen, vaste waarden" (New Ways, Firm 
Values) passed in 1996 will also be considered here. While the programme itself 
declared that it was not an electoral manifesto and the three year old Program van 
Uitgangspunten remained valid, the programme is worthy of attention for two reasons. 
First, it was the major programmatic work of the party during the 1994-8 period and is 
therefore valuable evidence of the party's ideological reaction to the shock of losing 
office. Second, the programme continues to be a reference point for the party in the 
present da/6, demonstrating that it was not a short-term platform with little impact. The 
answers the programme attempts to give to contemporary social, economic and political 
problems are still the basis for much of the CDA's programme. 
Both programmes were notable for their acknowledgement of change within 
society. The Programme of Points of Departure stated that Dutch Christian Democracy 
35 See Chapter Ill. 
36 For example, see the interview with CDA leader Jan Peter Balkanende (who himself had been 
the secretary of the group) in Katholiek Nieuwsblad 22/03/02. 
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had entered a third phase. After the earlier periods of emancipation and the post-war 
construction of the welfare state and the move towards European unity, the CDA now 
found itself in a time of great hope but also uncertainty. Society was changing through 
the ageing of the population, the influx of refugees and immigrants, new communication 
technologies and the growth of knowledge, increasing divergence in opinions and beliefs 
and the processes of Europeanisation and internationalisation (Section I). The 
introduction of 'New Ways, Firm Values' also stressed trends such as globalisation, 
increasing individualism and plural lifestyles and the swift development of new 
technologies. These offered new opportunities for personal fulfilment but at the same 
time resulted in the disappearance of a "feeling for direction" (Section 1, p.I )37. The goal 
of each programme, then, was to assert the relevance of Christian Democratic ideals in 
this age, to demonstrate that the "firm, deeply anchored values" (NWVW, Section 1, 
p.2) of the party were a foundation for the necessary new directions. 
Principles and self-identity 
The religious roots of the CDA continued to be an important point of reference. In 
comparison to the CDU and the 6vp, the number of references to the Bible and God 
was quite striking. For example, the party accepted the testimony of the Bible as of 
"decisive significance" for man, society and government (Article 1)38. In line with 
Protestant political traditions, the government was still seen as the servant of God 
(Article 6) and there was a firm commitment to maintaining Sunday as a day of rest. 
Even following the desertion of many non-religious voters in 1994, the later 1996 
programme made no effort to cast off the CDA's religious baggage. Indeed, the 
unchanging values the party expounds were explicitly linked to the life and teachings of 
Christ (NWVW Section 2, pA). This religious image of man leads to a wariness towards 
modern medical-technological developments Respect for the inviolability of human life 
should remain the basis for law-making whether the issue is abortion or euthanasia 
although the party concedes that exceptions can arise in emergency situations (Section 
111.2). Any research which violated human dignity should be banned while research 
should always be accompanied by consideration of its ethical and social implications. 
Fears about genetic research were also expressed in New Ways, Firm Values (Section 3, 
p.ll). 
37 Page references for "Nieuw Wegen, Yaste Waarden" are taken from the version available via 
the Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen website. 
http;/ /www.rug.nlldnpp/politickeParti jen/cda/pubJ icaties/notas Brochures/ 1995 nwvw .pdf accessed 
10/04/03. 
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The CDA's principles Uustice, spread responsibility, solidarity and stewardship) 
remain unchanged from its original programme from 198039• The importance of 
stewardship has grown since the earlier Programme of Points of Departure due to the 
party's greater environmentalism (see later). Individualism was also still rejected in 
favour of a personalist view of humanity. References to the free development of the 
person are almost always tempered by adjacent allusions to the individual's 
responsibilities towards neighbours and society This was also the case in the later 
programme which stresses the role of values more emphatically. Politics was not simply 
a question of economics. Instead, the human element must always be central: where 
change is needed, people must be at the centre of the aims and measurement (Section 2, 
p.5). 
Economic and social policy 
In social and economic policy, the Programme of Points of Departure favoured a limited 
role for the state. The government was to concentrate on its "core tasks" (Article 41) and 
the welfare system had be viable in the long-term and encourage self-responsibility 
(Article 42). A reference was also made to the W AO crisis as the programme sought 
increased work for socially marginal groups such as those suffering from work disability 
(Article 45). In addition, the text also mentioned the pressure on the Dutch economy 
caused by high taxes, poor rates of labour participation, low investment in technology 
and the growth of regulation (Section III.3). An interesting comparison could be made 
between Article 41 of the 1980 programme and Article 46 of the 1993 text. Where the 
earlier programme speaks of an orientation of benefits to the level of income of those 
working, the later version significantly alters this to "the difference between wages and 
benefits ought to be such that it encourages the carrying out of paid work". Such 
statements corresponded to the greater market emphasis and welfare state retrenchment 
carried out by the Lubbers governments. Nonetheless, the typical Christian Democratic 
concern for integration and accommodation is unmistakable through the numerous 
mentions of the need for a "maatschappelijk draagvlak" (societal weight-bearing 
surface) in decisions4o• This untranslatable, widely recognised term indicates "the need 
38 See also the introduction in which it was stated that the CDA was led "by the authority of the 
source of inspiration, the Gospel" and later "by the Good News of God to man" as well as 
Articles 2 and 4. 
39 See Article 7 for spread responsibility, Article 8 for responsibility, 9 for solidarity 11 for 
stewardship. 
40 There are over 10 separate mentions of either "maatschappelijk draagvlak" or simply 
"draagvlak" in the text in reference to among other things economic problems, democracy, 
212 
for government policies to have widespread support from organised interests and 
citizens" (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 148). Throughout the programme, the CDA 
constantly reiterated that government policy must result from a process of social 
incorporation and produce social consensus. The party was not proposing a radical break 
from previous practices. While reform of the welfare state was necessary, it was to be 
achieved in a consensual fashion. 
The social-economic policy outlined in "New Ways, Firm Values" was broadly 
similar. The first task of government was "to allow society to function as a community 
of responsible people ..... offering, supporting and protecting space" (Section 3, p.6). 
However, the programme mixed a greater amount of social concern with a stronger 
emphasis on adaptation. A minimum system of social security in which benefits would 
be set so low that unemployed parents could not resist any job regardless of the 
consequences was rejected and a number of policies were proposed to support the 
family. Following the debacle of 1994, the party also confirmed that the state pension 
(AOW) must remain intact as the basis for old age provision even though increasing 
numbers should take on supplementary pensions. Nonetheless, the programme conceded 
that the social market economy required changes. The government was no longer able to 
stipulate detailed regulations and was to intervene only where fundamental values were 
under threat and where markets were dominated by established interests (Section 5, 
p.17). More radically, a more active labour market policy was suggested based on a 
mixture of incentive and compUlsion in which jobs could be provided for the 
unemployed at below the minimum wage with a top-up supplied through benefits. This 
contrasted sharply with the typical transfer-orientated Christian Democratic welfare state 
(van Kersbergen 1995) and signalled a greater willingness to change. 
Foreign policy 
Continuity was the dominant theme offoreign policy. The CDA continued to support the 
process of European integration. However, like the 1980 programme, it was 
acknowledged that democracy in the EU was "defective" and that for citizens, the 
process of decision-making lacked transparency (Section III.1). This requires a greater 
level of participation from European citizens and more democratic control over decision-
makers through the European Parliament (Article 21). The CDA also continued to take 
an active interest in developmental policy and the standard 1.5% level of National 
Income for developmental aid was confirmed. Aside from a stronger concentration on 
Europe and environmental policy. See, for example, Section II (Appel), Section IlL I 
213 
the tackling of security issues at EU level, the 1996 programme essentially reaffirmed 
these foreign policy commitments, 
Family policy and the role of women 
Family policy remained an essential component of Dutch Christian Democratic policy. 
The traditional family should be supported through child benefit and the inclusion of 
child-raising years in pension calculations and social insurance (Article 46) with greater 
consideration to be given to their interests by the social partners (Article 43). 
Nonetheless, the adaptation of the party to changing social norms was comparatively 
quite radical. The government had to respect the diversity of society and no one form 
should be privileged. Gay and lesbian couples were even explicitly referred to (Section 
III,S) and other forms of living together involving an enduring acceptance of mutual 
responsibility had a right to public recognition and possibly legal registration (Article 
72). To some extent, the CDA had reverted to a more standard Christian Democratic line 
by 1996. The family was crucial to the fabric of society as the "most vital form of living 
together" based on "the recognition that for most people the family is the most satisfying 
basis for existence which offers large advantages for society and a bridge between 
generations" (NWVW Section 3, p,7), Accordingly, the party called for tax and pension 
reform to help parents, the raising of child allowance and improved chances for parents 
re-entering the labour market (NWVW Section 3, pp,7-8), The re-concentration on the 
traditional family indicated a shift in the party's stance, Other forms of domestic life 
were not to be ignored but the two parent family was given a discernibly stronger 
emphasis. 
Environmentalism 
Compared to the 1980 Programme of Points of Departure, the 1993 programme 
contained a greater green component (Articles 55-68), The fruits of God's creation were 
to be used but not be exhausted for future generations (Articles II and 12). The CDA 
desired sustainable economic growth, an ecologically responsible market economy and 
seeks to stimulate the development of clean energy sources (Article 56), In certain cases, 
the party was prepared to go beyond market instruments to ensure environmentally 
friendly development (Article 59) while international organisations like the EU 
(Articles 63-5) and the UN (Article 67) were also vital for appropriate policies. The eco-
component of the CDA may not have distinguished it from other parties (Lucardie 
(Democratische Rechtstaat, Democratie in Europa) and Article 65, 
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1993 :49) but the expansion of interest in this policy domain was unmistakeable and 
continued into the later document. 
Crime and Security 
A new theme of the 1993 programme was crime and security. The problem of escalating 
crime and especially international organised crime was identified. Although the party 
called for more appropriate punishments and swifter justice (Article 30), few clear 
policies were outlined. During the purple coalition, this attitude hardened. In 'New 
Ways, Firm Values' under the slogan of "A culture of acceptance not toleration", the 
party argues for a tougher line on official tolerance of illegal activities such as the sale of 
drugs or prostitution and on the presence of illegal immigrants within the Netherlands 
(Section 4, pp.14-5). 
CDA Programmatic Development: New Ways In Opposition? 
While some party members feared that the revision of the CDA's basic programme 
would trigger off ideological tension, the broad strand of continuity in the new Points of 
Departure was unlikely to cause serious ruptures. The party retained a stronger religious 
element than other Christian Democratic parties and its fundamental principles were 
unaltered. The party remained pro-EU integration and continued to support the family 
even though there was a greater acknowledgement of diversity. Alterations took place in 
social and economic policy and in the party's new-found environmentalism. A more 
restricted welfare state and a greater emphasis on the market were sought but it was 
repeatedly affirmed that this was to be done in a consensual fashion. The social market 
model was to be reformed, not demolished. Equally, green themes were adopted but did 
not cause a fundamental reordering of the party's priorities. Nonetheless, from a 
comparative perspective, there was a deeper acceptance of social change in the CDA, for 
example in family policy and the commitment to multiculturalism. Following the 
electoral catastrophe of 1994, this adaptation continued. In some issues, proposals for 
reform were fairly modest. The party argued for a limited amount decentralisation 
(Section 7, pp. 28-9) and gave only tepid support was given to a FRG-style Additional 
Member Voting system. Moreover, the 1996 programme tried to reassert the relevance 
of Christian Democratic principles. At the same time, however, the document introduced 
more substantive reforms (e.g. in employment and security policy) . This together with 
the concurrent attempt to highlight the party's social profile, particularly through family 
policy, constituted the major programmatic response of the party to its exile in 
opposition. 
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"New Ways, Firm Values" was used as a basis for the development of the 
election manifesto although further refinement of ideas was also achieved through a 
series of working groups. A development of potentially major significance resulting 
from one such group was the contention by Scientific Institute leader Klop that the ideal 
model for the family was no longer based on the solitary male breadwinner and 
housewife but instead on two parents each with part-time jobs. The consideration of 
such ideas demonstrated that the CDA was strongly committed to the task of keeping its 
programmatic foundation relevant. The results were regarded with some satisfaction by 
members of the party yet in view of the 1998 result whether this was welcomed or even 
noticed by the electorate was less clear. 
IV. Organisational Developments 
As outlined in earlier sections, the organisational make-up of the CDA has been a less 
significant influence on the party's development than has been the case for other 
Christian Democratic parties across Europe. The party had less in-built pluralism and 
power lay chiefly in the hands of the party in government and to a lesser extent the 
parliamentary party. Nonetheless, there was in the 1990-8 period a reaction against 
centralised power. Even before 1994, a greater dispersal of power and more grassroots 
involvement were being discussed. The first attempt at organisational reform came with 
the formation of the Appel en weerklank II commission in 1993 which presented its 
report in the following year. The report contained some quite strong criticisms of a party 
organisation which was "overstaffed, overcentralised, overelaborate and lacking in 
transparency" with "too little turnover among leading personnel" (Fogarty 1995: 151). 
The report suggested consultation with party members on certain topics, the reduction of 
the size of the party executive and a reorganisation of the CDA's auxiliary organisations, 
for example the Women's Council would become "an organisation of and for the CDA" 
(Lucardie, Noomen and Voerman 1995:43). The last suggestion was strongly resisted 
and eventually a compromise was found to ensure the Women's Council retained its 
autonomy. 
The theme of renewal was also raised in 1996 with a working group "Political 
Party New Style". As a result of this investigation, nine test projects were initiated in 
1997. These included differentiated membership, incentives for party branches to recruit 
members and the introduction of internal polls on certain topics (de Boer, Lucardie, 
Noomen and Voerman 1998:29). The long-term impact of such innovations remains to 
be seen but in the short-term such efforts to spur more participation failed to reverse or 
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even halt the continued withering of the party's membership base41 . Moreover, the 
limited number of CDA members in the 1998 DNES were overwhelmingly old and non-
participatory42. If these trends were present throughout the party, then the aim of the 
reformers to create a vital and lively party culture could not be judged to have been a 
success by 1998. 
In addition to these formal organisational changes, a further interesting intra-
party development was the shift in the balance of power towards the party headquarters 
in Kuyperhuis. The loss of government responsibilities created a power vacuum which 
was to some extent filled by interim party chairwoman Lodders and then by her 
successor Helgers. Lodders' handling of the post-1994 crisis boosted her reputation 
within the party and while Helgers was not especially well-known before his 
appointment, he was successful on a number of occasions in exerting his will against the 
Jractie, such as the battle over the 1998 candidate list43. Helgers' desire for renewal 
meant many established parliamentary figures (e.g. van de Camp, Hillen, Verhagen) 
found themselves below newcomers on the list (Versteegh 1999:236). Selected 
parliamentarians were able to adapt to opposition swiftly but the parliamentary group as 
a whole did not handle the change in the party's role well. The lack of unity, the weak 
leadership of Heerma and the generally poor performance of the parliamentary group in 
attacking the government undermined the Jractie's ability to counter the growing 
influence of the extra-parliamentary party. With the election of de Hoop Scheffer, it was 
expected that the parliamentary group would pose a more dangerous threat to the 
government (Lepszy and Koecke 2000:225) and perhaps in the process claw back some 
power from the party chairman. However, by 1998 this did not appear to be the case. 
The 1998 election programme was drawn up by a commission headed by Lodders and in 
terms of content reflected the programmatic initiatives of the party in opposition rather 
than the more right-wing standpoint of de Hoop Scheffer. 
The role of the other CDA affiliated organisations did not change drastically. 
The youth wing of the party continued to provide a critical, independent perspective 
(such as asylum issues and foreign aid) and pushed for a more radical response to the 
party's new situation post-1994. For example, the CDJA viewed 'New Ways, Firm 
Values' as "excellent values, but too few new ways" (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 
41 See Table 4.34, Chapter 4. 
42 The youngest was born in 1959 while more than a third of the CDA members sub-sample were 
ranked in the second lowest level of participation. 
43 See section II, this chapter. 
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1996:36). The Women's Council, too, was often critical of central party ideas. With the 
publication of the report "Meer partij met vrouwen", the party recognised that more 
ought to be done to recruit women into the party with a proposal for a minimal level of 
40% women for elected CDA members. In opposition, the Scientific Institute under 
director van Gennip became more influential. The WI was able to playa significant part 
in setting the party's agenda after the loss of office and van Gennip and his assistants 
(among them future CDA leader and Dutch prime minister Balkanende) were accorded a 
great deal of respect by the party leadership (Versteegh 1999:213). 
In conclusion, the CDA embarked upon a number of test projects aimed at 
increasing participation within the party and reducing the centralism of decision-making. 
However, the success of these in stimulating increased participation within the party was 
not yet known by 1998 as experiments remained at an early stage. What was clearer by 
1998 was that a certain fragmenting of power within the party had taken place. Even 
after the swift abandonment of the collective leadership idea, the central party apparatus 
headed by chairman Helgers and vice-chairwoman Lodders appeared to have a more 
prominent role in setting the party's general direction than previously while the jractie, 
by contrast, had more trouble finding its role in opposition. 
V. Conclusion 
The fall of the Dutch Christian Democrats from the peak of the Lubbers years and of 
being the party that "ran this country" to the prolonged, painful exile in opposition was 
spectacular. In a short space of time, the CDA moved from being the pivotal party 
deciding which other parties governed with it to a helpless political bystander. Structural 
factors (i.e. the long-term erosion of key social groups) played a role in the CDA's 
defeat but contextual factors, namely the W AO crisis, the divisions within the party and 
an unpopular leader, were also significant reasons for the loss and the subsequent 
exclusion from government. Four years after the initial shock of being cast from office 
for the first time, the 1998 Tweede Kamer election result brought the worst ever result 
for the CDA. This, it was argued in Section II, was primarily attributable to leadership 
instability, the unfamiliarity of the CDA in opposition and the accomplishments of the 
purple coalition. Faced by a coalition successfully carrying out policies not dissimilar to 
the previous Lubbers-led cabinets and encumbered by a makeshift leader and a 
parliamentary group generally lacking political combativeness, the CDA was unable to 
land any telling blows against the government. Failing to assert its credentials as an 
opposition party, the CDA relied on a increasingly small core support as even traditional 
supporters deserted the party. No clear way out of the crisis was obvious as the party 
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faced several strategic dilemmas. One choice was whether to target the growing body of 
liberal-inclined individualist voters or the more socially active post-materialists. 
However, beyond this it was not clear whether increasing support among either of these 
groups could be achieved without further losses among the more traditionalist core 
support. The future of the Christian Democrats as a socially inclusive people's party was 
by 1998 very much open to question. The opposition years had triggered a greater 
degree of internal friction but there was no immediate danger of disintegration although 
the longer the party spent in opposition, the greater this threat would become. 
In programmatic terms, the reaction of the party to the loss of office was clearer. 
As Section III showed, even before 1994, the party had revised its basic programme, 
adapting some of its ideas and policies to contemporary domestic and international 
developments while retaining its primary conceptions of humanity, society and the role 
of the government. In some respects, the party went significantly further in its 
adjustment to social trends than other Christian Democratic parties, for example in 
family policy. In opposition, programmatic work assumed a new importance. The 
direction of the party as a whole became much more closely linked to the plans coming 
out of Kuyperhuis. The actual programmatic work, however, brought few radical 
deviations from previous ideas. Although the CDA did try to re-establish its social 
credentials and again prioritised the two parent family, critical Christian Democratic 
principles were reasserted. Whether this blend of core continuity with elements of 
adaptation would be a successful basis for a re-establishment of Christian Democratic 
political power was far from certain. The same uncertainty surrounded organisational 
reform within the party. Section IV illustrated that the long-term effect of the main 
organisational changes in the 1990s (the attempt to encourage greater grassroots 
involvement, the growing power of the extra-parliamentary party) was unknown by 
1998. The CDA, thus, entered its second parliamentary term as an opposition party with 
a large degree of apprehension. 
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Chapter 8. Issue Salience in the Manifestos of the CDU/CSU, QVP and CDA 
I. Introduction 
The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), originally called the Manifesto Research 
Group, was an attempt to create a standardised framework for the analysis of electoral 
programmes across Europe and was initiated in 1979. The application of content 
analysis to party documents drew on Robertson's earlier work (1976) for theoretical 
validation. Here it was argued that the manifestos of various political parties could 
chiefly be distinguished by the degree of emphasis placed on certain issues. Rather than 
split their programme equally between issues on which they took a positive stance and 
those in which they took a negative one, parties tended to highlight only their positive 
policy domains (Budge 2001:82). The theory of issue salience also built on the earlier 
research of Stokes (1966) on valence issues, that is issues where a more or less 
unchallenged consensus existed and thus where only one position was politically 
feasible. However, it was discovered that in practice almost all issues functioned like 
valence issues within manifestos. Even where a party believed in the restriction of the 
welfare state, it would be unlikely to place a great deal of stress on outlining its 
proposals for curtailing state social spending in its manifesto. Instead, it would normally 
place a greater weight on free market policies or on economic orthodoxy. In contrast, a 
Socialist or Social Democratic party would devote a far more significant portion of its 
document to welfare state spending. The data gathered and coded by the CMP supported 
this theory. Individual coders examined the manifestos of political parties, counting the 
number of words used for each issue and then worked out what proportion of the whole 
document was given over to each issue. 
As the dataset expanded and became available to an ever-greater number of 
researchers, it has been put to a variety of different uses, primarily in attempts to link 
systematically political parties to policy outcomes (e.g. Hofferbert and Klingemann 
1990) and in studies of coalition formation (e.g. Budge and Laver 1993). Thus far, fewer 
researchers have employed the data to ask questions about the nature of parties 
themselves. Volkens (2001) analyses the policy positions of European Social Democrats 
in the post-war period while Bara and Budge (2001) look at short-term changes in 
Labour's election manifestos in the recent past in terms of the development of 'New 
Labour' ideology. This chapter draws upon these last two approaches but develops a 
new method for the analysis of Christian Democrat programmes. After considering some 
problematic aspects of the CMP's design, three different approaches based on the eMP 
data will be used: the left/right scale used by Budge and Hofferbert (1990) and Budge, 
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Klingemann and Hofferbert (1994), a study of issue salience by period and an alternative 
model based on free market liberalism, social-economic interventionism and social-
cultural traditionalism. Although the leWright scale used by those involved in the CMP 
does broadly correspond with expectations of the parties' positions, it will be argued 
here that the latter threefold division is necessary in order to unravel more fully the 
tensions within contemporary Christian Democracy. These various methods offer 
another approach to the question of Christian Democratic party identity and change: to 
what extent were the changes in the parties highlighted in chapters 5, 6 and 7 reflected in 
manifestos? Can common trends in the structure of CDU, 6vp and CDA manifestos be 
found? 
II. Problems with the CMP 
Before analysing the political manifestos of the German, Austrian and Dutch Christian 
democrats, it is worth considering some limitations of this approach. One of the main 
problems is the coding. This system (see Budge et al 2001 Appendix III for full details 
on the coding system) was devised by the multinational members of the original group 
to collect together the main policy domains found throughout Western Europe. While on 
the whole this has been a success, certain problems remain. Each of the different 
categories covers a number of different policy preferences. For example, c20 I "Freedom 
and Human Rights" encompasses "Favourable mentions of the importance of personal 
freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; 
freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the 
manifesto country and in other countries". By measuring the concept of freedom in such 
a flat, two-dimensional manner, the very real differences between a liberal notion of 
freedom and a Christian Democratic vision of freedom are overlooked. However, as the 
manifesto data is not the sole means of analysis being employed in this study, this 
problem is not relevant here. Nonetheless, it might be queried whether these separate 
elements of the "Freedom and Human Rights" category can be usefully grouped 
together. Some components of this category clearly belong to the right (e.g. freedom 
from bureaucratic control, individualism) yet personal freedoms might equally be used 
by the left (especially a post-materialistlleft-libertarian party). It might be reasonably 
objected therefore that two quite different policy objectives are being collapsed into one 
vague category. This is not true for most of the other classification categories but it 
alerts us to the problem that once the data has been ordered into these overarching 
aggregations by the individual coder, they cannot subsequently be broken down without 
an extensive, time-consuming and methodologically dubious process of recoding. 
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Realistically, we can only work within the existing coding but should nonetheless be 
alive to the possibility of erroneous results as a consequence of the coding system. 
A further inevitable difficulty arises from the use of the coding across countries 
and across time. The coding process necessarily involves blurring the subtleties and 
variations of national politics to produce a common model. Again this is justified given 
the project's international focus but at times, the categories can be frustrating. One such 
instance is "Multiculturalism: positive". All references to "cultural diversity, 
communalism, cultural plurality and pillarisation, preservation of autonomy of religious, 
linguistic heritages within the country including special electoral provisions" are 
included in this category. This immediately prompts the question whether support for a 
historically based form of cultural heterogeneity (such as verzuiling in the Netherlands) 
can be usefully grouped together with a more modem, ethnically mixed 
multiculturalism. The preservation of a traditional system of subcultural autonomy 
would certainly be deemed a right-wing position in the Low Countries but while it could 
be argued that extending this autonomy to incoming religious or ethnic groups is a 
logical step, it is not a necessary one, particularly if the traditionalists feel that the older 
nationally-rooted multiculturalism is under threat'. Consequently, it would be unwise to 
use this category as a gauge of traditionalism because it is impossible to. know whether it 
is measuring the same phenomenon in different national and temporal contexts. 
A more practical problem with comparing across nations is that different 
individuals will be involved in the process. The possibility certainly exists that each 
coder will bring a culturally shaped interpretation of the policy categories and/or the 
instructions for coding. However, the group developed a tight and rigorously applied 
system of checks and as Hearl (2001) and McDonald and Mendes (2001) have shown, 
the coding process does appear to have achieved a great degree of stability and 
reliability. It seems fair to conclude that many potential pitfalls inherent within such an 
ambitious large undertaking have been avoided. The problem of unwieldy or slightly 
unconvincing categories will probably only be overcome with the development of even 
more sophisticated computer software which should open up a wealth of possibilities for 
the individual researcher albeit at the cost of the unified method and standardized design 
of the CMP. Until such applications become available, the CMP remains an extremely 
valuable resource for researchers in a variety of different areas. 
, Indeed, this has been an increasingly important debate within the CDA since 1998. 
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Finally before movmg on to the data itself, the question of whether the 
manifesto data actually tells us of anything of significance must be addressed. Even if 
we accept that the relative weight of issues within the manifestos is carefully designed, 
we might still doubt their importance in evaluating the political stance of parties. Pelinka 
(1979:7-9) distinguishes between two fundamentally different type of party documents: 
programmes of basic principles aimed primarily at activists and members within the 
party and action programmes which are orientated outwards to the wider public and 
whose relevance is limited to a short space of time. Election manifestos fall into the 
latter category and are, therefore, more ephemeral. In constructing their electoral 
programmes, parties must frequently respond to short-term issues or trends. In the 
aftermath of a major environmental problem, the rational response of all parties would 
be to accord more space to the issue of environmental protection. This short-term focus 
would rarely herald a change of long-term consequence. There is, thus, a danger that by 
using election manifestos as an indicator of party change, we overstate the significance 
of short-term contextual factors that ultimately have little bearing on the ideological 
identity of a party. A possible example of this within the data used here is the 
CDU/CSU2 programme for the 1990 Bundestag election. As the first federal election 
after unification, the campaign was naturally dominated by the consequences of this 
momentous upheaval. As a result, a striking 12.09% of the CDU/CSU manifesto was 
concerned with social welfare issues in contrast to just 2.9% eight years later. This 
deviation leads to a correspondingly abnormal position of the CDU/CSU on a left-right 
scale, i.e. far further left than usual. 
A sensitivity to short term fluctuation, though, need not be a warning against 
using the data altogether. It merely emphasises that the dataset must be handled 
cautiously and in conjunction with a more qualitative, historical approach. Budge and 
Klingemann's swift yet convincing comparison (2001) of the left-right placement of 
parties generated by the CMP against the historical evidence supports the use of the 
former as a generally sound tool3• Overall, parties are situated in "appropriate sectors of 
the policy space" (p.48) and the overlapping of parties (one party becoming more 
right/left wing than another) is rare. Where odd deviations exist, they can be explained 
by reference to the extraordinary political events at the time. Developments in issue 
salience need not be a short-lived response to transient events. Where the structure of 
emphases changes in a manner not suggestive of short-term change, this could herald a 
2 It is important to note that the manifestos for the Christian Democrats in Germany are always 
rresented jointly by the sister parties. 
This is especially the case in the three countries investigated here. 
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decisive development in a party's identity. The data is not a replacement for expert 
analysis of party positions and policy space but rather an additional instrument that can 
support or even challenge previously held notions. It is for this purpose that the dataset 
is employed here. 
III. Christian Democratic parties and the left-right scale 
The left-right scale has been used in several earlier pieces of research utilising the 
manifesto data (Budge and Laver 1993; Budge and Hofferbert 1990). The measure is 
produced by separating out those issues belonging to the left and those typically 
advocated by the right. The proportion of the programme devoted to the former is then 
subtracted from the percentage given over to the latter creating a number located 
between -100 (a manifesto completely dedicated to left-wing issues) and +100 (one 
solely focusing on right wing concerns). 
The table below shows the division of issues: 
Table 8.1 Left-Right Scale Based on Manifesto Data 
Right emphases: sum of%s for 
Military: positive 
Freedom, human rights 
Constitutionalism: positive 
Political authority 
Free enterprise 
Economic incentives 
Protectionism: negative 
Economic orthodoxy 
Welfare state limitation 
National way oflife: positive 
Traditional morality: positive 
Law and order 
Social Harmony 
Source: Budge and Klingemann (2001 :22). 
Left emphases: sum of%s for 
Decolonisation 
Military: negative 
Peace 
Internationalism: positive 
Democracy 
Market regulation 
Economic planning 
Protectionism: positive 
Controlled economy 
Nationalisation 
Welfare state expansion 
Education expansion 
Labour groups: positive 
The classification of issues is certainly open to dispute. A left-libertarian might deny that 
freedom and human rights belongs to the right. Equally, the more authoritarian 
conservative components of the right (e.g. traditional morality) would quite probably not 
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be shared by a right-wing libertarian. The possible distortions resulting from using a 
single axis scale is problematic and is at the core of Kitschelt's criticisms of the CMP 
(1994:291-296). Budge and Klingemann's robust defence of the scale (2001:21-24) is 
quite persuasive yet it is with reservations that it is employed here. Regardless of 
whether one accepts Christian Democrats' claims to forge a new path between socialism 
and liberalism, the multifaceted, inclusive nature of such parties does make it difficult to 
place them on a single dichotomous scale. 
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Figure 8.1 Manifestos on a Left-Right Axis 
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Figure 8.2 Manifestos on a Left-Right Axis 
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On first sight, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrating the left-right movement of 
CDU/CSU, OVP Dutch confessional and CDA manifestos show a disconcertingly high 
amount of fluctuation. Even accounting for the flexibility of Christian Democratic 
parties, the range they cover is conspicuously wide. The CDU/CSU varies between -
11.56 on the left and 50 on the right, the OVP between -17.1 and 45.9 and the KVP 
between -26.2 and 19.7. Only the position of the CDA displays strong continuity with a 
range of less than 20. Nonetheless, some of the outliers can be explained fairly easily 
and in general, as the following section will show, the graphs correspond to expectations 
in mapping the policy changes of Christian Democratic parties. 
Some of the outliers can be explained fairly easily: post-war reconstruction in 
West Germany required state intervention pushing the CDU/CSU into the centre-left on 
the graph. Against this backdrop, the position of the party in 1957 stands out very clearly 
as the furthest right wing outlier. Intriguingly, this occurred at precisely the time that 
relations between the Union and business interest groups were at their most fractious. 
Adenauer had pushed through the historic pension reform in 1956 against the wishes of 
employers groups, the business wing of the Union and the CSU". Some Christian 
Democrats had begun to express their unhappiness about the extent of state involvement 
in the economy. It seems quite plausible that the manifesto, as part of the famous 'Keine 
Experimente' campaign, was intended as a gesture of conciliation to these groups. 
Moreover, after a reform of the election law in 1956 had raised the number of 
constituency seats needed to win Bundestag representation to three for those parties not 
passing the 5% threshold, a more right-wing programme could also have been used to 
attract voters of the smaller right-wing parties (Refugee Party, German Party). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the CDU/CSU was much closer to the centre-ground 
although the parties drift back out right in reaction to the policies of the Social-Liberal 
government. This trend culminated in 1983, the second furthest right-wing outlier, 
where Kohl's promised spiritual-moral turning point and economic cutbacks resulted in 
a more right-wing programme. The feeling that this promise was not fulfilled and the 
increasing domestic inaction of the Kohl government also seems to be reflected in the 
more centrist agenda of 1987. Since unification, CDU/CSU manifestos have shifted back 
rightwards. This again conforms to our expectations as economic problems have forced 
the party in government to examine how to make Germany an attractive location for 
investment (the Standort Deutschlands debate) while at the same time, responding to the 
increasing public concern with law and order issues. The movement of the CDU/CSU on 
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the left-right scale therefore does seem quite convincing even if the scale of the swings 
seems rather exaggerated. 
The Austrian People's Party's initial scores on the left-right axis appear too far 
to the right. There was, after all, a brief "French period" in the early history of the OVP 
when the party was thought to be on the centre-left and closer to the more progressive 
French vision of Christian Democracy than the version dominant in West Germany 
(Kriechbaumer 1990:64). One possible explanation of the OVP's position is that the 
party was keen to stress its independence from the pre-war Christian Socials. As a result, 
themes of freedom, human rights and the free market were important given the weak 
democratic credentials and anti-capitalism of the Christian Socials. From 1956 until 
1971, the OVP moved into a more centrist position as technocratic themes ("politics 
with a slide rule rather than a wine glass") became increasingly central. The abrupt lurch 
back to the right at this later date can be accounted for by the actions of the People's 
Party leadership at the time. After the OVP had been cast into opposition, a very definite 
strategic choice was made by party leader Schleinzer to move the party to the right in 
order to capture some FPO voters (Kriechbaumer 1995:56). The embrace of new ideas 
such as participatory democracy, education and international solidarity in the Salzburg 
programme which depicted the OVP as a "party of the progressive middle" is also 
captured by Figure 8.1. The decisive movement of the party to the left tends to confirm 
the idea that the process of self-examination and experimentation with new ideas was 
deeper in the People's Party than in their West German counterpartss. 
As the era of Social Democratic domination came to an end in Austria and 
Austro-Keynesianism began to fail, the OVP began once more to adopt a more market-
oriented platform stressing privatisation and state cutbacks, especially after the near-
collapse of the state-run industries in 1985. Since this point, the OVP has continued this 
rightward course, albeit with a return to the centre in 1990 when the chairmanship was 
taken over by the moderate Josef Riegler. Under both Busek and current OVP leader 
Schiissel, the People's Party have moved unmistakably to a position on the right of the 
political spectrum. Given the evidence of Chapter 6 which demonstrated the 
traditionalist conservative positions adopted by the party under the Schiissel-Khol axis, 
the OVP's more centrist position in 1999 is unexpected but this will be further explored 
in later sections. 
4 The pension refonn was passed in the National Executive of the Union only by a narrow 
majority (Schwarz, 1997:224-8). 
S See Chapter 3, Section III. 
229 
The pattern of the Dutch confessionals' left-right placement also seems to fit the 
historical evidence quite neatly. The parties are in appropriate positions, the KVP being 
to the left of the ARP and the CHU. All three parties drifted towards the left over the 
course of the following decades, albeit at different rates with the exception being the 
KVP and CHU's sudden swing rightwards in 1967. This followed the breakdown of the 
Cals cabinet in 1966 when the right wing of the KVP in parliament brought down the 
more progressive government. However, the continuing electoral decay of the 
confessionals, particularly the KVP and CHU, prompted another significant swing to the 
left in the following election. What the data does support very clearly is the increasing 
compatibility of the confessional parties6• In programmatic terms, the merger was far 
less problematic by 1971 than it would have been previously. An additional clear feature 
is the different response of the CDA to electoral decline. Whereas the loss of votes 
caused fluctuations in the policy positions of the confessionals, the merged party has 
stuck to a fairly consistent position just to the left of centre despite the disaster of 1994 
and the failure in opposition before 1998. A number of possible explanations could be 
suggested for this apparent anomaly. Chapter 7 suggested that the election manifesto of 
the CDA did mark quite a departure for the party compared to 1994 and there remains 
the chance that change did take place but has not been recorded by the scale. This will 
be examined later on. Alternatively, it might be proposed that the difficulty in effecting 
the merger constrained the party's options in subsequent years. A programme which was 
the result of sustained and heated debate between the parties could not be easily 
jettisoned subsequently. 
Table 8.2. Manifesto Left-right Placement- averages by period 
CDU/CSU OVP KVP ARP CHU CDA 
1945-2000 10.9 16.9 -1.9 5.0 8.9 -8.5 
1945-1965 6.5 28.6 2.7 13.8 17.5 
1966-1985 4.9 1.9 -11.0 -12.5 -8.3 -14.2 
1986-2000 15.0 22.8 -4.2 
*1986-2000 23.6 
*excludes the 1990 Bundestag electIOn 
The table above presents averages across different periods to analyse further the patterns 
of the left-right placement of the three parties. The clearest contrast emerging is the 
divergence between the German and Austrian parties on one hand and the Dutch on the 
other. The CDA and to some extent, its component predecessors, are very obviously to 
the left of the CDUlCSU and the OVP. The Dutch party has frequently been identified 
as amongst the most 'pure' Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe and its 
6 See Chapter 3. 
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centrist position is less surprising, particularly as its earliest programmes were "mildly 
progressive" (Irving 1979:210). Furthermore, with a competitor to the right (at least on 
socio-economic policy) in the shape of the VVD, there is less incentive for the party to 
depart from its centrist moorings although the party did move to a slightly more right-
wing position under Lubbers. The breakdown of averages by period reveals that the 
OVP's shift rightwards in manifesto emphases in recent years is just about as significant 
as its move to the centre-left was in the 1970s. This gives further support to the account 
of the Austrian People's Party in Chapter 6. In contrast, change in the CDU/CSU's left-
right position is much more gradual. Yet if we exclude the 1990 Bundestag unification 
election, there is enough evidence to suggest that there has been a considerable 
movement to the right. What shift there has been in regard to the CDA has also been in 
this direction but once more it must be stressed that this has not been a massive change. 
This is again borne out by looking at the standard deviations, which give an indication of 
the stability of the left-right position. The standard deviation of the left-right score for 
the CDA is 6.31 while for the same period (i.e. only 1977-2000) the equivalent figure 
for the OVP is 21.2 and 15.3 for the CDU/CSU (8.09 if 1990 is excluded). 
In conclusion, Figure 8.1 shows a definite shift to the right in the manifesto 
positions of the CDUlCSU from the loss of office up until 1983 and then again 
following unification. Although the Kohl government never fulfilled the rhetoric of an 
economic turning-point in the 1980s (Webber 1992; ZohlnhOfer 1999), Chapter 5 
illustrated that the party in government pursued a policy of welfare state retrenchment 
and market liberalisation in the 1990s. The influence of the social wing of the party 
dwindled and relations with the trade union federation deteriorated markedly. Figure 8.1 
also highlights the OVP's increasingly pronounced rightward course since the 1970s. 
This again corresponded to the analysis of Chapters 3 and 6. After the innovations of the 
early 1970s, the party increasingly focused its attack on the SP(,) government's 
economic policy, particularly after the crisis of the state industries. However, the larger 
standard deviation also confirms that in the face of electoral failure, the People's Party's 
strategy was not especially consistent. The placement of the CDA on the left-right axis 
over the last two decades does stand out but not just for the Dutch party's relatively 
leftist stance; what is equally striking is that regardless of severe electoral problems, the 
party has maintained a more stable position than the OVP. These findings are certainly 
interesting and to a large extent tally with the evidence of Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7 but 
there remains the possibility that the left-right scale is nonetheless masking or distorting 
trends within the structure of issue salience for these three parties. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look in more detail at the programmes in question. 
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IV. Issue salience by period 
Tables 8.3, 8.5 and 8.8 rank the stress accorded to the main policy domains for the 
CDU/CSU, GYP and CDA in election manifestos by period with the average proportion 
of text dedicated to the issue in brackets e.g. in the 1945-65 period, market regulation 
was the third most emphasised issue with an average 6.65% of CDU/CSU manifestos 
devoted to it. 
Table 8.3 Ranking of CDU/CSU average manifesto emphases by period 
Technology and infrastructure 
Welfare state expansion 
Market regulation 
Free enterprise 
Political authority 
Foreign special relationships: positive 
Non-economic demographic groups 
Social harmony 
Agriculture and farmers 
Economic orlhodoxy 
Governmental and administrative efficiency 
Social Justice 
European Community: positive 
Freedom and human rights 
Military: positive 
Environmental protection 
Law and order 
Traditional morality: positive 
Incentives 
1945-65 1966-85 1986-98 1986-98* 
1 (9.07) 1 (9.15) 1 (9.47) 2 (8.24) 
2 (8.78) 2 (6.79) 5 (5.85) 10 (4.07) 
3 (6.65) 
4 (6.35) 
5 (5.23) 10 
5 (5.23) 5 
7 (5.0?) 
8 (5.06) 
9 (4.76) 
10 (4.31) 3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
9 
(3.19) 
(5.07) 
(6.18) 
(5.4) 
(4.67) 
(4.36) 
(4.16) 
(4.11 ) 
8 (4.41) 
10 (3.91) 9 
7 (4.92) 6 
9 (3.92) 5 
4 (7.31 ) 3 
2 (8.44) 4 
3 (7.48) 1 
6 (5.13) 7 
8 
(4.56) 
(4.64) 
(5.23) 
(7.99) 
(6.87) 
(8.65) 
(4.64) 
(4.61) 
*excluding 1990 
The CDU/CSU data has been altered to include both the averages for the whole 1986-98 
periods and for this period without the 1990 election. Several surprising features present 
themselves: first, the relative lack of traditionalism in the early manifestos is 
unexpected. From the early stages of the Union parties, the principle focus was on 
technological, infrastructural and economic issues and this remains the case until the 
emphasis begins to change in the most recent period. Second, several unlikely issue 
areas have actually increased in importance in the past couple of decades. Although the 
agrarian sector continues to contract, references to agriculture and farmers have 
increased (7th in the list in the 1986-98 period). Equally, positive references to traditional 
morality have increased, a particularly interesting phenomenon given its earlier relative 
lack of significance. 
Other elements of Table 8.3 are less surprising. The weight of positive 
references to the ECIEU increases through time, acquiring particular significance in the 
Kohl era. The rising prominence (although slightly checked since unification) of 
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governmental and administrative efficiency is also predictable, the CDU/CSU having 
come to office promising state cutbacks. Another consequential development is the 
sudden rise of law and order as a key policy area within manifesto documents. If the 
1990 election is excluded, law and order becomes the number one priority in the most 
recent era which is consistent with the analysis of Section III of Chapter 5 which showed 
that crime and security themes had developed into a major CDU theme by the time of 
the ZukunJtsprogramm in 1998. Indeed, by excluding the 1990 figures, the programmes 
for the CDU/CSU in the last two decades indicate a new strategy: a mixture of 
traditionalist conservative concerns (law and order, traditional morality, agriculture and 
farmers) with strong pro-European and environmentalist elements with a concurrent 
reduction in the weight of interventionist policies. This is essentially confirmed by Table 
8.4 which additionally reveals the clear movement between 1994 and 1998 towards a 
more free market based programme with governmental and administrative efficiency 
and free enterprise increasingly important themes. The table also shows the fading of the 
CDU/CSU's green profile: by 1998 environmental protection had fallen to 9th on the list 
and all other major parties including the PDS gave more attention to green issues than 
the Christian Democrats. An interesting anomaly is the emphasis on positive mentions of 
labour groups in 1998 which appears to be an attempt to repair the damaged relations 
with the Trade Union Federation'. 
Table 8.4. CDU/CSU Issue Salience in Elections in the 1990s 
Environmental protection 
Technology and Infrastructure 
Welfare State Expansion 
Internationalism: positive 
Non-economic Demographic Groups 
Traditional Morality: positive 
European Community: positive 
Agriculture and Farmers 
Law and Order 
Market Regulation 
Incentives 
Social Harmony 
Free Enterprise 
Labour Groups: positive 
National Way of Life: positive 
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 
7 See Chapter 5, Section I. 
1990 1994 1998 
1 (13.16) 4 (7.25) 9 (4.19) 
1 (13.16) 2 (9.42) 4 (6.51) 
3 (11.18) 
4 (7.89) 
4 (7.84) 6 (6.16) 
6 (6.58) 5 (6.88) 7 (4.19) 
7 (5.26) 9 (5.07) 2 (7.91) 
8 (3.95) 8 (5.43) 
8 (3.95) 1 (15.22) 3 (7.44) 
8 (3.95) 7 (5.8) 
3 (7.61) 8 (5.12) 
10 (3.99) 9 (4.19) 
4 (6.51) 
6 (6.05) 
9 (4.19) 
1 (10.23) 
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Table 8.5 confinns once more the 6vP's relocation on the right since the mid-1980s but 
does so in more depth. While the party has reclaimed its place on the right of centre in 
recent years, it has not been through stressing the same issues. Certainly, free enterprise 
and economic incentives have become vital once more but issue areas previously 
marginal have also become more central, namely governmental and administrative 
efficiency, economic orthodoxy and political authority. Equally striking is the falling 
importance of democracy, freedom and human rights and particularly social justice as 
well as the more traditionalist concerns of national way of life, social hannony and 
agriculture and fanners. Indeed, the changes in the 6vp in the past twenty years are 
accurately captured by Table 8.5, tracing the transition from free market centre-right 
party with traditionalist concerns through the Salzburg period of re-evaluation (the 
interest in education, democracy, culture) in the 1970s to the blend of neo-liberal 
economics with cultural traditionalism that the party articulated in the late 1990s. 
Table 8.5. Ranking of6vp average manifesto emphases by period 
Free enterprise 
Incentives 
Freedom and human rights 
Democracy 
Social justice 
National way of life: positive 
Social harmony 
Agriculture and farmers 
Foreign special relationships: positive 
Welfare state expansion 
Productivity 
Technology and infrastructure 
Economic orthodoxy 
Culture 
Education expansion 
Non-economic demographic groups 
Economic goals 
Environmental protection 
Governmental and administrative efficiency 
Political authority 
Law and Order 
1945-65 
1 (9.68) 
2 (8.5) 
3 (7.4) 
4 (6.42) 
5 (6.14) 
6 (4.6) 
8 (5.12) 
7 (5.14) 
9 (4.9) 
10 (4.46) 
1966-85 
7 (5.3) 
2 (7.25) 
6 (5.55) 
8 (4.65) 
1 (10.32) 
3 (7.07) 
10 (4.3) 
9 (4.35) 
5 (5.85) 
4 (6.82) 
1986·99 
1 (11.84) 
9 (3.64) 
3 (6.22) 
7 (4.28) 
10 (3.52) 
6 (4.36) 
4 (6.11 ) 
2 (7.53) 
5 (5.55) 
8 (3.89) 
Table 8.6 showing recent issue salience in 6vp election manifestos highlights the 
6vP's lack of a consistent strategy in the 1990s as it struggled with the challenges it 
faced. Environmental protection, an integral theme in 1990 and 1994, drops from the 
party's agenda later in the decadeS. The 1995 programme was marked by a very strong 
concentration on free market themes with over a third of the entire manifesto dedicated 
to governmental and administrative efficiency, free enterprise and economic orthodoxy. 
234 
Table 8.6 also illustrates the influence of the Schiissel-Khol course in 1999 more clearly 
than the left-right axis. Where the latter scale showed only a movement towards the 
centre, the table shows that this obscures the heavy emphasis on law and order and 
traditional morality. 
Table 8.6 6vp Issue Salience in Elections in the 1990s 
1990 
Environmental protection 1 (14.2) 
Free Enterprise 2 (9.1) 
Technology and Infrastructure 3 (6) 
Education Expansion 4 (5.8) 
Political Authority 5 (5.1) 
Internationalism: positive 6 (4.9) 
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency7 (4.7) 
Welfare State Expansion 8 (4.4) 
Social Harmony 9 (3.8) 
Democracy 10 (3.6) 
Law and Order 
Economic Goals 
Incentives 
Freedom and Human Rights 
Economic Orthodoxy 
Productivity 
Economic Goals 
European Community: positive 
Traditional morality: positive 
Non-economic Demographic Groups 
1994 
3 (7.47) 
1 (9.38) 
6 (5.46) 
9 (3.46) 
4 (5.65) 
8 (3.55) 
2 (7.92) 
4 (5.65) 
7 (3.73) 
10 (3.28) 
1995 1999 
~ 
2 (14.17) 5 (7.33) 
7 (6.67) 6 (7.15) 
3 (8.7) 
6 (7.5) 
1 (15.42) 7 (4.79) 
9 (6.25) 8 (4.72) 
10 (1.67) 10 (3.6) 
1 (9.82) 
4 (10.83) 
3 (12.08) 
5 (9.58) 
7 (6.67) 
2 (9.26) 
4 (8.02) 
9 (4.47) 
Table 8.7 Ranking of Dutch confessional9 average manifesto emphases by period 
1945-65 1966-75 
Traditional morality: positive 1 (9.82) 9 (4.03) 
Welfare state expansion 2 (7.92) 1 (8.71) 
Multiculturalism: positive 3 (5.16) 
Social justice 4 (4.81) 3 (5.07) 
Free enterprise 5 (4.59) 
Agriculture and farmers 6 (4.36) 
Incentives 7 (4.35) 
Non-economic demographic groups 8 (3.75) 7 (4.27) 
Corporatism 9 (3.60) 
Technology and infrastructure 10 (3.26) 6 (4.52) 
Democracy 2 (6.97) 
Culture 5 (4.59) 
Internationalism: positive 4 (5.01) 
Education expansion 8 (4.17) 
Environmental protection 10 (3.84) 
The order of the combined Dutch confessionals' manifestos is chiefly interesting as a 
contrast to the German and Austrian Christian Democrats and supports the analysis of 
8 See Chapter 6, Section III. 
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Chapter 2, Section III which highlighted the confessionals' much firmer views on the 
regulation of public morality. In the 1945-65 period, traditional morality played a major 
role while the large amount of text about multiculturalism was clearly in support of the 
piIIarised system 10. In the last years of their existence, the structure of issue salience for 
the parties changed dramatically as traditional morality and support for multiculturalism 
were downplayed in favour of issues more commonly associated with the left (welfare 
expansion, democracy, internationalism). This instability in the confessionals' 
manifestos gives a further indication of their desperation as the process of depillarisation 
rendered their position more vulnerable. 
Table 8.8. Ranking of CD A average manifesto emphases by period 
Welfare state expansion 
Internationalism: positive 
Environmental protection 
Technology and infrastructure 
Education expansion 
Social justice 
Govt and administrative efficiency 
Economic goals 
European Community: positive 
Democracy 
Law and order 
Non-economic demographic groups 
1975-85 
1 (7.83) 
2 (6.5) 
3 (6) 
4 (4.8) 
5 (4.57) 
6 (4.23) 
7 (4.03) 
8 (3.57) 
9 (3.47) 
10 (3.4) 
1986-98 
6 (4.47) 
3 (6.33) 
1 (8.67) 
3 (5.88) 
6 (4.47) 
9 (3.16) 
2 (6.93) 
7 (3.89) 
3 (5.15) 
8 (3.38) 
As was suggested by the left-right scale in Section II, there is a strong sense of 
continuity in the balance of the policy emphases in CDA manifestos by period as 
environmentalism, internationalism, technology and education receive a consistently 
high amount of attention. However, Table 8.9 which shows the structure of issue 
salience in the two elections in the 1990s suggests that the stability shown in Table 8.8 
and Figure 8.2 hides considerable change. Environmentalism remained a major theme in 
the 1990s but following the loss of office and the changes in leadership, governmental 
and administrative efficiency declined in significance in 1998. Furthermore, welfare 
state expansion becomes the most heavily stressed policy having not been relevant in 
1994. The return to traditional morality and the heightened interest in law and order are 
further interesting aspects of the CDA's reaction to opposition. Therefore, while the left-
right scale registered little change in the position of the CDA, Table 8.9 confirms the 
analysis of chapter 7 which found evidence of a clear programmatic response of the 
CDA to opposition. 
9 The ARP, KVP and CHU scores have been combined for the sake of clarity to produce a single 
table. 
10 See Chapter 2, Section II. 
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Table 8.9 CDA Issue Salience in Elections in the 1990s 
Environmental protection 
Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 
Intemationalism: positive 
European Community: positive 
Market Regulation 
Law and Order 
Technology and Infrastructure 
Education Expansion 
Social Harmony 
Multiculturalism: positive 
Welfare State Expansion 
Traditional Morality: positive 
Non-economic Demographic Groups 
Conclusion 
1994 
1 (8.73) 
2 (8.23) 
3 (7.53) 
4 (5.29) 
5 (4.69) 
6 (4.64) 
7 (4.14) 
8 (4.09) 
9 (3.29) 
10 (2.79) 
1998 
2 (6.85) 
10 (3.99) 
7 (4.59) 
3 (6.66) 
6 (4.98) 
9 (4.29) 
4 (6.36) 
1 (9.32) 
5 (5.13) 
8 (4.49) 
From tables 8.3, 8.5 and 8.8, immediate differences between the countries are clear: the 
CDUlCSU has always prized technology and infrastructure as a vital policy area 
whereas the 6vp has consistently emphasised free enterprise the most. Social justice has 
frequently been prioritised by the merged CDA and its predecessors and also, to some 
extent, by the GVP while its relevance in CDU/CSU programmes has been negligible. 
The German sister parties have typically devoted a sizeable amount of text to social 
harmony, a theme of less significance for the Austrian People's Party and even less 
important in the Dutch context. 
By the 1990s, however, strong convergence in the policy priorities can be 
detected. In all three countries, Christian Democrats re-discovered more traditional 
issues in the 1990s: positive depictions of traditional morality and social harmony were 
increasingly important aspects of manifestos. Law and order became a central theme: it 
was the main topic of the manifestos of the CDU/CSU in 1994 and the 6vp in 1999, the 
second most emphasised issue in the 6vp manifesto of 1994 and third highest ranked 
policy area in the CDU/CSU and CDA programmes in 1998. Furthermore, 
environmentalism had become increasingly marginal in electoral programmes. The 
'green' clothing donned earlier had been largely discarded by the end of the decade and 
only the CDA continued to prioritise green ideas by the last election of the decade. 
Signs of an increasingly technocratic version of Christian Democracy were also 
visible. In addition to a shared emphasis on technology and infrastructure, governmental 
and administrative efficiency was another vital Christian Democratic theme. 
Nevertheless, by the last election of the decade, both the CDA and 6vp had recoiled 
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from using this as a dominant topic. Instead, the Dutch party adopted a more social 
platform while the Austrians mixed traditionalism with a new pro-Europeanism. Apart 
from the 1998 CDA programme, there has also been a diminished concern for social 
interventionism. References to social justice have become much rarer and welfare state 
expansion has dropped in prominence, particularly in CDU/CSU manifestos where it 
was not among the most salient issues in either 1994 or 1998. 
The representation of the parties presented here fits well with the evidence of 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The case studies of the parties in the 1990s highlighted a common 
incorporation of crime and security concerns, movement towards greater market 
liberalism, a renewed emphasis on the family and a concurrent interest in welfare 
reform. Following issue salience theory, we would not expect the last trend to be 
expressed through mentions of social cutbacks, but through less emphasis on 
interventionism. As shown above, each of these three trends has been reflected in the 
structure of issue salience within CDUlCSU, GVP and CDA manifestos in recent years 
although the case of the CDA is less straightforward. While the CDU and the OVP both 
moved rightwards in the 1990s, one aspect of the CDA's response to opposition was to 
revive the party's social profile. Once more, this can be seen in the relative priorities of 
the 1998 manifesto where welfare state expansion was the most emphasised policy 
domain. 
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V. An Alternative to the left-right scale 
Section III illustrated that the CMP data ordered into the left-right schema appeared to 
give a plausible representation of the parties' policy movements over time. However, 
Section IV gave a far more nuanced portrait of the parties' manifestos and highlighted 
that the left-right approach missed more subtle changes in the construction of Christian 
Democratic programmes, most notably the response of the CDA to four years of 
opposition in 1998 and the OVP's adoption of a more traditionalist position in 1999. 
There is a danger therefore that by focusing exclusively on the left-right scale, other 
critical developments are overlooked (see also Penning and Kernan's recent Dutch 
election study 2002). The trends presented also suggest an alternative framework for 
interpreting the movements of Christian Democratic parties. In all three cases, there was 
a common mixture of traditionalist ideas with support for a mixed economy (Le. a 
predominantly market based model with limited state interventionism). This is again 
consistent with the examination of the essence of Christian Democracy in Chapter I. 
The precise balance of these themes is different across nations and varies through time 
but the shared feature of Christian Democratic parties is the synthesis of these ideas. 
Therefore, it is useful to consider a non-dichotomous means of measurement. The tables 
and analysis of the previous section suggest a threefold division of Christian Democratic 
manifesto emphases: 
1) free market liberalism 
2) social-economic interventionism 
3) social-cultural traditionalism 
The ordering of the CMP variables into the categories used here is as follows: 
Table 8.10 
Free Market Liberalism 
Freedom and human rights 
Government and 
administrative efficiency 
Free enterprise 
Economic incentives 
Protectionism: negative 
Economic orthodoxy 
Welfare state limitation 
Labour groups: negative 
Social-Economic 
Interventionism 
Market regulation 
Economic planning 
Keynesian demand 
management 
Controlled economy 
N ationalisation 
Social justice 
Welfare state expansion 
Education expansion 
Corporatism 
Labour groups: positive 
Social-Cultural 
Traditionalism 
Military: positive 
Constitutionalism: positive 
Political authority 
National way of life: positive 
Traditional morality: positive 
Law and order 
Social harmony 
Agriculture and farmers 
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There are a number of disputable inclusions and exclusions. As stated before, the 
freedom and human rights variable is unfortunately rather broad and might include 
policies aimed at supporting human rights abroad rather than the economic aspect being 
measured here. Productivity, a possible candidate for incorporation under Free Market 
Liberalism, has been omitted because it is too vague and does not specify how 
productivity is to be increased. The placement of corporatism and labour groups under 
social-economic interventionism might be queried but as Christian Democratic social 
policy has typically been agreed upon through neo-corporatist channels involving labour 
groups, their inclusion seems reasonable. 
Figure 8.3 shows the manifesto emphases of the CDU/CSU using the threefold 
division proposed above. The balance between free market liberalism, social-economic 
interventionism and social-cultural traditionalism has swung quite a lot over the 1949-98 
period. Two periods where one category consistently received most emphasis over a 
succession of elections are visible. From the election of 1961 to 1980, social economic 
interventionism was the highest priority within Christian Democratic manifestos. With 
the candidacy of StrauB in 1980 this changed and the Union concentrated on social-
cultural traditionalism while Kohl's platform of social cutbacks in 1983 pushed free 
market liberalism to the top of the agenda. Subsequently, however, the last four elections 
have witnessed an increasing concentration on traditionalist ideas and disregarding the 
exceptional election of 1990, a simultaneous drop in social-economic interventionism. 
The tum towards traditionalism since 1987 is quite striking as can be seen in Table 8.11 
below. It is also emphasised by the growing gap between the different ideological strains 
within Christian Democratic manifestos. From the 1960s until the 1980s, the gap 
between the categories was quite narrow. Ever since then, the structure of emphases has 
developed in a less balanced way. If 1990 is excluded, there has been no consistent 
increase or decrease in the free market component but state intervention has clearly 
receded in importance while traditionalism has assumed a more central role. 
Table 8.11 Structure of CDU/CSU Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1949-65 17.7 23.9 20.8 
1966-85 20.9 19.1 20.1 
1986-98 12.6 15.2 29.0 
Trend (r/year) 
-0.07 -0.28 0.23 1949-98 
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GVP manifestos are quite differently organised in relation to their issue 
emphases. The predominant theme has been free market liberalism- in ten out of sixteen 
elections, it has been the most heavily stressed of the three categories. The GVP first 
developed market-based programmes in the Raab era and it was also the initial response 
of the party to being out of government in 1971. When the Austrian economy ran into 
difficulties during the 1980s, the party again adopted predominantly market-centred 
manifestos although once in office, the party's priorities became less consistent. 
Interventionism reached its peak in GVP manifestos between the 1960s and 1970s, 
although even then its importance varied from election to election. Over the past two 
decades, its significance has declined as shown by Table 8.12. Aside from the earliest 
Nationalrat elections, there has been a relative lack of concern for traditionalist issues. It 
is interesting that the traditionalism was quite a significant aspect of the 1994 
programme under Busek's leadership. This would seem to confirm his weakness in the 
party as a whole and the lack of consensus his liberal, open standpoint generated. 
Nonetheless, the 1999 manifesto stands out so clearly for its unmistakably traditionalist 
position. The Schiissel-Khol course represented an abandonment of the profoundly 
market-dominated 1995 platform where an unprecedented 55% of the manifesto was 
devoted to free market themes. The adoption of a more traditionalist stance can also be 
seen in Table 8.12 although trends are weak due to the GVP's inconsistent strategy since 
the 1980s. 
Table 8.12 Structure ofGVP Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1949-65 29.4 14.7 22.9 
1966-85 21.3 18.8 10.7 
1986-99 30.1 12.0 1B.9 
Trend (r/year) 
1949-99 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 
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Figure 8.4 OVP Manifesto Emphases 
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The most outstanding feature of Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 and confirmed by the tables 
below is the decline of traditionalism in the manifestos of the confessional parties. For 
each of the three parties, the emphasis given to these issues fell markedly before the 
merger of the CDA. In both the ARP and the KVP, the most accentuated category was 
social-economic interventionism although the Anti-Revolutionaries' manifestos retained 
quite an even balance between issues until the last few elections. The leftward direction 
of the CHU can also be seen in its increasing focus on state intervention which brought 
it much closer to the other two parties. 
Table 8.13 Structure ofKVP Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1945-65 15.4 25.7 17.6 
1966-75 17.4 21.2 10.5 
Trend (r/year) 
1945-75 0.12 0.06 -0.56 
Table 8.14 Structure of ARP Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1945-65 19.1 21.4 19.6 
1966-75 13.7 21.3 12.0 
Trend (r/year) 
1945-75 -0.27 -0.04 -0.50 
Table 8.15 Structure of CHU Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1945-65 15.4 17.1 25.8 
1966-75 16.7 19.5 14.4 
Trend (r/year) 
1945-75 -0.01 0.26 -0.62 
Since the formation of the CDA, social-economic interventionism has been the prime 
focus in half of the eight Tweede Kamer elections. However until 1998, it seemed to be 
dropping in importance. From the 1982 election, after which Lubbers 'no-nonsense' 
cabinet took office1t, there was a jump in the attention given to free market economics. 
This remains stable until 1998 when the CDA stepped back from the neo-liberal line 
represented by Brinkman in 1994. Furthermore, similar to the CDU/CSU and the OVP, 
there has also been an undoubted rise in the use of social-cultural traditionalism over the 
last few elections. By 1998, this theme received the most amount of text in the 
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manifesto. This is quite staggering when the history of the confessionals is examined: 
the last time traditionalist ideas had assumed such importance was in 1956 for the CHU 
and 1952 for the ARP and KVP. Therefore, using the threefold classification, it is 
possible to see that there was quite a clear reaction by the CDA to the defeat in 1994 
resulting in a fundamental reorganisation of the party's priorities. 
Table 8.16 Structure of CD A Manifestos- Average by Period and Trends 
Free Market Liberalism Social-Economic Social-Cultural 
Interventionism Traditionalism 
1976-85 13.5 20.9 8.6 
1986-98 14.5 16.1 14.7 
Trend (r/year) 
1976-98 -0.06 -0.25 0.58 
II However, van Agt, not Lubbers, had been the leading candidate in the election. 
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Figure 8.7 CHU Manifesto Emphases 
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Figure 8.8 COA Manifesto Emphases 
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VI. Conclusion 
The preceding sections have analysed the development of Christian Democratic 
manifestos in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands through a variety of different 
methods. The left-right scale used in Section III broadly matched expectations of the 
parties' positions although the swings it registered appeared exaggerated. Nonetheless, 
as Section IV proved, it also missed crucial changes within Christian Democratic issue 
salience. Drawing on these results and the description of the core of Christian 
Democracy presented in Chapter 1, it was contended that the structure of issue salience 
in Christian Democratic manifestos can best be understood through a threefold division 
of free market liberalism, social-economic interventionism and social-cultural 
traditionalism. This allows for a greater appreciation of the dynamics within the parties 
than a simple dichotomous measure as there is often more than one factional struggle 
within Christian Democratic parties. As was shown in Chapter 3 and in the later case 
studies of the parties in the 1990s, crucial battles have taken place not just between the 
social and business-oriented wings but also between modernising and traditionalist 
factions. Any examination of change within Christian Democracy must, therefore, 
include some consideration of traditionalism. 
There remams the risk of confusing short-term political fads with more 
significant ideological modifications. The immediate goal of manifestos is not just to 
articulate a political identity grounded in historic ideologies that is capable of mobilising 
adherents; they must also present a popular policy programme which accords with the 
general mood of the electorate. Rising public interest in green issues was mirrored in the 
political programmes of virtually all parties and equally, a common awareness of 
governmental and administrative efficiency is now spreading across the political 
spectrum. Can we be certain that the developments identified in this chapter are of 
lasting significance if manifestos are by their nature so responsive? This is partly a 
temporal question. Clearly, if a party's structure of issue salience remains radically 
different for a sustained period of time then it would seem safe to conclude that real 
change has occurred. The averages used for the top ranking issue priorities in section IV 
and V help to minimise the hazards of overestimating short-term change and hence 
indicate that the programmatic alterations found here are of more enduring significance. 
In terms of manifesto structure, the analysis highlighted that each party has to 
some extent adapted to political, social and economic trends. The final years of the 
confessional parties in the Netherlands illustrated one possible response to change. 
Confronted by a sudden loss of voters and a rapidly changing political environment, 
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each party abandoned many of their former priorities, notably traditionalist issues, and 
instead incorporated a new range of social concerns. As shown by Sections III and IV, 
however, this tactic has not been adopted by Christian Democrats in the 1990s as they 
faced electoral decline. On the contrary, each of the parties has heavily stressed their 
social and cultural traditionalism in election manifestos in the 1990s. To some extent, 
this can be attributed to their absorption of law and order issues, a previously 
insignificant theme, but it has also resulted from their renewed interest in traditional 
morality and social harmony. The analysis also revealed that the strain of social 
interventionism within Christian Democracy has clearly declined in prominence in the 
programmes of the CDU/CSU and the CDA. The shift to rhetoric and policies based on 
austerity and retrenchment under the leadership of Kohl and Lubbers respectively was 
therefore echoed in the structure of manifestos. 6vp programmes followed a similar if 
less consistent path. By the end of the 1990s, however, there was greater variation in the 
direction of the parties. The influence of the Standort debate could be seen on the 
CDU/CSU's more market-orientated 1998 programme which heavily stressed 
governmental and administrative efficiency and free enterprise. In contrast, both the 
Austrian and Dutch Christian Democrats retreated from strongly free market 
programmes after disappointing election results. 
Van Kersbergen (1999:369) identified two policy-related predicaments at the 
heart of Christian Democratic parties' problems in the 1990s. The first pertained to "the 
complicated if not paradoxical struggle to regulate publicly issues of private morality 
and the family on the basis of Christian norms and values" in increasingly individualist 
and secular societies. The second, and for van Kersbergen more decisive, problem was 
the question of how to strike "a politically viable balance between upholding and 
transforming the continental welfare state regimes in an increasingly unfavourable social 
and economic context". The analysis of the manifesto data here would suggest that in 
terms of the former dilemma there has been increasing convergence in the behaviour of 
the parties. All the parties under scrutiny have not only continued to emphasise their 
social and cultural traditionalism but have actually increased the prominence of such 
themes in their electoral platforms. Therefore, Christian Democratic parties have not 
discarded their traditionalist agenda and continue to battle against social and cultural 
trends. Such efforts may lack broad electoral resonance but it is also vital to note the 
central role of law and order issues in recent programmes. The revitalization of 
traditionalism within Christian Democracy is therefore both a re-discovery of older 
themes and an incorporation of new popular concerns. 
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With reference to the second problem, more divergence is obvious. After an 
initially interventionist reaction to unification, the CDU/CSU moved to an increasingly 
market-based programme in 1994 and 1998. In both the 6vp and the CDA, however, 
the last election of the decade saw a markedly reduced emphasis on free market 
liberalism. The crucial similarity across all three countries was that when the Christian 
Democrats adopted a heavily free market programme, they were punished by the 
electorate at the ballot box. As was shown by the case studies in previous chapters, this 
difficulty was a central reason for the CDU's problems in the decade and was also 
relevant for the Dutch and Austrian parties. Consequently, none of the parties have 
solved the predicament of how to reconcile the need for retrenchment and adjustment 
with the typically broad social inclusion of Christian Democracy. 
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Chapter 9. The COU, QVP and CDA in the 1990s and beyond: 
At the crossroads between tradition and adaptation? 
I. Introduction 
Previous chapters have explored the political, programmatic and organisational aspects 
of the challenge to Christian Democracy in the 1990s in Gern1any, Austria and the 
Netherlands. Each of the case studies argued that the problems of the parties were not 
limited to short-term circumstances but instead that the parties' self-identity as 
Vo/ksparteien was coming under increasing stress. The extent of the electoral challenge 
varied but in all three countries, there was a clear downward trend across national and 
regional elections with the GVP and CDA sliding to their worst ever results. Of the three 
parties, the CDU was clearly in the strongest position but even it had fallen behind its 
Social Democratic rival by 1998 and both the 1994 and 1998 results were new post-1949 
lows. Other indicators (partisanship, membership) also pointed to a decline of the parties 
on the ground. The contraction of the Christian Democratic core in Austria and the 
Netherlands prompted sombre reflections on the future of the party. Yet no clear 
strategic solution existed. Efforts to open the party up to society risked the loyalty of 
regular voters (e.g. the Busek-Ied OVP in 1994). Conversely, however, concentrating on 
more traditional issues to mobilise the party faithful appeared no more successful in 
arresting the Christian Democratic electoral slide as was shown by the 1999 Austrian 
and 1998 Dutch elections. 
In programmatic and organisational terms, too, there were signs of strain. One of 
the foundations of Christian Democratic success had been the ideological breadth of 
such parties. While purporting to be an alternative to the errors of socialism and 
liberalism, Christian Democratic parties in Germany and Austria happily integrated 
former liberals, conservatives and social Catholics (Haungs 1991: 172; MOiler 
1997:265). The Dutch Christian Democrats also brought together a varied mixture of 
different religious and philosophical traditions. Accordingly, programmes tended to 
contain a fusion of the different strands within Christian Democracy, an ideological 
patchwork binding the party together. By the 1990s, there were some indications that the 
stitches of this programmatic fabric were coming apart as the social Catholic heritage of 
these parties receded in significance and social-economic policy became more oriented 
towards free market solutions. The integration of different strands of thought (social 
Catholic, conservative and liberal) under one political roof was mirrored in the federal 
party structures of the CDU and OVP which embraced regional, interest and ideological 
diversity. This form of Vo/kspartei organisation demanded a skilful mix of cultivating 
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inner-party harmony with effective decision-making, a task which proved far easier in 
government than in opposition. Yet by the 1990s, the maintenance of this balance was 
becoming increasingly problematic even for the CDU and the GYP in government. 
Though the Dutch party lacked the formal and geographical pluralism of the other 
parties, the CDA's unity was also undermined by factional battles. 
Rather than summarise the conclusions of earlier sections, this chapter will 
return to the two principal aims outlined in the first chapter. Using the evidence 
presented in chapters 4-8, some conclusions will be drawn about the reasons for the 
decline of Christian Democratic parties in the 1990s and about the parties' reaction to 
this electoral contraction. This will lead on to a final section which will briefly look at 
post-1999 developments. In Austria and the Netherlands, Christian Democrats made a 
stunning electoral recovery in 2002 and although the Union parties did not recover 
possession of the German chancellorship, the sister parties regained the initiative early in 
the second term of the red-green government. The implications of this apparent 
renaissance of Christian Democracy will be considered in terms of the themes of this 
thesis. 
II. The Causes of Christian Democratic Decline 
Erosion of Christian Democratic Core Yote 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the key social constituencies for Christian Democratic 
parties were in long-term decline. To stretch Kirchheimer's metaphor (1966), the 
'private hunting grounds' of Christian Democrats were increasingly low on game. The 
electoral support of the CDUlCSU, GYP and CDA continued to be based on the 
religiously active, the self-employed, farmers and elderly voters. With the exception of 
this last band of voters, each of these groups was shrinking. This had caused a withering 
of the electoral core of Christian Democracy which none of the parties had fully 
overcome. The CDU/CSU was most successful at winning voters from beyond this 
natural reservoir, taking a greater share of the votes of white collar employees, blue 
collar workers, civil servants and the non-religious than their equivalents in Austria and 
the Netherlands. Nonetheless, even in Germany, support for the CDU/CSU from each of 
these groups dropped in the 1990s. The GYP's problems in this regard were even more 
serious with greater competition from the SPG and the FPG for such voters. 
Occupational characteristics were less useful in explaining the vote in the Dutch context 
but the CDA's chronic weakness among secular voters was unmistakeable. 
Demographic change was more favourable to Christian Democrats in view of their 
traditional popularity among older age groups but even here there were signs that such 
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strength was being challenged. In each of the three countries, Christian Democratic 
voting in the group of voters aged roughly between 45 and 59 fell away more sharply 
than support in the electorate as a whole. Indeed, for the OVP, other areas of the 
Christian Democratic heartland (self-employed, farmers) also began to desert the OVP. 
The contraction of the social bases of Christian Democratic support did not 
entail inevitable electoral losses for such parties but rather should be understood as a 
background condition. Political parties need not be passive victims of social and cultural 
change and can respond successfully to environmental changes. As the process of 
dealignment has equally affected the stability of the Social Democratic vote, an 
increasingly independent electorate offers electoral opportunities as well as dangers. 
Nonetheless, clearly these opportunities were not taken by Christian Democratic parties 
in the 1990s. Indeed, it is striking that the CDU/CSU whose vote was less reliant on 
such core groups suffered the smallest electoral decline. The question arises then: why 
were the parties unable to counterbalance such losses? To answer this, we must look to 
both system-level changes and intra-party factors. 
Increased Party Competition 
In all three countries, Christian Democratic parties faced an intensified level of 
competition. This could be charted in party system statistics such as increased party 
fragmentation and volatility (Volkens and Klingemann 2002:162; Dalton, McAllister 
and Wattenburg 2000:31-3). The strategic dilemma resulting from this competition was 
greater for the OVP and CDA than for the CDU. Both the Austrian and Dutch parties 
faced a powerful competitor to the right with the accompanying dilemma of whether to 
battle this right-wing threat directly or to remain in a centrist position. In Austria, the 
OVP lost ground throughout the decade to the populist right-wing FPO who advocated 
restricted immigration and asylum, an anti-European policy and more extensive 
economic liberalisation. The primary concern of the right-wing liberals in the 
Netherlands, the VVD, was economic but its parliamentary leader Bolkestein also raised 
questions about Dutch asylum and European policy albeit in a far less sensationalist 
manner than Haider. Like the FPO, the VVD also gained its best ever result in this 
decade. The CDU has faced less problems in this regard apart from during the brief 
period of far-right ascendancy in 1991-2. Nonetheless, the success of the DVU in the 
Saxony-Anhalt Land election in 1998 illustrated that the Union could not take for 
granted the continuing lack of a threat on the right in all regions. 
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Greater party competition in the 1990s also resulted from the contraction of the 
mainstream political spectrum and the growing congestion around the centre-ground. 
The increasingly moderate course of the main centre-left party in Germany, Austria and 
the Netherlands produced a more compressed party arena as the differences between 
parties became less distinct. This process simultaneously reduced the ability of the 
Christian Democrats to mobilise grassroots and opened up the possibility of voters 
vacillating between the major parties. This was evident first in Austria where the sPa, 
led by Vranitzky, absorbed much of the OVP's policy rhetoric in the process 
undermining the People's Party's distinctiveness on central socio-economic questions. 
The PvdA's abandonment of the polarisation strategy and its consequently more centrist 
course was also a greater challenge to the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands. 
Another by-product of this was to deprive the CDA of its earlier unchallenged position 
in any coalition as the PvdA and the VVD overcame their longstanding antipathy. In 
Germany, this trend was only visible by 1998. Previous SPD Chancellor-candidates had 
been uninspiring choices but under SchrOder, the SPD became a far greater threat to the 
Union's political supremacy. 
A further consideration for the OVP and CDA was the rise of the green parties. 
The increasing success of moderate post-materialist parties in Austria and the 
Netherlands challenged the depth of the Christian Democratic adoption of 
environmentalism and raised questions within the parties about whether they should seck 
out the votes of young post-materialists. In Germany, the divide between the Greens and 
the CDU was too great for the party to worry too much about appealing to such voters. 
There were, however, small signs of a growing political congruence between younger 
CDU and Green politicians which might indicate that this strategic debate will playa 
larger role in Christian Democratic circles in the future. 
Issue context 
The greater level of party competition faced by Christian Democrats and the strategic 
questions arising from it was also exacerbated by the changing nature of salient issues 
across Western Europe. Fears about crime, immigration and economic insecurity 
dominated the political agenda in the 1990s l . Christian Democratic parties have been 
I In Germany, the most prominent issues in the early part of the decade as ratcd by respondcnts in 
the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen surveys concerned the effects of unification and the asylum and 
foreigners question. After 1994, replies were increasingly dominated by unemployment. The 
most important issues to the Austrian electorate were securing jobs and securing pensions 
although fighting crime, foreigners and the wasting of public funds also figured prominently 
(MUlier 2000:38). In the 1994 DNES, unemployment and crime were mentioned most as the 
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able to adapt relatively easily to the rising importance of law and order issues as has 
been shown in the individual case studies. A greater prominence was given to such 
problems in election manifestos and a discernible toughening of programmatic rhetoric 
took place, for example, in the GVP's 1999 manifesto, the CDU's 'Future Programme' 
and the CDA's 'New Ways, Fixed Values'. Christian Democrats also responded to 
public fears about increased immigration and asylum-seeking. Both the CDU and the 
GVP in government carried out measures to restrict the flow of incomers, stressed that 
illegal immigrants would not be accepted and threatened the deportation of foreigners 
who committed crime. To an extent, then, the programmes of the far-right have been co-
opted although whether this allayed public fears on the issue remained to be seen 
(Chandler 2002: 15). 
The most problematic topie for Christian Democrats concerned economic issues. 
After the failure of state socialism and the difficulties of Social Democracy, "center-
right parties in Europe might be expected to benefit from the apparent shift in the 
political agenda around the world to neo-liberalism" (Wilson 1999:260). Yet the mood 
of economic insecurity which spread around Western Europe was not advantageous to 
the Christian Democrats. Mounting unemployment, sluggish growth rates, pension 
problems and expanding budget deficits raised questions about the extent of state 
involvement in the economy and the viability of the welfare state. Economic difficulties 
were further aggravated by the convergence criteria required for EMU, putting real 
pressure on incumbent governments to tackle politically awkward economic reforms. 
For Chandler (2002: 15), the explanation for the decline of centre-right parties 
despite the victory of the market economy lay in the left's absorption of the right's 
economic agenda. Electorates across Europe appeared more willing to accept neo-
liberalism from the centre-left than their centre-right adversaries. This was undoubtedly 
true but it also neglects the specific problems confronting the Christian Democrats. As 
shown throughout this study, the Christian Democratic approach to social and economic 
policy was never wholly dominated by free market thinking. Social Catholicism entailed 
a philosophical tolerance of government intervention when lower social organisations 
failed to provide a social good or service and in practice led to Christian Democratic 
acceptance of an extensive social state. It was possible to identify a rhetorical shift in 
Christian Democracy in each of the three countries during the 1980s but policy changes 
were more limited as social expenditure continued to rise. A more extensive 
largest problems facing the country but over 50% of the survey felt there were too many asylum 
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reconstruction or even dismantling of the welfare state would have provoked opposition 
not just from numerous veto-points in the system but also from within the party. 
However, pressure for reform in the 1990s increased as the need to comply with the 
criteria for Economic and Monetary Union forced greater fiscal austerity. Accordingly, 
the CDU, GYP and CDA began to push for more welfare retrenchment and market 
liberalisation. As shown in Chapters 5 and 7, the effects of this for the German and 
Dutch Christian Democrats were nothing short of catastrophic. Although other 
contributing factors should not be ignored, the attenuated social profiles of the CDU and 
CDA resulted in unprecedented electoral losses and expulsion from government. The 
GYP's proposed programme of social cutbacks ('blood, sweat, toil and tears' according 
to Finance Minister Ditz) in 1995 did not provoke a similarly dramatic electoral collapse 
but neither did it bring the expected reward and was subsequently moderated in the 1999 
election. In each of the three countries, the adoption of a harder line on socio-economic 
policy was electorally unpopular and seriously tested the integrative capacity of 
Christian Democratic parties. 
Intra-party difficulties 
Increased party competition and the rise of divisive issues raised crucial questions about 
strategy for the Christian Democrats. Disagreements resulting from this were an 
important cause of intra-party strains. Disunity was most apparent in the GYP and the 
CDA but the CDU was also afflicted by such problems. The already high levels of 
factionalism within the Austrian People's Party was if anything aggravated in the 19905. 
This was chiefly the result of discord over coalition strategy, whether to remain in the 
Grand Coalition or to form a black-blue alliance. However, this dispute also related to 
divergent visions of the GYP's identity: a more liberal, open party against a more 
conservative, traditionalist course. By 1999, proponents of the latter option appeared to 
have prevailed but this victory was by no means assured. In addition to strategic 
quarrels, regional factionalism became increasingly disruptive as the provincial parties 
argued with each other and with the federal party while the assertiveness of the Business 
League also aroused more ill-feeling. 
Friction within the CDA escalated rapidly at the beginning of the decade. 
Growing distance between the party in government and the extra-parliamentary party 
was evident at the beginning of the decade as the latter strove for more principled 
standpoints and a greater Christian content in policy. This tension was less destructive, 
seekers. 
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however, than the antagonism over socio-economic policy which developed between the 
CDA parliamentary party and the Lubbers III cabinet. Undoubtedly, this split 
contributed to the CDA's problems in 1994 as the party openly displayed its disunity to 
the electorate. After 1994, the aim of inner party cohesion remained elusive. The 
parliamentary party was divided with a substantial number of representatives unwilling 
to accept the new leadership although harmony appeared to be restored with the election 
of de Hoop Scheffer. A further division also opened up between the extra-parliamentary 
apparatus and the parliamentary party as the former sought more control. 
Ruptures within the CDU were more restricted. A number of prominent party 
rebels had been marginalized, the party apparatus, and especially the role of General 
Secretary, had lost significance and the regional party organisations were weak. While 
the party continued in government, there was little enthusiasm within the Union for a 
challenge to the policies of the Kohl government. The main intra-party conflict was 
between the social and business wings which became more acute during the Standort 
debate and after the failure of Alliance for Jobs. Nonetheless, in comparison to the 
Austrian and Dutch parties, the CDU's problems in this regard were less serious. 
Factional disputes did not constantly undercut the authority of the central party 
leadership as in Austria nor did they badly damage the credibility of an election 
campaign as the "fit of political ineptitude" (Fogarty 1995:154) suffered by the CDA did 
in 1994. 
A further problem for each party was unpopular and/or weak leadership. No 
chairman of the C>VP could claim to have the party fully under control. Both Riegler, an 
unwilling candidate from the outset, and Busek appeared weak and unable to act against 
the power of the Leagues and the provincial parties. Neither was seen as a charismatic 
political performer (MOller, Plasser and Ulram forthcoming: 17) and both rated poorly in 
comparison to SPC> chancellor Vranitzky and FPC> leader Haider. Following their 
failures, Schiissel conveyed a more modem and popular image and promised the party a 
brighter future. However, this early potential faded as he too seemed unable to assert his 
authority against the rampant factionalism within the party and he became embroiled in 
minor scandal. His indifferent performance as Vice-Chancellor failed to stop further 
Christian Democratic electoral losses in 1999. 
The Dutch Christian Democrats were also saddled with a succession of 
unpopular leaders. In 1994, Brinkman was a controversial figure even within CDA 
circles and could not match Lubbers' wide appeal across society. His successor as 
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fractie leader, Heenna, never exerted control over the party, struggled to cope with the 
role of opposition leader and was ill at ease in the media. Following Heenna's 
resignation as parliamentary party leader, de Hoop Scheffer gave the party more forceful 
leadership but as the 1998 election analysis showed, he was rated poorly by voters in 
comparison to other candidates. 
The CDU was again the exception for most of the decade as Kohl's status as the 
chancellor of unification ensured a lingering electoral bonus. The exceptionally 
personalised campaigns run by the Christian Democrats in the successful 1990 and 1994 
Bundestag elections attested to the popularity of the Chancellor. By 1998, this bonus had 
been completely depleted. After prolonged economic difficulties and political stalemate, 
the candidacy of Kohl was now a burden, symbolising the political stagnation of the 
CDU and the government's lack of credible solutions to the nation's problems. 
Conclusion 
Christian Democratic electoral difficulties in the 1990-9 period can therefore be traced 
to a range of structural and contextual factors. The long-tenn decomposition of integral 
social constituencies was critical in accounting for the new volatility of electoral support 
but the parties were also hamstrung by their own shortcomings. Publicly aired intra-
party disagreements and ineffectual leadership gave the impression of weak parties 
caught in internal tunnoil. Even the CDU began to follow this trend post-1994. The 
higher level of intra-party tension was not just, however, the result of nationally specific 
circumstances. New issues such as law and order and immigration and asylum rose in 
prominence across the established West European democracies. While incorporating 
such themes caused anxieties among liberal Christian Democrats, this programmatic 
adjustment did not arouse serious internal difficulties. The most divisive issue was in 
fact not 'new' but the vexed question of economic and social refonn was given fresh 
relevance by the need to comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria and the 
deteriorating economic context. 
Tackling deep-rooted economic problems strained the ideological and 
organisational diversity of Christian Democratic parties. The social wing of each party 
came under pressure to accept stronger welfare and labour market refonns, putting its 
leading representatives in an awkward position. In addition, there was little indication of 
public enthusiasm for such an agenda. Referring to the general problems of centre-right 
parties in Western Europe, former CDU General Sccretary Geimer attributed their 
electoral decline to the loss of their Volkspartei profile, an observation of particular 
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pertinence to Christian Democrats. By adopting what Geimer considered in essence a 
neo-liberal economic agenda, such parties had damaged their social profile and frittered 
away their integrative capacitl. Geil3ler's criticism is, of course, a one-sided 
interpretation of the electoral problems of the centre-rights, neglecting the role of other 
factors. Nonetheless, as was seen in both the case studies and the manifesto analysis in 
Chapter 8, when Christian Democratic parties pushed a more market-centred agenda, 
they were punished by the electorate. Short-term factors such as unpopular leaders and 
internal divisions should not be ignored but it also remains to be seen whether a less 
social version of Christian Democracy has the same electoral appeal. 
III. Paralysis or adaptation: Christian Democratic Responses to Decline 
The case studies have investigated the behaviour of Christian Democratic parties in the 
1990s in terms of their strategic choices, ideological change and continuity, and 
organisational developments. The main findings of these chapters will be summarised 
here. It is worth returning at this point to Harmel and Janda's model of party change 
(1994) as outlined in Chapter 1. Party change was most likely when an external shock 
affected the party's primary objective. While the end of the Cold War caused all three 
parties to revise their basic programmes in the early 1990s, we would not expect the end 
of Communism to result in significant adaptation as policy ambitions were not 
uppermost in the priorities of Christian Democrats. German unification and the collapse 
of the Communist bloc were indeed sizeable shocks but as shown in Chapter I, Christian 
Democratic parties are first and foremost office-seekers and programmatic 
considerations have typically played a more marginal role. According to the Harmel and 
Janda model, we would expect that Christian Democratic parties to be more sensitive to 
significant electoral erosion and/or the loss of national office. For office-seeking parties, 
such troubling developments could not be ignored. At the time of the revision of the 
basic programmes, only the GYP had suffered major problems in national elections and 
therefore, substantive programmatic change would be unlikely. Nonetheless, the 
continual electoral slide of Christian Democratic parties in the 1990s would lead us to 
expect some modifications by the later half of the decade. Moreover, the different scale 
of the problems faced by the three parties would further suggest that the nature of the 
adaptation would also vary. The Dutch party out of office and with a crumbling vote 
would seem more likely to adopt new strategies and ideas than the CDU whose 
problems were a latent threat until 1998. Although the GYP remained in office, its 
2 Interview with Heiner Geif3ler in Die Neue Gesellschaft No. 4/00. 
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continuing electoral crisis and the limited strategic opportunities available to it as junior 
coalition partner would also lead us to expect a more consequential change in the party. 
Leadership Change 
A common response to electoral losses for parties averse to programmatic work is 
personnel renewal at the head of the party (Muller 1988: 103). This occurred in both the 
OVP and CDA where a succession of leaders were tried out. In the former, there was a 
swift progression from Riegler to Busek to Schtissel as federal chairman with none of 
them really establishing a firm hold of the turbulent party. There was more continuity 
within the parliamentary party where Heinrich Neisser led the Klub between 1990 and 
1995 and then Andreas Khol between 1995 and 1999. However, the instability of the 
party was also shown in the succession of seven different General Secretaries in the 
1990-9 period. The reaction of the CDA to its predicament was not wholly dissimilar. 
Under pressure from party colleagues, parliamentary leader Brinkman resigned and in 
his place Heerma was elected while interim party chairwoman Lodders was also 
eventually replaced by Helgers. Heerma's poor performance then led to the election of 
de Hoop Scheffer as fractie leader. Leadership change, however, did not produce 
sustained improvements in poll results. Within the CDU, Kohl's position was 
untouchable after unification regardless of the Union's slide in opinion polls and 
Landtag elections. Other leading federal positions were also reasonably stable: there 
were only two general secretaries and two parliamentary leaders in the 1990-8 period. 
Coalition Strategy 
Another response to party decline could be found in the various parties' coalition 
strategies. This was most obvious in Austria where the People's Party shifted after 1994 
to an increasingly confrontational approach. Intra-coalition disputes with the SPO 
increased and the government collapsed in 1995 after an intractable budgetary quarrel. 
Even after the renewal of the Grand Coalition, tension within the coalition remained 
very high until 1999 with the Christian Democrats the instigators of most disagreements. 
Finally, the party's coalition strategy took a radical change of course in 2000 when 
negotiations with the Social Democrats were halted and a black-blue coalition was 
formed after exceptionally swift discussions with the FPO. No such drastic steps were 
taken by the Christian Democrats in Germany and the Netherlands. The CDU in 
government did move to a more confrontational strategy but with the opposition and the 
trade unions, not its coalition partners. By the 1998 election, it was clear that another 
Kohl government would almost certainly revive the Christian-Liberal coalition. The 
CDA once in opposition responded initially with a 'governmental opposition' strategy 
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which was quickly abandoned when it proved ineffective but its later more 
confrontational attitude was similarly fruitless. In advance of the 1998 election the 
party's coalition options looked very limited as another purple coalition appeared 
inevitable if the result made this possible. 
Programmatic Change 
In all three parties, the revision of their basic programmes in the early part of the decade 
did not bring about a fundamental re-evaluation of Christian Democratic beliefs and 
priorities. The new basic programme of the CDU was particularly dominated by 
continuity but even in the cases of the 6vp and CDA, significant departures from earlier 
documents were few in number. The Christian image of humanity was still central to the 
parties as they wrestled with the implications of new scientific and medical 
developments. All three parties incorporated an ceo-dimension to their programme but 
the essentials of the social market economy remained in place. Some accommodation 
with changing patterns of domestic life was evident, particularly in the CDA which 
explicitly recognised gay and unmarried couples, but the family continued to playa vital 
role in the Christian Democratic vision of society. Free market policies (deregulation, 
privatisation, tax reform) were increasingly important but within the context of the 
programmatic development of each party, this change could not be seen as a radical 
break with previous practice. Furthermore, the concerns of the social wing of each party 
were also reflected in the desire for social justice, limited expansionist policies to bolster 
the family and for change to take place in a consensual framework. Within the field of 
foreign policy, little change occurred despite the fall of Communism as Christian 
Democrats remained committed Atlanticists and European integrationists although the 
sweeping changes of 1989-90 relegated the significance of Austrian neutrality and 
allowed the 6vp to embrace a more unequivocal pro-European course. 
Scrutinising basic programmes for evidence of radical change is perhaps a 
fruitless endeavour. As such documents are composed with the chief aim of maintaining 
intra-party harmony and mobilising grassroots activists, there is a inherent tendency for 
continuity and the re-assertion of fundamental values. Contrary to the Schumpeterian 
understanding of political parties, deeply anchored ideological identities cannot be easily 
shifted to new philosophical waters. The lack of ideological upheaval within Christian 
Democracy in the early part of the 1990s is therefore not surprising. However, looking 
beyond basic programmes, a certain tension in the programmatic priorities of Christian 
Democrats can be discovered. Chapter 8 illustrated that there were definite signs of 
change in the manifesto structure of the three parties during the 1986-99 period. In the 
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manifestos of each of the parties, the balance between the three strands of issues 
identified (free market liberalism, social-economic interventionism and social-cultural 
traditionalism) had altered. In all three countries, the Christian Democrats had by the end 
of the decade swung to a more traditionalist position. Law and order, traditional morality 
and social harmony all assumed an enhanced role within Christian Democratic 
manifestos. Rather than back away from the religiously inspired regulation of public 
morality, as might be expected given the growth of individualism and the decline of 
organised religion, Christian Democrats appeared to be assigning such efforts greater 
prominence. The manifesto data, of course, does not reveal the precise content of the 
party's statements but the case study analysis of programmatic documents underscored 
the essential consistency of Christian Democratic views on the Christian image of 
humanity and in specific policy areas such as abortion and controversial new medical 
techniques. More variation was found in terms of free market economics and state 
interventionism. In opposition, the CDA reversed the waning of interventionism and 
instead, conspicuously reduced the amount of market liberalism. Following the 
disappointment of 1995, this path was also chosen by the 6vp. In both cases, most of 
the expansionist welfare rhetoric concerned pro-family policies. In contrast, social 
interventionist themes continued to lose significance in the electoral programme of the 
CDU/CSU in 1998 while free market aspects were accorded increased priority. 
In addition to the manifesto data, the case studies found evidence of a more far-
reaching change in the programmatic direction of the parties by the end of the 1990s 
compared to the fairly tepid revisions of the basic programmes in the first half of the 
decade. In both the CDA's 'New Ways, Fixed Values' (1996) and the CDU's 
Zukunjtsprogramm (1998), there was a perceptible shift towards a firmer stance on law 
and order (e.g. drugs, illegal immigration) and a greater willingness to reform the social 
welfare state. On the latter issue, for example, the CDU now stated that any measure 
which created work should be considered social and distanced itself from the aim of full 
employment. Although it backed moves towards deregulation, the CDA's position was 
more ambiguous as it still firmly rejected a minimum system of social welfare. The 
Dutch party also reasserted the value of the two parent family, signalling a slight retreat 
from the reforms earlier in the decade. In both programmes, environmental themes were 
still important but within the CDU, the shallow commitment of the party to green issues 
was obvious through the opposition aroused by Schauble's suggestion of an eco-tax, the 
continued commitment to nuclear power and the lack of consensus on the eco-social 
market model. Although the DVP produced no comparable document, the party under 
the Schtissel-Khol course also moved toward prioritising family policy and toughening 
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its rhetoric on law and order. In addition, the falling public interest in green issues was 
mirrored in the People Party where the discussion of the eco aspect of the eco-social 
market model was virtually non-existent. 
Organisational Change 
Developments within the structure of the parties can be divided into two categories: 
formal attempts at reform and informal changes in the balance of intra-party power. 
Each of the parties introduced initiatives to halt the contraction of the mass membership 
and increase grassroots participation. Within the time-frame of this study, however, 
there was little sign that they were having the desired effect. While the CDU remained in 
government, the more radical suggestions to breathe life into the party (such as polls of 
members) stood little chance of being accepted. The CDA, which had suffered the worst 
shrinkage of the membership, had attempted to address some of its organisational 
weaknesses even before 1994 through the 'Appel en weerklank' commission and these 
efforts continued in opposition with the experimentation with more participatory styles. 
Yet by 1998, there was no indication of an end to the shrivelling of the mass basis of the 
party. In Austria, the principal problem was less the loss of members, but rather the 
weakness of the federal party apparatus vis-a-vis the Leagues and the provincial parties. 
Attempts to rectify this imbalance have constrained to some extent the dominance of the 
Leagues but the federal party still appeared ineffective and weak against the Land party 
organisations. Therefore, the effects of formal organisational reforms in the three parties 
were limited. 
Informal changes in each of the three parties were also observable during the 
1990s. Not all of these could be classified as conscious adaptations to party decline but 
nonetheless, such intra-party power relations did have implications for the future outlook 
of the parties. In the last part of the Kohl era, the influence of many arms of the party 
(the social committees, Land party organisations) withered as decision-making 
increasingly centred around the Chancellor, his advisors and the leadership of the 
Fraktion. While this centralisation offered greater opportunities for co-ordination, there 
was a danger that once the resources of national office were lost, a power vacuum could 
appear which would threaten the unity of the party. The major development within the 
GYP was the growing strength of the parliamentary leader, Khol, who forced a new 
unity upon the Klub and became a highly visible presence in national politics. The 
difficulty with this was that Khol tended to polarise opinion within the People's Party 
and was not an consensus-based politician who could integrate the various wings of the 
party. Whether the enhanced influence of the Klubobmann would continue after Khol's 
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tenure was, in any case, unclear. An organisational consequence of the CDA's move into 
opposition was a greater dispersion of power. The party apparatus headed by chairman 
Helgers became more influential in shaping the direction of the party while the authority 
of the parliamentary party was curbed. 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study give some support to Harmel and Janda's general propositions 
about party change. While still in office and relatively unaffected by electoral losses, 
there was little reason for Christian Democrats to alter radically their strategy, 
programmatic identity or organisation. Initial changes in the decade were limited despite 
the momentous events in Eastern Europe and a more unfavourable economic context. 
However, more significant developments took place later in the decade when the parties' 
position in government had either been lost or was under threat. In the alien environment 
of opposition and having experienced serious electoral decline, the CDA embarked upon 
leadership renewal, programmatic adaptation and organisational reform. The party 
moved to a more traditionalist platform, toughened its stance on law and order and 
bolstered its social profile through a more interventionist manifesto in 1998. Similarly, 
the OVP engaged in extensive personnel change at the head of the party and adopted a 
more traditionalist agenda after 1995 while there was also a greater effort to centralise 
the party. The major change for the People's Party, however, was its new coalition 
strategy. As expected, there was less need for the CDU to initiate major reform in this 
period as it was still in government and its electoral problems were less severe. 
Nonetheless, by 1998 there were indications that it, too, had moved to a more 
traditionalist position with a pronounced stress on law and order issues. With the 
exception of the CDU, the parties had also retreated from the more market-centred 
electoral platforms of earlier in the decade after these had provoked an electoral 
backlash. This does not imply that the CDA and Oyp had abandoned their earlier desire 
to reform the welfare state and reduce regulation. As was shown in the individual case 
studies, such policies remained important within the programmes. 
The choice therefore for Christian Democrats was less clear-cut than opting for 
either tradition or adaptation; rather, the parties responded to the altered environment in 
which they found themselves by pushing their traditionalism to the fore. However, it 
must also be conceded that the absorption of a stronger law and order agenda was a 
novel element in this strategy of adaptation through tradition. Such issues had not 
previously been especially prominent in Christian Democratic thinking as shown in 
Chapter 8 and the individual case studies. Still, the new focus on traditionalism seemed 
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to signal victory for those Christian Democrats who wanted to concentrate on the party's 
core supporters rather than broaden the appeal to different social groups. Highlighting 
traditionalist issues was also perhaps a more viable approach than a nakedly pro-market 
programme. Yet whether such an strategy could revitalise Christian Democratic 
prospects was very much open to question. With a draining reservoir of support for 
sustenance, a 'closed' strategy based on mobilising regular voters did not generate much 
hope that the parties would recover their former dominance, especially given their 
weakness among younger voters and non-churchgoers. Relying upon an ever decreasing 
number of regular supporters would also eventually raise serious doubts about the 
Volkspartei model. If Christian Democratic voters continued to be drawn 
disproportionately from dwindling social groups, then the party as a vehicle for the 
integration and accommodation of a broad cross-section of society would be critically 
undermined. 
Predictions of such parties' eventual demise were nonetheless very premature. 
All the established parties faced similar problems in balancing the concerns of their 
shrinking grassroots with the electoral imperative of broadening their support. Christian 
Democrats were not unique in suffering from partisan and membership erosion and 
facing pressure for programmatic and organisational adaptation. Furthermore, the parties 
retained considerable organisational resources and in the case of the CDU and 6vp, 
sizeable mass memberships. Indeed, although voters' dissatisfaction with the 
mainstream parties became ever more obvious, the established parties still managed in 
most cases to cling on to power. There was no reason to believe therefore that the 
position of the Christian Democrats was irredeemable. With the bond between parties 
and voters loosening, short-term variables and issues have increased in importance. 
Although this opened up the possibility of more volatility, with more assured leadership, 
more intra-party unity and a more favourable issue context Christian Democrats would, 
in theory at least, be able to benefit from such changes. The golden age of Christian 
Democracy belonged, however, to the past. In an age of voter unpredictability, parties 
were more vulnerable, particularly those seeking to reconcile a plurality of different 
interests and viewpoints. As shown throughout chapters five to seven, the trend towards 
growing divergence between the different factions renders Volksparteien very 
susceptible to intra-party feuding. 
IV. Developments since 1998 
At the start of the new millennium the prospects for Christian Democratic parties looked 
at best uncertain, at worst rather bleak. Core supporters were fewer in number and a 
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variety of centrifugal pressures raised doubts about the viability of the Volkspartei 
model. Moreover, the parties faced the twin programmatic difficulty of selling their 
religiously derived traditionalist beliefs to an electorate largely distant from religious 
institutions whilst simultaneously reconciling their philosophical heritage of social 
Catholicism with a political agenda increasingly averse to state intervention. In all three 
parties, observers pointed to the possibility of a less Christian Democratic identity 
developing3 as the influence of social Catholicism faded yet there was little evidence to 
indicate that such a transformation would be rewarded at the ballot box. The CDU and 
the CDA faced the additional problem of their position in opposition. As shown by 
Chapter 3, existing outside their natural environment of government was no easy task for 
Christian Democrats. On the other hand, the GYP still in government and now in 
possession of the chancellorship had a similarly unpredictable future facing the domestic 
polarisation and international outcry resulting from its alliance with the Freedom Party. 
For some, the People's Party was "riding on the back of a tiger that sooner or later 
would swallow them" (Rose 2000:33). 
CDU 
Initially, the CDU appeared to have coped quite successfully with the transition (Helms 
2000:420-2). Admittedly, the party's adaptation was very limited: no real programmatic 
reconsideration was undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the defeat and a smooth 
transition from Kohl to Schauble4 as party chairman took place as the party avoided 
comprehensive personnel renewal. Nonetheless, early success in countering the troubled 
new red-green administration in Landtag elections indicated that the CDU's problems 
might not be especially deep. However, the Union's problems multiplied at the end of 
1999. A major financial scandal arose, wrecking Kohl's reputation, eventually 
undermining Schauble's position and shattering the Union's recovery in the pollss. 
Following the unfortunate Schauble's resignation from his posts as chairman and 
Fraktion leader, he was succeeded by Angela Merkl in the fom1er post and Friedrich 
Merz in the latter. These changes signalled a much more significant change in the Union 
as Merkl became the first female leader of the party as well as the first easterner6• Both 
she and Merz were relatively short of political experience and for many of the more 
conservative members of the Union, Merkl, in particular, was too liberal. Kohl's 
intransigence in refusing to name his secret donors continued to cast a shadow over the 
3 See Lucardie and ten Napel (1993) for the CDA; Walter and Bosch (\999) for the CDU; Sperl 
(2000) for the GVP. 
4 In contrast to Kiesinger, Kohl stepped down as party chairnmn directly after the election. 
S For more details, see Clemens (2000). 
6 Although born in Hamburg, Merkl had spent most of her life in the fomler GDR. 
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Union and Merkl failed to establish convincing authority over the party. In many policy 
areas, the CDU appeared disunited, symbolised by the failure of the party to prevent the 
government's tax reform passing through the Bundesrae. 
Some programmatic adaptation had taken place in the 'Essener Leitsiitze' in 
which more money for families was pledged, the concept of the family was expanded to 
include single parents and unmarried couples with children and more concrete measures 
to support working women were proposed. In addition, Merkl initiated a debate on a 
'new social market' fit for a globalised world economy in which the labour market 
would be subject to more liberalisation and insurance increasingly based on private 
contributions8 (Bosch 2002:69). The omission of the 'eco' prefix also signified the 
further marginalisation of the environmental component of the Union's programme. 
However, it was noticeable that the 'new social market' was not included in the 
CDU/CSU election programme. 
Regardless of such programmatic reforms, throughout 2000-1, the question of 
the chancellor candidate in the next Bundestag election remained unresolved. Backed by 
Junge Union, Frauen-Union and General Secretary Meyer, Merkl clung on to hopes of 
clinching the nomination but by 2002 she still had little support among the Land party 
leaders, her relationship with Merz was not especially close and the Bavarian minister-
president Stoiber appeared more appealing to Union voters. Consequently, Merkl was 
persuaded to let Stoiber stand as chancellor candidate9• The poor economic record of the 
red-green government, its internal divisions and its frequently poor self-presentation 
offered an excellent opportunity for the Union parties to return to government. Stoiber, 
learning from the mistakes of his mentor StrauB, advocated a moderate agenda and the 
CDU seemed more committed to the campaign than in 1980. However, after a virtuoso 
campaign performance from Schroder based on his hands-on approach during the 
catastrophic floods and clear rejection of military action against Iraq, the SPD managed 
to salvage its once desperate position. Together with gains for the Greens, this was 
enough to provide a thin majority for the government and the Union was left in 
opposition again. The CDU/CSU performance was extremely disappointing in view of 
the earlier traumas of the government and its economic record. Certainly, the sister 
parties registered a modest improvement in their vote but placed in historical context, it 
7 CDU party leaders in Bremen, Brandenburg and Berlin all broke the earlier agreement to 
oppose the bill. 
8 See the CDU Discussion Paper from Berlin 27108/01. 
9 See Der Spiegel (Nr.3 14/01102) for more details on the battle over the candidacy. 
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was only the third time ever the sister parties received less than 40% and it was their 
third worst result ever. In addition to the traditional heartland areas of the religiously 
active and older voters, the CDU/CSU had polled well among blue-collar workers and 
men. However, the strong gains made in Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg were not 
replicated elsewhere as the limitations of a CSU Kanzlerkandidat were exposed in 
Stoiber's lack of allure to northern and eastern voters, women and white-collar 
employees lO• While the second SchrOder cabinet enjoyed no honeymoon period in office 
with approval dropping incredibly rapidly, the Union's long-term prospects were not 
necessarily rosy. Once again, the party had struggled with its opposition role and while 
Merkl consolidated her power by becoming parliamentary leader, serious doubts 
remained about her leadership with speculation already that the 2006 candidature would 
be between Stoiber and Hessian minister-president Koch. 
QVP 
While the OYP's coalition with the FPO triggered a wave of international outrage 
culminating in the unofficial sanctions imposed by Austria's EU partners, this drew 
attention away from the extensive reform programme embarked upon by the 
government. According to FPO Finance Minister Grasser, the black-blue agenda sought 
"a paradigm change in social and economic policy" (quoted in Obinger 200 I :360) 
through increased privatisation, extensive deregulation of labour and welfare cutbacks. 
In the first few months of its existence, the OYP-FPO government introduced more than 
120 new laws (Obinger 2001:383). Amongst the measures introduced were the pension 
reform, the introduction of student fees, reforms to unemployment benefit and the 
establishment of outpatient charges. The mantra of 'zero deficit' was endlessly repeated 
by Grasser and budget consolidation was an indispensable part of the government 
accord. As significant as the policies themselves was the manner of their introduction. 
The social partners, but especially the trade unions and employees' associations, found 
themselves sidelined while the cabinet pressed ahead regardless of the objections. The 
government's willingness to use its parliamentary majority to push through refornls 
regardless of dissent from both sides of the social partnership seemed to many like the 
breaking of a taboo while according to OYP Economic Affairs Minister Bartenstein, the 
social partners now only had a right of suggestion, no right of veto (Profil 29/2001). 
Indeed, in 2001 the government trained its attention on the partners themselves with the 
removal of Hans Sallmutter as the president of the Main Association of Social Insurance 
Agencies (Sozialversicherungs Hauptverband), a prominent government critic. This 
10 See voting behaviour according to social and occupational characteristics at 
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provoked the first ever nation-wide demonstration in the Trade Union Federation's 
history when 50,000 participants took to the streets of Vienna in a "Demo fUr 
Demokratie" . 
The OVP's participation in such executive action raised questions about its 
Christian Democratic identity. Both the nature of the laws and the manner of their 
implementation seemed to indicate that the social image of the party was fading rapidly. 
Sperl (2000: 165) argued that the receding influence of social Catholicism pointed to the 
party moving to a more Anglo-American style form of conservatism. In addition, the 
OVP Interior Minister Strasser, formerly thought of as a liberal, pushed a firm line in 
immigration and asylum issues. At the same time, however, the government's prestige 
policy, the Kinderscheck, a benefit for parents who stayed home to raise their children, 
signalled a certain amount of continuity with earlier Christian Democratic ideas as did 
the party's refusal to let the FPO influence its pro-European line. Despite the domestic 
polarisation caused by the black-blue government, the OVP enjoyed an impressive 
resurgence in opinion polls and Land elections as the Christian Democrats capitalised on 
first the unpopularity of the sanctions and then the crumbling of support for the FPO. 
Intra-party dissent about the party's direction in government was therefore contained as 
the FPO finally seemed to have been stopped. Caught between its populist impulses and 
the attempted professionalism of the FPO cabinet members, the party was continually on 
the verge of disintegrating into open civil war throughout the government's lifetimc. 
Partly as a consequence of his earlier gamble, SchiisseJ's reputation also grew 
considerably in office as he conveyed an appropriately statesmanlike imagc. 
The government finally collapsed over the FPO's divisions on tax rcfornl and 
the purchase of interceptor jets. Now in a position of strength for the first time since the 
1980s, the OVP ran a heavily candidate-centred campaign II. The result for the Christian 
Democrats was spectacularly good: the party became the largest party, a feat not 
achieved since 1966 and registered the greatest ever gains by a single party (+15.4%. 
42.3%). In an incredibly volatile election, the 6vp's success was based on the attraction 
of former FPO voters l2 but other interesting aspects of its triumph were ils greatly 
increased support among young voters (33% of voters under 30) and blue collar workers 
http://www.aiq;s.oq;/wahlen/vot behavior.shtml accessed 25/08/03. 
11 Posters, playing on the doubts of many about spb leader Gusenbauer, asked 'Wer, wenn nichl 
er?' alongside a picture of the Chancellor. 
12 According to the polling agency SORA, the bYP received a net gain of 620,000 in voter 
mobility between the bYP and FPO. Apart from 1999 byp voters, the other main source of its 
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(34%), especially among skilled workers (Plasser and Ulram 2002: 12). Three coalition 
constellations were realistically possible: OYP-SPO, OYP-Green or OYP-FPO. While a 
majority of the electorate favoured a Grand Coalition, talks failed due to wide 
differences on student fees, the divisive issue of the interceptor jets and pension reform. 
Short-lived negotiations with the Greens broke down for similar reasons and once again, 
an OYP-FPO government was formed with great haste. The OYP's recovery had 
certainly been remarkable but this 'black-blue' encore risked compromising its 
foundation. The FPO was still extremely unstable and the issue of a further pension 
reform threatened to set off yet more mass protests. What did seem clear was that the 
party's hold on the chancellorship was crucial to its future success. The party showed 
previously hidden levels of unity during the period 2000-2 with Schiissel firnlly in 
control as long as he remained Chancellor. 
CDA 
Confronted by a further parliamentary term in opposition, the CDA nonetheless 
refrained from radical changes. De Hoop Scheffer was confirmed as parliamentary 
leader in spite of his limited appeal in 1998. Party chairman Hans Helgers announced his 
withdrawal from politics, considering that he had laid the foundations for future success 
with his execution of a process of renewal. He was succeeded in 1999 by van Rij who 
spoke of his desire for the party to have "an open culture of debate" (de Boer, Lucardie, 
Nomen and Yoerman 2000:21). In view of the deep problems experienced by the party, 
divisions within the Christian Democrats were not especially threatening although the 
conservative Christian Course movement within the party caused friction in its attempt 
to remove the openly homosexual Pex as the first reserve candidate on the European 
Parliament list. EJections in the provinces and for the European Parliament brought 
contrasting results for the CDA. In the former, the CDA unexpectedly improved its 
position and regained its position as the largest party although this was as much a 
consequence of increased political fragmentation 13 as the CDA's gain of 1.5%. 
Nevertheless, as a result of this improved showing, the CDA once more became the 
largest grouping in the upper house. Less encouraging was the EP election in which the 
party lost support. However, the CDA was still the biggest party and the coalition's 
popularity appeared to be waning as it encountered greater difficulties (e.g. the near fall 
of the cabinet over the failure of the law to introduce the corrective referendum in the 
upper chamber). 
electorate in 2002 were non-votes in 1999 http;//www.sora.at/wahlen/wsa/nov02! Accessed 
29108/03. 
13 Nineteen different lists won representation. 
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In 2000, the party celebrated its twentieth year of cxistence but it was a quiet 
year politically apart from the resignation of scandal-tainted PvdA Minister of Internal 
Affairs Peper. Within the Christian Democrats, however, intra-party friction increased as 
a debate about multiculturalism erupted. An initiative focusing on the integration of 
migrants provoked objections from those fearing a dilution of the party's religious 
inspiration while de Hoop Scheffer's demand for immigrants to adapt to Dutch traditions 
was criticised by the party council (de Boer, Lucardie, Noomen and Voenllan 200 I: 152-
4). De Hoop Scheffer also came into conflict with fornler leader Lubbers over the 
party's rejection of the coalition's planned cuthanasia law. The following year intra-
party quarrelling cscalated into a leadership crisis in whidl p.lrty chairman van Rij 
challenged de Hoop Scheffer's position as leading candidate. Failing to win the 
unqualified support of the party's daily cxccutivc'\ de Hoop Scheffer stood down as 
leading candidate and parliamentary leader. In his place, Jan Peter Balkcnende, a 
Twecde Kamer newcomer in 1998, was chosen for both positions. The an:lir caused a 
spate of resignations and with the election less than a year away, raised unple:lsant 
memories of thc 1994 debacle. However, the damage was limited as the experienced 
Bert de Vries took over as interim chairnHIn. 
In comparison to 1998, there was more disunity in the coalition and while the 
economy was still performing well, greater public dissatisfaction on issues such as 
health and the railways was apparent. Above all, however, questions of security h~ld 
risen prominence. By February 2002, over 50% of voters rated crime and security as onc 
of the two most important problems in the Netherlands (van Praag 2003: 15). The issuc 
of crime and security had also become linked to immigration and asylum with growing 
public unease on these issues. Although this damaged the standing of the government, 
the prime beneficiary was not the CDA but Liveable Netherlands, a new protest party 
that had grown out of Hilversum and Utrecht. LN's popularity was largely based on its 
leading candidate, the flamboyant columnist and fomler sociologist Pim fortuyn who 
had transformed the party's agenda from a populist progressive one to a more rightist 
populist stance. Fortuyn was by no means willing to be tied down to LN's more 
moderate electoral platfoml though and after he had criticised the constitutional 
protection against discrimination in February 2002, he was removed as LN's leading 
candidate. He promptly fanned his own list (LPF), winning consilkrable success in the 
14 Van Rij was offered third place on the list. 
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local elections in Rotterdam in March and polls predicted a sizeable vote 111 the 
upcoming Tweede Kamer election. 
An already tumultuous election campaign was rendered even more bizarre after 
the collective resignation of the Kok cabinet a few weeks in advance of ekction over a 
report about the Srebrenica massacre and then more significantly, by the murder of 
Fortuyn nine days before the election. The election went ahead in a climate of great 
uncertainty and an outpouring of public grief over the assassination. The outcome 
brought a cataclysmic end to 8 years of purple government as the coalition lost 43 of its 
97 seats and 27% (PvdA -13.9%, VVD -9.2, D66 -3.9%). Despite the party's own 
recent problems, the CDA emerged as the major victor of the election. The party gained 
9.6% and 14 seats as the party seemed to profit from Balkenende's more respectful 
stance towards Fortuyn. Where all other major parties had fiercely attacked Fortuyn 
before his death, Balkenende had refrained from emotive language and direct 
confrontations (van Praag 2003: 16). A quickly patched together cabinet composed of the 
CDA, VVD and LPF fell apart almost as rapidly as it had been put together and new 
elections were held at the beginning of 2003. In these, the CDA managed to sustain its 
vote and eventually, the Balkcncnde II cabinet was fornled with the VVD and D66. The 
exceptional events of 2002 had therefore led to the CDA resuming its pivotal position in 
the centre of Dutch politics and cabinets, in the process restoring its governmental 
credentials through the solid leadership of Balkenende. However, as issues like security 
and immigration drop in importance, the focus again appears to be shifting to socio-
economic issues. The party's divisions in the ) 989-94 period on precisely these issue 
areas and its subsequent banishment from government should provide a sobering 
reminder of the party's vulnerability as future CDA success may well depend on how 
successfully the government handles the balance between reform and economic security. 
Conclusion 
Post-1998 developments in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands highlight the need for 
caution in predicting the future for political parties. Once again, party survival rather 
than failure is the dominant theme. In both the case of the OVP and the CDA, few 
observers in 2000 would have prophesised the scale of the Christian Democr~ltic 
electoral recovery and yet by 2002 they had moved back into a position of consiJerabk 
power. Schussel's strategic gamble of forming a coalition with the FPO worked almost 
perfectly. Weighed down by government responsibility, the Freedom Party lost much of 
its populist appeal and was split between the party in office and the extra-parliamentary 
and provincial parties. By contrast, the spoils of office encouraged far greater disciple in 
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the 6vp which reaped the reward in opinion polls, Lam!tag elections and finally, in the 
2002 Nationalrat election. The CDA, too, has benefited from public perception of it as a 
force for stability. In the chaos of the 2002 election campaign, the CDA profited from 
the simultaneous desire for both change and continuity. As the most moderate opposition 
party, the Christian Democrats were well-positioned to capitalise on discontent with the 
purple coalition without the uncertainty and radicalism of the LPF. The Gennan 
situation is less comparable: the CDU failed to take advantage of the perilous economic 
context and the blunders of the Schroder government. The 2002 Bundestag election has 
to be viewed as a missed opportunity for the Union despite its improved showing. 
Therefore, while the 6vp and the CDA have managed to re-establish their centrality in 
the Austrian and Dutch political systems respectively, the CDU remains in a transitional 
phase. 
The specificities of post-1998 political developments in each country indicate 
that cross-national explanation is difficult. The 2002 results in the Netherlands and 
Austria appear to be exceptional elections determined by national conditions. The 
circumstances of the Dutch election in particular were absolutely unique and even the 
Austrian election appeared more like a one-off plebiscite on Schilssel's chancellorship. 
It is therefore too early to speculate about the pernmnence of any Christian Democratic 
resurgence. As this study has shown, the basis of earlier Christian Democratic success 
has been eroded over time and it would seem highly unlikely that such parties can 
assume a similar pre-eminent role. Electorates across Western Europe show wC~lkcning 
partisanship and higher levels of anti-party feeling (Webb 2002). In such an 
environment, the potential for explosive change will always be present and it may be 
that in the future the extremely high volatility of the 2002 Dutch and Austrian elections 
becomes less exceptional. Indeed, in both countries elections throughout the )9l)Os 
displayed increased levels of aggregate volatility. If such a scenario transpires, then the 
foundation of party success will always be under threat from electoral tremors. Yet in 
comparison to political newcomers, the established parties have a number of valuable 
assets. These advantages are not just based on organisational resources and the cartd 
tendencies of the long-standing major parties. While the ties between party and voter 
may have become loose, the established parties have the advantage of name recognition 
and reputations based on decades of government participation. Disenchantment with 
parties may be widespread but as could be seen in the Dutch and Austrian elections in 
2002, electorates still look to steady parties with renowned government credentials 
despite the pervasive desire for change. If Christian DClllocrats arc able to uccommodate 
both desires, then their electoral prospects Illay well be promising. Whether this is 
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feasible is, however, open to question. This study of Christian Democratic parties in the 
1990s has illustrated that the process of adaptation and change does not come easily to 
broad, internally heterogeneous parties in which different and frequently opposing 
perspectives and interests co-exist. Change undernlines the programmatic balance 
between the different strands of Christian Democracy and upsets the power relations 
between the various constituent interests. It would therefore be unwise to write off the 
1990s as an abcrration in the history of Christian Dcmocratic parties. The threat from the 
centre and the right will re-emerge and if the internal diversity of Christian Democracy 
again becomes open factional warfare, or the parties fail to supply convincing answers to 
pressing contemporary problems, serious electoral decay will again be the likely result. 
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Appendix I 
National Elections Results Since 1945 
Bundestag t:lection results 
1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2002 
COU/CSU 31.0 45.2 50.2 45.3 47.6 46.1 44.9 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 43.8 41.4 35.1 38.5 
SPO 29.2 28.8 31.8 36.2 39.3 42.7 45.8 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 33.5 36.4 40.9 38.5 
FOP 11.9 9.5 7.7 12.8 9.5 5.8 8.4 7.9 10.6 7.0 9.1 11.0 6.9 6.2 7.4 
Greens 1.5 5.6 8.3 5.1 7.3 6.7 8.6 
POS 2.4 4.4 5.1 4.0 
Others 27.9 16.7 10.3 5.7 3.6 5.4 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.4 4.2 3.6 5.8 3.0 
Turnout 78.2 86.0 87.8 87.7 86.8 86.7 91.1 90.7 88.6 89.1 84.3 77.8 79.0 82.2 79.1 
Nationalrat election results 
1945 1949 1953 1956 1959 1962 1966 1970 1971 1975 1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999 2002 
GVP 49.8 44.0 41.3 46.0 44.2 45.4 48.3 44.7 43.1 43.0 41.9 43.2 41.3 32.1 27.7 28.3 26.9 42.3 
SPO 44.6 38.7 42.1 43.0 44.8 44.0 42.6 48.4 50.0 50.4 51.0 47.7 43.1 42.8 34.9 38.1 33.2 36.5 
FPO 11.7' 10.9 6.5 7.7 7.1 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.4 6.1 5.0 9.7 16.6 22.5 21.9 26.9 10.0 
KPG 5.4 5.1 S.3 4.4 3.3 3.0 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Greens 4.8 4.8 7.3 4.8 7.4 9.5 
LiF 6.0 5.5 3.7 1.0 
Others 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0.5 3.3 0.2 0.04 0.03 0.05 3.5 0.3 3.3 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.09 
Turnout 94.3 96.8 95.8 96.0 94.2 93.8 93.8 91.8 92.4 92.9 92.2 92.6 90.5 86.1 81.9 86.0 80.4 84.3 
I 1949 result is fur Fro predecessor league of Independents (V dU) 
277 
Tweede Kamer election results 
1946 1948 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 
KVP 30.8 31.0 28.6 31.6 31.5 31.8 26.5 21.8 17.7 
ARP 12.9 13.2 11.3 9.9 9.3 8.7 9.9 8.5 8.8 
eHU 7.8 9.1 8.9 804 8.1 8.5 8.1 6.3 4.8 
eDA 31.9 30.8 29.3 34.6 35.3 22.2 18.3 27.9 28.6 
PvdA 28.3 25.6 28.9 32.6 30.3 28.0 23.5 24.5 27.3 33.8 28.3 30.4 33.3 31.9 23.9 28.9 15.1 27.3 
VVO 7.82 7.9 8.8 8.7 12.2 10.2 10.7 10.3 14.4 17.9 17.3 23.1 17.4 14.6 19.9 24.6 15.5 17.9 
D66 4.4 6.7 4.1 504 11.0 4.3 6.1 7.9 15.4 8.9 5.1 4.1 
ePN 10.6 7.7 6.1 4.7 2.4 2.7 3.6 3.8 4.4 1.7 2.0 1.8 0.6 
PSP 1.8 3.0 2.8 1.4 1.5 0.9 2.1 2.3 1.2 
PPR 1.8 4.8 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.3 
GL 4.1 3.4 7.2 7.0 5.1 
SP 0.2 0.3 0.5 004 0.4 1.3 3.5 5.9 6.3 
GPV 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.6 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 
SGP 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 
RPF 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.7 2.0 
eu 2.5 2.1 
OS70 5.3 4.1 0.7 0.5 004 
BP 0.6 2.1 4.7 1.1 1.9 0.8 0.23 
LPF 17.0 5.7 
Others 1.0 2.7 3.8 0.9 0.5 1.5 2.4 4.2 1.9 1.5 0.8 2.1 1.5 1.8 8.4 2.8 2.3 1.3 
Turnout I 93.1 93.7 95.0 95.5 95.6 95.1 94.9 79.1 83.5 88.0 87.0 81.0 85.8 80.3 78.7 73.2 79.0 79.9 
Note; only those parties winning scats in 2 or more elections have been included. 
2 Panij \·an de Vrijhcid 
) Renamed Rechtse \'olkspanij. 
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Appendix II 
Government composition 1945-2003 
Germany 
Date Composition Chancellor 
1949-53 CDU/CSU-FDP-DP Adenauer 
1953-56 CDU/CSU-FDP-DP-GB/BHE Adenauer 
1956-57 CDU/CSU-DP-FVP Adenauer 
1957-61 CDU/CSU-DP Adenauer 
1961-63 CDU/CSU-FDP Adenauer 
1963-66 CDUlCSU-FDP Erhard 
1966-69 CDU/CSU-SPD Kiesinger 
1969-74 SPD-FDP Brandt 
1974-82 SPD-FDP Schmidt 
1982-98 CDU/CSU-FDP Kohl 
1998- SPD-Greens Schroder 
Austria 
Date Composition Chancellor 
1945 SPO-OVP-KPO Renner 
1945-47 OVP-SPO-KPO Figl 
1947-53 OVP-SPO Figl 
1953-61 OVP-SPO Raab 
1961-64 OVP-SPO Gorbach 
1964-66 OVP-SPO Klaus 
1966-70 OVP Klaus 
1970-83 SPO Kresiky 
(between 1970-71 SPO minority government supported by FPO in parliament) 
1983-86 SPO-FPO Sinowatz 
1986-87 SPO-FPO Vranitzky 
1987-97 SPO-OVP Vranitzky 
1997-2000 SPO-OVP Klima 
2000- OVP-FPO Schilssel 
The Netherlands 
Date 
1945-46 
1946-48 
1948-51 
1951-52 
1952-56 
1956-58 
1958-59 
1959-63 
1963-65 
1965-66 
1966-67 
1967-71 
Composition 
PvdA-KVP-ARP-np 
KVP-PvdA-np 
PvdA-KVP-CHU-VVD-np 
PvdA-KVP-CHU-VVD-np 
PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU-np 
PvdA-KVP-ARP-CHU 
KVP-ARP-CHU 
KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD 
KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD 
KVP-PvdA-ARP 
ARP-KVP 
KVP-ARP-CHU-VVD 
Prime Minister 
Schermerhorn 
BecJ 
Drees 
Drees 
Drees 
Drees 
BecJ 
de Quay 
Marijnen 
Cals 
Zijlstra 
de Jong 
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1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-77 
1977-81 
1981-82 
1982 
1982-86 
1986-89 
1989-94 
1994-98 
1998-02 
2002 
2003-
Note: np= non-partisan 
ARP-KVP-CHU-VVD-DS70 
ARP-KVP-CHU-VVD 
PvdA-PPR-D66-KVP-ARP 
CDA-VVD 
CDA-PvdA-D66 
CDA-D66 
CDA-VVD 
CDA-VVD 
CDA-PvdA 
PvdA-D66-VVD 
PvdA-D66-VVD 
CDA-VVD-LPF 
CDA-VVD-D66 
Bicshcuvcl 
Bicshcuvcl 
den Uyl 
van Agt 
van Agt 
van Agt 
Lubbers 
Lubbers 
Lubbers 
Kok 
Kok 
Balkenendc 
Balkenendc 
In each case, the party of the chancellor/prime minister is named first. 
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Appendix III 
Landtag Election Results in Germany and Austria Since 1990 
Germany 
Baden-Wiirttemberg 
1992 1996 2001 
CDU 39.6 41.3 44.S 
SPO 29.4 25.1 33.3 
FDP 5.9 9.6 8.1 
Greens 9.5 12.1 7.7 
Repub1ikaner 10.9 9.1 4.4 
Others 4.7 2.8 1.7 
Bavaria 
1990 1994 1998 
CSU 54.9 52.8 52.t) 
SPO 26.0 30.0 28.7 
FOP 5.2 2.8 1.7 
Greens 6.4 6.1 5.7 
Others 4.9 3.9 3.7 
Berlin 
1990 1995 1999 2001 
COU 40.4 37.4 40.8 23.8 
SPO 30.4 23.6 22.4 29.7 
FOP 7.1 2.5 2.2 9.9 
Greens 9.4 13.2 9.9 9.1 
POS 9.2 14.6 17.7 22.6 
Others 3.5 8.7 7.0 4.9 
Brandenburg 
1990 1994 1999 
CDU 29.4 18.7 26.5 
SPO 38.2 54.1 39.3 
FDP 6.6 2.2 1.9 
Greens 6.4 2.9 1.9 
POS 13.4 18.7 23.3 
Others 1.1 l.1 5.3 
Bremen 
1991 1995 1999 2003 
COU 30.7 32.6 37.1 29.S 
SPO 38.8 33.4 42.6 42.3 
FOP 9.5 3.4 2.5 4.2 
Greens 11.4 13.1 8.9 12.8 
OVU 6.2 2.5 3.0 2.3 
Others 3.4 15.0 5.9 8.6 
2S1 
Hamburg 
1991 1993 1997 200t 
COU 35.1 25.1 30.7 26.2 
SPO 48.0 40.4 36.2 36.5 
FOP 5.4 4.2 3.5 5.1 
Greens 7.2 13.5 13.9 8.6 
Schill 19.4 
Others 4.3 16.8 15.7 4.2 
Hesse 
1991 1995 1999 2003 
COU 40.2 39.2 43.4 4S.S 
SPO 40.8 38.0 39.4 29.1 
FOP 7.4 7.4 5.1 7.9 
Greens 8.8 11.2 7.2 10.1 
Others 2.8 4.2 4.9 4.1 
Lower Saxony 
1990 1994 1998 2003 
COU 42.0 36.4 35.9 4S.3 
SPO 44.2 44.3 47.9 33.4 
FOP 6.0 4.4 4.9 8.1 
Greens 5.5 7.4 7.0 7.6 
Others 2.3 7.5 4.3 2.6 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem 
1990 1994 1998 2002 
COU 38.3 37.7 30.2 J 1.4 
SPD 27.0 29.5 34.3 40.6 
FOP 5.5 3.8 \.6 4.7 
Greens 4.2 3.7 2.7 2.6 
POS 15.7 22.7 24.4 16.4 
Others 9.3 2.6 6.8 4.3 
North Rhine-Westphalia 
1990 1995 2000 
COU 36.7 37.7 37.0 
SPO 50.0 46.0 42.8 
FOP 5.8 4.0 9.8 
Greens 5.0 10.0 7.1 
Others 2.5 2.3 3.3 
Rhineland-Pfalz 
1991 1996 2001 
CDU 38.7 38.7 35.3 
SPD 44.8 39.5 44.7 
FOP 6.9 8.9 7.8 
Greens 6.5 6.9 5.2 
Republikaner 2.0 3.5 2.4 
Others 1.1 2.2 4.6 
Saarland 
1990 1994 1999 
CDU 33.4 38.6 45.5 
SPD 54.4 49.4 44.4 
FDP 5.6 2.1 2.6 
Greens 2.6 5.5 3.2 
Others 3.4 1.4 1.3 
Saxony 
1990 1994 1999 
CDU 53.8 58.1 56.l) 
SPD 19.1 16.6 10.7 
FDP 5.3 1.7 1.1 
Greens 5.6 4.1 2.6 
PDS 10.2 16.5 22.2 
Others 3.6 1.3 2.1 
Saxony-Anhalt 
1990 1994 1998 2002 
CDU 39.0 34.4 22.U 37.3 
SPD 26.0 34.0 35.9 20.0 
FDP 13.5 3.6 4.2 13.3 
Greens 5.3 5.1 3.2 2.0 
PDS 12.0 19.9 19.6 20.4 
DVU 12.9 
Others 4.2 3.0 2.2 7.0 
Schleswig-Holstein 
1992 1996 2000 
CDU 33.8 37.2 35.2 
SPD 46.2 39.8 43.1 
FDP 5.6 5.7 7.6 
Greens 5.0 8.1 6.2 
PDS 10.2 16.5 22.2 
DVU 6.3 4.3 
SSW 1.9 2.5 4.1 
Thilringen 
1990 1994 1999 
CDU 45.4 42.6 51.0 
SPD 22.8 24.6 18.5 
FDP 9.3 3.2 1.1 
Greens 6.5 4.5 1.9 
PDS 9.7 16.6 21.3 
Others 3.3 1.3 3.1 
Source: compiled from http://www.election.de 
Austria 
Burgenland 
1991 1996 
OVP 38.2 36.1 
SPO 48.1 44.5 
FPO 9.7 14.6 
Greens 3.4 2.5 
Others 0.6 2.4 
Source: http;//www.wahlcn.b~ld.~v.at/landta!.! 
Carinthia 
1994 1999 
OVP 23.8 20.7 
SPO 37.4 32.9 
FPO 33.3 42.1 
Greens 1.6 
Demokratie 99 3.9 
LiF 2.6 
Others 0.4 0.4 
Source: http://www.wiencrzcitun!.!.at/framclcss/wahkn.htm.?ID=M 14 
Lower Austria 
1993 1998 
OVP 44.2 44.9 
SPO 33.9 30.4 
FPO 12.1 16.1 
Greens 3.2 4.5 
Others 1.5 0.6 
Source: http;//www.wicncrzcjtun~.at/I inkmap/politik 'nQc200}wahll and 
http://www.wicncrzcitum!.at/framclcss/wahlcn.htm.?1 D=1\117 
Salzburg 
1994 1999 
OVP 38.6 38.8 
SPO 27.0 32.3 
FPO 19.5 19.6 
Greens 7.3 5.4 
LiF 5.8 3.7 
Others 1.8 0.3 
Source: http://www.wjcncrzcitlln!.!.atlfral11clcss/wahlcn.btm.?1 D-=;"l J 5 
Styria 
1990 1994 
GVP 44.2 36.3 
SPO 34.9 55.9 
FPO 15.4 17.2 
Greens 1.7 4.3 
LiF 3.8 
Others 3.8 2.5 
Source: bup ;LLwww, v~rwilItU!1L: .slQil:[lJlark ,at 
2000 
35.3 
46.6 
12.6 
5.5 
0 
2003 
53.3 
33.6 
4.5 
7.2 
1.5 
2000 
47.3 
32.3 
12.4 
5.6 
l.l 
1.2 
Tyrol 
1994 1999 
VP-Tyrol 47.3 47.2 
SPO 19.8 21.8 
FPO 16.1 19.6 
Greens 10.7 8.0 
LiF 3.4 3.2 
Others 2.7 1.3 
Source: http://wahlen.tirol.!;v.at/wahI2000/wahlcn erL:cbnis dctai I.cfm 
Upper Austria 
OVP 
SPO 
FPO 
Greens 
LiF 
Others 
1991 
45.2 
31.4 
17.7 
5.6 
1997 
42.7 
27.0 
20.6 
5.8 
2.1 
1.8 
Source: http://www.Qoe.~v.at/wahleJ1/00E=iJ1dc.(.htI11 
Vienna 
1991 199" 
OVP 18.1 15.3 
SPO 47.8 39.2 
FPO 22.5 27.9 
Greens 9.1 7.9 
LiF 8.0 
Others 2.5 1.7 
Source: http://www.wicncrzcituJ1!;.at/framclcss/wahlcn.htOl.?ID=M29 
Vorarlbcrg 
1994 1999 
OVP 49.9 45.8 
SPO 16.2 13.0 
FPO 27.4 18.4 
Greens 7.8 6.0 
LiF 3.5 3.4 
Others 0.9 4.5 
Source: http://www.wieJ1erzcituJ1~.at/fralJ1elcss/\\.uhlc!1.htm.?1 D=M 16 
2001 
16.4 
46.9 
20.2 
12.4 
3.4 
1.7 
2S5 
Appendix IV 
Leading National Party Positions 
Bu ndesparteivorsitzende 
(Federal Party Chairman) 
Kurt Adenauer (I 950-66) 
Ludwig Erhard (I 966) 
Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (J 967-71) 
Rainer Barzel (1971-73) 
Helmut Kohl (1973-98) 
Wolfgang Schauble (1998-2000) 
Angela Merkel (2000-) 
Generalsekretar 
(General Secretary) 
Bruno Heck (1967-71) 
Konrad Kraske ( 1971-73) 
Kurt Biedenkopf (1973-77) 
Heiner Geif3ler (1977 -89) 
Volker Ruhe (1989-92) 
Peter Hintze (1992-98) 
Angela Merkel (1998-2000) 
Ruprecht Polenz (2000) 
Laurenz Meyer (2000-) 
Bundespartciobmann 
(Federal Party Chaimlan) 
L. Kunschak (1945) 
Leopold Figl (1945-52) 
Julius Raab (1952-60) 
Alfons Gorbach (1960-63) 
Josef Klaus (1963-70) 
Hermann Withalm (1970-71) 
Karl Schleinzer (I971-75) 
Josef Taus (1975-79) 
Alois Mock (1979-89) 
Josef Riegler (1989-91) 
Erhard Busek (1991-95) 
Wolfgang Schauble (1995-) 
COU 
CDVlCSU FraktjonsvorsitU'luJc 
(CDU/CSU Parliamentary Party Chairman) 
Heinrich von Bretano (1949-55) 
Heinrich Krone (1955-61) 
Heinrich von Bretano (1961-64) 
Rainer Barzel (1964-73) 
Karl Carstens (1973-76) 
Helmut Kohl (1976-83) 
Alfred Dregger (1983-91) 
Wolfgang Schauble (1991-2000) 
Friedrich Mcrz (2000-2) 
Angela Merkel (2002-) 
QVP 
Klubobmann 
(Parliamentary Party Chaimlan) 
Julius Raab (1945-53) 
Alfred Malcta (1953-62) 
Felix Hurdes (1962-66) 
Hcmlann Withalm (1966-70) 
Stephan Koren (1970-78) 
Alois Mock (1978-86) 
Fritz Konig (1987-90) 
Heinrich Neisser (1990-94) 
Andreas Khol (1994-99) 
Wolfgang Schilssel (1999-2000) 
Andreas Khol (2000-2) 
Wilhelm Molterer (2003-) 
2S6 
Generalsckretar 
(General Secretary) 
Felix Hurdes (1945-52) 
Alfred Maleta (1952-60) 
Hennann Withalm (1960-70) 
Karl Schleinzer (1970-71) 
Herbert Kohlmaier (1971-75) 
Erhard Busek (1975-76) 
Sixtus Lanner (1976-82) 
Michael Graff (1982-87) 
Helmut Kukacka (1987-90) 
Raimund Solonar (1990-91) 
Ingrid Korosec (1991-95) 
Ferdinand Maier (1991-93) 
Wilhelm Molterer (1993-94) 
Maria Rauch-KaBat (1995-2003) 
Othmar Karas (1995-99) 
Reinhold Lopatka (2003-) 
Fractievoorzitter 
(Parliamentary Party Leader) 
AAM. van Agt (1977) 
W. Aantjes (1977-78) 
R.F.M. Lubbers (1978-82,1986,1989) 
B. de Vries (1982-86,1986-89) 
L.C. Brinkman (1989-94) 
E. Heenna (1994-97) 
J.G. de Hoop Scheffer (1997-2001) 
J.P. Balkanende (2001-2, 2003) 
M.J.M. Verhagen (2002-3, 2003-) 
CDA 
Partijvoorzittcr 
(Party Chainnan) 
P.AJ.M. Steenkamp (1975-80) 
P. Bukman (1980-86) 
B. Fleers (interim) (1986) 
W.G. van Velzen (1987-94) 
P.c. Lodders-Elfferich (interim) (1994-95) 
J.J.M. Helgers (1995-99) 
M.L.A van Rij (1999-2001) 
B. De Vries (interim) (2001-02) 
M. van Bijsterveldt (2002-) 
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